



The Struggle for ZIMBABWE



**David Martin
& Phyllis Johnson**



THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE

The Chimurenga War

David Martin & Phyllis Johnson

On 21 December 1972, soon after Salisbury's Rotary Club heard Ian Smith again pronounce that Rhodesia had the 'happiest Africans in the world', a communiqué from Security Force headquarters announced a guerrilla attack on a remote farm that signalled the beginning of the decisive phase of the war. Seven years later to the day the signing of the Lancaster House agreement brought a ceasefire, a transition from the British colony of Southern Rhodesia to the independent state of Zimbabwe and the beginning of the end of ninety years of white rule.

This is the definitive book on the decisive phase of the 'struggle for Zimbabwe' – the personalities, the military strategy, the political upheavals and historical processes which led to the election outcome announced on 4 March 1980. From its origins in the 'scramble for Africa' the story is traced through the days of the British South Africa Company, the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia and Federation, the increasing African political activity in the fifties in the face of an increasingly reactionary government to the foundation of ZAPU and ZANU, the inception of the armed struggle in 1966, the course of the war and the various attempts to reach a settlement before the final ceasefire.

Published to mark the first anniversary of independence, this book is an authoritative and indispensable document of analysis and record.

Front jacket photograph by Neil Libbert

Back jacket photograph by Anders Johansson

MBS
\$25.00

David Martin, Africa Correspondent of the *Observer*, has drawn on seventeen years of top level contacts in Africa – including presidents, prime ministers and guerrilla leaders – to research this book which was four years in preparation. During this time he collaborated with another journalist, Phyllis Johnson, who has spent seven years in Africa reporting for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

*If you would like to receive
our announcement catalogues
please write to
Faber & Faber Ltd
3 Queen Square London WC1N 3AU*

ISBN 0 571 11066 5

The Struggle for Zimbabwe

also by David Martin
GENERAL AMIN

The Struggle for Zimbabwe
The Chimurenga War

David Martin and Phyllis Johnson

FABER AND FABER
London and Boston

*First published in 1981
by Faber and Faber Limited
3 Queen Square London WC1N 3AU
Printed in Great Britain by
Fakenham Press Limited, Fakenham, Norfolk
All rights reserved
© David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, 1981*

*Dedicated to Josiah Tongogara
and others who died in the
Struggle for Zimbabwe*

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Martin, David
The Struggle for Zimbabwe. 2. Johnson, Phyllis
1. Zimbabwe—History
I. Title
968.91'04 DT 962.75
ISBN 0-571-11066-5

Acknowledgements

Many people were involved in the process of researching this book when the authors were covering Africa for the *Observer* and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Among those who gave much valuable time for interviews and reading parts of the manuscript were the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, and his colleagues, Simon Muzenda, Emmerson M'nangagwa, Kumbirai Kangai, Dzingai Mutumbuka, Simbi Mubako, Mayor Urimbo, Rex Nhongo, Josiah Tungamirai, Sheba Gava, John Mawema and John Chimbande. Numerous other Zimbabweans contributed in one way or another to our understanding of the Chimurenga struggle, but any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. Senior Mozambique, Tanzanian and Zambian officials also provided valuable insights, as did some British diplomats.

Thanks are due to the Ford Foundation which agreed to fund the final expenses for completion of the book; to Lori Grundy who began the mammoth task of reorganizing the library in Lusaka; to Kate McCalman who stoically finished it in Salisbury and who ably assisted with research; and to Charles Mutangabende, a remarkably fast and accurate typist who gave up his weekends—and towards the end his evenings and lunch hours—to type the manuscript.

Last, and most importantly, we must thank the late Josiah Tongogara without whose help and confidence this account of the struggle for Zimbabwe could not have been told.

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	page vi
<i>Chronology</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xvi
 1 The Great Illusion	 1
Opening of decisive phase of war—Rhodesian military activity in Mozambique—Inefficiency of Rhodesian intelligence services—Reassessment of guerrilla strategy during late 1960s—Development of links between ZANU and FRELIMO	
 2 Some <i>Vakomana</i>	 21
ZANLA guerrillas join FRELIMO in Tete Province—Early guerrilla recruitment and training methods—Tensions between ZANU and ZAPU and between guerrillas and their political leaders	
 3 Deception, Invasion and Repression	 35
Cecil Rhodes invades Mashonaland (June 1890)—Treaties between Matabele kings and European colonists, 1836–1890—Rivalry between Boers and British South African Company—Invasion of Matabeleland (October 1893)—Matabele and Shona uprisings (1896)	

CONTENTS

4	Sowing the Seeds for Revolution	51
	Racial discrimination in matters of land, education, employment and health care from 1890s onwards—Growth of African protest and nationalist political activity before UDI	
5	Mobilization and Recruitment	73
	Importance of tribal spirit mediums in winning support for guerrillas—Infiltration of ZANLA guerrillas into Rhodesia from Tete Province—ZANU policies of mass mobilization	
6	Rhodesian Response	92
	White Rhodesian complacency—Muzorewa negotiates with Smith (July 1973)—Enforcement of repressive legislation by Rhodesian authorities—Prisoners of war—Use of propaganda by both sides	
7	The Portuguese <i>Coup d'État</i>	115
	Portuguese government overthrown (April 1974)—Mozambique proceeds towards independence—Rhodesian and South African reaction—ANC rejects agreement signed by Smith and Muzorewa	
8	Détente	125
	Vulnerability of Zambia's economy—Lonrho attempts to bring Kaunda and Vorster together—Drafting of détente scenario—Smith releases detained nationalist leaders—Declaration of Unity signed by Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema (December 1974)—Conditional ceasefire announced	
9	The Other Face of Détente	158
	Nhari rebellion (December 1974)—Failure of ceasefire—Assassination of Chitepo in Lusaka (March 1975)—Zambian authorities arrest ZANU	

CONTENTS

	leaders and personnel—Proceedings of the International Commission to investigate the death of Chitepo	
10	Mugabe Takes Over	191
	Failure of Victoria Falls conference (August 1975)—Mgagao Declaration criticizes Sithole, Muzorewa, Nkomo and Chikerema—Mugabe appointed leader of ZANU, prepares for renewal of war	
11	Enter ZIPA and Kissinger	215
	Creation of ZIPA—War resumes on three fronts—Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia (March 1976)—Nkomo negotiates with Smith—Kissinger arrives in Africa	
12	Exit Kissinger and ZIPA	235
	Kissinger and Vorster persuade Smith to accept principle of majority rule—ZANU and ZAPU combine to form the Patriotic Front—Failure of Geneva conference (October–December 1976)—ZANU leaders, released from detention in Zambia, reassert their authority over ZIPA commanders	
13	The Storm Gathers	264
	Anglo-American proposals (August 1977)—Restructuring of ZANU—Rapid escalation of war—Rhodesian attacks on camps in Mozambique—Smith forms transitional government with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau, but fails to stop the war	
14	From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe	300
	Report by Conservative peer approves election of Muzorewa government (May 1979)—Cuban plan for installation of alternative Patriotic Front government rejected—Guerrilla advances despite	

CONTENTS

government amnesty proposals—Thatcher agrees at Commonwealth summit to convene constitutional conference—Lancaster House conference (September–December 1979)—New constitution agreed, ZANU (PF) wins elections

<i>Notes</i>	335
<i>Index</i>	365

Chronology

- 1890 On 12 September the 'Pioneer Column' ran up the Union Jack on Harare Hill in Salisbury and 'in the name of Queen Victoria, took possession of Mashonaland, and all other unpossessed land in South-Central Africa that it should be found desirable to add to the Empire'.
- 1891 Order-in-Council in London declares Mashonaland a British Protectorate.
- 1893 Matabeleland invaded and occupied by settlers.
- 1894 Death of Lobengula.
- 1895 Mashonaland and Matabeleland renamed Rhodesia.
- 1896 Mashona and Matabele uprisings. Matabele uprising crushed in October and Mashona uprising a year later.
- 1898 The spirit mediums Nehanda and Kagubi are tried and hanged. An Order-in-Council renames Rhodesia 'the Colony of Southern Rhodesia'.
- 1899 An all-white Legislative Council is formed.
- 1900 Mapondera uprising at Mazoe, the last military assault on white rule until the 1960s. Mapondera was captured four years later and died after a hunger strike.
- 1902 Death of Rhodes. All Africans over fourteen years required by law to register and carry passes (*situpas*).
- 1914 Nyamanda and Matabele National Home Movement lead protest at decision to vary 'native' reserves in quality and size.
- 1919 Privy Council in London rejects case for African and British South Africa Company ownership of the land and decides that it belongs to the Crown.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1922 Referendum, in which only sixty of the country's 900,000 Africans are eligible to vote, rejects union with South Africa and decides in favour of 'responsible government'.
- 1923 The rule of the British South Africa Company is terminated and Southern Rhodesia annexed as a British colony with internal self-government. Abraham Twala forms the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association urging Africans to rely upon themselves for their own salvation and not Britain.
- 1924 First elections to Legislative Assembly with Sir Charles Coghlan becoming first Prime Minister.
- 1930 Land Apportionment Act, approved by Britain, divides Rhodesia into African and European areas.
- 1934 Aaron Jacha forms first African National Council (ANC).
- 1945 Strike by African railway workers. ANC revived under leadership of Reverend Thompson Samkange.
- 1948 First general strike by African workers.
- 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act introduces stringent measures to force African farmers to de-stock and modify land tenure practices; the Act becomes a focal point of nationalist protest.
- 1953 Referendum, in which only 429 Africans are eligible to vote, approves Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Garfield Todd becomes Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister.
- 1955 City Youth League formed, later changing its name to the African National Youth League. Public Order Act gives power to detain and restrict without trial.
- 1956 Youth League organizes successful African bus boycott in Salisbury after which over 200 nationalists are detained.
- 1957 Youth League and ANC merge under the name of ANC with Nkomo as President and Chikerema as Vice-President.
- 1958 ANC meetings in rural areas prohibited. Todd ousted in Cabinet revolt.
- 1959 ANC banned and 500 members arrested.
- 1960 National Democratic Party (NDP) formed with Michael Mawema as first President, later replaced by Nkomo. British Prime Minister, Macmillan, makes 'wind of change' speech in Cape Town.
- 1961 NDP banned and replaced by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) on 17 December.
- 1962 Rhodesian Front (RF) party formed in March winning elec-

CHRONOLOGY

- tion in December with Winston Field becoming Prime Minister. ZAPU banned in September.
- 1963 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) formed on 8 August by ZAPU members dissatisfied with Nkomo's leadership. Emmerson M'nangagwa leads first squad of recruits of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) sent to China for guerrilla training. Nkomo forms People's Caretaker Council (PCC). Dissolution of Federation.
- 1964 Field, reluctant to consider unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), forced to resign and replaced by Smith. White referendum votes ten to one in favour of independence. ZANU holds congress at Gwelo. ZANU and PCC banned. Nkomo, Sithole, Mugabe and other nationalist leaders begin a decade in detention. ZANLA 'Crocodile Commando' kill first white in an act of war since 1897.
- 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November. Britain applies selective sanctions. Guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) enter the country in May. A State of Emergency declared, which remained in force for the next fifteen years.
- 1966 United Nations imposes selective mandatory sanctions. Wilson and Smith meet on HMS *Tiger*. Seven ZANLA guerrillas die in a battle at Sinoia with Rhodesian forces; the anniversary of the battle, 28 April, is commemorated by ZANU as Chimurenga Day, the start of the armed struggle. Wilson tells the British Parliament that there will be no independence in Rhodesia before majority rule (NIBMAR).
- 1967 ZIPRA and ANC (South Africa) forces involved in large battle with Rhodesian forces at Wankie.
- 1968 United Nations imposes comprehensive mandatory sanctions. Wilson and Smith meet again aboard HMS *Fearless*. Three captured guerrillas hanged despite reprieve by the Queen. FRELIMO open Tete front in Mozambique.
- 1969 Sithole sentenced to six years' imprisonment after being found guilty of plot to assassinate Smith. Denounces armed struggle during trial, setting in motion a chain of events leading to his removal as ZANU President in 1974. In November ZANU meet FRELIMO in Lusaka to ask for access to Rhodesia through Tete. Reassessment of ZANLA military strategy begins.
- 1970 Rhodesia becomes a republic. Britain and United States veto

- United Nations resolution demanding tougher sanctions. Conservatives win British election. In May ZANU and FRELIMO hold second meeting and FRELIMO, whose forces had crossed the Zambezi River in Tete, agree to the first ZANLA guerrillas, Urimbo, Chauke, Mpofo and Shumba, joining them in Tete.
- 1971 Smith and the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, sign an agreement setting out proposals for a settlement. The African National Council with Muzorewa as leader is formed to oppose the proposals. On 4 December the first two ZANLA guerrillas, Chauke and Amon Zindoga, cross into Rhodesia from Tete.
- 1972 Pearce Commission finds that the settlement proposals are unacceptable to the African majority. United States Senate votes against reimposing chrome embargo. Armaments are carried through Tete into Rhodesia and sixty guerrillas are infiltrated in preparation for the start of the protracted struggle which begins on 21 December with the attack on Altena farm.
- 1973 Smith closes—and then re-opens—Rhodesian border with Zambia. Kaunda keeps it closed. Rhodesian parliament passes repressive legislation designed to curb guerrilla activity. Muzorewa starts negotiations with Smith.
- 1974 In response to escalating guerrilla war, the Rhodesian government begins extending the military call-up. Portuguese government overthrown in April in *coup d'état*. ANC rejects Smith's proposals to Muzorewa. Rhodesian Front wins whites-only election. Following extensive talks between representatives of Kaunda, Vorster and Lonrho, détente scenario is drafted in Lusaka in October. Smith releases detained nationalist leaders for preliminary talks. Declaration of Unity signed in Lusaka by Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema, while Nhari Rebellion occurs after secret contacts at the front. Smith announces ceasefire, which fails to take effect.
- 1975 Guerrilla infiltration continues as Rhodesians concentrate forces in north-east. Herbert Chitepo is assassinated in Lusaka and Zambian authorities arrest ZANU leaders and personnel. Mozambique becomes independent under FRELIMO government. Opening of International Commission to investigate the death of Chitepo. Victoria Falls conference. Vorster visits Zambia but Smith breaks off talks with nationalists after

- a few hours. Mgagao Declaration criticizes Muzorewa, Sithole, Nkomo and Chikerema; Mugabe appointed leader of ZANU. Formation of ZIPA, led by Rex Nhongo. Nkomo starts negotiations with Smith.
- 1976 War resumes on three fronts: Tete, Manica and Gaza. Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia. Kissinger arrives in Kenya on start of African tour. Rhodesian attack on Nyadzonia refugee camp in Mozambique. Kissinger and Vorster persuade Smith to accept principle of majority rule. Kaunda releases detained ZANU leaders. Patriotic Front is formed and Geneva conference opens (adjourned in December).
- 1977 As war escalates, David Owen arrives in Dar es Salaam on start of African tour. Rhodesian Front wins whites-only election. Owen and Young arrive in Salisbury with Anglo-American proposals. Smith rejects Anglo-American proposals, starts negotiations with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau for internal settlement. Rhodesian attacks on camps at Chimoio and Tembwe in Mozambique.
- 1978 Malta conference attended by Owen, Young, Nkomo and Mugabe. Smith signs agreement with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau to form transitional government to precede majority rule. Dar es Salaam conference attended by Owen, Young, Vance, Nkomo and Mugabe. Rhodesian attacks on camps in Zambia. Kaunda opens southern rail route.
- 1979 White referendum approves new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution and Muzorewa wins internal elections. Report by Conservative peer approves the elections, but international recognition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is withheld. Guerrilla activity continues despite amnesty proposals. Cuban-inspired plan for installation of alternative Patriotic Front government rejected. At Commonwealth summit in Lusaka, Thatcher agrees to convene constitutional conference. Opening of Lancaster House conference. Agreement on new constitution signed; ceasefire takes effect.
- 1980 Mugabe wins British-supervised elections. Independence of Zimbabwe.

Preface

Chimurenga is a Shona word which has its political origins in the uprisings of the 1890s as the Africans north of Limpopo River fought to prevent the white settlers from the south occupying their land. The uprisings were crushed in 1897 and for almost seventy years the Africans of the country the settlers called Rhodesia witnessed their most fertile lands being taken away. They were subjected to increasingly repressive legislation and became virtual slaves in their own land, subjects of the whim and the will of the settler.

Throughout these harsh years the word 'Chimurenga' lived on in the folklore of the villages and townships as the elders passed on the stories of the resistance of the 1890s to new generations. A second Chimurenga war was inevitable in the face of settler obduracy, and it began fitfully in the early Sixties as the Africans gradually came to recognize that only through armed struggle could they liberate their land. On 28 April 1966 a squad of seven guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), died near Sinoia, north-west of Salisbury, in a fierce twelve-hour battle with Rhodesian security forces backed by helicopter gunships.

Today ZANU marks the anniversary of that battle as Chimurenga Day, officially the start of ZANLA's armed struggle. The word 'Chimurenga' has a number of meanings in current usage—revolution, war, struggle or resistance—and one of ZANU's main slogans during the second Chimurenga war was 'Pamberi ne Chimurenga', meaning 'forward with the struggle or the revolution'.

This book concentrates on the decisive phase of the struggle, from


21 December 1972, when a squad of nine ZANLA guerrillas attacked a settler farm in north-eastern Rhodesia. This attack marked the change from the sporadic, and militarily ineffectual, actions of the Sixties, to protracted armed struggle. Seven years to the day later, at Lancaster House in London, Rhodesia finally capitulated. On 18 April 1980 the nation of Zimbabwe was born from the sacrifice and suffering of thousands of young men and women who fought and who became affectionately known as the '*vakomana*' and '*vasikana*', literally the 'boys' and 'girls'.

Some of these, whom the Smith regime and much of the Western press referred to as 'terrorists', are introduced here. The book is mainly about ZANU, who won a clear-cut victory in the 1980 independence elections, and ZANLA, who did over 80 per cent of the fighting during the final decisive seven years. This is not intended to suggest that young people of ZIPRA did not also lose their lives in the struggle for Zimbabwe, but it sets out to explain the background to the election result and the historical reasons why ZANU and not ZAPU acquired Mozambique as a vital rear base for the war. It traces the evolution of ZANLA's new military strategy based on the mistakes of the Sixties, the development of the war from Mozambique, the mass mobilization and political education which were to lay the groundwork for ZANU's election victory, the inevitable convulsions within the movement during the struggle, and Robert Mugabe's emergence as undisputed leader. Interwoven with this are the many international attempts to end the struggle—from the détente exercise to Lancaster House. Its shape and form derive from a remark made by Mozambique President Samora Machel, who said in an interview in Dar es Salaam in September 1976: 'You see in Zimbabwe today we have an armed struggle, that is the secondary school. When it becomes a revolutionary struggle, that is the university, and Dr Kissinger is coming to close the university before they can get there.'


DM, PJ

Salisbury October 1980

RHODESIA MAP I—SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS



ZIMBABWE MAP 2—ZANLA OPERATIONS



The Great Illusion

'I have been taken to task in certain quarters for describing our Africans as the happiest Africans in the world,' Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith told a Rotary Club lunch in Salisbury on 21 December 1972, 'but nobody has yet been able to tell me where there are Africans who are happier—or, for that matter, better off—than in Rhodesia.'

In his flat monotone Rhodesian accent, Smith spoke of the pride he took in the excellence of the country's race relations. 'The reasons for this relaxed racial climate which we enjoy here are many. First and foremost is the nature of the people who make up our country. The Africans of Rhodesia are by nature unaggressive, and they have an instinctive leaning towards a peaceful communal life. They have a highly developed sense of humour—which is an essential ingredient of happy race relations—and they have an appreciation of the security, both for themselves and their families, which flows from a stable and orderly system of government.'¹

A few hours after Smith spoke to the Rotarians, Rhodesian Security Force headquarters issued a military communiqué. In the early hours of 21 December, guerrillas had attacked Altena Farm, the property of Mr Marc de Borchgrave, in the north-eastern Zambezi valley area. The attack, the communiqué said, lasted approximately thirty seconds, during which one of de Borchgrave's children received minor injuries. The farmer had run two miles to sound the alarm because the guerrillas had cut the telephone wires. A mine was found buried in a road leading to the farm and a store on an adjacent farm was set on fire. Prophetically, the communiqué concluded: 'The

possibility exists of further terrorist-inspired incidents in border areas. Widespread security force activity continues.²

Altena Farm, set on the lee of a hill sixty-five kilometres from the Mozambique border and 240 kilometres from Salisbury, was the first European farm to be attacked by guerrillas since May 1966. It was an attack of great significance, for that brief burst of fire marked the beginning of the decisive phase of the Rhodesian war. Seven years to the day later, at Lancaster House in London, an agreement was signed which marked the beginning of the end of eighty-six years of white rule.

Mr de Borchgrave, a leading tobacco farmer, and his family moved to stay with a neighbour, Mr Archie Dalgleish, at Whistlefield Farm. On 23 December, guerrillas attacked that farm and the luckless de Borchgrave—whom local Rhodesian officials subsequently said they believed was a target because of his poor labour relations—and another of his children, were slightly wounded. A security force vehicle driving to the farm hit a landmine, killing one white soldier and wounding three others, while three more Rhodesian soldiers were injured in another landmine incident. 'An increase in terrorist activity can be expected,' a military communiqué blandly noted.³

On New Year's Eve, in a television and radio broadcast to the nation, Smith described Rhodesia as 'a strong nation, sure of its purpose and confident of its future'. Racial harmony, he stressed, was of paramount importance and, in this, Rhodesia compared most favourably with anywhere in the world. Almost as an afterthought, it seemed, he concluded his speech by saying: 'As you all know, we have had a few incidents recently in the north-eastern border. Fortunately, our security forces were quickly on the scene and have meted out to the terrorists salutary retribution. As we have done in the past, once again this year you will all join in saying a prayer of thanks for our security forces, whose constant vigil on our borders plays such an important part in helping to preserve Rhodesia.'⁴

Contrary to Smith's claim, the security forces had arrived on the scene in the Centenary and Mount Darwin farming districts a little over twelve months too late. On the night of 4 December 1971, two guerrillas, Justin Chauke and Amon Zindoga, crossed into Rhodesia near Mukumbura on the north-eastern frontier from Mozambique's Tete Province. They were members of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Their mission was to begin

laying the groundwork for protracted guerrilla warfare, and the first person they contacted on that brief reconnaissance visit was a local schoolmaster who had been in touch with FRELIMO guerrillas.⁵ Both Chauke and Zindoga survived the war, but in radically different circumstances: Chauke rose to the ZANLA high command but Zindoga was wounded and captured in early 1973. He had one leg amputated and spent the next seven years in prison. From Chilimanzi area, Zindoga's real name is Sebastian Hore; among the guerrillas he had earned the nickname Matsikachando, meaning that he was a tough man.

On 4 December 1972, exactly one year later, and seventeen days before the first shots of the decisive phase were fired at Altena Farm, the Rhodesian Prime Minister said in a radio interview with a panel of six selected journalists: '... the [security] position is far more serious than it appears on the surface, and if the man in the street could have access to the security information which I and my colleagues in Government have, then I think he would be a lot more worried than he is today.'⁶

Smith was fully aware of the impending threat in the north-east, although he also had reports, which were wrong, of a guerrilla build-up to the west in neighbouring Botswana. He had received many reports from his Special Branch about the situation in the north-east, indicating it was a fertile area for guerrilla infiltration, and had he taken those reports more seriously he would not have been taken by surprise when the war began a year later. African labourers on the white farms were paid abysmally and some were paid only every third or fourth month. 'They were being treated like absolute animals and the SB told Smith the area was ripe for revolution,' said one Rhodesian officer who worked in Combined Operations during the war.⁷ 'But he ignored their reports, preferring to listen to Internal Affairs, who insisted they knew everything that was happening in the African reserves. They did not.'

Having thwarted the guerrilla offensive which followed the 11 November 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Rhodesians had grown complacent. Smith's main area of military concern was Mozambique, where guerrillas of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) were now threatening Rhodesia's trade routes to the Indian Ocean through the port of Beira as well as the road to Malawi. On 14–15 October 1972, he had met the Portuguese Prime Minister, Marcello Caetano, in Lisbon to discuss the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique. On 15

November, Caetano, apparently responding to a BBC story filed from Salisbury which appeared to be an official leak expressing Rhodesian anxiety, said in a broadcast: 'Some of our neighbours with less experience do not conceal their fears and [thus] play the game of the enemy. They have been told more than once there is no reason for their great apprehension.'⁸

A number of reports saying that Rhodesian troops and planes were operating in Mozambique in support of the Portuguese forces had appeared before Smith faced the panel of journalists on 4 December. They asked him whether there was any substance in the reports. 'No,' he said. 'We are not operating in Mozambique, but I would hope that if it was ever needed we would be able to participate, we would be prepared to participate. At this stage there has been no need for this.'⁹ That was not the first—or last—time Smith misled the Rhodesian public. His forces had been operating in Mozambique for at least three years.

A comprehensive report compiled by the British-based International Defence and Aid Fund, entitled *Terror in Tete*, detailed atrocities against civilians in Tete by Rhodesian troops in 1971 and 1972. One appendix entitled 'The Slaughter of Mukumbura' is the report of two Spanish Burgos priests, Father Alfonso Valverde and Father Martin Hernandez, who were detained without trial for twenty-two months by the Portuguese colonial administration for publicizing their findings.

The report said that late in August 1971 Rhodesian troops began 'reprisals' in the Mukumbura area after FRELIMO guerrillas had entered Rhodesia in an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap an African who was a Rhodesian informant. The Rhodesian reprisals began on 1 September and the report recounts what occurred: '3.9.71 — in the village of Deveteve, the Rhodesian soldiers killed David, the son of George. It was evening and he was going out to bring in the cows. As he went along the path he was shot dead. The soldiers took him to a nearby hillock and left him there after cutting off his hands and feet. Three days later he was found and buried by villagers from Mandwe. David was one of our best Christians in Mandwe and was married with four children.'¹⁰ The two priests attended the funeral and went to see the Rhodesian soldiers to demand an explanation. 'They themselves recognized it had been an error ("... a very unfortunate thing, Fathers. Sorry, we thought he was a terrorist...").'

On 5 September a squad of Rhodesian soldiers arrived at Singa village in Mukumbura district, arrested Chief Singa's three eldest

sons and sent him to find the rest of the family, who were in hiding. They were shot by another Rhodesian squad as they returned after dark. 'Only two children managed to escape death. The following died instantly: the Chief Singa, his son Adamo (10 years old), his daughter Ronica, recently married and pregnant, his three daughters-in-law, Matiguiiri, Rotina and Ester. Also two babies who were being carried on their mothers' backs.'

When the soldiers realized what they had done, they built a bonfire to burn the bodies. 'But a very strong fire is needed to get rid of all the traces. There were remains of burnt flesh and charred skeletons, which were discovered on the following day by the Africans in the village.' The villagers were too frightened to bury the remains and when the priests arrived four days later the bodies had been picked over by hyenas. The priests photographed the scene and sent the film to their bishop.

Another priest, Father Luis Afonso da Costa, corroborated their report adding the names of nine more people, three of them boys of twelve, who were killed. A dozen others were flown to Rhodesia for interrogation. In late April the same year three Rhodesian soldiers who, according to the official account, had crossed into Mozambique 'for friendly contact with Portuguese border authorities', died when their vehicle hit a FRELIMO landmine. Referring to the aftermath of this incident, Father da Costa wrote: 'Once a mine has exploded, once the troops have been attacked . . . the reprisals start. Since the enemy cannot be found, it is necessary to terrorise the population: to kill, torture, arrest and rape. Why? Only thus can victory be achieved: first one injustice, then another and another . . . until a people has been exterminated, and nothing is left but those who can be described as "deranged creatures".'

A report by Portuguese middle-ranking army officers which was published in April 1974 put the date when Rhodesian military operations began in Tete as 1969 or early 1970. 'Contrary to official denials,' the report said, 'there exists a close collaboration in the military field between the Portuguese army and Rhodesian troops, who include mercenaries from South Africa and other countries. This has been verified for the past four years all along the border with Rhodesia, in the districts of Tete and Vila Pery, but since the beginning of last year the collaboration has intensified with the permission given to the airborne troops from Rhodesia to operate in very large areas, north and south of the Zambezi, up to (and in certain cases beyond) the meridian that passes through the village of Carnde, in the Zambezi,

100 kilometres inside Mozambique territory. These operations, co-ordinated with the Portuguese military operations, consist of speedy paratroop actions in specified areas and the liquidation of any human lives (there being no military or civilian prisoners) and a return to their bases in Rhodesia.¹¹

Several reports about Rhodesian activity in Mozambique had appeared in overseas newspapers before a Salisbury-based freelance journalist, Peter Niesewand, filed stories to the BBC, the *Guardian* and other publications in mid-November 1972. He was subsequently charged under the Official Secrets Act, while in public the Rhodesians continued to deny their forces were in Mozambique. The transcript of Niesewand's *in camera* trial shows that, after tortuous cross-examination, the Secretary for Law and Order, John Fleming, who was also a member of the Rhodesian Government Security Council, finally reluctantly admitted that Rhodesian forces had 'unofficially' operated 'off and on' in Mozambique throughout most of 1972. Fleming said that reports stating this were embarrassing to the government.¹²

In the same interview of 4 December 1972, Smith makes it clear he did not know that Chauke and Zindoga had been infiltrated through Tete a year earlier, that they had been joined by another sixty well-trained ZANLA guerrillas, and that a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition had been cached in the north-east. Asked if military co-operation with the Portuguese would tighten up security in the north-eastern border area where there had been clashes with FRELIMO guerrillas, Smith replied: 'If we have problems with infiltration through Mozambique, well then we may approach the Portuguese to ask for some change in the arrangements as they exist at the moment. But, as I see it, they're holding the position.'¹³

Smith still chose to believe that the major threat of infiltration came from Zambia, and on 9 January 1973 he announced the closure of their common border to all trade except Zambian copper exports to Beira. A notice in the government *Gazette* began with a preamble about three incidents involving landmines, including one the previous day in which two South African policemen had been killed and three others wounded. It added that 'terrorists who have been operating in Rhodesia's north-east border, and have been responsible for terrorist activities and mining incidents in that area, have also come from Zambia.' The border would remain closed, the announcement said, until satisfactory assurances were received from the Zambian

government 'that they will no longer permit terrorists to operate against Rhodesia from their territory'.¹⁴

South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia's two allies, were not informed in advance of the decision. A spokesman for the South African Foreign Trade Association said that his country's exports to Zambia, excluding invisibles like freight and tourism, amounted to £300,000,000. Rhodesia's trade with Zambia was £7,500,000. South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, made it clear that his country did not support such boycotts or sanctions and that Smith's decision was ill-advised,¹⁵ while the Afrikaans press embarked on a campaign that was unprecedentedly critical of the Salisbury government. Such a decision, with the resulting tensions along the Zambezi, obviously did not suit South Africa's desire for dialogue and détente.

On 3 February, under pressure from Pretoria and realizing he had made a diplomatic blunder, Smith claimed he had received the assurances he required through an envoy from Lusaka and announced the reopening of the border. President Kaunda responded by insisting that no such message had been sent. He challenged Smith to produce his 'dishonest broker' and said the border would remain closed.¹⁶ Three days later Zambia severed direct communications links with Rhodesia.

Finally, on 8 February, during an interview with a panel of journalists, Smith came close to admitting he had made an error. 'Well, the terrorists operating in the north-east are not operating from Zambian soil. They haven't come across from Zambian soil, and we have to face up to this. . . .'¹⁷ That was very different from his claim when he closed the border a month earlier.

Smith had chosen to believe the information he was receiving from his Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was supposed to be government's eyes and ears in the rural areas, with its network of district officers, rather than his intelligence services. In late 1971 and early 1972 Internal Affairs had advised Smith that the majority of Africans would support the proposals for a settlement agreed between him and Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. The proposals included fifty seats for whites, eight others elected by Africans and eight more appointed by the Chiefs (who were in the pay of the Rhodesian government). Any increase in African membership in Parliament would be based on earnings and education and, if parity in the House was ever reached between blacks and whites, Smith or his successors could still block majority rule for evermore. Not

surprisingly, the Africans rejected the proposals they had had no part in negotiating and certainly no interest in endorsing.

A more perceptive man than Smith would have recognized from that débâcle just how hopelessly out of touch his Internal Affairs Ministry was with African grassroots opinion. Instead he chose to believe that the verdict was a result of intimidation. Given his apparently sincere, if misplaced, belief that Rhodesia's Africans were the happiest anywhere and his oft-stated belief that he knew 'his Bantu', it is perhaps not surprising that he chose to believe the uninformed but calming reports from Internal Affairs rather than the disturbing 'Ripe for revolution' view of the SB.

On 10 February 1973, after belatedly realizing that the guerrillas had come through Mozambique with the help of FRELIMO and not across the Zambezi River from Zambia as he had erroneously assumed, Smith sought to correct the impression that he had blamed the security forces for the failure to spot the guerrilla build-up. The guerrillas, he said, had been in the north-eastern area for six to seven months (it was twice that long) before they began fighting. There had been a breakdown in security, he admitted, but not by the security forces, who through 1971 and 1972 had not been in the area but looking the wrong way across the Zambezi to Zambia. What had broken down, Smith went on to admit, was 'the security groundwork, the communications, to a certain extent the tribal system. We darn well know that tribesmen were subverted. We know, for example, that Chiefs have also been playing with the terrorists, and they are going to be dealt with, but this isn't anything one can anticipate. It was the information that didn't come through. We have also known for some time that we haven't got good enough ground coverage in some of these remote areas.'¹⁸

Internal Affairs, in common with other ministries, had been starved of funds as a result of the post-UDI freeze on the expansion of establishment. Defenders of the Ministry argue that it was this shortage of funds and staff which affected the 'ground coverage' and made it impossible to detect the build-up. However, as officials of Internal Affairs had little contact with rural Africans other than trusted Chiefs and kraalheads, and as they were seen as the blunt end of an oppressive system by most Africans, there was little chance they would detect the slow covert build-up. The reality was that the evidence of the danger had been placed before Smith by the SB, and he chose to ignore it.

However, the SB cannot be exonerated from the failure to detect

what was happening in the north-east. They recognized the danger signals but when the threat became a reality they failed to detect it or determine where it came from. At the same time, their extensive network of informants was to a large extent neutralized in this critical period as the guerrillas initially worked through trusted people with whom FRELIMO had made contact earlier. It was through them that 'sell outs' were identified and many were eliminated.

The third failure was by Smith's external intelligence wing, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). This had been set up in 1963 by the late Rhodesian Front Prime Minister, Winston Field, and for the next seventeen years it was headed by Ken Flower, an astute and experienced British-born intelligence officer. Intelligence officers subsequently admitted that they missed two crucial developments involving ZANU in this period: the reassessment of political and military strategy, and the development of links with FRELIMO.¹⁹

Rhodesian intelligence officers divide the war into three phases. The first lasted from 1964, after Zambian independence when guerrillas began to infiltrate across the Zambezi River, to the end of Operation Excess, the last consequential action in Mashonaland in 1968. The second phase was the lull until the attack on Altena Farm at the end of 1972. The third, or decisive, phase followed ZANU's reassessment. It encompassed a rapid escalation of the war and several international attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement, and it ended with the ceasefire agreement signed on 21 December 1979.²⁰

Assistant Commissioner of Police, Michael Edden, who was SB liaison officer at Combined Operations for much of the decisive phase of the war, said they estimated that 150 guerrillas were infiltrated from Zambia in the first phase, three-quarters of whom were killed or captured in joint operations involving the army, police and game division. Edden confirmed two important points about this period: that as early as 1965 the Rhodesian security forces began to use 'pseudo gangs'—members of the security forces posing as guerrillas, wearing guerrilla uniforms and carrying weapons used by guerrillas—and that Rhodesian forces were 'unofficially' operating in Mozambique, in the extreme north-west sector between their frontier and the Zambezi River, pursuing retreating guerrillas. The main area of operation was at the conjunction of the Duangua and Hunyani Rivers some fifteen miles inside Mozambique.²¹

This phase was marked by two particularly important battles. On 28 April 1966, ZANLA scored a publicity coup, which had profound

psychological and political significance, at the Battle of Sinoia. Seven of their guerrillas—Simon Chimbodza, Christopher Chatambudza, Nathan Charumuka, Godwin Manyeremere, Peter, Ephraim Shenjere and David Guzuzu—who were heading for the Charter area and were part of a group of twenty-one, died in a fierce encounter with Rhodesian troops backed by helicopter gunships. It was the deepest penetration into Rhodesia in this phase by any guerrilla group and today ZANU marks 28 April as Chimurenga Day, the official start of the war.

In July 1967, unbeknown to the Rhodesians, a joint guerrilla force of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) crossed the Zambezi between Victoria Falls and Kazungula and headed for the Wankie Game Reserve. On 15 August the Vice-President of ZAPU, James Chikerema, and the Acting President of ANC, Oliver Tambo, announced a military alliance between the two organizations.²² Throughout much of August and September there were a series of actions in the Wankie area, in which the Rhodesians claimed they killed thirty-one guerrillas and captured a similar number. Seven members of the Rhodesian forces were killed and twice that number wounded. The guerrilla force numbered approximately seventy men and the inclusion of ANC guerrillas led to South Africa committing paramilitary police units to the Zambezi valley.

The joint action drew sharp criticism from ZANU and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa. A PAC pamphlet entitled *The Wankie Fiasco in Retrospect* observed: 'You cannot hope to gobble up a regular army, all at once in a conventional style war, as our brothers tried to do, and still claim to be waging guerrilla warfare. It is wholly unacceptable both in theory and practice.' ZANU's official publication, *Zimbabwe News*, observed in September that if the ANC wanted to help the struggle in Zimbabwe it should fight at home, thereby dividing the enemy forces, and not in Rhodesia, which had led to a concentration of enemy forces.

Some writers have tended to view these statements as sour grapes on the part of ZANU and the PAC, in that they felt the publicity given to the Wankie battle overshadowed their efforts. While there may be some truth in this view there was a more fundamental rationale behind the statements. Both ZANU and the PAC received the bulk of their support from China, and the Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare was quite different from the theories of the Soviet Union, which supported ZAPU and the ANC.

ZANU's first group of five guerrillas had gone to China for training on 22 September 1963. The group was led by Emmerson M'nangagwa and included John Shoniwa, Eddison Shirihuru, Jameson Mudavanhu and Lawrence Swoswe.²³ Their course lasted for six months and included military science and a period at the school of ideology. A second group, including William Ndangana, Bernard Mutuma, Silas Mushonga and Felix Santana, who had undergone basic training in Ghana in 1964, went to China in 1965 for advanced training as instructors.²⁴ Early in 1966, Josiah Tongogara led a group of eleven to Nanking Academy in Peking where they underwent training in mass mobilization, strategy and tactics. This group returned to Tanzania in November 1966, after the Sinoia battle.²⁵

In the Sixties there had been a tendency among liberation movements, and particularly the Zimbabwean movements, to believe that all that was necessary to end white minority domination was to train some guerrillas and send them home with guns: this would not only scare the whites but would ignite a wave of civil disobedience by blacks. It was a belief psychologically founded on the relative ease other African countries had in achieving independence in the early Sixties. The guerrillas would go home and fire a few shots, the belief went, the people would greet them as their liberators, the colonial powers would withdraw and the last white bastions would crumble. 'We thought that it was easy to just go and get a gun and go and fight in Zimbabwe,' said Mayor Urimbo, ZANU's Political Commissar, 'but it was very difficult for that group in 1966. That was why they failed. It was very simple for them to go and fight but very hard for them to retreat. It was realized that the people had to be mobilized if we were to conduct a successful struggle. Tongogara in particular had learned in China that it was vital to mobilize the people and it was that lesson which shaped future strategy. He brought the new strategy which said if you want to win a revolution it is not only a revolution of the gun but a revolution of mobilizing the masses.'²⁶

In a paper to the International Conference on Southern African History at Lesotho University in August 1977, Simbi Mubako (a law lecturer at Lusaka University who was to become independent Zimbabwe's first Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs) said: 'In purely military terms it [Sinoia] must be seen for what it was—a defeat. We do not have to accept the figures of those killed or captured given by the Salisbury regime to come to that conclusion, for time has now shown that the gallant effort displayed by the pioneer band of

freedom fighters was not and could not be sustained. That particular battle could in any case not have been won by as small a group of guerrillas surprised and subjected to superior ground and air bombardment.²⁷

Criticism, Mubako argued, cannot be levelled against the Sinoia seven for engaging the enemy in conventional warfare instead of avoiding it. 'The more relevant criticism can be levelled, not against the cadres, but against their superiors who hastily threw them into battle apparently for short-term political gain rather than for laying the groundwork for a protracted armed struggle.'

With most of its guerrillas trained in the early Sixties either killed or captured, ZANU began a lengthy reassessment of policy. There were plenty of clues as to what was taking place. The Rhodesian intelligence services knew that ZANLA groups were being sent to China for training. A notebook found on one of the dead Sinoia battle guerrillas showed that he had trained at Nanking Military College late in 1965.²⁸ A captured guerrilla, Edmund Nyandoro, who was sentenced to death in February 1967 for the killing of a farming couple, Mr and Mrs J. H. Viljoen, at Gadzema, told the court he had trained in Egypt, Tanzania and China.²⁹ The intelligence services were also aware that eight Chinese instructors had arrived at ZANLA's training camp at Itumbi in Southern Tanzania in January 1969. One of these instructors, Comrade Lee, the infantry expert, was to play a particularly important role in the evolution of the new strategy, and the group then at Itumbi were the first ZANLA guerrillas to receive specialist training at the Tanzanian camp. From all these clues it should have been possible to predict that ZANLA's tactics were likely to change from conventional confrontation—which had marked earlier engagements—to the classical Maoist teaching of mobilization of the population prior to launching a protracted struggle.

Even if there had been a knowledgeable analysis, it is, however, unlikely that Smith would have paid any more attention to it than he did to earlier warnings, or that Rhodesian political and military leaders would have recognized or changed the root cause of the problems in their country. 'Mr Smith would have us believe that his only quarrel with black nationalists is over the pace at which change should take place. The actions of his government, however, belie this rhetoric,' said a study by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 'The policies of the Rhodesian government, rather than moving, however gradually, towards racial equality, are "the intensification of the repression and the growing adoption by South-

ern Rhodesia of the laws and values of the apartheid system in South Africa".³⁰

In mid-1971 ZANU's late national chairman, Herbert Chitepo, spelt out the changed thinking publicly to the Rhodesians. In an interview published in a Danish newspaper, he said, 'It is useless to engage in conventional warfare with well-equipped Rhodesian and South African troops along the Zambezi.'³¹ The interview was reprinted in the *Rhodesia Herald* on 18 August 1971, three and a half months before the first guerrillas were infiltrated into the north-east from Tete.

Chitepo elaborated on this theme at ZANU's September 1973 biennial conference in Zambia. A reassessment of strategy had taken place between 1969 and 1972 he said. 'We have since tried to correct this tragic error by politicizing and mobilizing the people before mounting any attacks against the enemy. After politicizing our people it became easier for them to co-operate with us and to identify with our programme.'³²

In a Granada Television interview on 1 January 1970 Chikerema suggested that ZAPU was also reassessing earlier policy: 'We do not intend to finish in a matter of two, three, four or five years . . . this is a protracted struggle. The type of war we fight depends on changes of tactics and I can tell you that we've changed our tactics. We will combine both—where they meet us and intercept us, we will stand and fight; where they don't see us, we will go to our own areas and infiltrate ourselves into the population and organize our masses.'

However, one might sympathize with the Rhodesian intelligence services if they wrote off what Chikerema said as rhetoric. Three months later, during the ZAPU leadership crisis in March 1970, Chikerema said something different: 'The objective of the army was not to wage guerrilla warfare but to carry out acts of sabotage which were considered relevant to bring forth fear and despondency to the settlers of Rhodesia in order to influence the British Government and foreign settlers to accede to popular revolutionary demands of the people'; and he dismissed talk of protracted armed struggle as 'calculated hypocrisy and calculated manoeuvres for position and influence in the party and army'.³³ Chikerema had not learned from the lessons of the Sixties and he remained throughout one of the obstacles in forging a united revolutionary leadership from a nationalist party leadership. Instead it was Jason Moyo and the cadres who supported him in the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) who became ZAPU's vanguard, just as the ZANLA leadership, first to

comprehend the need for a protracted struggle, became the vanguard of the emerging ideology of ZANU.

Most of the evidence of a change in strategy was ignored or written off as empty rhetoric by Rhodesian intelligence agencies, who regarded phase one as 'a pigeon shoot' and a 'complete victory for the security forces'. Rhodesians became complacent, as Smith later admitted. They were contemptuous of the FRELIMO guerrillas who had opened a new front in Mozambique's western Tete province on 8 March 1968 and who had crossed the Zambezi in November 1970. 'We didn't take FRELIMO very seriously,' Edden admitted. 'They were a security threat but not a military threat in our view. We didn't expect the ZANLA guerrillas to come through Tete and we didn't know about ZANU's new policy. If we had we might have taken FRELIMO and the threat from Tete more seriously.'³⁴

The other new development Rhodesian intelligence agencies missed occurred at two secret meetings in Lusaka between ZANU and the top military commanders of FRELIMO in November 1969 and May 1970.³⁵ To understand the significance of this development it is necessary to go back to January 1969, in the early years of the Sino-Soviet split. Late that month in Khartoum, leaders of seven liberation movements gathered at a Soviet-sponsored conference. The movements were FRELIMO, ZAPU, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), and the National Liberation Movement of the Comoros (MOLINACO). They became known as the 'authentic'. All received assistance from Moscow and had a special relationship with each other as 'natural allies'.

Mozambique President Samora Machel later said they were 'authentic' in terms of their own definition, in that they agreed on principles and objectives. Their objective was independence and their struggle was against colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and exploitation of man by man. They sought national unity with the armed national liberation struggle as one of the fundamental aspects of forging this. They were opposed to tribalism, regionalism, divisionism, and racialism, insisting that the enemy was not necessarily white. Although they did not share a common ideology they all had progressive ideas.³⁶

The creation of this group left out movements like ZANU, the

South West African National Union (SWANU), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Front for the Liberation and Independence of Portuguese Guinea (FLING), the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO), and several others. The first four, as well as all of the 'authentic', were recognized by the OAU; and while the 'authentic' were supported by Moscow, the 'non-authentic' turned increasingly to Peking.

For FRELIMO the problem of ZANU's creation in 1963 was complicated by a number of factors. In the first place they knew little about the pressure and dissatisfaction within ZAPU prior to the split and they were therefore inadequately equipped to judge the significance of the new movement. When FRELIMO was created in Dar es Salaam in 1962 ZAPU already existed, and FRELIMO had regarded the men who emerged as ZANU's leaders as their allies in ZAPU only a year earlier. FRELIMO had been created from three separate movements and one of them, UDENAMO, was trying to break away again and re-emerge in its own right. Thus, not surprisingly in the circumstances, FRELIMO took the view that ZANU, like UDENAMO, represented dangerous divisionist and tribal secessionist tendencies. The possibility of any relationship in the early days of ZANU was further inhibited by what FRELIMO regarded as the racist and indisciplined behaviour of ZANU representatives and members.³⁷

Finally, ZANU, along with other 'non-authentic', was linked with COREMO, defined by FRELIMO as its 'ideological enemy' in that it espoused many of the negative aspects to which the 'authentic' were opposed.³⁸ COREMO, like ZANU, had strong links with Israel in this period and at one point part of the expenses for running ZANU's Dar es Salaam office were paid for by the Israeli Embassy. While ZAPU had over the years secured the support of most progressive countries and movements around the world, ZANU was initially able to attract little support and, externally, ZAPU appeared to be the more consequential movement.

Against this background the relationship which emerged between ZANU and FRELIMO seems surprising, but in fact it is not when one considers FRELIMO's commitment to independence and national unity through the armed struggle. On 7-8 March 1968, FRELIMO had opened the Tete front in the eastern province of Mozambique adjoining Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia and, as FRELIMO

consolidated their position in this war zone, a new corridor was opened for infiltration of guerrillas and armaments into north-eastern Rhodesia. Automatically they turned to their 'natural ally', ZAPU, to begin the war in the north-east. A senior FRELIMO official explained: 'How did we start supporting ZANU after all this background? It was when our natural ally refused to fight with weapons in their hands. They violated all the principles. When ZANU accepted to fight with weapons in their hands they became our allies. This is really the great point of difference. It was not the fighters [ZIPRA] who refused. It was the ZAPU leadership.'³⁹

ZAPU's failure to respond to FRELIMO's request to send guerrillas to the Tete front for practical training prior to beginning to fight in north-eastern Rhodesia coincided with requests from ZANU to be allowed passage into Rhodesia through Tete. Contact was established between FRELIMO and ZANU at a tentative meeting in Dar es Salaam's Twiga Hotel in 1968, when Eduardo Mondlane, then leader of FRELIMO, and Machel met the ZANU national chairman, Herbert Chitepo, and the Secretary for Defence, Noel Mukono, who was a major force in developing the relationship between the two parties. Nothing substantial was discussed, but a link ZANU was to build on was established.⁴⁰ In April 1969, the exiled leaders of ZANU held their first biennial review conference in Lusaka and formed an eight-member war council known in Shona as 'Dare re Chimurenga' (DARE), literally 'Council of the Revolution'. After the review conference the ZANLA high command decided that an approach should be made to FRELIMO to request access to Rhodesia through Tete. The high command first convinced Chitepo, and then a full meeting of the DARE. It was decided that the meeting should be held at military level. In November 1969, in Lusaka's Lilanda township, at the house of the FRELIMO representative to Zambia, Mariano Matsinha, a ZANU team led by Mukono and including Tongogara, Ndangana and Cletus Chigowe, head of security, met Machel, Matsinha and Sebastao Mabote, a member of FRELIMO's high command and now Mozambique's deputy Minister of Defence. ZANU formally asked for access through Tete, saying they wanted to open a front in the north-east of Rhodesia. Machel explained FRELIMO's difficulties in Tete, where they had not yet consolidated their position, and the difficulty of supplying the front because of serious problems with Zambia. The meeting ended with FRELIMO agreeing to consider ZANU's request.⁴¹

Ndangana recalled that ZANU's request to go through Tete had

arisen from the enormous difficulties posed by the Zambezi valley. The river was a natural barrier, giving an advantage to the defender and, even if it was crossed safely, few people lived in the area on the Rhodesian side to give food, shelter and information to the guerrillas. There was a shortage of water, it was excessively hot and, finally, the Rhodesian forces, who saw the main threat as coming from Zambia, had created a *cordon sanitaire* with camps along their bank of the river.⁴² Tongogara said these difficulties led to the conclusion that they must try to get through Tete. 'We realized that we could not carry on because when you are in a revolutionary war you first have to have a strong rear base and then you endeavour to create a strong front. These things have got to work cohesively. If the rear is weak, the front cannot be strong. So we discovered that we were doing a very good job inside, according to that time—it was the beginning—but the rear was weaker than the front, despite the hardships of the front. We discovered that we could not continue with the war like that and win.'⁴³

The next meeting with FRELIMO was in May 1970 at a ZANU house in Lusaka. Machel was accompanied by the same team but on this occasion Chitepo led the ZANU team, accompanied by Tongogara and four senior commanders. Tongogara recalled the meeting in an interview in 1978 at Chimoio in Mozambique, where ZANLA's headquarters were located. 'It was at the second Lusaka meeting when we agreed to work together. . . . And Comrade Machel made it clear to us—he was very open and honest and you know he doesn't hide his feelings—that the decision to work with ZANU did not mean that FRELIMO supported ZANU. ZAPU was still its partner. He was very clear, saying that FRELIMO supported the revolution of the people of Zimbabwe. He said, "We don't support ZANU. We support ZAPU. But we also support the people of Zimbabwe and anyone who can show us he can start a revolution in Zimbabwe and liberate the people of Zimbabwe we will support." He also told us, "Some of us, when we look at the situation in Mozambique, realize if we liberate Mozambique tomorrow that will not be the end. The liberation of Mozambique without the liberation of Zimbabwe is meaningless."'

Machel's insistence that although FRELIMO was prepared to help ZANU it did not support the party 'perplexed us', Tongogara admitted. Nevertheless, a working committee with four members from each side was set up and a series of meetings took place, the last of which was held in July between Kaswende in Zambia and FRELIMO's major base at Chifombo just across the border in Mozambique. It was

decided there to send the first four ZANLA guerrillas to join FRELIMO in Tete to begin acquiring practical experience of guerrilla war.⁴⁴

This decision notwithstanding, the FRELIMO Military and Political Committee, which had agreed to allow ZANLA into Tete, still hoped to persuade ZAPU. In late 1970 when the first FRELIMO reconnaissance teams were being infiltrated across the Zambezi River. Marcelino dos Santos, FRELIMO's vice-president, was authorized to meet ZAPU leaders to offer 'Tete as a base of operations'. At his house in Dar es Salaam's Changombe suburb, dos Santos met George Silundika, one of ZAPU's three principal leaders in exile. The FRELIMO leader explained that ZANU was requesting access and that ZANU wanted to fight, but, he explained, ZANU was not FRELIMO's ally, they did not support ZANU. FRELIMO wanted armed struggle in Zimbabwe and were willing to support it, he said, but 'it should be our ally who begins the armed struggle using the conditions FRELIMO has created.'⁴⁵

There was no response from ZAPU, Silundika later explained, because 'our friends approached us when we had real difficulties. Any decision had to be taken by the full executive committee, including Chikerema, and at the time he was not co-operating with J. Z. [Moyo]. The war council, which comprised Moyo and Chikerema and a few commanders, was no longer working. So paralysis was starting within ZAPU at the time when our friends were making these proposals and therefore the question of our responding to them immediately was just not practical. The whole of 1970 the split was on but it had not yet been actually recognized, so we had the added difficulty that anything we would have done would have been recognized by the Zambian government and the OAU only through Chikerema. We were in a tight corner.'⁴⁶ The smouldering division within ZAPU burst into the open early in 1971 and no further meetings could be held with FRELIMO for more than a year 'because we were under virtual arrest. We were released under conditions of negotiation between the Zambian government and the boys who had arrested us, but then we were taken to a camp at Mboroma where we stayed until October. We were completely out of action until after the formation of FROLIZI. We were in the bush. So no meeting took place between us and FRELIMO until after October 1971.'

In February 1972, ZANU and ZAPU formed the Joint Military Command (JMC), which was never operational, and Silundika met dos Santos to brief him on the new alliance. 'I think his worry was,

why wasn't the unity more effective than we had agreed in Mbeya? Why wasn't it political as well as military? Because this would have saved FRELIMO the embarrassment of having to go along with ZANU, obviously leaving a long-standing ally.' At that meeting, and at another one in April with Moyo, dos Santos explained that now FRELIMO had crossed the Zambezi, was operating in the Mukumbra area on the Rhodesian frontier, and had supply convoys of porters carrying armaments right up to the frontier area, the conditions were ripe for ZIPRA to begin operations. FRELIMO would ensure their supplies. This was to be a moment of truth for FRELIMO; they had assumed that ZAPU enjoyed support all over the country. 'And Jason Moyo said "We do not have control in that region [the north-east]." This is exactly what he told us. "We have no control in that region."⁴⁷

In June 1972, dos Santos made another attempt to persuade ZAPU to use Tete as a rear base for operations in the north-east. On this occasion, he met both Moyo and Silundika, who were by now irritated by FRELIMO's links with ZANU. 'We had detected that FRELIMO was no longer for that idea of authentic liberation movements as such, but had a split mind between ZAPU and ZANU. Dos Santos mentioned this idea of unity between us and them, in operating in the northern border. You see, we were still in quite some difficulties. Our commanders in the JMC should have gone to Zambia in April but they were refused entry because of the difficulties we had with Chikerema. Our commanders couldn't get to Lusaka until they decided to come in clandestinely, I think it was in June, and the ZANU comrades had moved in through the other way with FRELIMO.' FRELIMO leaders say the message at that meeting was the same, that ZAPU 'had very few members in that area. So then we became aware that ZAPU did not have control of the whole of the country, they did not represent the whole of Zimbabwe. And then we started to think and we found that along the border [in Rhodesia] that everyone there was a member of ZANU. That was the reality we found. A reality we had to face.'⁴⁸

FRELIMO had still not responded to ZANU's request to use Tete as their rear base, although they had been willing to allow them to learn the practice of peoples' armed struggle in that area. In August 1972, after accompanying a Soviet film team to Tete, Machel travelled back through Lusaka and went to see Kaunda, whom he had met for the first time in March that year. He told Kaunda what FRELIMO had found in the border area and that the reality was that ZANU must

be accepted as a party and not disregarded as an inconsequential splinter group, which had been the tendency hitherto. Machel went on to Dar es Salaam to impart the same message to Nyerere.⁴⁹

Soon after, having failed to persuade ZAPU to operate from Tete, FRELIMO finally agreed to allow ZANLA guerrillas and armaments—then all supposedly for FRELIMO—to pass through Tete into north-eastern Rhodesia. All these negotiations had been kept secret. In the case of both ZANU and ZAPU only a handful of people know about them to this day. Yet this series of meetings contributed to changing the course of Zimbabwe's history. Had ZAPU actively responded to the opportunity that FRELIMO not only offered but implored them to take, then ZIPRA and not ZANLA would have had Mozambique as its vital rear base and the nature and outcome of the struggle for Zimbabwe might have been very different.

2

Some *Vakomana*

The first four ZANLA guerrillas sent to join FRELIMO in Tete in mid-July 1970 were led by Mayor Urimbo, a tough stocky man who was to become ZANLA's first provincial military commander and ultimately the Political Commissar of ZANU. His deputy, Justin Chauke, was in charge of medical supplies. The other members of the team were Cornelius Mpofo, logistics, and Shumba, who was responsible for reconnaissance and was the only member of the group to be killed in the war. They were armed with one submachine-gun and three Kalashnikov automatic assault rifles with their distinctive banana-shaped magazines, and they carried their personal kit in rucksacks. These four, and the thousands who came after them, came to be known affectionately in the kraals and villages of Zimbabwe by the Shona word *vakomana*, literally 'the boys'.

Urimbo was born Samuel Mamutse in 1945 near Fort Victoria, in the Nyadzi African Purchase Area in Gutu district, where his family occupied a forty-acre farm.¹ He adopted 'Mayor Urimbo' as his *chimurenga* name (war name or *nom de guerre*), a measure calculated to minimize the persecution of relatives and friends still at home. He was the second of eight children, all of whom received a little education, but there was no money for secondary school fees, so he drifted through a number of jobs in Salisbury, each paying a basic salary of £1.50 a week, before joining the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) which transferred him to Zambia in 1963 as a machine operator and instructor in a new cigarette factory. His salary was £7 a week, which he could double with overtime.

In Zambia he became involved in ZANU youth politics and was an

active member of Zambia's now ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP), which drew many young Zimbabweans into its ranks—including Tongogara and M'nangagwa—around the time of the 1963 break-up of the three-nation Central African Federation (Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia), a union which had been bitterly opposed by African nationalist leaders and their followers.

Chauke, a short, rotund, ebullient man, was born William Hathlan Hanyani Makeke Chauke in 1947 at Nupapa Chanyanga in Nuanetsi district, near Rhodesia's Beitbridge frontier with South Africa.² His father was a local headman who owned over a hundred cattle and who, as a member of the indigenous ruling class, was allowed to plough as much land as he wanted. By local standards, the family was wealthy. Chauke went to Chikumedzi Primary School in his home district and completed Standard IV but, even as the son of an influential headman, he could not get a place to continue his education.

Like so many other Africans who were denied further education in that era and who emerged a decade later as ZANLA's top commanders, Chauke left for Zambia. He arrived there in 1960, at the age of thirteen, looking for work, and a year later obtained a provisional driving licence and took driving lessons. For the next three years he drove a truck for a Zambian company delivering maize to local markets. This truck broke down after a short time and he moved to Lusaka, first as a driver for the UN Economic Commission for Africa and finally as a taxi driver. In 1964, during a visit to Lusaka, Chauke paid a membership fee of one shilling and six pence to join ZANU. Over the next four years he talked with many of the exiled leaders, including Tongogara who had also gone to Zambia because he had been denied further education in Rhodesia. They explained ZANU's objectives to him and Chauke later recalled that when they were recruiting men to go for guerrilla training in 1968, 'I decided it was time I joined the revolution. I used to see some of the comrades who had already undergone training in China and I came to the conclusion I would like to go to train, get my gun, and then go home.'

Chauke left for Tanzania on 30 August 1968 in a group of 110 recruits. At the Tunduma border post between Tanzania and Zambia the group, accompanied by Tongogara, ran into difficulty because they did not have clearance to cross. They spent a week waiting while clearance was obtained and begged food from people in the area because they had no money. That group, which also included Urimbo, was the fourth intake at the ZANLA training camp at Itumbi

near Chunya in a cold mountainous region of south-western Tanzania, but only thirty-eight of them reached the camp. The other seventy-two deserted on the way.³

In those early days—before the war in Rhodesia began in earnest and before the psychological impact on young Zimbabweans of the liberation of the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique—ZANU and ZAPU had considerable difficulty in getting recruits. They chose to employ a method once widely used by the British navy—press-ganging. Many young men from the large Zimbabwean community in Zambia were press-ganged into going for training and, inevitably, desertions before, during and after training were not uncommon. Urimbo recalled that in 1967 ZAPU were 'kidnapping' Zimbabweans living in Zambia to go for guerrilla training irrespective of what party they were affiliated to. ZANU adopted a similar policy. 'You were told you were going for national service, that your time had come. You were told you were a Zimbabwean, a member of the youth and that you were to go and save your country. You were just told to pack and go. You had no choice.'

Mubako says that press-ganging was in part due to the pressure being exerted on ZANU and ZAPU by the rest of Africa, particularly Tanzania and Zambia, through the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The two movements were totally dependent upon their hosts and the OAU Special Fund for Liberation tended to be allocated according to results and the number of cadres. 'For all these reasons the parties vied with each other to satisfy their supporters. As recruitment in those days was difficult, both parties resorted to press-ganging methods which had adverse effects during the early stages of the struggle, for not only did the parties lose support among civilians in Zambia and Tanzania, but some of the conscripted guerrillas gave themselves up to the Rhodesian army at the first opportunity, ready to make press statements denouncing the party that had recruited them and exposing the security of those who remained in the bush. External pressure had some ill effects but it was on the whole an important factor which prodded the Zimbabwe liberation movement into active acceptance of the armed struggle as the principal instrument for combating settler colonialism in their country.'⁴

Itumbi camp had opened in 1965. It was located on an abandoned farm which included a disused gold mine dating back to the German colonial era in Tanzania before the First World War. Ndangana, a

member of ZANLA's high command, commanded the first intake. By then his name was already well known as leader of the 'Crocodile Commando', a ZANLA group who on 4 July 1964 stabbed to death Mr Petrus Oberholtzer, a Rhodesian Front branch chairman, near Melsetter on the eastern border, after stopping his car with a crude road block. He was the first European to die in an act of war by guerrillas since the uprisings in the 1890s. Ndangana's action demonstrated to many young nationalists that a man with courage and determination could fight, even without a gun. Tongogara commanded the second intake at Itumbi after giving up a comparatively comfortable life in Lusaka, where he learned to play golf and was bars manager at the local whites' amateur theatre club.⁵ The fourth intake, in addition to Urimbo and Chauke, included Sheba Gava, who would later become ZANLA head of security; Patrick Mpunzarima, who was a senior commander until his death in a Rhodesian raid on a camp in Mozambique during the 1979 Lancaster House talks; Joseph Chimurenga, one of the top field commanders of the war; and Ernest Kadungure, who became Minister of Transport and Power at Independence on 18 April 1980.⁶

There were a few ZANLA instructors at Itumbi—Nhamo, Madiba and Saranowako—who were responsible for political education and basic training in the use of firearms. Instructors from the Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF) took charge of drill and physical fitness. In January 1969 a team of eight Chinese instructors arrived to give lessons in reconnaissance and sabotage, and also training on weapons such as mortars, bazookas, and anti-aircraft guns.⁷

The recruits were at Itumbi for sixteen months; the first six months were devoted to basic training and the remainder to specialist training including 'special engineering', a euphemism for advanced sabotage. Tongogara was determined that the fourth intake at Itumbi would be politically and militarily more advanced than any that had preceded them; he intended them to become the spearhead for a new offensive leading to the mobilization of the people, thereby laying the groundwork for a protracted war rather than the sporadic and militarily ineffective battles of the past.⁸

In December 1969, ten of the trained guerrillas were infiltrated into Zambia. Then, and throughout the war, President Kaunda and his government had much closer ties with ZAPU, and thus infiltration into Zambia by ZANLA guerrillas was necessary in those early years. The following year, and for some time thereafter when ZANLA began to operate through Tete, their guerrillas passed through Zambia

pretending to be FRELIMO guerrillas, and their armaments passed through as FRELIMO armaments. The group of ten guerrillas infiltrated in December 1969 was commanded by Urimbo, and it included Chimurenga (who was to become Provincial Field Operations Commander deploying the guerrillas to start the war three years later), Kadungure, Gava, Chauke, Mpunzarima, Peter Baya Chihota (who died in 1978 in Mozambique from natural causes), Fred Kurauone (who died from natural causes at Mbeya in Tanzania where he was representative), John Zenda and Gideon Kuzvipa, who on separate occasions were allowed to go on leave in Zambia to visit their families.⁹

In June 1970 a group of the guerrillas including Urimbo, Chimurenga, Kadungure, Chauke, George Magobeya, Mpunzarima and Kuzvipa were sent secretly to the Zambezi valley with the task of carrying out reconnaissance along the river from Feira on the border with Mozambique to Kariba on the eastern end of the huge man-made lake.¹⁰ All the reconnaissance was done on foot. It involved hours of peering across the Zambezi through binoculars, watching for movements by Rhodesian troops and South African paramilitary police on the other bank and searching for potential crossing points where there were no rapids and no Europeans. The guerrillas, dressed like simple villagers, studied the other bank and did some fishing. They caught a lot of fish which they were able to send, fresh or dried, to their colleagues in Lusaka. Contact had been made with villagers on the Zambian bank during previous reconnaissance and crossings in the Sixties, and now they needed places on the Zambian side where villagers were willing to ferry men and armaments across the broad river without informing the Rhodesian or Zambian authorities. In 1965 ZANU had bought a motor boat, which they had left with the villagers on the understanding that when the guerrillas needed it it would be available.

The guerrillas built a house in a village where they stayed and several years later discovered that the man they had been staying with, who knew their real identities and what they were doing, had subsequently been recruited by Rhodesian security forces as a spy. He was later caught by the Zambian authorities after he laid mines in the area which killed a number of villagers.

The initial reconnaissance took a month. The group then returned to Lusaka to report to Tongogara, Ndangana and Chigowe, then head of security. They had expected that guerrillas would be infiltrated at the crossing points they had surveyed but were informed of the

meetings between ZANU and FRELIMO and the decision to infiltrate through Tete.

When Urimbo, Chauke, Mpofu and Shumba arrived in Tete in mid-July 1970 they came under the command of Jose Moyane, FRELIMO's commander of the province and a tough veteran of the northern Niassa front who had taken command of Tete in 1969. He had been told by Tongogara: 'If there are any problems with these people, arrest them, because we don't want problems.'¹¹

Moyane remembers the group as earnest and keen to fight 'although some weren't really up to it, maybe they were weak on political vision. That was why one or two were changed.' He said that FRELIMO's aim was to show the ZANLA guerrillas 'how we started fighting and after the fighting began what problems arose. They visited all sectors of operations and saw how we organized the soldiers and how we organized the population. They were integrated into the process and saw all the problems associated with armed struggle—successes, failures, difficulties and how they were overcome. These experiences we transmitted to these comrades.'¹² Chauke later recalled this period of training with FRELIMO:

We had to learn by observation how the masses lived. We had to learn from FRELIMO how to keep prisoners. We had to learn how they taught the masses co-operative work like agriculture and also how to establish cordial relations with the masses. We wanted to see how they taught them about war and how they prepared their minds for war. It was important for us to learn how to cache arms properly, what to do if a comrade falls sick on a march. We had learned the theory at Itumbi. What we lacked was the practice.

One of the things we had learned in theory in training was how to decide whether water was safe to drink or not, but this became much clearer in practice when we were with the FRELIMO comrades and we got to a pool. First you watched to see if there was life in the pool, fish or any living thing. If there was it was a good sign that the water was okay. As far as burying arms is concerned, the most important thing is to thoroughly examine the terrain before you decide to bury the arms. If you observe certain features like hills and so on, you'll want to look at your compass so if you send someone who was not present when you cached the arms it won't be too difficult to locate them. Another thing we learned was that when you come to a river, even if you're very thirsty, you don't go

straight to the water and drink before crossing the river. Your first task is to cross the river and then drink, because if you get to a river and you all go down to drink, the enemy may have already spotted you and you will all be gunned down with your heads down in the water. So you must cross the river first. Then having ascertained that there is no enemy around, your next task is to drink. You also have to do reconnaissance even when it appears there is no enemy around, before you cross the water or the river, or before you just go to a pool, to make sure you are not found on all fours.¹³

Urimbo said, 'Our mission was to go and be taught by FRELIMO how they operated, how they stayed with the masses, the relationship between the party and military forces, how reconnaissance was done and how to mobilize the masses if you wanted to start a revolution.' After three months with FRELIMO, Urimbo decided that he should go back to Lusaka and report to the high command. Chauke, who had been with him at Itumbi and who understood the emphasis on mass mobilization, agreed. Mpofu and Shumba, who had been in a group of twenty-eight trained in Cuba in 1965, disagreed and insisted they should all go to Lusaka.¹⁴

Those who trained in Cuba 'had a different ideology or orientation' from those who had been schooled in the classical Chinese approach to guerrilla warfare, Urimbo said. Differences of strategy had emerged among guerrillas trained elsewhere and Urimbo said the Cuban-trained guerrillas 'had this Fidel [Castro] idea and did not believe in a long term build-up mobilizing the masses'. In his analysis of *The Three Stages of Protracted War*, the late Mao Tse-Tung identifies the first stage as being the 'strategic defensive phase' involving political mobilization of the population prior to the commencement of guerrilla warfare, which is limited to small scale operations, and in which conventional positional warfare must be avoided. In the second phase, having secured a base in the rural areas by mobilizing the people and retaining the tactical initiative, the guerrillas can take on the enemy on a larger scale. Finally, in the third phase, having secured liberated zones, positional warfare and attacks on urban centres become possible.¹⁵

This was the basis of the criticism by ZANU and the PAC of the 1967 Wankie battle. In effect they were saying that ZAPU and the ANC had ignored the first two stages and, as a guerrilla force, tried to take on the Rhodesians with conventional strategy, a situation in which the Rhodesians inevitably held the tactical initiative. Che

Guevara had criticized FRELIMO's tactics in the mid-Sixties but he was to write subsequently: 'Almost all the popular movements undertaken against dictators in recent times have suffered from the same fundamental fault of inadequate preparation.'¹⁶ Differences in approach between those schooled in Maoist theory and Soviet theory were inevitable, and Mpofu and Shumba advocated the swifter, more dramatic, military action rather than the long, often tedious, mobilization and build-up and the accompanying hardships of the bush.

Urimbo took the dispute to Moyane who supported the ZANLA commander and ordered Mpofu and Shumba to remain at Kaswende base with Chauke while Urimbo went to Lusaka. There Urimbo outlined the contradictions within his unit and the two were recalled on 18 October and replaced by Chimurenga, who became deputy commander, and Kadungure, who was put in charge of finance 'because we had some 150 Rhodesian dollars [£100] with us,' Urimbo said. It is noteworthy, however, that despite this early contradiction, Mpofu and Shumba remained in ZANLA. Shumba died later in combat and Mpofu, a commander and member of the General Staff, entered Assembly Point Foxtrot at the time of the ceasefire and remained in the army after independence.

Chimurenga, whose real name is Fazo Siwela, was born in Rhodesia's central farming Selukwe district, the home area of Tongogara and Smith, in August 1944.¹⁷ He joined ZAPU while at primary school and in 1961 was involved in a strike at Vungwi school which resulted in his getting fifteen strokes and being denied a secondary school place. He left for Zambia in 1963 and joined ZANU the following year, becoming youth organizing secretary of the party in the small agricultural town of Choma on the road between Lusaka and Livingstone. When ZANU began their recruiting drive in Zambia in 1968 Chimurenga refused to go for training. 'You see, we wanted politics, fair enough, and we wanted guerrilla warfare to be taking place in Zimbabwe, but who has got the guts to go for training?—because the point was, if you go and confront the Smith regime enemies you die. No one wants to die, but freedom was needed. The problem was, who was going to fight for it?'

Chimurenga said that he and Fred Kurauone, whose real name was Aavian Masaiti, were kidnapped at Choma and taken to Tanzania for training in a group of eleven who followed the August 1968 group of 110. His original plan was to undergo training and, instead of going

home to fight, return to Zambia where he would then be in a position to defend himself if ZANU or ZAPU tried to kidnap him in the future. After a short period of political education at Itumbi he became convinced that he should go home and fight.

Kadungure was born at Enkeldoorn in the heart of Rhodesia, in February 1945.¹⁸ He received a better education than most of the early guerrillas and worked as a teacher at a Government Upper Primary School for eighteen months. In 1964, after the break-up of the Federation and shortly before Zambia's Independence on 24 October, he also left home and headed north. He studied privately in Zambia, working first as a telex operator, then briefly at Shell as a sales manager before entering government service as a computer programmer.

He had joined ZANU when it was formed in 1963 and in 1968 he went for training at Itumbi. He remembers the period in Tete with FRELIMO 'as a very difficult time. For FRELIMO it was a period of great trial and we wanted to show our FRELIMO comrades the determination we had.' Throughout this period they pretended to be FRELIMO guerrillas speaking local Shona and Nyanja dialects and sharing the hardships of the FRELIMO guerrillas' life. At one point in mid-1971 during a major Portuguese-Rhodesian offensive they were pinned down at FRELIMO's central base north of the Zambezi. Food supplies ran out and they lived off roots, wild honey, berries, shrubs, bugs and whatever game they managed to shoot. That was another part of their guerrilla education which had not been included in the Itumbi course.

In mid-1971 Kadungure was reassigned as an instructor at ZANLA's new training camp at Mgagao near Iringa in Tanzania; this camp had replaced Itumbi earlier that year. In August, Urimbo, who was now spending most of his time at FRELIMO's central base as co-ordinator, returned with his colleagues to Zambia to attend ZANU's second biennial review conference at the small town of Kafue near Lusaka. They found there had been a sharp deterioration in relations among politicians in both ZANU and ZAPU.¹⁹

Differences within ZAPU had begun to emerge in 1967 between Chikerema, and others, who looked for leadership to the late respected Jason 'J.Z.' Moyo. While the supporters of these two men tended to line up on tribal lines the root cause of the ZAPU crisis was not tribal or regional. Chikerema, then the ZAPU vice-president, leader in exile and head of the defence department, and Moyo, the second man in the defence department, clashed over the failure of the

late Sixties, which led to the death of many brave members of ZAPU's military wing, ZIPRA, without any tangible military gain, and also over Chikerema's autocratic and contradictory style of leadership.²⁰ The simmering crisis became public in 1969 when Chikerema allowed a British television crew into a ZIPRA training camp in Zambia to shoot a film which was shown in Britain and West Germany. Photographers were not normally allowed into guerrilla training camps because of the risk of identification by the enemy of guerrillas photographed. Chikerema was forced to issue a public apology to the Zambian government, whose public position was that there were no training camps in Zambia.

Moyo and his main supporters in the ZAPU leadership, George 'T.G.' Silundika and Edward Ndlovu (both later elected to the first Zimbabwe Parliament, Silundika becoming Minister of Roads, Post and Telecommunications in the coalition government), issued a document entitled *Observations on our Struggle* in which they accused Chikerema of irresponsibility and dictatorial leadership. Chikerema responded by accusing them of plotting against him. He dissolved the executive and army command, vesting all powers in himself, a move which Moyo declared in another circular as 'null and void' and a 'reckless bid for personal power'. The guerrillas in the ZIPRA camps divided roughly along tribal lines and some fighting occurred.

The rival factions of the ZIPRA forces were put into separate camps and the politicians used separate offices and houses. On the night of 22 April 1970, Chikerema's supporters attacked Zimbabwe House where Moyo, Silundika, Ndlovu and some of their supporters were staying. A number of people were injured in the ensuing battle, in which automatic rifles, pangas, clubs, hoes, axes, stones and kitchen knives were used. Zambia tried to unite the factions but the rift was beyond repair. The ZIPRA forces, numbering about 400 at this point, either went with Chikerema or Moyo, stayed in a 'neutral' group, deserted, or crossed to ZANU, and all military operations and plans came to a total standstill.

On 11 March 1971, the 'neutral' group headed by a young Ndebele commander, Walter Mtimkulu, kidnapped all of the main leaders except Chikerema at gunpoint and took them to a camp. The Zambian army quickly intervened. Chikerema was taken to join his colleagues and for several days the Zambians tried to reconcile differences between the factions. When this failed Mtimkulu and his group were detained and, in August, 129 of them were deported across the

Victoria Falls Bridge and handed over to the Rhodesian authorities. The Zambians contended they were 'spies' but, as some of them were reported to have been sentenced to death and others imprisoned in Rhodesia, this was certainly untrue.²¹

Up to this point ZAPU leaders had refused to have anything to do with ZANU leaders, contending that they were an inconsequential splinter group. The ZAPU split left ZANU as the largest military entity and Chikerema, having failed in his bid to seize absolute power in ZAPU, turned his attention to ZANU, proposing unity between his faction of ZAPU and ZANU.

Both movements had been under pressure for some years from the OAU and individual African states to form a united front. Thus it was not possible for ZANU, which had publicly committed itself to unity in the struggle, to reject Chikerema's overture out of hand, but equally it was clear that unity with Chikerema would only represent unity with a faction of ZAPU. That faction was Shona and more specifically Zezuru. ZANU's chairman Chitepo might have been better advised to insist that any unity negotiations involve Moyo (whose group still held that ZANU did not exist), but instead he elected to go ahead with talks with the Chikerema faction.

In the Spring 1975 edition of *Issue*, a quarterly journal of African opinion, in an article entitled 'The Quest for Unity in the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement', Mubako wrote: 'It became clear that Chikerema wanted to create dissension within ZANU when he was unable to dissolve ZAPU. . . . The tactics of Chikerema and his supporters also raised suspicion within ZANU. It was common knowledge that while he was conducting official talks with Chitepo and Mudzi he was having more frequent unofficial talks with Shamuyarira and Mutizwa, who were members of the ZANU supreme council [DARE]. Above all, he annoyed ZANU supporters by leaking to British journalists the startling news that Sithole and Nkomo had stepped down in favour of Mugabe, the prestigious Secretary-General of ZANU, in Salisbury Central Prison. Like Shamuyarira and Mutizwa, Mugabe was from Chikerema's tribe and region. These tribal and regional overtones in Chikerema's strategy were bound to raise questions about his real motives. Annoyance was turned into fury when Sithole managed to smuggle out a letter to Chitepo denying any communication with Nkomo, let alone any agreement. It will be recalled that Chikerema had confirmed the stepping down story, saying he had received communication from Nkomo. ZANU followers became convinced that the whole exercise

was a swindle, and the sooner Chitepo pulled out of it the better for the party.'

This was the political morass Urimbo found on his return to Lusaka in August 1971 for the second biennial review conference. The DARE had been expanded from four to eight members at the first review conference in Lusaka in April 1969. The newcomers included Taziana Mutizwa as Publicity Secretary, Mukudzei Mudzi as Administrative Secretary and Stanley Parirewa in charge of Welfare and Social Affairs. The fourth was Nathan Shamuyarira, who was to become Minister of Information and Tourism at independence. He had been elected deputy Financial Secretary at ZANU's 1964 Gwelo conference but had had four years of what he described as political inactivity while he studied in the United States. He was appointed Secretary for External Affairs at the 1969 review conference.

Shamuyarira, Mutizwa and Parirewa all supported unity with Chikerema. Henry Hamadziripi, Secretary for Finance, Mudzi, and Mukono, the Secretary for Defence, disagreed. Initially Chitepo, while sounding out the opinions of the party rank and file, and Simpson Mutambanengwe, Secretary for Political Affairs, held the middle ground before finally deciding that the will of the majority was against unity with Chikerema. Thereafter they supported that view. Shamuyarira challenged Chitepo for the chairmanship of the DARE and at the 1971 review conference he and his group were defeated by a two to one vote by about 120 people present, including overseas representatives, district and branch officials and members of ZANLA. Shamuyarira and Mutizwa lost their places on the DARE and a few days later resigned from ZANU.²²

One noteworthy point about the DARE elected at the 1969 and 1971 review conferences is that not a single member had been for military training or had any military experience, including the Secretary for Defence who automatically chaired the high command. Inevitably, this led to tension between the politicians and the guerrillas. Tongogara was to observe of some of the military plans and instructions from the DARE in that period that they were notable for their foolishness. The politicians would often demand a dramatic, and possibly suicidal, action for short-term political gain at the OAU or to coincide with some other meeting, at a time when the military preoccupation was to lay the groundwork for continuous and protracted struggle. The soldiers would try to ignore that kind of instruction

without openly contradicting the politicians, which would have been regarded as insubordination.

There was also growing mistrust of some of the political leadership, which led the guerrillas to decide that where military matters were concerned the less the politicians knew, and the fewer who knew anything at all, the better. After the Sinoia battle a number of other guerrilla groups were sent home and the comparative ease with which the Rhodesians tracked them down led many of the fighters to conclude that they were being betrayed by one or more of the politicians.

The conviction of the guerrillas that they were being sold out was reinforced in July 1971 when the Rhodesians discovered a large arms cache in a warehouse belonging to Stuttaford's, a road transport firm, in Salisbury's light industrial site. The arms had been smuggled from Zambia on trucks operating to Salisbury and were to be distributed to ZANU branches in the city. The cache included twenty-five hand grenades, sixty stick grenades, 163 pieces of explosive, ten striker mechanisms, 208 igniters, 132 detonators, seven electric detonators, two time pencils, nine anti-personnel mines, two RPG light machine-guns, eight Simonov semi-automatic rifles, six AK assault rifle magazines, two Schmeisser submachine-guns, 5,961 rounds of 7/62mm ammunition, 3,889 rounds of 9mm ammunition, six Schmeisser magazines, nine 9mm submachine-guns of Czechoslovakian manufacture and eighteen submachine-gun magazines. Three men were arrested and charged under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. One of them, Joe Taderera, jumped bail and fled to Zambia. Denis Mangwana received a sentence of twenty-six years and another man six years. One of the chief prosecution witnesses, who had apparently been working for the Rhodesians throughout, was a friend of Mutambanengwe, then Secretary for Political Affairs on the DARE and one of the ZANU leaders responsible for getting the arms to Salisbury. Although there is nothing to suggest that Mutambanengwe had the slightest suspicion of the man's divided loyalties, this case further heightened the cadres' mistrust of the politicians.

This mistrust led to a greater separation of military from political affairs throughout the Seventies, and this was resented by some politicians who sought to use the military to advance their own political ends. The guerrillas believed that confidential military matters were compromised less frequently as a result in these years and this could be one reason why the CIO missed the infiltration through Tete in 1970, 1971 and 1972. Whatever the explanation, when Tongogara was elected to the DARE at the 1973 biennial review conference he

was to become the bridge between the political and military wings of ZANU. His election was seen by the guerrillas as a considerable victory and a belated recognition of their importance. Thereafter, Tongogara chaired the high command and no civilians sat on it.²³

That was not the case, however, in 1971 when Urimbo reported to the high command about his group's activities over the previous year and the situation in Tete. He was elected to the high command at the 1971 review conference and it was decided that Chimurenga, Chauke, and Zindoga, who had replaced Kadungure, should be sent south across the Zambezi River to begin preparations in the Rhodesian border area for the infiltration of guerrillas and armaments. That decision had to be approved by Machel, who had taken over as President of FRELIMO following the assassination by the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) of the movement's first leader, Eduardo Mondlane.

Mukono and Urimbo flew to Dar es Salaam and then on to FRELIMO's massive and impressive main training camp at Nachingwea to meet Machel. They explained that the high command had decided the time was ripe to begin transporting armaments across the Zambezi, which FRELIMO guerrillas had crossed eleven months earlier, in preparation for the start of the war. Machel was again tough and uncompromising. Mukono and Urimbo assured him that ZANLA was well prepared and determined.²⁴

Chimurenga, Chauke and Zindoga crossed the Zambezi for the first time early in September 1971. The guerrillas' period of education in Tete with FRELIMO was nearing its end. They had been taught all that FRELIMO could teach them, and the time was approaching when they would have to put their training into practice in their own country.

3

Deception, Invasion and Repression

On 26 June 1890, an invasion force of 300 policemen recruited by Cecil Rhodes's South Africa Company and almost 200 'pioneers' crossed the Macloutsie River from Bechuanaland (now Botswana) to colonize Mashonaland, today the largest area of Zimbabwe. The 'pioneers' had been selected from 2,000 applicants in South Africa for their ability to ride and shoot as well as their technical skills. They included mechanics, farmers, butchers, bakers and a large group of prospectors, who were lured by tales of an Eldorado with vast goldfields to the north.¹

They were armed with Martini-Henry rifles, Webley revolvers, Maxim machine-guns and artillery. They wore military uniforms: brown corduroy riding breeches, yellow leather leggings, army boots and broad-brimmed hats with one side turned up. They were paid 7s. 6d. a day and the wagon-train guide, Major Frank Johnson, had promised them fifteen claims each in the goldfields and 3,000 acres of prime freehold farmland in Mashonaland—a total of almost 1,500,000 acres. Their objective was Mount Hampden, 640 kilometres away on the outskirts of the city they named Salisbury.²

During their trek north they built forts at Tuli, Victoria and Charter, with post stations every twenty-five to thirty-five kilometres between Bechuanaland and Salisbury, where they arrived on 12 September 1890. The next day Lieutenant Tyndale-Biscoe ran up the Union Jack on a rough pole on a hill known to the Africans as Harare. 'The Pioneers, and the remainder of the police who had seen them to their goal, paraded on the veld, and in the name of Queen Victoria

formally took possession of Mashonaland, and all other unpossessed land in South-Central Africa that it should be found desirable to add to the Empire.³

That this was an invasion is not in dispute. Until 1961, when it became known by the somewhat less provocative name of 'Pioneer Day', 12 September was annually commemorated as 'Occupation Day'.

The invasion and occupation of Mashonaland followed an incredible saga of chicanery and international power politicking. Explorers and missionaries like David Livingstone laid the groundwork by propagating the popular illusion in Europe that the 'Dark Continent' was inhabited by warlike, savage tribes who were several steps lower on the ladder of evolution. European guidance was necessary to bring 'civilization' to Africa, and the role of the church was to convert Africa's 'heathen' hordes—a task which, often in the hands of quite unscrupulous churchmen, was not in the least at odds with Rhodes's passionate imperialist and expansionist plans to exploit the supposed mineral wealth of Mashonaland and other areas to the north.

Livingstone and others fostered an image of Africa which by the time of the Berlin Conference of 1884–5 had provided an excuse, or moral argument as it was no doubt then seen, to colonize Africa or, as the French described it, to embark on a 'civilizing mission'. The Berlin Conference opened the door to invaders, adventurers and mercenaries by insisting that a European power must 'effectively occupy' a territory before it could claim sovereignty over it. That decision precipitated the 'scramble for Africa' in which the Europeans, portrayed as liberators who ended the slave trade and brought peace, brutally enforced their will and enriched themselves while crushing African political, economic and cultural autonomy, relegating the Africans to new forms of slavery and denigrating traditional authority and values.

Contrary to subsequent settler propaganda, the area of the Shona bounded by the Zambezi in the north, the Limpopo River to the south and Indian Ocean to the east, was not inhabited by a barbaric uncivilized people whose sole pastime was killing each other. Rudimentary agriculture had been practised by Late Stone Age hunter-gatherers and later, over a period of 1,500 years, considerable quantities of gold had been mined and exported from the area. The Mwene Mutapa dynasty had been established in the fifteenth century in what is now north-east Mashonaland. In the seventeenth century this dynasty fell victim to Portuguese expansionism and a puppet Mutapa was instal-

led. Portugal's tenuous hold on the area was broken at the end of the century by the expanding Shona empire of the Rozwi Mambos who developed a complex and stable political and economic system, permanent evidence of its great sophistication being the stone structures around the country, including Great Zimbabwe.⁴

The first Boer settlers who arrived in the eastern Melsetter area in 1893 listed the extensive range of African agricultural products. 'Mealies, pokon corn, kaffir corn, millet, groundnuts, beans (five sorts), eggs, fruit, cabbages, sweet potatoes, peas, pumpkins of sorts, water melons, cucumbers, chillies, tobacco, bananas and lemons, and these all grown to perfection,' one wrote. At the same time an early settler in western Mashonaland was describing the successful and varied agriculture of Chief Mashayangombe's people: 'The path wound through fields of mealies, kaffir corn, rukweza, sweet potatoes, pumpkins, peanuts and then across rice beds in the marshes.' Cattle and goats were herded.⁵

Thus, the truth is that when the settlers arrived in 1890 a politically and economically developed system existed. The settlers had mainly come for the gold and over the next twenty years much of their food was supplied by the African economy. When the settlers found there was little gold they turned to farming, in the process destroying the African economic system and forcing the Africans into reserves as they expropriated their land, thereby creating a reservoir of cheap labour for the settlers' farms, mines and developing urban centres.

Between 1836 and the invasion of Mashonaland a series of 'treaties' were concluded with the Matabele kings, Mzilikazi and his son, Lobengula, an enormous majestic man. The first of these was in 1836 between envoys of Mzilikazi and Sir Benjamin D'Urban representing the British government. In the treaty, signed in Cape Town, Mzilikazi undertook '... to be a faithful friend and ally of the Cape colony, to maintain peace, to protect white people, who, with his consent, visited or were resident in his country'.⁶

His country in those days was what is now known as the Transvaal, the northernmost province of South Africa. Mzilikazi had recently learned the power of the gun the white man possessed and he was anxious to prevent it being used against his people. It seems that he believed the treaty was binding on all white men, and he might have achieved his objective had the treaty not coincided with the Great Trek by the Boers away from the Cape, British rule, and the formal

abolition of slavery. The Boers wanted land and the land they wanted was occupied by Mzilikazi and his people. They had moved there after Mzilikazi fell out with the Zulu soldier-king, Shaka, and in 1840, under attack by the Boers, local tribal collaborators and Shaka's successor, they were driven out of the Transvaal to what is today known as Matabeleland in southern and western Zimbabwe.

Matabeleland was then part of the Rozwi empire occupied by the Shona, but the plunder and pillage of an earlier group of fugitives from Shaka's Zulu state led by Zwangendaba, coupled with Portugal's continuing territorial designs, had led to the decline of the Rozwi. All of these incursions were to contribute to the Shona's vulnerability when the white invaders arrived from the south half a century later.

The Boers of the Transvaal Republic feared the Matabele soldiers and in January 1853 a written treaty was drawn up in which Mzilikazi was referred to as 'the Kaffir King'; it was signed on behalf of the Boers by Pieter Johannes Potgieter.⁷ This and subsequent treaties leading to the occupation of Mashonaland, the conquest of Matabeleland and the creation of Southern Rhodesia must be considered carefully, for there is every reason to believe they were totally fraudulent. All the treaties were made between illiterate Africans and unscrupulous literate whites seeking to exploit the gold and other assets in the northern African lands. The Africans were forced to rely upon these same unscrupulous whites to 'tell' them what the treaties said, and the crosses purporting to be the marks of Mzilikazi, Lobengula and their envoys could have been made by anyone.

In the case of the 1853 treaty, the identity of 'Kaffir Captain Marati', Mzilikazi's supposed envoy, is not known. The Moffat treaty on 11 February 1888 and the critical Rudd Concession on 13 October were both witnessed by the Reverend Charles D. Helms. Lobengula believed that the priest was an impartial churchman who interpreted for him the contents of the documents, but it was later discovered that Helms was in the pay of Rhodes.⁸

After the Berlin Conference, the scramble for the areas north of the Limpopo River began in earnest with the British, Portuguese, Germans and Boers in competition. On 30 July 1887 Lobengula is purported to have signed a treaty with Piet Grobler, a Boer trader and hunter. This guaranteed peace between the Transvaal Republic and Matabeleland—mutual respect of territorial integrity—and it referred to Lobengula as an 'ally' of the Boers.⁹ That much may be believable for, like his father, Lobengula recognized the danger of the white man's guns and throughout his life he tried to avoid war with

them; but, thereafter, Lobengula, if he signed the treaty at all, was clearly tricked. The third clause of the treaty reads: 'The above named Lobengula commits himself to provide assistance at all times, whenever he is summoned by the Government or an officer of the South Africa Republic, to render any assistance, either with soldiers or otherwise, and his people shall then have to stand under the command of the commanding officer or lesser officer under him, without he or one of his men showing the least disobedience.'¹⁰

In the Grobler treaty and the 1853 treaty the Matabele kings are supposed to have agreed to the Boers settling any disputes involving Matabele and Transvaal nationals. In the Potgieter treaty Mzilikazi is also supposed to have agreed not to allow the trading of guns or ammunition in his territory and to arrest any arms traders and hand them over to the Boer Republic. In return for all this loss of sovereignty all the Transvaalers agreed to was to maintain peace with the Matabele and recognize Mzilikazi's sovereignty over his land.

It is inconceivable that Mzilikazi, an astute and able military commander and politician, would have agreed to deny his army guns when he knew they were a source of superior military might. Nor would he have agreed to place his soldiers under the command of Boer officials whenever the latter commanded. Mzilikazi and Lobengula certainly wanted peace with the white men and they continually proffered the hand of friendship. But it is highly improbable thereafter that they had any idea what the Potgieter, Grobler and subsequent treaties contained.

The Transvaalers considered Mashonaland and Matabeleland their legitimate area of influence and expansion, but the 1884 London Convention had laid down that the Limpopo would be the Republic's northern boundary. For the Boers, the Grobler treaty was an important development reflecting the natural consequence of their territorial ambitions. Cecil Rhodes thought otherwise. The son of a British parson, he had gone to South Africa because of his poor health and had made a fortune in diamonds. He was motivated by the desire to expand British imperial control in Africa and to exploit the reputed gold resources of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. The Grobler treaty threatened to put a barrier in the way of his imperialist dream—an unbroken line of pink on the map of Africa extending from the Cape to Cairo—and his ambitions were further threatened by the Boer claim that the Grobler treaty gave them the right to mining concessions across the Limpopo.

Rhodes first tried to persuade the Governor of the Cape, Sir

Hercules Robinson, to declare Mashonaland and Matabeleland British Protectorates. That was rejected as too costly. However Sir Hercules instructed the Administrator of Bechuanaland, Sir Sydney Shippard, to ascertain whether a treaty had been signed with Grobler, to get it renounced if this was true and persuade Lobengula to sign a new treaty giving Britain exclusive rights to influence events in Matabeleland.¹¹

The choice of the Reverend John Moffat to execute this plan was extremely shrewd. His father, the Reverend Robert Moffat, had been the first European to visit Mzilikazi in 1829 and they had formed a lasting friendship, with Moffat acting as an informal diplomatic agent for the King. After Mzilikazi's flight to Matabeleland, Moffat was the first European to visit him there in 1854, and five years later he established the London Missionary Society in Matabeleland. Lobengula readily accepted the Reverend John Moffat, a brother-in-law of David Livingstone, as the son of a trusted friend of his father, not realizing that he, and others, like the Reverend Helms, were charlatans in clerics' cloth.

The Reverend John Moffat persuaded Lobengula to renounce the Grobler treaty and to issue a statement, which was almost certainly accurate, saying that what was contained in the treaty 'are not my words'.¹² The statement added, and this again was almost certainly true, that all he had discussed with Grobler was 'the old treaty of general friendship which was made between my father Mzilikazi and Enteleka'.¹³ The Reverend Moffat probably told Lobengula the true content of the Grobler treaty and pointed out its obvious disadvantages. But once he had renounced it the way was cleared for a new round of chicanery by Rhodes and his agents which was to have tragic consequences for Lobengula and the Matabele and Mashona nations.

On 11 February 1888 the Reverend Moffat concluded the second objective of his mission. A new treaty, allegedly signed by Lobengula with the now familiar mark of a cross, was produced. In this the Matabele leader was supposed to have reiterated the 1836 friendship treaty with Britain and to have expanded it by agreeing to 'refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign State or Power to sell, alienate or cede, or permit or countenance any sale, alienation or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amandebele country under the chieftainship or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa'. The reverse side of the treaty was endorsed by the Reverend Helms as follows: 'I hereby certify that the accom-

panying document has been fully interpreted and explained by me to the Chief Lobengula and his full Council of Indunas and that all the constitutional usages of the Matabele nation have been complied with prior to his executing the same.'¹⁴ Once more there is little reason to suppose that Rhodes's undercover agent had told the Matabele leader what was really in the document.

Lord Knutsford, the British Colonial Secretary, lost no time in endorsing the treaty. Within a few months he was to use it as a warning to the Portuguese to cease their own territorial expansionist designs. 'Her Majesty's Government,' Lord Knutsford said, 'have satisfied themselves that Lobengula, with whom they have concluded a treaty, is the undisputed ruler over Matabeleland and Mashonaland and that he would tolerate no doubt of his rule over both territories. His authority over Mashonaland is so complete that no person of any nationality can enter it without his permission.'¹⁵

The British had pre-empted the Boers by the nullification of the Grobler treaty while concluding their own equally dubious treaty. Now they were embarking on a sinister new course which would lead directly to the 1890 invasion. All previous treaties with Mzilikazi and Lobengula had described them only as rulers of Matabeleland. Lord Knutsford, by describing Lobengula as undisputed ruler of Mashonaland as well, was subtly preparing the way for Rhodes's, and in the final analysis Britain's, invaders.

The Transvaal government reacted to the setback by belatedly appointing Grobler its consul in Matabeleland. In the Grobler treaty, Transvaal had undertaken to post a permanent representative in Matabeleland but had delayed doing so and this had left the door ajar for Moffat. Grobler carried a personal message from President Kruger to Lobengula in June 1888 which read: 'My country is being inundated by foreign adventurers, fortune seekers and scoundrels, who pester me greatly. If you permit them to search for gold in your country, that is the end of you. In your father's time nobody was permitted to pick up a stone in Matabeleland. That is the only reason why you are still living there today.' In July, Grobler went home to collect his family. He never arrived. On the banks of the Limpopo River he was killed by soldiers sent there by Chief Khama, the ruler of Bechuanaland, who had been convinced by Rhodes's agent, John Fry, that the Boers were massing for an invasion on the Limpopo, where Grobler had left his river boat and a number of Transvaalers who were to accompany him to Matabeleland.¹⁶

Lobengula would have done well to heed Kruger's warning.

Instead, amidst angry exchanges between Britain and South Africa over Grobler's death, he became involved in new agreements. In March 1887 he had made an agreement with Joseph Wood and two other whites giving them exclusive rights for ninety-nine years to prospect for and extract gold between the Shashi and Macloutsie Rivers for a rent of £100 a year. The concession had to be taken up within one year but while Wood, a member of the Cape Legislative Assembly, was trying to raise funds for the project, Rhodes used the Bechuanaland Administrator, Shippard, to prevent his return to Matabeleland, arguing that the agreement would provoke a war between Khama and Lobengula over the disputed territory between the two rivers. When Wood and his friends tried to go to Matabeleland they were arrested and forced to agree never to return to the area.¹⁷

Rhodes then began to carry out his final plan. In February 1888 he sent three emissaries—Charles Rudd, a business associate, Rochfort Macguire, a London lawyer, and Francis Thompson, a fluent Zulu-speaker who lived in the Cape Colony and who was nicknamed 'Matabele Thompson'—to obtain for Rhodes the Wood concession. At Lobengula's kraal they found about thirty other whites, one group from the aptly-named Exploiting and Exploration Company, all trying to talk to the King to secure exclusive mineral rights. But Rhodes's envoys carried a letter from the Cape Governor saying they were highly respectable gentlemen, and through the Reverend John Moffat, still a trusted friend, they soon obtained an audience with Lobengula. The Reverend Helms acted as interpreter. For eight months the three emissaries argued and pleaded, trying to obtain the concession. Lobengula's trusted senior *induna*, Lotshe, was promised a bribe of 300 sovereigns for his support and Helms urged the King to reach an agreement with Rudd.

On 13 October, Lobengula, harrassed on all sides, finally gave way. He was purported to have signed an agreement, with Helms as the principal witness and interpreter, under which Rudd, Macguire and Thompson undertook to pay a monthly rental of £100 and to give Lobengula 1,000 Martini-Henry breech rifles, 100,000 rounds of suitable ball cartridges and an armed steamboat to patrol the Zambezi River, or £500 in lieu, the latter of which was ultimately paid.¹⁸

In return, Lobengula, described in the concession as 'King of the Matabele, Mashonaland and other adjoining territories', gave 'complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my kingdoms, principalities and dominions' to Rudd,

Macguire and Thompson, their heirs and representatives. He agreed that the three could take all necessary and lawful steps to exclude anyone else intent on exploiting minerals, and undertook not to grant any concession of land or mining rights to anyone else without the consent of the three.¹⁹ The concession was then sold to Rhodes's British South Africa Company for £1,000,000. Rhodes had finally obtained the concession he wanted, thereby apparently closing the door to others. But, while the Rudd concession contained a *carte blanche* over mineral rights, it is important to note that it did not contain similar rights over land, although Lobengula undertook not to grant any land concessions without the agreement of Rudd, or in reality the Company. However, another group of speculators led by Edouard Lippert subsequently persuaded Lobengula to grant them a land concession, and this was in turn also sold to the Company.²⁰

News of the sweeping Rudd concession drew a storm of protest from rival would-be exploiters. A Boer delegation visited Lobengula and told him he had sold his country. Soon afterwards, a notice from the Royal Kraal dated 18 January 1889 and signed by Lobengula was inserted in the *Bechuanaland News*, suspending the concession pending an investigation. The King sent two envoys to London to see Queen Victoria to renounce the concession accompanied by E. M. Maund, a business rival of Rhodes whom Lobengula naïvely believed had the interests of the Matabele at heart. Maund did not renounce the concession and instead double-crossed Lobengula, negotiating an amalgamation of his company with Rhodes's. Believing, correctly, that he had effectively given away his country, and at his wits end over the unending duplicity of the white man, Lobengula finally publicly renounced the Rudd concession.²¹

Rhodes was furious. He was in the process of trying to obtain a Royal Charter from the Queen for the British South Africa Company to administer the concession area. The fullness of Rhodes's unscrupulousness was not revealed for forty years. On 12 September 1930, the anniversary of Occupation Day, Frank Johnson, the man who guided the 'pioneer' column to Salisbury, revealed in the *Cape Times* the details of a plot hatched between himself and Rhodes to overthrow Lobengula in order to restore the fortunes of the Company that were threatened by Lobengula renouncing the Rudd concession. He said the plan, to be financed by Rhodes, was 'by sudden assault to overthrow Lobengula and break up the military power of the Matabele'. A group of 500 men, posing as prospectors, trained

ex-members of the South African forces, were to gather in Bechuanaland in an uninhabited part of the country and from there launch a lightning strike on Lobengula's kraal at Bulawayo. It was debated whether to take Lobengula hostage or kill him if he was captured alive. Johnson was to lead the attack and be paid £150,000 if he succeeded, but the plan failed because one of Johnson's friends got drunk and revealed details to a missionary who promptly wrote to the administrator of Bechuanaland.²² Their coup plan thwarted, Rhodes and Johnson now set about planning the occupation of Mashonaland.

While the invading column of 1890 gave the Matabele a wide berth, fearing Lobengula's soldiers and taking stringent precautions against attack, they held a contemptuous view of the Shona, an attitude they were to rue less than six years later. W. D. Gale, in his book *One Man's Vision*, an attempt to glorify Rhodes, wrote of the last day the 'pioneer' column paraded in Salisbury on 30 September 1890: 'They formed the nucleus of a civilized population in the heart of a barbaric land.'²³

The Shona, their mighty empire in decline, did not fear the arrival of the white man for they had not had Lobengula's experience of the whites' duplicity. Nor, apparently, did it occur to them that the white man would steal their land. Stanlake Samkange, in his book *The Origins of Rhodesia*, explains: 'This was due to the Mashona concept of land as something very sacred—*cinonyera*—belonging to the whole tribe but held in trust by the chief and elders whose duty it was to allot it to those who needed it. Land that was given to an individual did not become his property in the European sense of the word. It only meant that he could use it and that his family and descendants could have first claim on its use. . . . Land was sacred because it contained the graves of ancestors. These ancestors were very much part of the day-to-day thinking of the people. People's actions and behaviour were, in one way or another, affected by their belief in the proximity and power of their ancestors in the same way that Christianity and Islam have inspired some men's thoughts, words and deeds . . . the land in which the ancestors were buried was not only sacred but it was also the link between the past and the present and future members of the tribe.'²⁴ The Mashona believed the spirits would protect their land and that therefore they had nothing to fear from the whites, not knowing that the members of invading columns had already been promised 1,500,000 acres and that they had the firepower to support their expropriation. Once the Mashona realized what was happening

an uprising was inevitable, and in this the spirit mediums, the link between the dead and the living, were to play a vital role.

Although Mashonaland was initially peacefully occupied, the white invaders remained extremely wary of the Matabele. Lobengula's soldiers were growing increasingly restless about the occupation and the way it was beginning to limit their forays against Mashona chiefs who had previously paid homage to Lobengula. Tensions grew and a crisis was inevitable, for Rhodes had not forgiven Lobengula for nullifying the Rudd concession and he was determined to bring Matabeleland under Company control.

Gale, while defensive of the motivation of Rhodes and the settlers, is revealing of the settlers' attitude on this point. 'It was obvious that civilization and barbarism made poor bedfellows. They were completely incompatible in traditions, culture, outlook, ways of thought and methods of life. Friction was inevitable. The whites on the one hand regarded the independence of the Matabele as an irksome restriction on their activities. Not only could they not live and work in peace in the country they had occupied, but they were prevented from testing and developing the rich reefs in Matabeleland, now totally closed to them. Progress was impossible until the Matabele had been humbled.'²⁵

The excuse, if one was really needed, for action against the Matabele occurred when Lobengula sent soldiers into the Fort Victoria area to discipline a Mashona chief who was refusing to pay his annual dues. It also coincided with the realization that there were no vast gold reefs in Mashonaland and the continuing belief that the real vast deposits lay in Matabeleland.

The Charter Company was meting out excessively rough 'justice' to Africans. In one case a farmer named Bennett alleged he had had some goods stolen from his farm by people from Chief Ngomo's kraal and when he complained to the Chief he and 'his boy' were struck 'by natives'. Captain Lendy and a contingent of troops were sent to look into the case, supported by a seven-pounder Maxim Nordenfelt gun. Messengers were sent to order Ngomo to surrender by sunset to be taken to Salisbury, and when he did not surrender Lendy took this as defiance of the white man. Lendy surrounded the Chief's kraal and opened fire, killing the Chief, his son, and twenty-one other Africans. 'All natives in the vicinity are peaceful,' said a report on the incident, adding that the author was thoroughly satisfied that it 'will serve as a useful example'. A Colonial Office report considered Lendy's actions 'utterly disproportionate to the original offence', adding that he had

'acted in this matter with recklessness and undue harshness'. The Company did not see it that way. Lendy was promoted to be Magistrate of Fort Victoria.²⁶

With considerable perception the London *Financial Times* observed in January 1887: 'The Pioneers have done all in their power to provoke Lobengula.' It went on to say that 'there is no doubt that a fight must ultimately and very shortly ensue.' Lobengula clung desperately to the hope that war could be avoided. He made peaceful overtures and wrote to Queen Victoria, but it was to no avail. Rhodes was determined to have Matabeleland and the settlers the gold they believed existed there.

On 14 August 1893, Dr Jameson, the Charter Company Administrator of Mashonaland, ordered Captain Allan Wilson to recruit men for the invasion of Matabeleland. It was to be a mercenary force. Each member was promised 6,000 acres of land anywhere in Matabeleland, twenty claims in the goldfields and a share of the 'loot', half of which would go to the Company, the remainder to be divided equally among the officers and men. In hard cash the invasion was estimated to be worth £10,000 to each man, a very considerable sum in those days.²⁷

A three-pronged attack was planned involving 1,135 white troops, including a contingent of the Bechuanaland Border Police and 1,800 soldiers supplied by Bechuanaland's Chief Khama. The force was backed by Maxim machine-guns and artillery and carried supplies for a two-month campaign. The invasion, authorized by Britain, was on 3 October and Lobengula's kraal in Bulawayo was occupied a month later, after the forces he committed had been severely mauled by the invaders' superior fire power. Forced to retreat, he tried to buy peace. He sent an emissary to admit defeat and to offer the invaders 1,000 sovereigns to go and leave his people in peace. The emissary gave the message and money to two white soldiers, who kept the money and did not pass the message on to their officers. Lobengula, a bitter and disillusioned man, was finally hounded to his death in late January 1894, but not before his soldiers had achieved a measure of recompense by killing Captain Wilson, who had raised the invasion force, and thirty-one of his men on the Shangani patrol.

An uneasy truce followed. Over 90,000 cattle belonging to the Matabele were confiscated as part of the 'loot' as the conquerors rode roughshod over the conquered. African 'reserves' were established in north and north-east Matabeleland and the invaders expropriated the

most fertile land. A hut tax was imposed and, to add to the misery of the Matabele, drought, locusts and rinderpest hit the area. Robert Blake states in his book *A History of Rhodesia*, that in 1893 in Matabeleland alone Africans owned 200,000 cattle. By 1897 there were less than 14,000 African-owned cattle in the whole of Rhodesia. Thousands of healthy African-owned cattle had been shot by the settlers to stop the spread of rinderpest, an action which was viewed as malevolent by the Africans.²⁸ For the Matabele the arrival of the settlers meant that their country had been invaded, their best land taken, their cattle confiscated and shot, a hut tax imposed and many of them driven into reserves. The catastrophes of drought, locusts and rinderpest followed the arrival of the whites and this had occurred, the Africans believed, because the settlers could not 'make peace with the land'.

A new crisis between the Matabele and the settlers was inevitable and Gale observes: 'It was not natural for a nation of savages who had taken so much pride in their former strength and tribal greatness to discard the cloak of racial independence for the sackcloth of servitude without a struggle.' Attitudes such as those expressed by Gale were not uncommon among the early settlers. The British Deputy Commissioner, Sir Richard Martin, in his report on the causes of the 1896-7 uprisings, observed that the Company believed 'all heart had been knocked out of the natives, and that they were . . . at liberty to impose what laws and place what exactions they thought fit upon them, without fear of retaliation.' Such a view, Sir Richard noted, defied 'common prudence'.²⁹

The opportunity for the Matabele to hit back at their oppressors was provided by the ill-conceived Jameson raid into Transvaal in late December 1895. The initial plan was that there would be an uprising in Transvaal to overthrow President Kruger, and that once it had begun, Dr Leander Jameson, the Company's Administrator in Rhodesia, would lead a force to support the uprising and crush the Boer Republic. Jameson chose the Company police to be the nucleus of his raiding force and, although the uprising failed to materialize and no orders from Rhodes (who had approved the invasion) were received, he went ahead with the raid on 29 December. On 2 January 1896, Jameson and 400 members of his force surrendered at Doornkop, fourteen miles from Johannesburg, and were imprisoned in Pretoria. The raid had several repercussions. Jameson was handed over to the British by the Boers, tried, and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. Rhodes was forced to resign as Prime Minister of the

Cape and six months later from the board of the Company. Of even greater importance was that Jameson's decision to take Company police as part of his raiding force meant that there were only forty-eight European mounted police left in Rhodesia.³⁰ As news of the abortive raid spread north across the Limpopo the Matabele saw the opportunity and struck.

The first sign of impending trouble came on 20 March when an African police detachment was attacked. Three days later the first settlers were killed. Within a week 130 Europeans had died. General Sir Frederick Carrington, who became commander of the forces in Rhodesia during the uprisings, expressed the views of most of the settlers when he advocated at a public dinner that the Matabele should be exterminated or deported.³¹

The oppression of the Matabele following the 1893 invasion had laid the seeds for the uprising, and two differing sources of power brought it to fruition. One was Umlugulu, the Matabele high priest, who was supported by the older aristocracy of Lobengula's court. The second was an *induna* named Mpotshwana who had the support of the younger warriors. Both groups had their different candidates to fill the vacant throne. The alliance against the whites was cemented by the Mwari or Mlimo cult, part of the ancient Shona religious system.³²

Initially the surviving settlers were driven into four laagers at Bulawayo, Gwelo, Belingwe and Mangwe. The Matabele had plenty of ammunition, shot more accurately than during the 1893 war, avoided the direct battles which had previously proved their downfall and were joined by a number of African policemen who had defected. The Mwari priests told the Matabele that the settlers' bullets would turn to water. The war looked as if it would become protracted and too costly for the Company until Rhodes, by offering to rectify some oppressive measures, negotiated peace with the Matabele *indunas* in the Matopos at four *indabas* (councils of elders) between 21 August and 13 October.

The need for peace in Matabeleland had been brought home sharply to the settlers by the totally unexpected uprising of the Mashona. Their view of the Mashona, as Gale writes, was even more arrogant and superior than it was towards the Matabele. 'Cowardice was their besetting sin. A *sjambok* in the hand of a determined man was sufficient to send them scurrying in all directions. As a race they lacked courage and spirit, and from the white man's point of view, possessed few redeeming qualities. Any suggestion that so spineless a

people could have perpetrated the outrages they committed during the Rebellion would have been laughed to scorn.³³

In Mashonaland the settlers and the Company had overruled the traditional authority of the Chiefs, enforced their own brutal and punitive 'justice', introduced widespread forced labour, stopped trade with Tete in the eastern Portuguese colony, allowed treaties with Mashona Chiefs to lapse, seized land on the basis of Lobengula's authority which the Shona Chiefs did not recognize, expropriated cattle and, in March 1894, introduced a hut tax of 10s. a hut per annum. Locusts, drought and rinderpest had also afflicted much of Mashonaland, and on 16 June 1896 the Shona, seeing the opportunity the Matabele uprising had created, began to fight.

The uprising began in the Hartley area of western Mashonaland and was led by paramount Chief Mashyangombi. Swiftly it spread to other areas, and although the Matabele surrendered four months later the Shona fought on for another year. Their uprising was less well co-ordinated and not as centralized. Salisbury was not virtually surrounded as Bulawayo had been and many Chiefs, as had happened in Matabeleland, stayed aloof from the first war of liberation. In the Mtoko area, due east of Salisbury, where forced labour had not been introduced, the Chief did not join in. Melsetter area, which had escaped rinderpest, also remained peaceful.³⁴

Two spirit mediums were credited with great influence in the uprising. Gomporehumba, the son of Chief Mashonganyika who was a strong supporter of the uprising in the Hartley area, was reputed to be the medium of a Shona spirit known as Kagubi. In the Mazoe area a frail woman was the medium for the Shona spirit Nehanda. They, and other spirit mediums, were the link between the dead and the living and they wielded enormous power, playing a revolutionary and charismatic role as they recognized the people's grievances and urged them to rise to overthrow their oppressors.³⁵

No attempt was made to negotiate with the Mashona as Rhodes had done with the Matabele. In September 1897 one of the staunchest supporters of the uprising, Chief Makoni, who had offered to surrender in return for his life being spared, was tried and summarily executed. The Kagubi medium surrendered in October, the month the settlers considered the Mashona rebellion ended. A total of 450 whites had been killed and 189 wounded in the uprising. Of the dead 372 were settlers—10 per cent of the settler population at that time.

Nehanda was captured in December. She and Kagubi were tried and executed in March 1898, but her name lived on in the folklore of

the Mashona as the stories of the heroes of the first war of liberation were told by the elders in the villages. Seventy-four years later, when the decisive phase of the second *chimurenga* war began, one of four sectors in the north-east was named Nehanda by the guerrillas. The new medium of the spirit Nehanda, a woman of considerable age, was carried from the area around Musengezi to Chifombo camp on the Mozambique–Zambia border, nine days' march away, to give inspiration and guidance to a new generation of freedom fighters.

4

Sowing the Seeds for Revolution

Even before the settlers and imperial troops put down the uprisings of 1896–7 some 15,000,000 acres of the country's total of 96,000,000 acres had been expropriated from the Africans without any form of compensation.¹ By 1898 an estimated 38 per cent of the total population of Matabeleland had been forced into reserves.²

The realization that the reputed abundance of gold did not exist in Rhodesia led in turn to the recognition that the country's agricultural base must be developed if the Company was to profit from its adventure. By 1904 little progress had been made, with Europeans farming only 5 per cent of cultivated land and producing 10 per cent of agricultural output.³ Cheap land policies—ranching land was 8½*d.* and potential arable land 3*s.* 9*d.* an acre in 1908—were intended to encourage expansion.⁴ From 1905 to 1911 the number of white farmers rose from 948 to 2,067,⁵ but this was not fast enough for the Company, which tried to attract multinational capital to increase land values and capitalist production. Reservations remained among possible external investors, although in 1911 Liebig's bought 1,200,000 acres of ranchland for less than £45,000.

Until 1918 the land purportedly belonged to the Company by right of the Lippert concession and conquest. The Company distributed and sold the land as it saw fit, to settlers, Africans and missionary organizations, the latter acquiring 400,000 acres over the years. By 1908 the settlers—as the Africans had already done—were questioning the Company's right over land, arguing, correctly, that it was making money out of land it did not legally own. In 1914 the settlers

challenged the Company's rights in a case submitted to the judicial committee of the Privy Council. The Privy Council concerned itself solely with 'unalienated land', land which had not been sold. This included 'native reserves' where Africans had been 'temporarily' settled. The verdict, given in 1918, deprived the Company of the power it had conferred upon itself and vested all land in the British Crown. The settlers benefited greatly from the decision and rushed to buy huge tracts of unalienated land, the Privy Council having declared that 'whoever owns' the land not yet sold to the settlers, 'the natives do not'.⁶ With this Order-in-Council 10,000 kilometres away, the expropriation of the fertile lands by the settlers was 'legalized' and the Africans were 'legally' deprived of the land in their own country. It is little wonder that land was to become the central issue in nationalist politics leading up to and through the second war of liberation.

Until 1914 Africans were allowed to remain on land purchased by the settlers but had to pay rent, either in kind as cheap farm labourers or in cash, for the 'privilege' of continuing to occupy their ancestral homes. Rents had been imposed on Africans living on 'unalienated lands' in 1908, and on Africans living on Company farms in 1912. A single kraal could be charged up to £300, administrative hut taxes were £1, and a further levy of 10s. for each wife had been introduced. In 1915, according to the Native Reserves Commission, 405,376 Africans were living in the reserves. A further 327,777 were living on the 22,385,182 acres expropriated by the settlers while 47,825,668 acres of land remained to be 'alienated'.

Initially the African farmers produced a surplus which was sold to the settlers, but as the latter turned increasingly to farming the policy of the Company changed to reducing competition from African farmers and to creating a permanent reservoir of cheap labour. Despite the imposition of excessive taxes and other adversities created to discourage them, African farmers showed a clear reluctance to work on the settlers' farms. This is illustrated by the fact that in 1909, 54 per cent of labour in the country came from outside Southern Rhodesia.⁷

The next major change in land policy came in 1930 with the Land Apportionment Act which institutionalized the racial division of all land in the country. The following table illustrates the racial breakdown the following year and the changes by 1962:⁸

	1931 (acres)	1962 (acres)
European areas	49,149,000	35,384,000
Native reserves	21,600,000	21,020,000
Native Purchase areas	7,465,000	4,216,000
Special Native areas	—	19,150,000
Unassigned or unreserved	17,793,000	5,416,000
Wankie Game Reserve	—	3,324,000
Forest area	591,000	6,650,000
Undetermined	88,000	—
TOTALS:	99,686,000	96,610,000

The creation of Native Purchase Areas, located adjacent to reserves, was intended as a form of compensation to the more progressive African farmers. If they had the money and a Master Farmers Certificate (no such qualification was needed by the whites), they could buy farms in these designated areas. But it was not much of a concession: of the total of 7,465,000 acres about 4,000,000 acres were in remote areas of the country and unsuitable for farming. By 1977 there were only 8,102 occupied Purchase Area farms (compared to 675,000 'tribal cultivators in the reserves')⁹ and the area set aside for purchase had been halved.

Prior to that Act, land outside the reserves could be purchased by any racial group but, although less than half the land outside the reserves was being farmed and only 50,000 acres had been bought by Africans, the whites feared that the Africans would demand and occupy more land. After the Land Apportionment Act the policy of moving Africans to reserves was intensified. In the next decade 50,000 people were moved to reserves, between 1945 and 1959 another 85,000 were moved, and from 1964 to 1978 at least 88,000 more were moved.¹⁰ Most of the latter group were classified as 'squatters' and evicted from European farming areas. An estimated 500,000 more were moved to 'protected' or 'consolidated' villages in the Seventies during the second war of liberation to prevent them giving food and other forms of support to the guerrillas.

The original idea of the Land Apportionment Act was that the cities, towns and commercial areas would be exclusively white domains with no Africans living in them. African urban areas—sprawling townships where the poverty stood out in stark contrast to the conspicuous wealth of the white areas—were prescribed

in an amendment to the Land Apportionment Act in 1941 which divided the country into four areas: European, Native, Forest and Unreserved Land. In 1950 the African areas were further divided into Special Native Areas and reserves, the former being sub-divided into Purchase and Township areas.

In the late Twenties there were reports that the reserves were full. The land set aside for reserves was notable for poor soil and rainfall, often infested with tsetse fly, and frequently so far removed from lines of communication that it was impossible for surplus produce to be sent to market. The huge enforced population inflow inevitably led to overstocking and erosion and the Land Apportionment Act was again amended in 1951, when the Native Land Husbandry Act was passed. This provided for the 'control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives to ensure its efficient use for agricultural producers and to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources'. African families were entitled to five head of cattle and eight acres of land. The District Commissioner and not the Chief, the traditional authority, allocated (or refused to allocate) land. Families were forced to sell off cattle in excess of five at artificially low prices and the Native Land Husbandry Act—a futile attempt to arrest a situation they had themselves created—generated more bitterness against the settler government than any previous legislation.

The pressure for land had increased sharply after the Second World War with the influx of European settlers, attracted by the post-war demand for agricultural products, notably tobacco, and encouraged by the earlier settlers who were beginning to feel racially insecure after a slack period of population growth between 1920 and 1940.¹¹ The white population almost doubled between 1946 and 1953, reaching 158,000 at the outset of Federation.¹² Between 1950 and 1960, 110,000 Africans were expelled from European farming areas.¹³ The post-war economic boom swelled the labour market in agriculture, mining and industry, but this was to be a factor in precipitating the upsurge of black nationalism in the mid-Fifties after a drop in the price of copper caused the economy to sag. The new immigrants, largely lower middle class and semi-skilled, found themselves most threatened by the upsurge in African expectations and this often manifested itself in more pronounced racial prejudice.

African feelings of bitterness over the Native Land Husbandry Act are illustrated in a story told by a young man who was to become one of the first guerrillas to go for training in Ghana in 1964.¹⁴ In 1951, when

the Act was introduced, he tended his father's cattle, the traditional task of most rural boys; his father had given him one cow as an incentive to look after the herd carefully. When the Act was introduced the father was forced to take a number of cattle, including his son's, to market to reduce the herd to the prescribed maximum. He returned from the market and gave his son one shilling for the cow, which he instructed him to keep in an earthenware pot, the shilling representing the nominal sum he had received for a cow which was worth far more and in traditional terms was a conspicuous sign of wealth. Each day the father asked his son whether the shilling had multiplied and, somewhat perplexed by his father's seemingly abnormal behaviour, the son replied that it had not. This process went on for several weeks until one day the father told his son that it had not because they were oppressed. The cow now belonged to a white man and it was producing calves and increasing its value for that white man—but the shilling the white man had paid would never reproduce, his father said, and the Act was simply a device to keep Africans poor while the whites grew rich.

From its inception in 1930 the Land Apportionment Act was subject to about sixty amendments without ever affecting the principles applying to African land. At the time of the 1961 amendment, more than one-third of the land in Southern Rhodesia was held by Europeans, who numbered only one-seventeenth of the population. Almost all the best land was in the hands of 6,400 white farmer-owners and 1,400 white tenant farmers.¹⁵ Of the land held by Europeans, only 3.5 per cent of usable land was under cultivation compared to 10.4 per cent in the less fertile African areas, which carried fourteen times the population.¹⁶ Large tracts of European land, then and now, were owned by absentee landlords. In 1970, under the Land Tenure Act, the division of land between Europeans and Africans was finalized 'for all time' and the reserves became known as Tribal Trust Lands, of which 165 covering 40,200,000 acres were designated.

Roger Riddell in his pamphlet on *The Land Problem in Rhodesia* noted: 'If each African cultivator is to have enough grazing and arable land to support its family then the TTLs, as presently constituted, are able to carry approximately 275,000 cultivators. But in 1977 there were already 675,000 cultivators in the Tribal areas, nearly three times the maximum number that can be safely carried. The land is not only acutely over-populated but there is now little or no land left for potential young farmers; in some areas over 40 per cent of men between the ages of sixteen and thirty are landless.'

Tongogara succinctly explains the bitterness of those of his generation who were to become the first fighters. 'My grievances were based on the question of oppression which I had seen myself, from my parents or from my own people, particularly in the deprivation of land. You know our people are naturally farmers. They like soil. They know that everything is soil, and yet they are deprived of the rich soil in Zimbabwe. This and education. I used to listen to my parents talking about it. My elder brother failed to get a place for school, even other friends.'¹⁷

Education, or rather lack of it, was to become the second major grievance of Southern Rhodesia's Africans. It is apparent from the stories of many of the guerrillas that in the Sixties and early Seventies they went for training after being denied further education.

In 1907 the British government had passed the first Order-in-Council on African education, the Native Education Ordinance. This established boarding schools for Africans under the supervision of missionaries, who were settlers themselves and whose interests in many ways were similar to Rhodes's settlers. Christianity, with its emphasis on obedience and humility, was a useful tool in an emerging colony, where missionaries like Livingstone, Moffat and Helms had done so much to prepare the way for occupation and where the church itself was to have a share of the spoils. Nonetheless, mission schools were to play a crucial role in African education for many decades. Most of the young people who fought in the second war of liberation seventy years later were mission-educated, as were most cabinet ministers in the first independence government, and many remote mission stations were to play a largely positive role during the decisive phase of the war.

By 1920 there were 43,084 pupils in nearly 700 schools, rather more than 5,000 of whom were Europeans.¹⁸ Government expenditure on African education was £10,016 a year, or 5s. 3d. per pupil each year. Expenditure for white pupils was £187,831, or £34 15s. a head.¹⁹ The Department of Education was responsible for white education, the Native Affairs Department for African education.

In 1930 education was made compulsory for white children and eight years later this was extended to Asian and Coloured children, but up until independence in April 1980 the same basic right never included Africans. The settler government feared the emergence of a literate, white-collar, African proletariat and emphasized technical rather than academic education for blacks, thereby limiting employ-

ment possibilities almost exclusively to manual labour and minor artisan fields. It was a policy which brought the government into dispute with two white groups. The white trade union movement felt it would be threatened by Africans with technical skills who would break the monopoly of white workers on skilled employment. However, industry and commerce wanted a black work force with some technical and academic skills so they could break the high wage structure demanded by white workers. The 1931 Public Services Act reinforced government policy by excluding non-whites from the civil service except as teachers and nurses.

A period of increased government hostility towards African advancement occurred. Between 1929 and 1943 there was a decline in the number of schools and pupils. In 1930, when government expenditure for African education was £44,737, the African contribution to government revenue through direct taxation was eight times that amount.²⁰ Kraal schools, enrolling the largest number of pupils, received only £12,169 a year. The missionaries, whatever their shortcomings, remained the only non-Africans contributing to African educational advancement. While much was made of the number of Africans in schools in Southern Rhodesia the reality was that Northern Rhodesia, with a smaller population, had more. In Southern Rhodesia the government was responsible for only two trade schools. The Northern Rhodesia government was responsible for all urban education.

It was not until 1942 that the Southern Rhodesia government took over responsibility for the education of Africans in urban areas and this was not implemented until 1946. The first African government secondary school, Goromonzi near Salisbury, was opened that year and two others in Bulawayo three years later. Private studies or enrolment in South Africa were the only way Africans could get secondary education until 1946, and two years later there were 716 private students, 100 more than had been enrolled in government schools.

The Garfield Todd government from 1953 to 1958 brought the first serious attempt to improve African education. The number of government primary schools rose from twenty in 1953 to forty-six in 1960. African education was taken away from the Native Affairs Department and mission schools were given grants to help introduce four-year courses into secondary schools. Fletcher High School, the second government secondary school teaching up to university entrance, was opened at Gwelo in 1957 and a government teacher

training school and a technical teacher training school were opened. These measures contributed to Todd being condemned by the settlers as a dangerous liberal and finally ejected from power.

Part of Todd's tenure covered the years of the Central African Federation (1953–63), a period in which it was often claimed that African education in Southern Rhodesia was the best in Africa. In fact a 1962 census revealed that only 60 per cent of school-age children from seven to sixteen years old were attending school and that 46.6 per cent of males and 58.7 per cent of females born after 1947 had never been to school at all.²¹ In 1959–60 African secondary enrolment was 3,300 compared to 21,671 Europeans enrolled in the Federation. The amount spent on a white pupil's secondary education was £103 a year. The comparable sum for a black pupil was £8.²²

The formation of the Rhodesian Front in 1962, its coming to power later that year, the ousting of Sir Winston Field in April 1964 and his replacement by Smith, represented a further setback to all forms of African advancement. Smith declared a month after coming to power: 'If in my lifetime we have an African nationalist government in power in Southern Rhodesia, then we will have failed in the policy that I believe in.' The RF embarked upon a deliberate policy of emasculating the African education system, enrolment in teacher training declined and budget cutbacks decreased school intakes. Higher school fees introduced in 1964 led to more pupils dropping out because their parents could not afford the fees. The number of African pupils declined from 713,170 in 1968 to 703,729 in 1970, when the annual population growth was over 2.5 per cent.²³ The numbers of teachers, many of whom had been detained, also fell. Teachers and pupils suspected of nationalist sympathies were dealt with harshly and the community school in Highfield where Josiah Chinamano was headmaster was closed. Of the 113,941 pupils who began the first year of primary education in 1960 only a third were able to complete primary education and only 6,754 obtained secondary places.²⁴

The discrepancy between the amount of money spent on African and European education is again illustrated by the government vote in 1971:²⁵

	African	Non-African
Population	4,817,950	252,414
Total education vote	Rh\$21,400,000	Rh\$20,299,000
Expenditure per head of population	Rh\$5	Rh\$80

The government maintained that it was spending more on African education than most African countries and that the burden was borne mainly by the white taxpayer. This was not true. Todd had introduced a system under which every African male paid a £1 annual tax specifically for education and African parents contributed considerably to school funds by helping with buildings and school equipment. The bulk of European taxes were anyway a result of the profits made from cheap African labour. 'At most, the contribution to African education through income tax can only be regarded as a joint effort,' Shamuyarira argues in his book *Crisis in Rhodesia*. Smith's government reinforced emphasis on technical rather than academic education for Africans, and the most telling comment came from his Minister of Education in a statement to Parliament in 1966 when he observed that, for the great majority of Africans, there was no purpose in education other than literacy.

Discrimination in land distribution and educational opportunity led inevitably to a third area of discrimination: labour conditions and job opportunities. The cornerstone of the discriminatory legislation in this area was laid in 1901 with the Masters and Servants Act. This excluded all Africans employed in domestic service, agriculture and mining from trade union activity. The full significance can be seen by the fact that in 1962 Africans employed in domestic service or agriculture numbered 323,000, or 51.6 per cent of all wage-employed Africans.²⁶ Therefore the majority of the black work force was barred from any trade union activity and denied any wage-setting machinery or right to collective bargaining. No minimum wage was set by government, wages were determined solely by 'market forces'. They were entitled to only one day off a week and the maximum 'day' was set at ten hours.

The African Labour Regulations Act, which was amended eight times, followed in 1911. This covered African labourers employed to perform 'bodily labour in mining, agriculture, husbandry, trade or manufacture' but it excluded domestic and skilled workers. It made it an offence to poach labour—agricultural workers being in particularly short supply at that time—by offering higher wages, greater benefits or any other inducement to persuade an African to break an existing contract of service. No similar legislation ever existed governing non-Africans.

In 1934, as a result of pressure from white trade unionists who feared their jobs were threatened by technically orientated African

education, the Industrial Conciliation Act was passed. All Africans were excluded from the definition of 'employee'. In the Forties, after mine workers were removed from the Masters and Servants Act, leaving only domestic and agricultural workers debarred from trade union activity, the government began minimal movement to allow the institutionalization of some African unions which had begun to form in other fields. In 1959 the Act was amended to allow their registration, but the Minister of Labour said bluntly: 'It could be argued that to provide for these associations is nothing more than a control measure and, let me be perfectly frank, it is.'²⁷ Whereas white trade unions were automatically registered under the Act, black unions had to qualify and apply for registration. Initially the African unions were hostile but with nowhere else to go they began to apply for registration. By June 1962 only five had been granted registration certificates.

The provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act covered all workers except those in domestic service, agriculture, the civil service and Rhodesian Railways. Apart from those categories, the Act implied a fundamental change, introducing union-management negotiations for a limited number of workers—mainly skilled and therefore white—while conditions of the rest of the workers were regulated by Industrial Boards. These were not negotiating boards but appointees of the Minister of Labour to recommend on wage policy. Unions could only represent workers, or a class of workers, in a single industry, trade or occupation and even then only in a single area of the country. The unions were precluded from affiliating with any political party or organization or from using funds to further the interests of a political party organization. Industrial Councils, potentially the more promising bargaining instrument for African workers, could be formed only with management agreement and any agreements reached had to be submitted to the Minister of Labour, who had the power to amend the terms of any agreement if he considered it contrary to the interests of the 'consumers' and 'the public as a whole'. Through amendments in 1964, 1967 and 1971 the government gained increasing control over the unions. In 1971 constraints were placed on the right to strike if it was deemed against the 'public interest'. In addition, any person convicted under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act or Unlawful Organizations Act was debarred from holding union office for seven years.

In 1960, when the British Prime Minister, Sir Harold Macmillan, was making his 'wind of change' speech about decolonization, South-

ern Rhodesia was moving to new heights of legislative repression with the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and Emergency Powers Act. Those two acts superseded much of the existing labour legislation. Under Section 31 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act it became a criminal offence to incite strike action in 'essential services'. These essential services ranged from coal mining to the production, supply, delivery or distribution of food, fuel and coal. Under the provisions of this section African workers who went on strike could be imprisoned for life or sentenced to death. Two further pieces of labour legislation in 1973, the African (Registration and Identification) Act and Vagrancy Amendment Act, were designed to prevent African job seekers and small traders entering the urban areas.

Differential controls, always giving Africans an inferior status, pervaded every aspect of their lives. Job opportunities were limited and wages were appallingly low. The poverty datum line for the average family in municipal accommodation in January/February 1974 was estimated at £49 a month for Salisbury, £47 for Bulawayo and £56 for Fort Victoria.²⁸ The average wage of £22 was well below the average family's minimum needs and in 1976 only 10 per cent of African workers outside agriculture were being paid above the poverty datum line.²⁹

In Salisbury's luxurious Borrowdale suburb, where paddocks, tennis courts and swimming pools are commonplace, only a handful of domestic workers and gardeners were earning over £20 a month when that figure was introduced as a minimum wage for agricultural and domestic workers soon after independence in April 1980. A survey showed that a number of gardeners were being paid as little as £7 a month. White 'bosses' and 'madams' protested vociferously at the introduction of the minimum wage and many African workers were dismissed, one to the author's knowledge for failing to report to work on independence day, a public holiday. At the same time, in the Earl Grey Building, which houses many government ministries, white porters, supplementing their retirement pensions, were being paid three times as much as Africans doing exactly the same job.

The wage gap between blacks and whites had become a source of deep anger. In 1974, for instance, there were 927,000 Africans employed in European areas, representing 88.7 per cent of all employees. They earned £248,000,000, only 41.3 per cent of total national earnings. Their average earnings were £266 a year compared to £3,580 for the 118,200 European, Asian and Coloured employees, a wage gap of eleven to one.³⁰

Although only about 15 per cent of the African population were in wage employment in 1977, wages are a much more important component of African existence than this figure suggests. About half the population is under seventeen and only 10 per cent of the total African work force is female, thus it becomes apparent that 50 to 60 per cent of African households are dependent upon income from salaried employment as their principal source of revenue.³¹

The contrast between European affluence and African poverty is also reflected in health care. The original health service started as a network of hospitals serving European settlers, concentrated in urban areas. The early administration began to provide a rudimentary health service for Africans for two reasons—because of the danger of epidemics like smallpox spreading to European areas and because a healthy labour force was needed, particularly by the mining industry. This led to the establishment of fever hospitals and mine hospitals. In the rural areas, as had occurred with education, most of the burden fell upon the missionaries to establish dispensaries and hospitals. It was not until the late Twenties that the government began to accept some responsibility for rural health services.

In June 1969 the Matabeleland Provincial Medical Officer of Health stated: 'The conditions which are currently responsible for most of the ill-health in the rural population are those associated classically with low standards of living and those conditions most commonly affect children. They are not tropical diseases but are in many ways similar to the diseases which prevailed in Europe in the nineteenth century—malnutrition, infections in the respiratory system, gastrointestinal system, skin and eyes, measles and whooping cough. To these must be added the tropical condition of trachoma which also fits into the category of diseases associated with low standards of hygiene.'³²

One study in the Macheke district found that 90 per cent of African children living on European farms were undernourished.³³ Prior to the July 1980 introduction of a £20 a month minimum wage for agricultural workers, this group were supposed to be paid about £13 a month, but many white farmers were paying considerably less. In the Tribal Trust Lands the average monthly income of a family was probably less than £10. Malnutrition, especially among infants, was a major cause of death and disease and the infant mortality rate for Africans was estimated at between 120 and 200 per 1,000 births compared to the European figure of 17 per 1,000.³⁴

The bulk of the national health budget was spent on running hospitals and clinics, on curative rather than preventive medicine. Salisbury hospitals, for example, catering for 8.7 per cent of the total population, received about 30 per cent of the total health vote. The gap between urban and rural medical services became even wider as private practices and medical aid societies flourished in the towns almost entirely to serve the white community. It was estimated in 1971 that there was only one doctor for every 45,556 people in the rural areas. By 1979, with the loss of 50 per cent of mission doctors, the rural doctor-patient ratio was put at one to 100,000 and even that figure may have been an overestimate.³⁵ In early 1980 only a handful of Southern Rhodesia's 1,000 or so doctors were working in rural areas. In contrast European health care was extremely good, on a par with health care in Europe and the United States.

In 1976 the government provided only one hospital bed for every 1,261 Africans while providing one bed for every 255 whites. For maternity cases there was one bed for every 6,339 Africans and one for every 964 whites. In 1977, when there were 13,781 general hospital beds in the country, the missions were responsible for 4,095, some 30 per cent of the total and two-thirds of all rural hospital beds. Yet central government provided only £2,000,000 in grants to local authorities, missions and voluntary organizations—a mere 9 per cent of the total health budget.³⁶

In all facets of life in Southern Rhodesia, Africans were discriminated against. The story of land, education, labour and health continues through housing, social welfare (unemployment benefits, pensions, etc.) to business opportunities and access to loans. Many newspapers that tried to express African grievances—like the African *Daily News* and the Catholic publication *Moto*—were banned, others were censored, scores of journalists were expelled and many valuable African historical and political works were prohibited.

After the uprisings of 1896–7 had been suppressed, with the exception of the Maopondera uprising in Mazoe in 1900 there was no further fighting until the 1960s. Nationalist political protest continued—in 1914 the Matabele National Home Movement was particularly vocal in denouncing plans to reduce the size and quality of reserves—but African opinion continued to be ignored. In the 1922 referendum on whether there should be closer ties with South Africa or 'responsible' self-government only sixty members of the 900,000 African population were eligible to vote. The settlers opted for self-government and

in 1923 the rule of the Company, by now thoroughly unpopular with the settlers, ended. Southern Rhodesia was annexed as a British colony.

With the advent of internal self-government a British Governor was appointed and Britain retained certain reserve powers, the most vital of which was the right to veto any legislation discriminating against Africans. At no point, as the settlers evolved a society founded on discrimination against the African population, did Britain use its veto before the November 1965 illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence. One of the earliest nationalists, Abraham Twala, a Zulu Anglican teacher, wrote in 1922: '... experience has taught us that our salvation does not lie in Downing Street...' ³⁷ It was a perceptive observation many subsequent nationalist leaders would have done well to heed. The following year Twala formed the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association, urging Africans to depend on themselves for their salvation and not on the British government.

Matabele resistance, however, for thirty years after the suppression of their 1896 uprising, manifested itself mainly in demands for the return of their kingdom. In 1927 a delegation was sent to London to petition King George for its restoration, a move which provoked the settlers into banishing Lobengula's relatives to Bechuanaland and South Africa. Associations had been formed in Bulawayo and in rural areas of Mashonaland in 1920 but they fared no better in terms of widespread mobilization than did the first African National Congress formed in 1934 by Aaron Jacha. In that era trade unions were a more effective mobilizing force.

Two of the main targets for nationalist criticism in that era were the missionaries and the district commissioners. Clements Kadalie, from Nyasaland's Nkata Bay, said of the missionaries: 'Their greatest sin is that they lift the eyes of the African people from the things of this world to the things above, of which they have no certainty.' That philosophy, as we shall see later, was to become a genuine problem for African clerics and laymen, some of whom chose to cast aside their holy robes for guerrilla uniforms when they could no longer defend their moral contradictions. The Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (RICU), the first mass movement between the two World Wars, led to the emergence of men like Masocha Ndlovu, who was to be denied holy communion by the Catholic church for questioning why it told Africans to close their eyes and pray to God while the Europeans stole their land. The RICU had close links with the South African Communist Party and one of

the early RICU leaders, Charles Mzingeli, held May Day parades until 1957.

Southern Rhodesia, in common with most African countries, underwent a nationalist resurgence immediately after the Second World War as African soldiers, who had fought and died alongside whites, returned home to find themselves second-class citizens again. In 1945 the first effective strike by African workers on Rhodesian Railways was organized to win a pay increase and trade union recognition. The same year the African National Congress was revived under the presidency of Reverend Thompson Samkange. The first general strike followed in 1948 but indecisiveness by the ANC left the main thrust of nationalist militancy firmly in the hands of the trade unionists. One of them, Benjamin Burombo, a towering man standing six feet six inches tall and weighing 250lb, ran the British African Voice Association. He was one of the most outspoken and fearless champions of African rights in that era. Burombo was to influence many young men who were later to emerge as nationalist leaders, including Tongogara who lived near his home and who used to gather the young people around him to explain why the system must be changed. After Burombo's funeral in Bulawayo, Nyandoro was accused of maligning officials of the Ministry of Health by saying he had died on the operating table. He was fined £25 and given a two-month suspended sentence, although he says it was not he himself who actually spoke the words.

Throughout the first half of the century nationalist protest tended to be fragmented and sporadic. A catalyst was needed for concerted national action and this was provided by the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951 which forced rural families to reduce their cattle herds and change land tenure practices. Burombo was one of the most active figures in opposing this hated legislation, and its introduction coincided with the debate on the almost equally emotive issue of the Central African Federation linking Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Less than 450 Africans were eligible to vote in the Federal elections in 1953, which returned two black members, both African journalists, whose subsequent (and past) records showed them to be well removed from the mainstream of radical nationalist politics. Nkomo, at the time a trade unionist, ran unsuccessfully for one of the two seats.

In August 1955 four men whose names were to become well known in the nationalist struggle—James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Edson Sithole and Dunduza Chisiza—formed the City Youth

League. The name was later changed to the African National Youth League (ANYL) to give the movement a broader national appeal. The names of the first three appear elsewhere in this book, and many young people who emerged later as military and political leaders mentioned them as an early source of inspiration. Chisiza, however, should be singled out for special mention at this juncture for in many ways he was the moving spirit behind the Youth League. An articulate and dedicated nationalist, he was born in Nyasaland and like many of his countrymen went to Southern Rhodesia looking for work. His involvement in Southern Rhodesia illustrates the cross fertilization in nationalist politics within the three territories in those days as that of Tongogara and others in Zambia did some years later. Chisiza was deported from Southern Rhodesia in September 1956 after the Youth League organized a highly successful bus boycott by Africans in Salisbury. He became prominent in politics in his own country, was detained for eighteen months by the British colonial administration and after his release became Secretary-General of the Malawi Congress Party. He died in September 1962 in a car crash which many nationalists did not accept as an accident.

Garfield Todd's take-over as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia with the creation of the Federation in 1953 created a slight possibility of evolving political partnership between blacks and whites. In September 1957 the Youth League merged with the Bulawayo branch of the ANC to form a national ANC with Nkomo as President, Chikerema as Vice-President and Nyandoro as Secretary-General. Todd was ousted the following year in a cabinet revolt and the illusion of partnership politics was swiftly dispelled.

In 1959 a State of Emergency was declared throughout the Federation. This was to remain in force in Southern Rhodesia until independence in 1980. In February 1959 the ANC was banned, 500 members were arrested and 300 detained, including Chikerema, Nyandoro, Hamadziripi and Edson Sithole. Nkomo was out of the country when the party was banned and other leaders detained, and for the next twenty months he remained overseas trying to rally support for the nationalist cause. When the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed on 1 January 1960, Michael Mawema became its President and Nkomo the Secretary for External Affairs. In October there was a reshuffle and Nkomo returned as compromise President of the NDP.

Then, in January 1960 in Cape Town, a few months after winning the British general election, Sir Harold Macmillan made his much quoted remark about the 'wind of change' gusting across the conti-

ment. For most African nationalists it was a period of high hopes. Dr Hastings Banda had been released from detention in Nyasaland and a new majority rule constitution agreed to. General Charles de Gaulle had reached agreement for the independence of the African Francophone colonies within the French community, and thirteen attained independence during 1960, nine in the month of August. The Belgian Congo and Nigeria became independent that year and Sierra Leone and Tanzania the following year. Colonially-divided Somalia came together as an independent nation. From only eight independent nations on the continent, the number had leapt to twenty-six by the end of 1961. It was the era of John Kennedy, President of the United States, talking of 'new frontiers' and almost daily, or so it seemed, new frontiers, or new nations, were emerging.

In Southern Rhodesia, however, the mood was quite different. The downfall of Todd had led to a marked shift towards greater settler oppression of the African majority. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act was introduced in 1960 and the Public Order Act replaced by the Emergency Powers Act. In July there were demonstrations in Salisbury and Bulawayo which ended in eleven people being killed and widespread damage to property.

Federation continued as a focal point of nationalist anger in the three territories and in 1960 the Monckton Commission reported that there was considerable African animosity towards the Federation and demanded its end or radical changes in the franchise. A Federal Review Conference began in London on 5 December and Banda, Nkomo and Kaunda walked out of it with their delegations. In mid-January 1961 constitutional talks began in Salisbury and with the arrival of the British Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, talks turned to the thorny issues of the franchise and representation in Parliament.

The NDP's twelve-member executive agreed to insist on parity for African and European seats in the Legislative Assembly as a minimum and Mugabe was particularly forceful in pressing this. Instead Nkomo agreed to proposals which guaranteed Africans a minimum of fifteen seats and Europeans fifty on a complex A and B roll electoral system. Sandys described the breakthrough as a 'miracle', to which Shamuyarira counters that in reality Sandys was 'baptising the fraud as a miracle' and that by acquiescing to it the Colonial Secretary laid much of the groundwork for the impasse of the next two decades.³⁸

For Nkomo the consequences of going along with the proposals were to prove considerable. The NDP Secretary for External Affairs, Leopold Takawira, sent an angry telegram to Nkomo from London,

where the Northern Rhodesia constitutional conference was taking place. 'We totally reject Southern Rhodesian constitutional agreement as treacherous to three million Africans,' Takawira's telegram said. 'Agreement diabolical and disastrous. Outside world shocked by NDP docile agreement. We have lost sympathy of friends and supporters. We have undermined Northern Rhodesian constitutional conference. Unless you take firm stand in Sunday council meeting future means untold suffering and toil. Pray you denounce uncompromisingly and reject unreservedly conference agreement. Demand immediate reversal of present position. Future of three million Africans depends on immediate action.'

The NDP executive, after a heated four-hour meeting, unanimously agreed to reject the franchise and representational proposals. Nkomo threatened to suspend Takawira and one other member whom he described as 'imperialists' and 'Tshombes' trying to divide the party,³⁹ but he was badly shaken by the rebuke he had received. It was to be an issue which his political opponents and critics would frequently use against him in the coming years. The NDP decided to boycott the referendum on the 1961 constitutional proposals in which the Southern Rhodesia government of Sir Edgar Whitehead obtained a two to one majority.

Under pressure from Sandys, Whitehead announced his intention to repeal the Land Apportionment Act to get the required 50,000 Africans on to the B roll. He also spoke about racial integration in schools. At the same time a ruling was handed down by the High Court desegregating public swimming pools. On 9 December 1961, the same day Tanganyika became independent, Whitehead banned the NDP after its refusal to recognize the new constitution. ZAPU was launched ten days later with much the same leadership; Nkomo became President of the new movement, which was also to be banned in ten months' time. Early in 1962, the Rhodesian Front was formed. They were as opposed to the 1961 constitution as the Africans were but for very different reasons.

For Whitehead those were fateful errors. He believed that the two-thirds majority he had secured in the constitution referendum would ensure his return to power in the December 1962 general elections, but he had misread the reasons for that majority. The Europeans had voted for the possibility of independence under the new constitution and not for reforms such as desegregating schools and swimming pools, the repealing of the Land Apportionment Act and the prospect of African rule in fifteen years, to which Whitehead

referred. Against these perceived threats to their status quo the campaign of the Rhodesian Front, led by Winston Field, for the preservation of the Land Apportionment Act, rejection of 'forced integration' and perpetuation of white rule, fell on fertile ground. The Rhodesian Front won thirty-five seats against the United Federal Party's twenty-nine, of which fourteen were won by African UFP candidates in 'districts'. Only a small percentage of Africans entitled to vote did so and it was later estimated that had 5,000 more Africans on the B roll turned out for the UFP Whitehead would have won. Thus the boycott was decisive and the way was open to seventeen years of unbroken rule by the Rhodesian Front.

The arrival of the Rhodesian Front in power and its stated objective of preventing black rule made many nationalists who had not realized it already recognize that the only way to liberate their country was to use the same means the whites had employed to take it—force of arms. But in many nationalists' minds there remained the hope, which inhibited full commitment to armed struggle, that Britain or the United Nations or both would force the settlers to give way. In 1961 Nkomo put their case to the United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four on Decolonisation which rejected Britain's argument that Rhodesia had been a self-governing colony since 1923 and that its internal affairs were not a matter for discussion by the world body.

Before it, too, was banned on 20 September 1962, ZAPU's leadership reached two important decisions: to start bringing arms and ammunition into the country and to send young men out to train in sabotage. Arson and other acts of destruction increased from August 1962. 'General Chedu' emerged as a focus for militancy, with public statements and private instructions for young saboteurs. 'He' was in fact three people—two members of the ZAPU central executive and a youth leader. In July 1962 the ZAPU national executive also decided that if the party was banned they would operate underground rather than regrouping under a new name. When the ban came, Nkomo was in Zambia, and most of the other leaders at home, including Takawira, Mugabe and J. Z. Moyo, were placed under restriction.

Nkomo was expected to return home immediately to support his colleagues. Instead, against the advice of Zambian nationalist leaders, he drove to Tanzania, allegedly to consult the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who was in fact in Athens. Sithole and Enoch Dumbutshena sent telegrams to Nkomo from London remonstrating with him and he finally returned to Southern Rhodesia to restriction at Semukwe Reserve near Plumtree. He summoned his colleagues to propose that

they should flee through Bechuanaland to Tanganyika to set up a government-in-exile, but this was rejected and they remained under restriction until December.

In April 1963 Nkomo finally persuaded his colleagues—insisting that it was the wish of President Nyerere as well as some other African leaders—that they should go to Dar es Salaam to discuss setting up a government-in-exile. Mugabe had misgivings about the proposal but, in common with most of his colleagues, he had little contact with African leaders in those days, so he and his wife, Sally, went to Tanganyika. They assembled in Dar es Salaam on 12 April and, to their great surprise, Nyerere professed to have no knowledge of the plan to set up a government-in-exile. He made it clear he thought their place was at home. In May he told Nkomo to go home and, in June, Kaunda also expressed his disapproval of the executive's absence from Southern Rhodesia.

This opposition to Nkomo's idea acted as a catalyst for those who had been growing increasingly discontented with his leadership. They wanted a firmer policy of confrontation with the settlers and a new more decisive political party. They found Nkomo indecisive and they were concerned at what they perceived to be a lack of confidence in him in Tanzania, Zambia and some other African countries which supported the liberation struggle. Nkomo, they felt, had been vacillating for over a decade by joining the Federation talks in 1952 and then running for a Federal seat, and more recently by his handling of the 1961 constitution issue. Nkomo avoided attempts by the executive to pin him down to a meeting to answer for his actions. He attended the conference to wind up the Central African Federation at Victoria Falls in June and thereafter returned home, leaving most of his executive outside. But the crisis could not be avoided indefinitely, and, after intercepting letters from executive members in Dar es Salaam saying that they had lost confidence in his leadership, he suspended Ndabaningi Sithole, Takawira, Mugabe and Moton Malianga. They retaliated by suspending him but, as he was at home and they were still outside, Nkomo held an immediate tactical advantage.

ZANU was formed on 8 August 1963. Ndabaningi Sithole became its first President, Takawira its Vice-President, Mugabe the Secretary-General and Malianga the Secretary for Youth. Nkomo formed the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) to act for the banned ZAPU. Some of the ugliest incidents in nationalist politics followed. Rival supporters attacked each other with any weapons they could lay their hands on and many people were killed as former colleagues

turned against each other. Homes and stores were burned and looted. In Salisbury and Bulawayo, where Nkomo had moved quickly to assert his authority before his opponents returned home, the PCC had strong support. In the midlands, eastern and southern Mashonaland ZANU held sway. While nationalist supporters looked on in dismay, the Rhodesian Front—where Smith had deposed Field in April, because the latter was reluctant to consider a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain—bided its time before banning ZANU and the PCC in August 1964. Nkomo, Sithole, Mugabe and hundreds of others began more than a decade in detention while the lieutenants they had sent outside—Chikerema, Nyandoro, J. Z. Moyo, Silundika and Ndlovu in Nkomo's case, and Chitepo, Hamadziripi and Mudzi in Sithole's case—directed the faltering start of the armed struggle in the late Sixties.

Independent African states, perceiving the increasing threat of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian Front, demanded unity among the feuding nationalists. ZANU agreed to a meeting of the two parties chaired by the OAU, but ZAPU argued that there could be no discussion with a splinter group which had no support inside the country, a piece of fiction it was to maintain for many years. Any suggestion of recognition of a government-in-exile was excluded by OAU members as a result of their previous unfortunate experience with Holden Roberto's Angolan Revolutionary Government-in-Exile (GRAE), and in December 1963 Nkomo's men were to receive a further setback when the Dar es Salaam-based OAU Liberation Committee of nine members—Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Congo (Zaire), Nigeria, Senegal, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Uganda and Tanzania—decided to recognize both ZANU and ZAPU (although the latter was to receive initially the largest contribution from the Special Fund).

Harold Wilson's Labour government had been elected in Britain in October 1963 and this momentarily appeared to provide some respite, but Smith was determined to achieve independence under white rule at any cost and could not be dissuaded. In November 1964 he faced his white constituency in a referendum with a single question: 'Are you in favour of independence based on the 1961 constitution?' It was a safe bet. A total of 58,091 voted in favour and only 6,096 against. In May 1965 he followed this up with a general election in which the Rhodesian Front won all fifty A roll (white) seats. The stage was set for UDI. The question remained: What, if anything, would Britain do? Wilson—in whom so much hope had been misplaced—supplied the

answer on 31 October 1965: 'the demand for Britain to attempt to settle all Rhodesia's constitutional problems with a military invasion is out.' With the military option firmly ruled out, the way was clear for the Smith government to take matters into their own hands. Majority rule was not to be achieved without the loss of some 30,000 lives in a bloody war.

5

Mobilization and Recruitment

Rex Nhongo, whom the Rhodesians were to come to fear and respect as one of the bravest and most aggressive guerrilla leaders of the war, commanded the unit of twenty-one men in Nehanda sector of the Mozambique-Zimbabwe (MMZ) north-east war zone which fired the first shots of the decisive phase of the war in December 1972.

From their base in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, where Chief Chiweshe was an early supporter, a squad of nine men commanded by Nhongo's deputy, Jairos (who died in action in 1973), set out to attack Altena Farm fifteen kilometres away.¹ Nhongo says they heard from people in the area that the farmer, de Borchgrave, had poor labour relations, but the choice of Altena Farm was fairly random. 'At that time we had no experience of war, so the main thing was for us to study the reaction of the enemy and his tactics so we could decide upon our own tactics.'² Reconnaissance for the attack took one hour. After cutting the telephone lines and mining the road, the guerrilla unit retreated to Chiweshe TTL to watch the Rhodesian response through the extensive network of contacts they had established. These contacts included *mujibas*, a South African slang word for young unemployed men who live by their wits. The *mujibas* were to become the eyes and ears of the guerrillas over the next seven years; by the end of the war they numbered over 50,000, according to ZANLA commanders.

Rhodesian reaction came the following day. The guerrillas were informed that fifteen truckloads of troops had moved into the area, backed by armoured cars, helicopters and spotter planes. They

interpreted this as an indication that the Rhodesians expected the sort of direct confrontation which had characterized fighting in the Sixties and which the guerrillas, in this phase, were determined to avoid. In order not to risk his entire force in a single battle Nhongo split it into three units of seven men. He commanded one, Jairos the second and Hopedzichirira the third.³

Initially the Rhodesians did not realize that they were fighting a new and more determined force of guerrillas, whose priority was to mobilize the people politically rather than to confront the security forces militarily. In a broadcast to the nation on 18 January Smith began to explain this new and serious threat:

There have been some unusual developments over the past few weeks and as facts and the trends are now emerging I would like to put you in the picture as far as I can without breaching our security requirements. The terrorist incursion in the north-east of our country has developed in a manner that we had not previously experienced and as a result we have to face up to a number of serious problems.

In the first place, for some months now these terrorists have been operating in this area, quietly and methodically undermining the local population. They have done this in a number of ways. Firstly, through intimidation at the point of a gun; secondly they found a few witchdoctors of doubtful character and of little substance, and succeeded in bribing them to their side. These were then used to good effect in misleading local tribesmen into accepting that the terrorists were worthy of their support.

I am sure that I do not have to inform you how easy it is to mislead these simple, gullible people who still believe in witchcraft and the throwing of bones. You may ask how it was possible for terrorists to operate in this area for so long without detection. This was for the reason that they were able to move backwards and forwards across the border from their so-called base camps and were thereby able to avoid detection for long enough to enable them to subvert pockets of local tribesmen. Thereafter their task was made easy through the shelter, food and assistance they received from the locals.⁴

While Smith did not minimize the seriousness of the new development, he displayed the very simplicity and gullibility he charged Africans with. If the guerrillas had, as he claimed, intimidated the population at gunpoint, then it is inconceivable that, after a year and

seventeen days, their presence in the area would not have been reported to the authorities. The truth was, as SB had accurately predicted, that the area was extremely susceptible to the guerrilla message that the Africans were oppressed by the settlers and that a war of liberation—in the spirit of the resistance shown in the 1890s—was the only answer. Secondly, the witchdoctors Smith referred to were in fact spirit mediums and were not of doubtful character and little substance. By calling them witchdoctors Smith displayed the ignorance common to so many whites in Africa who are incapable of differentiating between the various facets of indigenous society. Nor did he apparently understand the inspirational legacy of mediums like Nehanda and Chaminuka whose names, at the time he was speaking, had been given by the guerrillas to two new sectors of war in the north-east.

Urimbo, ZANLA's first provincial commander, and Chimurenga, the operational commander of ZANLA forces in MMZ, swiftly recognized the importance of the spirit mediums in the north-east. Early in 1972, Chimurenga made contact with one called Chipfeni, who later put him in touch with another named Chidyamuyu. He was in direct contact with Mbuya Nehanda, an old woman, probably in her mid-eighties, who had for more than sixty years been recognized as the medium of the Nehanda who was hanged in 1898. That Nehanda was reputed to have said before her death that her children would one day liberate the country, and Chidyamuyu reminded the young guerrillas of this when they went to see him. Mbuya (i.e. grandmother) Nehanda lived in a village in the Msengezi area, and Chimurenga says that when they met her they talked with the spirit of the first Nehanda, explaining that they were her children and that they needed her guidance to launch the war of liberation. The guerrillas asked about strategy, places to cache arms, places to hide and routes to take. Chimurenga says the spirit ordered them to take the medium to a place of safety where she would be able to give them plans for the war through her medium.⁵

Urimbo, who was directing guerrilla operations from a FRELIMO base in Tete, remembers Mbuya Nehanda as a small woman, very thin and very old, with white hair and skin that was exceedingly black. She was dressed in a piece of black cloth that was wrapped around her body and she wore bangles, some of them gold, on her wrists, and other ornaments around her neck. Her skin was dry and cracked with age, and dung was regularly rubbed on to protect it from the sun.⁶

Mbuya Nehanda, Urimbo says, was reluctant to leave her home.

She insisted that she wanted to stay in the north-east and fight but the guerrillas argued that her spirit had said she must be taken to a place of safety. The guerrillas constructed a crude stretcher from poles and blankets and set out to carry the old woman to Chifombo. It was a journey complicated by the beliefs and taboos surrounding the medium. They could not carry her across water until they felt that the spirit had agreed. The Zambezi River—believed by mediums to be particularly powerful—was to prove a major problem. The guerrillas were forced to spend a long time clapping their hands and appealing to the spirit until they felt she had agreed. Mbuya Nehanda, still protesting that she wanted to stay in the north-east and fight, was ferried across the Zambezi in a dugout canoe and carried on to Chifombo. There a special house was built for her and she blessed war materials and guerrillas going to the front. She told them that if they were to succeed they must not touch women, must not eat certain types of relish and must not fight each other. If a snake crossed their path they must take a different route.⁷

Some of the ZANLA guerrillas were circumspect about the use and powers of Mbuya Nehanda and other mediums. One was Josiah Tungamirai, later to become ZANLA's Chief Political Commissar, who frankly admits, 'Personally I didn't believe in that because I was brought up in the church.' He was born Thomas Mberikwazvo in 1948 in Gutu district where his father was a 'subsistence' farmer. His primary education was at Mutero Mission, a Catholic school run by the Bethlehem Fathers. One of the early political influences on his life was the late Leopold Takawira, who had considerable influence among schoolteachers in Gutu and other areas, and whose participation in ZANU when it was formed in 1963 drew many teachers to the new party. His parents could not afford secondary school fees so Tungamirai told the Fathers that he wanted to become a priest. This was a means of obtaining secondary education, and he went to the seminary at Chikwingwizha where he completed four years. The whites-only Guinea Fowl school was nearby and, as they did not have their own church, the white boys went to Chikwingwizha for Sunday services. Segregation, either through separate services or sitting in pews on different sides of the church, existed in services and in the taking of communion. One of the priests, a history teacher, spoke vehemently against the guerrillas, whom he said would not go to heaven. There were also arguments between some of the pupils and priests about communism, Tungamirai recalled, with the priests arguing that in a communist state everything, including children and

wives, belonged to the state. 'We asked if Mao's wife could be taken by anybody else and were told "Shut up! If you don't want to stay here you can leave."' When he was asked if he wanted to continue with the priesthood, 'I realized that I couldn't fit into the Catholic Church and become a priest.'⁸

Tungamirai left the seminary in 1968 and studied for two years part-time at Salisbury Polytechnic, working during the holidays to earn enough money to pay for his education. There he encountered more discrimination—separate toilets, separate eating facilities, and white pupils calling him 'kaffir'. In December 1970 he left Rhodesia via Botswana to join the guerrillas, and took the *chimurenga* name Tungamirai, which means 'to lead'. Like many other guerrilla recruits, he recalled that it 'was probably an adventure' for him in those days, an adventure inspired by listening to the ZANU and ZAPU radio programmes beamed into Rhodesia from Cairo, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka, and even the BBC. Before leaving Rhodesia he had written to ZANU in Lusaka asking what route he should take and was surprised when he received a reply giving him directions in a letter postmarked with Salisbury's Mufakose African township. He was told to go to Botswana and contact the ZANU representative, Shoniwa, who would be responsible for looking after him. Shoniwa sent him to Lusaka where Tongogara and Chauke met him and other recruits at the airport. He was sent on by bus to Itumbi in Tanzania and later transferred to Mgagao camp, seventy-five kilometres south of Iringa, when it replaced Itumbi in May 1971.⁹

His Catholic background coupled with his political education at Mgagao had made Tungamirai sceptical about spirit mediums when he met Mbuya Nehanda at Chifombo in 1972. 'One day the cadres came and told me that Mbuya Nehanda wanted some relish. Would you fetch a chicken for her. They didn't tell me the colour of the chicken she wanted, so I brought one with white feathers. When I was at the door of her house the chicken collapsed. It didn't die but it just collapsed and stopped making a noise. I asked people about it and they said "Sorry, we didn't tell you about the colour. Go and get one with black feathers." So I did. I went back with it personally and nothing happened, it didn't collapse. That's when I started thinking about this thing of spirit mediums. There must be some science in this. Sometime we must really go deeply into this because there are some wonders being made by some of these people. When we started the war these people helped with recruitment. In their villages they are so powerful. If they tell their children they shouldn't go and join us they

won't. When we wanted to go and open a new operational zone we would have to approach the mediums first.¹⁰

Tungamirai believes that Mbuya Nehanda was ZANLA's most important and influential recruit in those early days. 'Once the children, the boys and girls in that area, knew that Nehanda had joined the war, they came in large numbers.' Nehanda, in Tungamirai's view, was then the most powerful medium in Zimbabwe and other mediums followed her in joining the guerrillas, recruiting for ZANLA, and pointing out 'sell outs' in the villages.¹¹

Mbuya Nehanda, Urimbo says, died at Chifombo on 12 June 1973. Tungamirai says she had been dead in her house for some days before it was realized that the old woman, who often spent days in seclusion without eating, had died. Urimbo says the spirits were consulted and they insisted that she must be buried at home, but the war made it impossible at that time. Instead she was initially buried in a shallow grave, two feet deep, alongside the trail guerrillas and armaments passed going to the front. The bottom of the grave was covered with a bed of branches and leaves and all but her head was covered with earth, giving the impression of a person sleeping with blankets pulled up to the neck.¹² After independence in April 1980 the guerrillas met the demands of Mbuya Nehanda's spirit. Her remains were collected from her grave and taken back to Zimbabwe for burial. Mbuya Nehanda is one of the most influential and mystical figures of the early phase of the war. She will be remembered as a major figure in the second war of liberation in the same way that her spirit is remembered in the first liberation war of the 1890s.

The original group of four guerrillas who had gone to Tete in 1970 had been strengthened by another unit of four men, including Rauya, who was Political Commissar, Chipembere and James Bond. All three were to die in the war. Bond—whose real name was Paul Murwira—established a considerable reputation as a particularly brave and ferocious fighter who personally selected the men in his unit and would not tolerate cowards.

In November 1971, Tongogara and Chigowe went to Tanzania to collect the first forty-five guerrillas who had been specially trained for the impending north-eastern offensive. In three trucks supplied by the OAU Liberation Committee, and carrying food, clothing and weapons as well as cadres, they went to the FRELIMO farm outside Lusaka and then on to Kaswende camp. Their arrival at Chifombo was delayed for some days because of a large Portuguese attack on the

camp, but when they were able to get there they were divided into two groups. Twenty-three began carrying armaments from Chifombo to the Zambezi, under the command of Chamunorwa, who later died in action. The remaining twenty-two, commanded by Thomas Nhari, carried the arms on south to the Rhodesian border.¹³ Each leg took about three days, walking some thirty kilometres a day, carrying heavy loads of ammunition and food to last the journey. With the help of the population in the border area, the arms were then carried into the country to suitable caches throughout 1972.

The first ZANLA guerrillas in the north-east built on trusted contacts already established by FRELIMO, Tongogara said. One of the first people they came into contact with and recruited was George Rutanhire, a Catholic lay teacher who bicycled around the area teaching the catechism. He was born at Wedza, south of Salisbury, in April 1947 into a poor peasant family. His father had two wives and fifteen children. In 1956 the family moved from Wedza to Mount Darwin and bought a 73-acre farm costing £750 in the Chesa African Purchase Area. The soil was extremely poor but they grew maize, groundnuts and a little tobacco. Their cash income varied from £140 to £280 a year, from which they paid off the farm at £15 a year, bought essential items like seeds, fertilizer and clothes, and paid taxes on their fifteen cattle and dogs.¹⁴ But they still managed to put aside a little money to give five of the children rudimentary education, and George was one of the fortunate ones. He would leave home at 5.30 a.m. each day to walk five miles to school and he completed six years of primary education, the last three at a Jesuit mission boarding school where the fees were £45 a year. His family could not afford all of this so when other children went home for holidays George remained at the mission doing odd jobs to pay off part of his fees. Even then his father had to borrow money to meet all the fees and buy school uniforms and, when there was any money to spare, George received the princely sum of 15 pence as pocket money for a term.

Secondary school was out of the question so instead George went and trained as a catechist. He cycled around the Mount Darwin area earning £7 a month, part of which he sent home to help to educate other children. He was good at his work but doubts began to creep into his mind about what he was doing: 'The people began to say to me: "You tell us that God is for all people, that blessed are the poor and meek for they will go to heaven. But what is blessed about being poor? And if God is for us all why are the Africans so poor and the Europeans so rich?" I was convinced that there was life again

up there and told them that one day when they died they would be rich. But they did not really believe me. And I also started to doubt it.¹⁵

His mounting doubts coincided with the arrival of the first FRELIMO guerrillas in the area. They were entering Rhodesia to buy food and clothes and to establish contact with a few people to find out which political party they favoured and what degree of support Zimbabwean guerrillas could expect. Rutanhire's first contact with FRELIMO occurred at a mission hospital where his father was being treated. The guerrillas were unarmed and dressed in civilian clothes. They pretended they lived in the area and were interested in becoming catechists. They talked to him about the war in Mozambique and about oppression, and gave him some simple errands such as buying shoes and salt for them. Rutanhire said he was far from clear what oppression really meant, although he encountered it every day of his life. On one occasion he took the FRELIMO guerrillas to watch a local court presided over by a chief. They watched people paying money to have their cases heard and noted that if a person could not pay, even if he might be innocent, the finding was almost always in favour of the party who had paid. Did Rutanhire know what that was, the FRELIMO guerrillas asked? He did not. 'That,' the guerrillas said, 'is oppression.'¹⁶

Rutanhire became involved in helping refugees who were crossing the border from Tete, fleeing from atrocities committed by Portuguese and Rhodesian troops. 'Some of them had been shot and others so badly beaten that they could not move,' he said. By 1972 over 400 refugees had arrived in the area, and Rutanhire arranged with local kraalheads that they should be absorbed into families. If the authorities asked who they were, it was to be claimed that they were relatives. Acting as a link between the FRELIMO guerrillas and local kraalheads, Rutanhire came to be trusted. In late 1972 he learned that ZANLA guerrillas were being infiltrated into the area, and that armaments were being smuggled in through the Mukumbura area and at another point farther south where the Mazoe River flows into Mozambique.

Rutanhire left with his wife Susan to join the ZANLA guerrillas on 5 November 1972. His departure was precipitated by the police coming to search for him after learning about his involvement with FRELIMO, but he had already decided to join the guerrillas. He told Susan about his contacts with FRELIMO and of his decision to join the ZANLA guerrillas. 'I said it was what I had to do. I had to help

others free our country because we were not free. I had wanted to go back to school but I wasn't able to because the money I earned was insufficient. I was still only getting £7 and trying to help my family at home. I told Susan that if I died it was okay but I had to go.' Rutanhire, although he had been told to bring his wife, was uncertain about a woman's place in a war. 'She insisted on coming. She told me that I was not the only one who was oppressed. We all were. And we were all suffering.'¹⁷

Their journey to Mozambique was eventful. Rutanhire was bitten by a snake and had to be taken to a nearby village where an old traditional medical practitioner administered an antidote. At a FRELIMO camp in Tete they met their first ZANLA guerrillas: Tungamirai, Kenneth Gwindingwi, who later defected to Sithole, and Nhari, who would rebel two years later. They also found seven more recruits from Chesa at the camp. Rutanhire and the other recruits were escorted north to FRELIMO's camp at Chamboko where they met more ZANLA guerrillas and found about 130 recruits carrying armaments to the Rhodesian border. On 9 November, Rutanhire, his wife and others who had been selected to go for training set off on a ten-day march north to Chifombo, where Susan would remain for the next two years.

Rutanhire went on to Tanzania to train at Mgagao. Any romantic ideas he may have had about guerrilla life were swiftly dispelled by the rigorous routine. The day began at 4.30 a.m. with exercises, followed by a sixteen-mile run; after the first four months they ran carrying full equipment. Political education started at 7.00 a.m. Recruits were taught the National Grievances contained in *Mwenje One* (*mwenje* is Shona for 'light'), the political manual of ZANU drawn up by members of the high command and based on the experiences of many of the early guerrillas before they joined the struggle.

Tongogara described the early cadres sent into the north-east as being more political commissars than guerrilla fighters. 'I had trained them in generalized guerrilla warfare and specialized mass mobilization,' he said.¹⁸ The considerable emphasis on political education at Itumbi and later Mgagao underlines this. The National Grievances—dealing with deprivation of land, limitations on the number of cattle a family could keep, restrictions on education and job opportunities, and the inferior African health service—were the cornerstone of political education. The writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao were discussed, the nature of capitalism, communism and colonialism were analysed, and the history of Zimbabwe, its geography, climate,

vegetation, agriculture, wildlife, minerals, industry, population and economic base, were taught.¹⁹

The 200 recruits at Mgagao were impatient to go home and fight. 'We felt we were already late starting this thing,' Rutanhire said. 'After our political orientation everybody was able to understand the situation at home—the direction which had been followed by the Smith regime and the direction ZANU wanted to follow. Our political education taught us that when we went on to learn about guns we would know who were our enemies and who were our friends at home. We were taught how to approach the masses and how to live with them and that we were the people's soldiers. We were taught that we had come from the people and that we had to go to the people, to stay with the people. The people were our source of supplies, shelter and security.'²⁰

Rutanhire went home in mid-May 1973 in a guerrilla camouflage uniform carrying a submachine-gun. His six-month training course had been somewhat curtailed because of the need for reinforcements in the north-east. His group crossed the Zambezi east of Feira and marched through the sparsely populated and humid river valley to the Dande Tribal Trust Land and on to the Centenary and Mount Darwin area. Where he had once taught the catechism he now taught ZANU's political education as a commissar. He discovered that after he left the police had come looking for him. People had been beaten up when they said they did not know where he had gone, and bullets had been fired aimlessly into the walls of his house. His mother had been arrested, badly beaten at Mount Darwin and held for three months before being released.²¹

Susan Rutanhire remained at Chifombo for two years carrying armaments to the Zambezi. In groups of about fifty, escorted by ZANLA guerrillas, they would march for a week carrying a bucket of mealie meal on their heads to eat during the journey, a load on their backs that included bazooka and mortar shells, a bandolier of bullets slung around their waists, and a gun in one hand. In June 1974 she was in the first group of women ZANLA sent for training at FRELIMO's Nachingwea camp in Tanzania. After training she became a weapons instructor at Chiribichimbi camp in Zambia.²²

Both George and Susan became members of ZANLA's general staff of approximately 450 people in 1974. Seven of George's brothers and sisters came out to join the guerrillas and all but one received training and went home to fight. Of the six catechists working in his area in 1972 three others also left and became guerrilla fighters. In February

1980, in Zimbabwe's independence elections, George was elected as a Member of Parliament for the Mashonaland Central district.

The opening of the north-eastern front and the fact that fighting became continuous, not sporadic as it had been in the Sixties, was to completely change the nature and scale of recruitment. Prior to that, ZANU and ZAPU had difficulty in recruiting and, as we have seen, resorted to press-ganging Zimbabweans in Zambia. One group of fifty ZANLA recruits had been sent to Ghana for training in late 1964 but they had been betrayed by a Special Branch informer and were nearly all arrested and sentenced to prison terms after being infiltrated into Rhodesia in August 1965. Others had trained in China, Cuba and Egypt, but there was only a trickle of recruits. The success of those who went home to fight was limited and their leadership generally inadequate.

The story of John Mawema, who became head of party security, illustrates the difficulties of recruitment as late as the beginning of 1971.²³ He came from a peasant farming background and had a reasonable job in Salisbury when he applied for a United Nations scholarship to go for further studies in Yugoslavia. The application forms from the UN office in Maseru were intercepted by Special Branch. Because Yugoslavia was a communist country, SB decided Mawema must have communist leanings and he was questioned. In November 1970, he walked across the border into Botswana hoping to join the guerrillas.

Shoniwa, who was then ZANU representative in Botswana and who had been in the first group of five guerrillas trained in China, assigned Mawema to the task of returning clandestinely to Rhodesia and collecting people who were being secretly recruited by the party's underground network. From January to April 1971 Mawema went home four times, crossing the border on foot through the bush near Plumtree and then travelling by train or bus to Salisbury.²⁴ On the four journeys Mawema brought out 'almost twenty recruits', a satisfying figure in those days before the start of the sustained war, and the psychological impact of the Portuguese *coup d'état*, turned the trickle of recruits into a flood of thousands.

Why did those few recruits come out in the Sixties and early Seventies, before joining the *vakomana* became so fashionable? 'Well you know as students most of us want to be adventurers,' Mawema explained. 'It was a sort of adventure. What we saw in the films. People shooting each other. You know, wanting to become cowboys

of some sort. But as you go for training you are given the political line of the party, the ideology and the objectives of the armed struggle. Then you realize that all you were thinking was wrong. The party education was clear even in those days. I did nine months' training and the party was more concerned about political education than military training. Most of us arrived for training thinking we would go back to Salisbury and blow up Chibuku Breweries or Rhodesian Breweries or one of those sort of places. There was no political education on the ground among the masses at home at this point.²⁵

Mawema was expelled from Botswana in April 1971 after the police learned about his recruiting trips. He went to Zambia and then on to Tanzania the following month and was in the first intake of fifty-two recruits at Mgagao. The group included Tungamirai, Gwindingwi, Dzinashe Machingura (who would be detained later after trying to reject the political leadership during the ZIPA period), and Bassopo Mpangara. The cold, damp, misty weather in the Iringa area, coupled with the tough discipline and demanding physical exercises and marches, swiftly convinced the recruits that a guerrilla's life was not a pleasant adventure. They were taught the meaning of 'a people's war, a people's army, the objectives of the war and the basic teachings of Mao on guerrilla warfare. We dealt more with the party line than military training because the Chinese, who had twenty instructors at the camp, believed that you have got to be matured politically in your head before you go and shoot,' Mawema said.²⁶

The recruits could see little point in the drills the Chinese instructors insisted on. 'We had about six months of drilling, left turn, about turn, forward march, saluting and so on. You know the Chinese are very particular about such behaviour. We said "This is not necessary, it's got nothing to do with our armed struggle." At that time we were not saluting anybody. All we were doing was saying *pamberi* [forward] and that was all. We were not saluting anyone. That came after we realized what's the use of saluting if we don't salute our seniors. We used to argue with our instructors about the need for it and if Tongogara came he would just have to get in line the same as anyone for meals. We did not feel he was different to us.'²⁷

While Mawema was undergoing training at Mgagao, a new phase of recruitment began in the north-east. FRELIMO guerrillas, who had been into the area before ZANLA, found that while there was support for ZANU, the people were dissatisfied with the lack of military activity. They would support anyone prepared to fight. This gave considerable appeal to the ZANLA guerrillas when they arrived.

Among the first recruits in the north-east were eighteen old men. Age is traditionally respected in African society, hence the reason for recruiting old men was for their influence in the area where ZANLA had decided to begin the war. They were escorted by four ZANLA guerrillas 180 kilometres into Mozambique to a point near the Kaswende base. Tongogara, accompanied by a group of FRELIMO commanders, went to meet them and a somewhat elaborate deception—which apparently did not entirely fool the old men—followed.²⁸ The ZANLA guerrillas had been instructed to treat Tongogara as a FRELIMO commander for security reasons, as ZANLA's activities in Tete were still secret at that time. Even after the war began, and it was known that ZANLA were infiltrating through Tete, the pretence continued.²⁹

Tongogara's greatest difficulty in deceiving the old men was language. He spoke English, Swahili and Nyanja but the old men were not fluent in any of those languages. Finally Tongogara used Shona, pretending that his home was near Mukumbura on the Mozambique side of the border, but from their whispered conversation among themselves he suspected they believed that he was Zimbabwean. The old men asked for weapons and guerrillas to be brought in through Tete without knowing that ZANLA and FRELIMO were already planning this. Tongogara adopted the same tough no-nonsense strategy that Machel had used on him and his colleagues a year earlier when Machel agreed to let ZANLA operate in Tete. He was willing to give them a chance, Tongogara said, but once the war began in the north-east there could be no question of running to Mozambique and drawing Rhodesian troops after them into even greater involvement with the Portuguese army against FRELIMO. The old men swore that this would not happen and Tongogara gave instructions that they should be given boots and clothes and allowed to rest for a week at Kaswende before returning to their homes to begin preparing to receive the guerrillas.³⁰

After the elders had gone home the high command met with FRELIMO commanders to discuss strategy, and they took the decision that the time had come to send in a larger group of sixty guerrillas. Their instructions would be to carry out further reconnaissance, liaise with the old men, who would provide food and shelter, and cache more arms in the area. Above all, Tongogara said, 'we had told them there was going to be dead silence for three months—if possible.'³¹ Tongogara's priority was to get a large quantity of arms and ammunition into the area before the war began. 'We realized that

once the first shots were fired the enemy would close our entry points. We wanted a year's supply cached in the north-east and as it turned out it was eleven months after the war began before we were able to get more supplies to the front.³²

A small reconnaissance team sent in September 1972 made the first penetration deep into the country when it went as far as St Albert's looking for places to hide war materials in the Mavuradonha Mountains. When it returned, the group of sixty was divided in two and infiltrated through three crossing points. Half entered through two routes into Nehanda sector and the other half crossed later, after an enemy attack in the border area, to Chaminuka sector. The sixty included the group of forty-five who had been initially carrying armaments from Chifombo across the Zambezi and fifteen others who had been sent to reinforce them, led by Nhongo with Tungamirai as his deputy. Nhongo commanded the group in Nehanda while Tungamirai was political commissar of the other group, commanded by Gwindingwi, which entered Chaminuka in November. Eight years later when Nhongo became acting ZANLA commander after the death of Tongogara, Tungamirai was again to be his deputy.

Nhongo was born Solomon Tapfumaneyi Mutuswa in May 1945 in the Charter Tribal Trust Land south of Salisbury.³³ He was the last of ten children by his father's two wives. Nhongo had his primary education at mission schools in the area before going to Zimuto Secondary School where he became involved in ZAPU youth politics. He was arrested after organizing a demonstration with several others at the school, but he admits they did not really understand what they were doing in those days. 'We didn't really know what was happening. It was really playful, sort of like children playing without really knowing the aim.' A clandestine ZAPU branch was formed at the school and Nhongo became organizing secretary. After he was expelled in 1962 he went to Zambia and enrolled at Lusaka's Munali Secondary School. Within three months he was again expelled for political activity. He got a job as secretary to the District Commissioner at Mumbwa but returned to Rhodesia in 1963 after hearing of the illness of his father, who died three days after his arrival. Later that year he got a job in Bulawayo as a salesman for Dunlop, where he worked until December 1967. Although he did not hold political office during those years, he was politically active. He helped to organize demonstrations and petrol bombings, and he was arrested several times. On 25 December 1967 he was forced to flee to Botswana

after it was discovered that he had bribed African police constables to allow the escape of three ZAPU members under guard at Bulawayo's Mpilo hospital.

Dressed like a schoolboy, in shorts and without shoes and with no travel documents, he boarded the train to Plumtree and crossed the border pretending to be the son of a woman he met on the train. It was Christmas Day when he entered Botswana, and he contacted the ZAPU representative in Francistown. Nhongo had decided to join the guerrillas and, after three months in Botswana as a refugee, he flew to Zambia in March 1968. In August that year, with nine others, he went to Moscow for an eighteen-month course in radio communication and administration. In contrast to ZANLA's daily hours of political education, the ZIPRA trainees in Moscow received political education only on Fridays. Nhongo completed his course and flew to Dar es Salaam in November 1969 only to learn that he was to be dispatched to Bulgaria with twenty-five other members of ZIPRA to attend an artillery course near Sofia. They returned to Dar es Salaam in May 1970 and found that all was not well in ZAPU. Tribalism had become apparent in the build-up to the FROLIZI split, and Nhongo and his group were sent to Mbeya in southern Tanzania, where they found they could not go on to Lusaka because of troubles in the party there. 'That's when we discovered that ZAPU did not have a fighting programme,' Nhongo says.³⁴ He went to see the ZANU representative in Mbeya, Godfrey Savanhu, a former student at the University of Salisbury who had been expelled for joining a protest demonstration against UDI.

Savanhu sent a message to Lusaka and Tongogara arrived a few days later. He talked with Nhongo and five other dissidents and—as this came just at the time plans were being laid for the first ZANLA guerrillas to join FRELIMO in Tete—he suggested that they remain in ZIPRA for the moment and benefit from whatever additional training might occur. The group of twenty-six were sent to the ZIPRA camp at Kingolwira near Morogoro, an agricultural town about 200 kilometres west of Dar es Salaam, for a year of general military training. Their instructors included Alfred 'Nikita' Mangena, who became head of the ZIPRA forces and who was later killed in Zambia near the Rhodesian border when his vehicle hit a landmine, and Lookout Masuku, who was political commissar at Kingolwira and who later succeeded Mangena as ZIPRA commander.

To Nhongo it was obvious that ZAPU had no programme to fight. He accompanied the late Treasurer-General of ZAPU, Moyo, to

Nachingwea in early 1971 to meet Machel. Machel wanted ZAPU to use Tete but, due to the disruption of Chikerema and the FROLIZI split, nothing materialized. In March Nhongo crossed to ZANLA and was sent to Itumbi camp, where he adopted his *chimurenga* name meaning 'male goat'. Among his instructors were Kashiri, who defected to FROLIZI then returned to ZANLA only to join the Nhari rebellion, and Chimedza, who died later in a car accident in Mozambique after gaining high regard for his political instruction and for his skill at mediation. Nhongo found the emphasis on political education at Itumbi very different from his past experiences. 'In the Soviet Union they had told us that the decisive factor of the war is the weapons. When I got to Itumbi, where there were Chinese instructors, I was told that the decisive factor was the people. This was a contradiction. Now I agree with the Chinese.'³⁵ Nhongo joined the group of sixty guerrillas who entered Rhodesia in the last months of 1972 to begin the decisive phase of the war.

The most important task of those early groups was to mobilize the support of the people, ZANU's new strategy which became—as the Chinese instructors had said—the decisive factor of the war. 'We had to convince the masses why we are fighting so they could not turn and call us bandits or terrorists, as Smith was calling us,' Chimurenga said.³⁶

'Approaching the masses' in a new area of operation had three aspects, according to Tongogara. The first was to know thoroughly and understand the area and how it functioned. Second, 'you've got to study the characteristics of your people within that area.' The third element was that if word of the process leaked out and the 'enemy pursues you, you must be prepared to fight'.³⁷ This was the key element of ZANU strategy that their opponents never really understood: that (until the war entered a new and more conventional stage at the beginning of 1978) ZANLA was not on the offensive but was engaged in defending the process of mass mobilization.

The first task of a guerrilla group entering the new area was to ask the population what their problems were, then to provide solutions where possible 'to convince them that you are serious'. Tongogara continued:

I remember the first group which went. They got to a village and the first thing they were told was that there were two farmers around there whom they didn't like and they would really

appreciate whoever would get rid of them. Take for instance one Boer who lived near my home. We used to call him, in Shona, *madhuura*, a man who shoots at anybody who crosses his farm. That was known all over. If you let your cattle go and graze within the vicinity, he gets the cattle, then he calls you and whips you. If you go to a place and they tell you such things, probably you start punishing a man like that. The people will really feel here is somebody who is going to look after our interests. . . . We try to investigate these grievances. If the farm labourers tell us that this farmer is very bad, they must list all the grievances and send it to the commanders to analyse. If a white man calls an African man a 'boy', the African may take offence at that, but it's not a real grievance. I didn't join the revolution because I was called a 'boy'. . . . Also you have to explain to them how much the war concerns them, what they get out of this. When you liberate, what do people gain out of that liberation? Our people are very inquisitive, particularly, you know, our people are traditional farmers, but they have no land. So you find most of them come up because they have no land or because they are deprived of education. Those are some of the reasons that compelled them to come and join the fight.³⁸

The guerrillas always faced a barrage of questions. How would they defeat Smith? Would there be taxes after independence? How many cattle would one person be allowed to keep? Were they communists and did communists respect wives and children? There were many questions about communism and socialism, Chimurenga said: 'Stories had been spread by Smith's agents and some missionaries, but not all, many understood. Some people had read things in books but did not have anybody to explain certain points.' He, too, said the questions always turned to land. 'They wanted to know how the land would be distributed, so we had to explain to them to whom does the land belong. You are the owners of the land and you are to liberate the land, so after you have liberated the land to whom does it belong? Automatically it belongs to the owner who liberated it.'³⁹

There was also the 'enemy' factor. After the war began, the Rhodesian army was a major mobilizing force for the guerrillas, Tongogara said. 'After we had some battles in an area the enemy retaliated by bombing places and chasing the people. They really got the point. They saw innocent people being bombed, killed, so they decided, okay, why should I remain here. I better follow you. So the

enemy helped us too.'⁴⁰ As the battles spread to other areas, mobilization was easier and recruitment intensified.

ZANLA's change in approach also put white farmers in the invidious position of having domestic workers and labourers sympathetic to the guerrillas. One Centenary farmer with experience of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, said 'The atmosphere among farmers here is very similar, except that we know these chaps are using highly sophisticated modern weapons. I would call it Mao Mao rather than Mau Mau.'⁴¹

The group of sixty started recruiting as well as mobilizing and a few recruits were given rudimentary training in the north-east. Among these were Everisto Nhamo, who became ZANLA's Chief of Communications. The training took less than a week. They were taught how to crawl, how to take cover, and how to use a gun, but, for security reasons, they were allowed to fire only two bullets during training. The third bullet they would fire would be in action.⁴²

Once the war began the flow of recruits accelerated. The eighteen old men were to play an important role in this process. When the guerrillas wanted to infiltrate trained men they would ask for a similar number of recruits. 'With the old men we would ask them how many sons they had,' said Tongogara using the word 'son' in its African kinship sense rather than literally. 'If he said he had five we would say give us the five and we will give you five others. So the old men would give us their sons. And we would give them our comrades who automatically became their sons.' The *situpas* (identity cards) of the new recruits, which bore a name but no photograph, would be handed over by the new recruits to the incoming trained guerrillas. 'And we went to some of the teachers and said how many workers do you have at your school? If he said he had a hundred we would say give us ten and we will give you ten.' They infiltrated political commissars into St Albert's mission school, north-east of Centenary, and through the Dande, Chesa, Mount Darwin and Centenary farming areas in this way, over a period of six months.⁴³

While a message was on the way from Tongogara to the commanders in the north-east to start the war at Christmas or New Year when Europeans would be celebrating and many soldiers would be on leave, Nhongo decided to attack Altena Farm. He said he took the decision after hearing the news on Rhodesia radio on 19 December intimating that the group in the Mtoko area had run into difficulties with the security forces. There had not been any fighting and the security

forces apparently did not know that the group were guerrillas, but Nhongo decided to act to take the pressure off them. The decision about targets was generally left to the local commander, although Nhongo recalled that his instructions then were 'to hit farms so that we could destroy the economy of the country'.⁴⁴ Explosives were in short supply for strategic targets like bridges, and in the early days they concentrated on farms, whose owners, Chimurenga argued, were not 'innocent civilians' but reservists liable for call-up, as well as on telephone communications and roads.⁴⁵ The latter tactic was to prove extremely effective. By 4 January ten members of the security forces had been wounded in landmine explosions,⁴⁶ and one, Corporal Norman Moore of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), had died from his injuries.

Despite the impending storm in the north-east which would sweep the whites from power within seven years, a Rhodesian radio commentary said on 7 January, 'what is worrying Rhodesians far more than the terrorists is the weather.'⁴⁷ The country was in the grip of the worst drought for thirty-five years. Umtali had banned the watering of gardens and the washing of cars. The Dutch Reformed Church and the Bishop of Mashonaland called for a national day of prayer for rain.

The drought concerned the guerrillas as much as it alarmed the farmers. The offensive in the north-east had been timed to coincide with the rains when thick green foliage would provide better cover for the guerrillas, when water would be plentiful, and when the Rhodesian advantage of mechanized mobility would be reduced by flooded rivers and roads that turned into treacherous quagmires.

Rhodesian Response

The unexpected resurgence of the war and the drought notwithstanding, white Rhodesians found plenty to comfort themselves with in their 'never-never land'. Four bishops, including Abel Muzorewa, leader of the African National Council (ANC), who within two years would claim to be leader of the guerrillas, condemned the 'terrorists' who had attacked Altena Farm and other targets. The World Council of Churches (WCC), a particular Rhodesian *bête noire*, was also attacked by the bishops for giving moral support and humanitarian aid to the guerrillas.¹

Rhodesia was enjoying something of an economic boom when the war began in the north-east. Tourist figures for Umtali and the lush Eastern Highlands had reached a new record in 1972 and the number of white settlers arriving had exceeded those departing by 8,435. The white population of Umtali—to be noted six years later for a cryptic T-shirt message 'Come to Umtali and get bombed', after guerrillas mortared the town from nearby hills—had increased by 900 in the first eleven months of 1972. Exports had topped pre-UDI levels for the first time and the growth rate in the previous twelve months had been 8 per cent. Inflation was only a shade over 3 per cent.² An added fillip was the major coup by the highly efficient sanctions-breaking organization in acquiring three Boeings for Air Rhodesia. Rhodesia was still one of the finest places in the world to live—if you were white.

That year the vote for African education was £16,000,000 while the amount allocated for European, Asian and Coloured education was £14,000,000.³ A survey of African education in 1972 by John Robertson showed that less than one-third of Africans aged eighteen and

nineteen had formal education beyond the third year of primary school. As Standard 6—the completion of six years' primary education—was the common basic minimum educational requirement for employment in the manufacturing industry, over 70 per cent of Africans in this age group were deprived of the possibility of jobs in this sector. Less than 6 per cent of Africans in this age group were fortunate enough to get secondary school places and only two African children in every 1,000 reached the sixth form in secondary schools. Robertson pointed out the hopeless inadequacy of the amount voted for education, observing that if all the £30,000,000 allocated to education were spent on Africans it would still be insufficient to educate all African children up to Form Four. The annual estimated African birth rate of 280,000 in 1972 exceeded the total white population and Robertson said: 'If existing trends continue, a third of them might never enter school at all.'⁴

On 9 August 1973 the *Rhodesia Herald* published a table Robertson had compiled showing the drop-out rate, most frequently because parents could not afford fees, of 112,608 African children who enrolled in Sub-Standard A in 1959.⁵ By 1966, the final year of primary education, the drop-out rate had risen to 70.7 per cent. Only 6,674 of these children were enrolled in secondary education (Form 1) in 1967, and the drop-out rate in the first year was 94.1 per cent; only 223 were enrolled in Form 6 in 1972, and the drop-out rate in this year was 99.8 per cent. The drop-outs over fourteen years in these horrifying statistics included men like Tongogara, Urimbo, Nhongo, Chauke, Rutanhire and hundreds of others who were to become prominent in the liberation war of the Seventies.

Although the whites may not have foreseen the danger of statistics like these, they should have been concerned about the economic storm clouds which were gathering by mid-1973. The army commander, Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, complained in his annual report that the shortage of European manpower and finance was inhibiting expansion plans for the security forces.⁶ A week later government estimates contained a 20 per cent increase in both the defence and police votes bringing their total budget for 1973–1974 to £35,000,000. A further £7,500,000, largely to cover increased salaries for the lower ranks and extra operational flying hours, was voted at the end of the year. Defence spending now accounted for 12 per cent of the country's total budget compared to 9.3 per cent in 1972–1973.⁷ By the end of the war defence expenditure was approaching almost £700,000 a day.

In his Budget speech on 19 July the Minister of Finance, Mr John

Wrathall, drew attention to another problem created by the war. He praised the economic achievements since UDI and described the drought, sanctions and 'terrorism' as 'inconveniences', but he went on to admit that the war had adversely affected emigration and immigration.⁸ Statistics released the following month showed that in the year ending 31 August the immigration gain had been only 2,050 compared to 6,620 in the previous twelve months.⁹ In September 1973 there was a net loss for the first time since September 1966—675 immigrants against 770 emigrants—and in December the net outflow of Europeans was 460. In the first nine months of the war the immigration figure fell 33 per cent on the previous year's total.¹⁰

At the end of the year the government launched a campaign to try to attract one million settlers to Rhodesia. 'When one thinks that in many countries in the western world the scene is one of widespread unemployment, spiralling inflation, strikes and a cold, wet winter, by comparison Rhodesia must present a warm and inviting picture,' Smith said, but the escalating war ensured that the 'Settlers 74' campaign never got off the ground.¹¹ Tourism, which had boomed in 1972, fell by 20 per cent in the first six months of the war, partly because the closure of the Zambian border had cut off tourism from the north.¹² Rhodesian Railways annual accounts a year after the border closed showed a deficit of £7,300,000, an increase of about £6,000,000 on the previous year, which was attributed almost entirely to the border closure.¹³

Further worrying economic signs began to emerge in the first sixteen months of the war. No country—not even Rhodesia, though many of the whites appeared to think so—is an island isolated from international trends. Rhodesia was particularly vulnerable to inflation in the Western industrial nations and the Arab oil embargo because it was frequently forced to sell its goods under world market prices and to buy its imports above world market prices to get around sanctions. The impact of international inflation and the oil embargo coincided with the start of the war in the north-east, which in turn led to far greater fuel consumption by the military.

Petrol rationing had been introduced in Rhodesia when oil sanctions were imposed following UDI in November 1965. However, with a lot of help from the major Western oil companies, the position had sufficiently improved to allow the government to end petrol rationing in 1971. On 8 November 1973 a Rhodesian government spokesman denied that petrol rationing was about to be reintroduced following a 15 per cent increase in the price of fuel. The next day it was announced

that petrol stations would be closed from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. and that Viscounts would replace Boeings on the Salisbury to Bulawayo flight. Both measures were designed to conserve fuel. Despite the denials about rationing, coupons had already been printed, and it was finally reintroduced on 1 February 1974.¹⁴

Another sign of the problems ahead came on 7 February 1974 with the first major changes in the call-up. The National Service intake was doubled, men over twenty-five years old who had been living in Rhodesia for five years and who had no previous military commitment became eligible for call-up periods of up to one month, and it was decided to raise a second battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles. Given the shortage of immigrants, particularly skilled artisans, they were exempted for at least five years after arrival. This exemption period was later reduced to two years, and towards the end of the war many people eligible for call-up were spending eight months a year in the forces. An inevitable result was that businesses, already short of white manpower, suffered even more.¹⁵

The 'head-in-the-sand' attitude of most white Rhodesians to the implications of the outbreak of fighting in the north-east prevailed throughout the first year of the war. On 23 January 1973, a month and two days after the attack on Altena Farm, a Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation commentary said: '... in Rhodesia, fortunately, relations between black and white are too sound and the black people are inherently too sensible and stable for the terrorists to be able to prosper. This is being demonstrated now in the north-eastern area where the latest terrorist incursion took place. At first terrorized by witchdoctors and threats from the terrorists, the tribesmen are now coming forward again to help the authorities. As a result, the incursion has failed, the terrorists are being killed or rounded up and their arms and equipment seized.'¹⁶

At the end of the month the Minister for Justice, Law and Order, Mr Desmond Lardner-Burke, said the security forces were now on top of the situation and there was no doubt they would win.¹⁷ This provoked the ANC Publicity Secretary, Dr Edson Sithole, who was in reality a ZANU member, to state that the guerrillas could not be defeated because they held the initiative as to when to fight and what targets to pick and they had the support of the people. White politicians must come to terms with African aspirations if there was to be peace, he added.¹⁸

In mid-February the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr Lance Smith,

said the African population explosion was a greater threat than the guerrillas; a week later he was calling for increased African population in the north-east as a means of combating the guerrilla threat,¹⁹ although at this time official thinking was shifting to moving Africans out of the areas so that they could not help the guerrillas. The Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism, Mr P. K. van der Byl, insisted that although the guerrillas were more sophisticated than before, and better armed, the security forces had the measure of them: they would be 'swiftly and expeditiously overcome', he said.²⁰ Speaking at a bridge-opening ceremony in July, Smith said: 'I have no hesitation in saying that it is impossible for the "terrorists" to secure a permanent foothold in Rhodesia. Not only will we clear this lot out in the short term, but when our long-term plans are completed we will be able to prevent any future similar recurrence.'²¹

Realistic voices were few and far between in those days and rarely to be heard from the ruling Rhodesian Front. African Members of Parliament argued that harsh measures against villagers, including collective fines, were counter-productive and were causing resentment, but they were howled down by RF Members as 'terrorist' sympathizers who should remember how much the whites had done for the Africans. When the Rhodesia Party M.P. for Matobo, Allan Savory, used the word 'guerrilla' in Parliament instead of 'terrorist' and suggested that the war was a political one requiring political and not military solutions, he also was denounced. Some months later when Savory suggested that guerrilla leaders should be invited to a constitutional conference Smith described the suggestion as the 'most irresponsible and evil' he had ever heard. Smith said Savory's remarks encouraged the guerrillas, adding, 'I ask, is there no limit to the irresponsibility of this man in his apparent quest to destroy the good name of Rhodesia?'²² Savory had been a Rhodesian army officer before entering politics, and years later senior Rhodesian officers were to admit that his military ideas and his arguments for a political solution were correct and that had they been followed considerable bloodshed could have been avoided.²³ Smith, without having the grace to admit it, was also to acknowledge that Savory was right. Within nine months of denouncing Savory for suggesting that the guerrillas attend constitutional talks, Smith began holding talks with nationalist leaders in Lusaka.

The most sombre and perceptive analysis in 1973 came in a paper written by a Rhodesian, Anthony Wilkinson, for the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. In the paper, entitled

'Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973: An Account and an Assessment', Wilkinson warned that white rule in Rhodesia was unlikely to survive a protracted guerrilla war. The regular army consisted of only 3,500 men, the Territorial Force of a further 10,000 and the Air Force of 1,200 men and 45 combat aircraft. The problems of obsolescence of existing military equipment and the acquisition of spare parts had been accentuated by sanctions. Rhodesia, with a population of only 250,000 whites, did not have the manpower to maintain control of a system which discriminated against 5,500,000 Africans, whose population would double in twenty years. 'White Rhodesia', Wilkinson wrote in his conclusion, 'was founded by force and for 80 years has been successfully maintained by economic and military superiority. It is not altogether surprising that many black people in Rhodesia have taken from this experience the precept that "might is right"'. The prospect facing Rhodesia now is not that of a revolt of primitive warriors as in the 1890s, nor even of a Mau Mau type of revolt . . . but of a war of national liberation fought by guerrillas recruited from many tribes, increasingly well-trained, armed with modern weapons and enjoying the moral or material support of most countries. . . . If, however, guerrillas acquire the ability to expand their numbers significantly, it is doubtful whether rule by the white minority . . . could be sustained.' If the level of war was contained, Wilkinson predicted that South Africa would continue to give military and economic support; but if it seriously escalated, Pretoria—rather than risk being drawn in more deeply—would be prepared to countenance and assist in the controlled implementation of majority rule in Rhodesia in return for the restoration of an acceptable measure of regional security. At that point Rhodesia, because of its economic and military dependency on South Africa, would not be able to dictate the terms.²⁴

Mr Wickus de Kock, newly appointed deputy Minister of Justice, Law and Order, who was later to disagree with Smith and resign from the RF government, tried to warn Rhodesians in June 1973 that the war could be a long one. The guerrillas, he said, were showing a far greater sense of purpose and determination than their predecessors. 'The tactics they have adopted have been far more difficult to counter, with the result that operations against them are still continuing.'²⁵ In October General Walls also warned that the war could take a long time. These were isolated voices. Smith kept insisting that the guerrillas were losing, that the problem was well in hand, and the white Rhodesian flock preferred to listen to 'good old Smithy'. Even in

February 1974, when he finally admitted that the war was taking longer than expected and there was no quick solution, few whites questioned Smith's leadership.

An important point about Smith's style of leadership is that he was not an initiator of policy to resolve the Rhodesian problem. Possibly he did not perceive it to be a problem, and certainly he did not see it as a problem in the same way that others saw it. The result was that he was permanently on the defensive, reacting to events and pressures beyond his control, rather than dictating them, or, at least, predicting the possibilities and having a strategy tailored to meet them. Smith's style, in response to each new unfavourable twist in the Rhodesian saga, was to dangle a carrot and see what reaction he got.

Little more than a month after the war began in the north-east he indicated at a press conference that he would try to reverse the verdict of the Pearce Commission, to pave the way for a settlement with Britain. He pursued this theme in Parliament in April, saying that he intended to try again to reach a settlement with Britain: '... we now go forward once again in an attempt to prove to the British Government that the implementation of the agreed constitution would be in the best interests of Rhodesia and of all its people.' He brushed aside African rejection of proposals that would have prevented majority rule for decades as 'a hasty decision which was not devoid of intimidation and violence'. The 'silver lining', he argued, 'is that many of us do not believe that Pearce produced a true verdict. Having allowed a certain time to elapse for people to reconsider the situation and have second thoughts, I believe that it is now both necessary and timely for a further attempt to be made. It is essential to bring finality to this matter of a settlement, so that Rhodesia can determine its future course.' A settlement, he went on, would bring considerable economic benefits, but he made it abundantly clear that he had no intention of meeting the fundamental principles demanded by the nationalists: 'If their opposition is motivated by thoughts of obtaining political power, then they have grossly misjudged the situation.'²⁶

It was the same old obdurate Smith harking back to yesteryear and trying to dictate the acceptability of what had already been rejected as totally unacceptable by the Africans, which in turn meant that Britain had no justification for pursuing the matter. Despite Smith's negative style of leadership and uncompromising statements, however, there were always some Africans who were prepared to negotiate. His tactics were to seek alternative groups to the fighters to negotiate with

and, over the years, Muzorewa, the Chiefs, Nkomo, Sithole, Chikerema and others were to be lured into this trap, with the result that their political reputations suffered. By playing on nationalist ambitions and rivalries Smith was able to keep them divided and continue to rule while undermining the efforts of the guerrillas by raising false hopes of a settlement. It allowed him to appear confident, commanding and uncompromising at the Victoria Falls and Geneva conferences. It was not until late 1979, when the war had escalated sufficiently, that Smith met his political Waterloo at Lancaster House.

In early 1973 it was Muzorewa who responded to Smith's overtures. The Bishop had been appointed jointly by ZANU and ZAPU to head the ANC and African opposition to the 1971 constitutional proposals. His executive was divided between the two parties and where a member of one party headed a department his deputy automatically came from the other party. In this role Muzorewa played an important part in blocking the proposals, and had he gone back to the pulpit as head of Rhodesia's United Methodist Church at that point his contribution would have been remembered positively and not marred by all that was to follow.

In February he reacted to a statement by Smith that the ANC had not made any direct approach for talks by saying they were considering doing so.²⁷ Why they should have been considering it, with Smith insisting that the 1971 constitutional proposals were not negotiable, is a mystery. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had observed—to the delight of Smith and in response to the RF leader's April parliamentary statement—that the Africans had been wrong to reject the proposals.²⁸ Whitehall and Smith notwithstanding, Muzorewa's position as ANC leader should have been that if all that was to be discussed was the 1971 proposals then there was nothing to talk about. Despite the detention of two senior ANC officials in late February, Muzorewa said the following month: 'After reflection we have decided that our course of action is more important than the ANC. The need of our country to return to normality and to reach an honourable settlement is greater than the temporary suffering of our brothers. ...'²⁹ He added that he would press for constitutional talks.

Sir Alec chose the golden jubilee dinner of the South Africa Club in London as the forum on 17 April 1973 for a lengthy appeal to Rhodesians for a settlement, saying 'no longer can either race avoid the choice between persuasion and the gun.' He said that he believed, with concessions on both sides, agreement was possible. He continued: 'What can the gun profit the Africans? It can only frustrate

their ambitions as attitudes become more rigid and intransigent. The lesson for them must surely be to seek steady but sure constitutional advance which will recognise their desire for a responsible role in their country's development and ultimate control of its destiny. Things are not going well for the Africans in Rhodesia today. They will be worse off if they hold out for the unobtainable.' A few days later Sir Alec said that there would be 'a really bloody mess in Rhodesia' unless there was a settlement. 'There has to be an evolutionary political settlement or else there will be a confrontation not only in Rhodesia but on the Zambezi and the rest of the continent. I cannot imagine anything more catastrophic than that.'³⁰

Smith, who had not responded to ANC approaches for negotiations, attacked Sir Alec for using 'extravagant language about a problem of which he knows so little'.³¹ In mid-June Sir Alec told Parliament in London that there was not sufficient agreement between black and white in Rhodesia to warrant reopening settlement negotiations.³² Nevertheless he sent the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Denis Greenhill, to Salisbury. His visit coincided with the hanging of the first three African guerrillas captured in the north-east and provoked expressions of outrage in Africa.

On 29 June, two days after Sir Alec had told Parliament that Smith and the ANC realized a settlement was essential, Smith rejected as 'totally and absolutely unacceptable to the Rhodesian government' a list of eight ANC demands. These included lowering and broadening the franchise to include more Africans, immediate parity between Africans and Europeans in Parliament, a single integrated schools system and repeal of all discriminatory legislation within twelve months, the repeal of the Land Tenure Act, African advancement in the civil service, the release of all political detainees and an amnesty for members of ZANU and ZAPU outside the country. Smith reiterated that the 1971 proposals were not negotiable and said the ANC demands showed a complete lack of realism: '... they add up to nothing less than the old parrot cry for one man, one vote. It stands to the credit of the British government that even they joined with us in throwing that one out of the window whenever it was produced.'³³ The ANC denied that it had told Smith's officials that it wanted immediate parity, the repeal of the Land Tenure Act or that it had discussed detainees or exiles.

Muzorewa chose that moment, just when it seemed there was nothing to talk about, to hold his first official meeting with Smith. They met on 17 July. During the next forty-eight hours, underlining

his stance that the 1971 proposals were not negotiable, Smith met two groups that supported the proposals, the Rhodesian Settlement Forum headed by Henry Chihota and the African Settlement Convention. Whatever optimism may have been generated by those meetings was swiftly dashed a fortnight later when the government detained thirty-three ANC officials and banned a meeting the Bishop was to have addressed. Nevertheless, Muzorewa said, he still favoured further talks with Smith, who, addressing the International Dental Conference, pronounced that the elimination of racial discrimination in Rhodesia would be 'disastrous for both blacks and whites'.³⁴ On 1 September he told an RF meeting that '... it is because of this government's policy and action that the white man's place in Rhodesia is now secure for all time.' Three weeks later he told the RF Congress: 'We have got to take the Africans along with us. ... We have come to the conclusion that we can no longer go on delaying. We are willing to meet the Africans and there are many things taking place which I would be reluctant to divulge now.'³⁵

ZANU's office in Lusaka had demanded that the Bishop cease talks with Smith, but the contacts continued through 1973 and into the first three months of 1974. Muzorewa was strongly condemned in a letter dated 20 March 1974 and smuggled from the political detainees section of Salisbury Prison. The letter was signed by six members of ZANU's central committee, Ndabaningi Sithole, then the President, Robert Mugabe, then Secretary-General, Enos Nkala, Moton Malianga, Edgar Tekere and Maurice Nyagumbo, the last of whom spent a total of twenty years and eight months in detention. The letter said that the detained central committee members had met and passed the following resolution: 'That this ZANU central committee at Salisbury Prison is not associated, has not been associated and does not wish to be associated with the ANC's negotiations with the illegal regime and the various postures and methods adopted by the ANC in such negotiations; that ZANU is and has always been an organisation apart from and independent of any other; and that therefore no organisation has authority to speak on ZANU's behalf.' The six expressed concern at reports reaching them that Muzorewa claimed to be negotiating with their mandate and said that by negotiating he was threatening to undermine the offensive in the north-east. They were also concerned that the ANC position fell short of 'majority rule now', and regarded ANC involvement in negotiations 'as disastrous and posing the greatest political threat to African political interests in a situation currently being militarily improved in the Africans' favour

and which ought to be left to mature further for our maximum exploitation when the regime and its supporters are sufficiently ground down to yield meaningfully'.³⁶

With a negotiating strategy of sorts under way, Smith's second predictable response to the war in the north-east was to introduce even more repressive legislation. The police and district commissioners were given wider powers to restrict the amount of food villagers grew and the number of cattle they kept, to prevent them feeding the guerrillas. Fourteen African Members of Parliament who questioned the renewal of the State of Emergency in mid-1973—arguing that the causes of the war must be removed—were accused of supporting 'terrorism' by the Minister of Justice, Law and Order, then Lardner-Burke. The Catholic bishops challenged the increasingly repressive legislation and one, Bishop Donal Lamont, described the racism practised in Rhodesia as 'pernicious heresy'. He said it would be a grave scandal if the church remained silent.³⁷ The Anglican Bishop of Matabeleland, the Reverend Mark Wood, said if the state forced him to choose between its apartheid laws and his conscience he would obey his conscience.³⁸ A lawyer, Alan Hannah, defending a captured guerrilla, observed: 'It is clear that Africans are fighting for political freedom. This is a country where it is black against white so far as the terrorists are concerned. Whether or not we or the terrorists are right or wrong, your Lordship must look at the motives of the terrorists. If they are not ignoble they must be taken into account. How much, it is for the court to decide. I do not ask for the condonation of the methods that are employed but I submit that their objectives in doing what they are doing are comprehensible.'³⁹ The judge's willingness to understand why the guerrillas were fighting was less enlightened than Hannah's. He sentenced the guerrilla to death.

The introduction of legislation empowering provincial commissioners to impose collective fines on communities for allegedly aiding the guerrillas was widely questioned and was a tacit admission of just how much support the guerrillas were getting. An editorial in the *Rhodesia Herald* accepted that drastic action was necessary as a result of the resurgence of guerrilla warfare, but continued: 'For all that, one recoils from any measure which imposes punishment without recourse to the accepted process of law. Punishment then can so easily become oppression; and it is difficult to defend when labelled tyranny if a man has not been tried in court.'⁴⁰ Chikukwa village in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land was fined £100, an enormous sum given

the poverty of the area, for allegedly and collectively failing to report the presence of guerrillas. Members of the security forces and officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were empowered to impound property, and the government claimed that this measure had been introduced at the request of the Chiefs and kraalheads. In the case of Chief Chiweshe, who supported the guerrillas and later went out to Mozambique to join them, this claim was certainly not true.

Regulations curbing African drinking in European-designated areas were introduced; schools, churches and clinics in the Chiweshe TTL were closed; thousands of Africans in the Chiweshe and Chesa TTLs were questioned; and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act was amended to make it an offence to conspire to overthrow the constitution or to advocate its overthrow. The maximum sentence for undergoing guerrilla training was increased from twenty years to life imprisonment or death, as were the penalties for recruiting or encouraging someone to undergo training and for 'harbouring' or 'failing to report the presence of' guerrillas. The sentence for committing an act of 'terrorism' inside Rhodesia or against a neighbouring country was increased from thirty years to life imprisonment or death. The forfeiture of property was added as an additional penalty. Thousands of villagers were forcibly moved from their traditional homes to 'protected villages', which the nationalists referred to as 'concentration camps'. 'No go' areas were created in the north-east and a tough package of new legislation in May allowed for the lawful destruction of property which might be used by the guerrillas. This covered anything the rural people might possess including their cattle, crops, clothes, homes, pots and pans. In this package the regime also signalled its intention to introduce legislation indemnifying any member of the security forces or any government official who, in 'good faith', committed any act believing that his or her actions were for the suppression of 'terrorism' and in the interests of maintaining public order.

The Indemnity and Compensation Act, which was not finally passed until 1975 but was made retroactive to 1 December 1972, was described as 'profoundly shocking' by the former Chief Justice of the Central African Federation, Sir Robert Tredgold. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) noted, in a booklet entitled *Civil War in Rhodesia*, that most governments denounced torture and even those that employed torture vigorously denied they were doing so and tried to conceal it. 'By contrast the Rhodesian Government has admitted in passing the indemnity legislation that such practices have

been used in the past and will be used in the future. It has also shown by this legislation that it is prepared to condone and cover-up acts of torture and brutality perpetrated by its security forces upon civilians in pursuit of the war aims.⁷⁴¹ During the seven years of war the world was to hear a great deal from the Smith government about atrocities by the guerrillas—allegations which were then disseminated by ‘on side’ members of the Salisbury press corps—but rarely did the world hear of the atrocities by the security forces which, as we will see, were widespread. Some journalists certainly knew this during the war but chose to remain silent. To do otherwise meant expulsion or, at the very least, classification as an ‘off-side’ journalist and little access to senior sources of information.

The CCJP also revealed considerable evidence of torture, assaults and destruction of property by members of the security forces. ‘These acts, it was said, were committed with the aim of extracting information about the movement of insurgents, or of compelling the population to cooperate with the authorities, or of punishing villagers suspected of having assisted the insurgents. These allegations, and others of a similar nature, were totally rejected by Government, as also was the call for an independent inquiry rejected on the grounds that persons alleging that they had been injured by such actions had the perfectly adequate remedy of pursuing their grievances in the ordinary courts.’⁷⁴² The Indemnity and Compensation Act, ruled unconstitutional by the Rhodesian Senate Legal Committee, barred any action in the courts for acts committed from three weeks prior to the start of the war on 21 December 1972, thereby terminating all pending cases and preventing future ones.

Few countries throughout history can have passed a more dangerous and damning piece of legislation. The Act was a licence to kill, maim and torture with a guarantee that almost anything was legal: no matter what anyone did they could argue that it had been done in ‘good faith’. The meaning of that phrase and its parameters were not defined in the Act and thus ‘good faith’ was a matter of definition by the individual committing the act. On this point the CCJP observed: ‘The Act itself appears to lay down a totally subjective test for the purposes of immunity. Thus if a policeman savagely tortures a civilian whom he genuinely believes to have security information and he does this in order to extract this information, he would be acting in good faith to suppress terrorism, even though he knew that he was acting unlawfully and even though it turned out that the prisoner did not possess any information. So, too, if soldiers entered a village where

they believed that the villagers had information about the movement of insurgents and proceeded to shoot dead one of the villagers in order to seek to induce the other villagers to give information, again it would seem that the soldiers would be acting in good faith to suppress terrorism. Even if the policeman was not acting in good faith but was for instance taking revenge upon a prisoner because of a personal grudge against him, this would be almost impossible to prove if the policeman asserted that he had beaten the prisoner to extract security information.’⁷⁴³

The Commission was to produce cases to prove that innocent civilians had been assaulted and tortured, but the Minister of Law and Order issued certificates saying that the assaults and tortures had been committed in ‘good faith’ to suppress ‘terrorism’ despite the fact that some of the assault complaints had nothing to do with the guerrillas or the war. Attempts to obtain compensation were also blocked under the Act and neither complainants nor their lawyers were allowed to appear before Compensation Boards.

Belatedly the government realized that incoming guerrillas had been taking the *situpas* of outgoing recruits, and new identity cards bearing the holder’s picture and birth certificate number were introduced in eight north-eastern districts. White farmers in the north-east began to take stringent precautions against attacks. ‘The precautions’, wrote the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, Christopher Munnion, ‘include a careful vetting of African workers employed on the farms. There have been grounds for suspicion that casual labourers employed by day can become not-so-casual terrorists at night.’⁷⁴⁴ Cash rewards for informants were introduced: £3,332 for a senior ‘terrorist’ leader, £1,332 for an ordinary ‘terrorist’, a similar amount for a rocket launcher and half that amount for a machine-gun. A circular, in English and Shona, urged villagers to report quickly and said: ‘do not be afraid to report all you know about the whereabouts of terrorists and their weapons because your identity will be kept secret and the reward you earn will be paid to you privately. You can choose to be paid in cash or the money can be put into a Post Office or Building Society savings account in your name.’⁷⁴⁵

Sentences by the courts became increasingly severe, and Smith turned a deaf ear to worldwide protests in May 1973 when three guerrillas were hanged for the attack the previous December on Whistlefield Farm and the ‘murder’ of Corporal Moore. ZANU argued that Corporal Moore had not been murdered but had died in action and that the captured guerrillas should be given the status of

prisoners of war. Both ZANU and ZAPU were to recognize the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war, and a number of these were released through Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Rhodesian government, however, refused throughout the war to give this status to the guerrillas, and at least fifty were hanged.

The first ZANLA prisoner of war in the north-east was a 29-year-old white land surveyor, Gerald Hawksworth. He was captured in January 1973 when guerrillas ambushed the two-vehicle convoy he was travelling in, killing two other white surveyors in the lead vehicle, Robert Bland and Denis Sanderson. A security force communiqué on the incident bizarrely observed: 'Terrorist action cannot be discounted in this connection.'⁴⁶ Hawksworth was marched out of Rhodesia and across Mozambique's Tete province to ZANLA's main rear base camp at Chifombo on the Zambian border. There he met Tongogara, who thereafter referred to him as 'Comrade Hawksworth'. The guerrilla leader, whom Hawksworth described as always smiling and excessively polite, made sure he had plenty of cigarettes and anything else he needed. Tongogara also insisted that it was not a racial war, and told his prisoner that if a black man stood in the way of the principles ZANLA was fighting for he would also be seen as the enemy.⁴⁷ Hawksworth was taken through Zambia and imprisoned in Tanzania from where—although at least eight ZANLA guerrillas had been hanged in Salisbury Prison by this point—he was released in December.

Four other white prisoners, who were handed over to Amnesty International at the end of the non-aligned nations preparatory meeting in Maputo in February 1979, were also revealing in terms of guerrilla attitudes. One of the men, Major Thomas Wigglesworth, was a 66-year-old former British regular army officer who had served in Malaya. He had been captured on his smallholding near Umtali six months earlier and marched to a guerrilla base only twelve kilometres from his home. At a press conference when he was released, he described the ZANLA guerrillas as 'well-trained, well-disciplined, and in good morale. Life was quite hard but we were never ill-treated and we were never any worse off than our guards. They were rather keen on our cleanliness and we bathed almost daily.' Another of the captives was 54-year-old Johannes Maartens, an Afrikaaner who had had two heart attacks and had undergone heart surgery in South Africa. Maartens was a prisoner for ten and a half months and, at the

same press conference, he said: 'They were very considerate and when they learnt I had a heart condition they let me rest when I wished.' He was allowed to write to his wife two months before his release and, twice during his captivity, Mugabe personally visited him to see if he was well. The other two, James Black, a 45-year-old forest ranger, and John Kennerley, a 19-year-old printing apprentice, told similar stories.⁴⁸

All of this was quite incomprehensible to the white Rhodesians who had been propagandized into believing that Mugabe and his guerrillas were a bunch of bloodthirsty murdering 'terrorists'. Obviously, they thought, the remarks of the four had been made under duress, surrounded as they were on the balcony of the Polana Hotel in Maputo by members of ZANLA and FRELIMO. Wigglesworth, in fact, had said a wrong word, possibly with good-humoured deliberateness when, during the press conference, he referred to ZANLA as 'terrorists'. Mugabe and his colleagues broke into laughter and Wigglesworth changed the word to 'guerrillas'.

The *Rhodesia Herald* reflected the thinking of white Rhodesians in an editorial on 5 February. 'Although the abductees say they were well treated by their captors theirs must have been a dreadful ordeal, the full story of which has yet to be told.' The Foreign Minister, van der Byl, obviously shared that sentiment. The same day he produced Maartens and Black at a press conference in Salisbury where the Rhodesians apparently thought they would be able to speak more freely. To van der Byl's consternation, Maartens described Mugabe as a 'very decent and humane man' who was 'highly articulate and pleasant', and he added that the guerrillas had 'nothing against the skin [colour] of a man'. Black added to van der Byl's discomfiture by describing Tongogara as a 'humorous chap' who had brought him beer when he was in captivity and said his abduction was a mistake. To make matters worse, Black countered Rhodesian claims that villagers were forced to help the guerrillas, saying when they arrived in a village the people waved ZANU flags and gave food and drink. The guerrillas, he added, were highly motivated and well-disciplined.⁴⁹

The Rhodesians had unwittingly helped Mugabe to score a major public relations coup. There was no request by ZANU for the release of ZANLA prisoners and the releases were described by Tekere as 'a gesture of goodwill to their families'. One is bound to contrast that to van der Byl's remarks at a Geneva press conference in late 1976. Pressed by a Rhodesian journalist as to why the government had ceased releasing the names of guerrillas who had been hanged, he

finally responded in his haughty drawl: 'Well it's academic isn't it? They are usually dead afterwards.'⁵⁰ Rhodesians, instead of trying to understand that Mugabe and his men were possibly not as bad as the RF propaganda machine told them, generally reacted badly towards the four released men and Maartens was refused the compensation normally paid for losses incurred as a result of guerrilla action.

Propaganda—which once simply meant the dissemination of information but has now taken on a different meaning—is an accepted weapon in war and in peace, but for propaganda to be a useful weapon it is necessary for it to be credible. Throughout the war casualty claims on all sides were, to put it mildly, extravagant. On 5 January 1973 a ZANU statement from Lusaka claimed that in fighting in the last ten days of December a total of seventy-five Rhodesian soldiers had been killed and an unknown number wounded. It seems fairly certain that only one Rhodesian soldier, Corporal Moore, died in that period. ZANU was also to claim responsibility for killing a Wedza farmer named Joubert on 30 March 1973, but a subsequent trial revealed that he was killed by Commander Guvamatanga, a FROLIZI guerrilla, during FROLIZI's only action of the war, which sacrificed lives in a vain bid to try to convince the OAU Liberation Committee that FROLIZI should be recognized. In September another ZANU statement claimed that they had killed 165 Rhodesian soldiers between 5 May and 29 July, a claim which was certainly inaccurate.

ZAPU were guilty of similar extravagance. A communiqué from their office in Algiers on 3 October 1973 claimed that ZIPRA forces had overrun a Rhodesian military camp at Urungwe, killing and wounding sixty South African soldiers. The release of the Algiers statement followed a Rhodesian communiqué announcing the attack and saying that one soldier had been injured. In December 1973 ZAPU's publication, the *Zimbabwe Review*, claimed that nineteen South African soldiers had died when their vehicles struck landmines in three different places in the Urungwe district on 7 December. Again it was not true. The high point of the claims and counter-claims came in 1978 when both ZANU and ZAPU claimed responsibility for blowing up fuel storage tanks in Salisbury. A subsequent trial revealed that it was a ZANLA operation.

The test of credibility becomes doubly difficult for a liberation movement when the bulk of the journalists reporting a given war are white and when their sympathies are generally with the white regime. This was the case in the Rhodesian war. The Rhodesians, partly

because of a more sympathetic press corps and a more receptive audience in the West, were more effective than the liberation movements, but their claims were also extravagant. The guerrilla force in the north-east on 21 December 1972 numbered only sixty. On 18 February the Rhodesian Ministry of Information was claiming that twenty-six guerrillas had been killed and 'many more' captured. As the guerrillas had not received any reinforcements at that point the continuing level of fighting is inexplicable if, as the Rhodesian statement suggests, some two-thirds of the guerrillas had been killed or captured. The figure becomes particularly inexplicable when one takes into consideration how many of that initial group of sixty survived—men like Urimbo and Nhongo who remained with ZANLA, Chimurenga and others who joined opposing parties and factions, or Nhari and Badza who died in later years after rebelling against the ZANU leadership. By 27 May the Rhodesian forces were claiming to have killed over fifty guerrillas and to have captured many others. By 21 August the figure was 130 killed and nearly as many captured, and by 29 January 1974 a total of 214 guerrillas were said to have been killed and an unspecified number captured, at least eight of whom had been executed. The problem about these Rhodesian claims, apart from the number of guerrillas who survived that period, is that fewer than the number of guerrillas the Rhodesians claimed to have killed and captured had been sent into the country. If the body count was accurate they were certainly not all guerrillas.

The public was also being misled in other areas. During Niesewand's *in camera* trial the first prosecution witness to be called was Assistant Commissioner of Police Ronald Eames, who was the Criminal Investigation Officer for Salisbury and Mashonaland. On 19 March 1973, asked by the prosecutor how many guerrilla attacks there had been since the Altena Farm attack on 21 December, he replied, 'Up until the 15th of this month, in excess of 200 incidents have been logged.'⁵¹ The public had been told of less than forty.

Further evidence of how much was kept from the public is revealed in reports by SB and military intelligence. These documents also give an insight into the patchy nature of Rhodesian intelligence, a point illustrated by two reports in late 1973.⁵²

The first, dated 21 September 1973, on ZANLA activities in Operation Hurricane, the code name the Rhodesians gave to the north-east command after the Altena attack, was written by two Detective Inspectors, Stanton and Baldwin, who were SB members stationed at

Mount Darwin. Tongogara, who read the report some years later, described it as being excellent intelligence work and Peter Stanton, who was to remain in the north-east during the war, was regarded by his colleagues as one of the top SB field officers. The report dealt with ZANLA 'activities, strengths and intentions' in what the guerrillas called Chaminuka sector. It listed five guerrillas who had brought five boxes of ammunition from Binda base in Mozambique and cached them on the northern bank of the Mukumbura River to be picked up by guerrillas operating in the Nehanda sector. On 9 or 10 September a new contingent of guerrillas trained in Tanzania had arrived at Binda base to reinforce Chaminuka and Nehanda sectors. Nhari, who had the SB code number C40/XYP 7796, had collected the Nehanda reinforcements and Badza the seventeen for Chaminuka sector. The report lists the names of the seventeen guerrillas, of whom twelve trained in Tanzania and five at Binda where the training was far less sophisticated. They moved from Binda on 9 or 10 September and were deployed in sections in the Gwetera and Fura areas of Mount Darwin on 17 February. At 11.15 a.m. on 19 September, the security forces, acting on information from people in the Chesa African Purchase Area, made contact with the two sections, numbering nineteen guerrillas, who were together at the time. Four guerrillas were captured and three were killed, one a veteran called Jakachaka and two who had arrived in the north-east ten days earlier.

Guerrillas were instructed not to reveal military details if they were captured but, very frequently, they did. According to the SB report, one of the captured guerrillas, whose *chimurenga* name was Andrew Makoni, provided invaluable information, including the location of a FRELIMO camp called Horteiro in the Matimbe area of Mozambique, which ZANLA guerrillas were using as a transit point. It is not wise for outsiders, who have not experienced the hardships of guerrilla life and the fear when captured, to make moral judgement of the actions of men like Makoni, but what becomes clear is that, although there was Rhodesian infiltration, the bulk of information in a report such as this one was obtained during interrogation of captured guerrillas.

The SB report is revealing in several other aspects. On 30 August a Rhodesian 'pseudo group'—security forces dressed and armed as guerrillas—led by Sergeant André Rabie of the Special Air Service (SAS), picked up a guerrilla named Kefas Mashangara. As a result the nine-man guerrilla section stationed near Shamva decided to move its base from Chibara, and on 7 September they were involved in a

'contact' at Mukaradzi Mine in which three of the guerrillas were killed. The commander, Kennedy Zvamutsana, died from his wounds after being carried on a stretcher to a new camp in the Chesa African Purchase Area. The surviving guerrillas believed that they had been attacked by another ZANLA group because they recognized one of the attackers. It was in fact another 'pseudo group' commanded by Sergeant A. P. Franklin of the Selous Scouts, and the man they recognized was a 'turned' guerrilla. Sergeant Rabie was killed leading his 'pseudo group' on 16 September. Sergeant Franklin was to be one of the first four men awarded Rhodesia's second highest medal for bravery, the Silver Cross, on 13 September 1974. The operations of the 'pseudo gangs', both inside and outside Rhodesia, were to be increasingly questioned during the war and it is believed that many killings ascribed to the guerrillas were in fact carried out by these irregular units.

The report is also revealing about the level of support the guerrillas enjoyed among the villagers at a time when Rhodesian politicians were claiming support for them had ceased. 'It is obvious that the Chaminyuka[sic] sector is expanding eastwards towards Mtoko, etc.', the report says. 'Recruiting appears to be doing well and cooperation with the locals continues. It is quite obvious from visiting the new camp [in Chesa APA] that kraals in the immediate area have been in contact with the terrorists.' The report listed forty-nine known guerrillas active in the Chaminuka sector. Five of them had just left the country escorting more recruits to Mozambique.

In contrast to the detailed and thorough SB report, a military intelligence report from Brady Barracks, Bulawayo, dated 19 October 1973 and signed by Captain M. J. F. Ainslie, on ZAPU and ZIPRA activities, is in several places conspicuously inaccurate. In the first place the authors are under the erroneous impression that the Joint Military Command (JMC) created at Mbeya in Tanzania by ZANU and ZAPU in 1972 was a functioning body controlling the military activities of the two movements. In fact the JMC, and the Joint Political Council established in Lusaka in March 1973, never functioned: they were both window-dressing established by the movements when under pressure to achieve a measure of unity and threatened with the cutting off of funds from the OAU Liberation Committee. The authors of the report were also mistaken in believing that the JMC was responsible for disbursing funds to ZANU and ZAPU. It was the Liberation Committee which had this task, and which was threatening to halt funds to ZAPU unless there was some

military action. The report is even more seriously inaccurate when it states that there was a large concentration of ZIPRA guerrillas, outnumbering the ZANLA guerrillas, at FRELIMO's Chifombo base in Tete, and that the ZIPRA guerrillas could be allocated the zone westwards from the Hunyani River along the Zambezi escarpment towards Kariba. In fact at the time Nhongo was in process of opening a new war zone known as ZZ—Zimbabwe-Zambia—in that area, and on 18 December General Walls announced that the new offensive had begun.⁵³

Despite these shortcomings, the military 'intelligence summary 4/73' provides a few insights. ZAPU, after a period of internal disarray and threatened by ZANU's sustained resurgence of guerrilla activity which was receiving wide publicity, 'has shown its teeth once more', the report noted. They were credited with responsibility for the 27 September attack on the South African Police 'platoon base' at Mana Pools and with two mine incidents in October which damaged South African Police vehicles at Chete and in the Victoria Falls Game Reserve. The authors ascribed ZAPU's inactivity for some time as being due to 'a shortage of funds, manpower and equipment combined with a certain amount of dissension from the existing rank and file'. The report noted that approximately eighty-eight ZAPU recruits had passed through Botswana on their way for training, that two large shipments of arms had recently been unloaded in Dar es Salaam and that a new representative, Joseph Maposa, had been appointed in Francistown and was proving effective in revitalizing the ZAPU network and streamlining the movement of recruits through Botswana.

Further activity by ZIPRA was predicted in Matabeleland. 'The majority of the Ndebele speaking members of ZAPU have expressed their reluctance to infiltrate through Mashonaland, claiming that there were too many disadvantages. They preferred instead to infiltrate via Botswana and it is understood that the necessary reconnaissance for this is now being undertaken.' The report adds: 'From the foregoing it is clearly evident that terrorist effort against Rhodesia will increase on an ever widening front.' The conventional Sixties style of crossings into northern Matabeleland together with the widespread use of mines was predicted; infiltration through Botswana and attempts at political mobilization in the Kezi and Gwanda districts of south-west Matabeleland were seen as forerunners to larger crossings of the Zambezi. Increased vigilance in the 1st Brigade area of the Rhodesian army covering Matabeleland was advocated, with

increased patrolling of the Zambezi River and clandestine visits to Zambian islands in Lake Kariba and the Zambezi River.

However, the main thrust lay with ZANLA, as it would throughout the war. A confidential priority signal from Joint Operational Command (JOC) Hurricane on 15 January 1974 to various commanders stated:

Reliable information indicates the following:

- A. Strength of Nehanda sector of MMZ province as at 25.12.73 was a total of 105 men divided under 14 section commanders. Strength of ZZ province probably 40 men but not known how broken down.
- B. A meeting of commanders was held in the Membire area on 11.1.74 and following matters discussed:
 1. Problems in transportation of material and it was suggested that advantage should be taken of the rainy season and recruits should be used as porters.
 2. In Dande area no terr action to be taken with the intention of stopping security force concentration there which is blockading transport of material.
 3. To take advantage of rainy season to infiltrate locals before the advent of the dry season when security forces allegedly occupy the water points. This is to the west of the Msengezi River in the Sipolilo area. In addition it is argued that this would assist with importation of material via Ruwangwa [presumably Luangwa] and would also assist communications with ZZ province.
 4. Nyombwe area to have as its main purpose a communicating base.
 5. Centenary area the aim to be to mobilise the people to serve as a base for advance groups and operations to be aimed further into the interior as far as Ryua and Karuyana Rivers.
 6. Operations to be continued in Mazoe [Chiweshe] and Madziwa areas to attract security force attention away from Dande and Nyombwe areas.
- C. Reports were submitted by various commanders and in one of these terr leaders considered Chesa APA is now staged for operations and say terrs can do so with maximum safety and security.⁵⁴

From this, and many other JOC Hurricane priority signals, it is apparent that Rhodesian intelligence in the north-east by late 1973

was extremely good. However, in spite of the knowledge of the names of most of the guerrillas in the north-east, their rough locations and plans, the Rhodesian forces, who were vastly superior in this phase in numbers and equipment, were unable to crush the guerrilla force which at the time of the JOC Hurricane report numbered fewer than 200. The new ZANLA strategy of concentrating on political education was paying dividends. Once the groundwork had been laid among a generally receptive population, the Rhodesians were never able to uproot or contain it.

The Portuguese *Coup d'État*

'We are concerned, as I think the people in Mozambique and Portugal are, at the manner in which the terrorists do seem to have gained ground. However, I am satisfied that it is the intention of the Portuguese Government to get on top of this problem and eventually push the terrorists out and we must all work to this end,' Smith told a panel of journalists on Rhodesian television on 25 March 1974. He had been asked by one of the journalists whether, as the security situation in Mozambique was the key to Rhodesia's well-being, a collapse or political change in the Portuguese colony would make Rhodesia's situation more serious than it already was. Such a change, Smith agreed, would be unfortunate for Rhodesia but, he added, 'I am happy to say I don't visualize that sort of thing taking place.' Exactly a month later, on 25 April, the Portuguese armed forces overthrew the government of Dr Caetano in a *coup d'état*.

If Smith was taken aback by the events in Lisbon so too were the strategists in Western capitals. In the United States, the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, of which Henry Kissinger was then secretary, had observed in its now infamous National Security Study Memorandum No. 39 that 'the situation in the region [Southern Africa] is not likely to change appreciably in the foreseeable future, and in any event we cannot influence it.' The document, which contained the conclusions of an analysis of Southern Africa ordered by Richard Nixon soon after he became President in 1969, was circulated by Kissinger to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was to be the guiding assessment for American policy on Southern Africa over the next five years, until events overtook its predictions.

The NSSM evaluation reached one further staggeringly incorrect and racist conclusion: 'The blacks cannot gain political rights through violence. Constructive change can come only by acquiescence of the whites.'² Similar views prevailed in most Western capitals.

What had been ignored was that after thirteen years of war in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, the Portuguese people—and particularly the Portuguese armed forces—had grown war-weary. A total of 7,674 Portuguese soldiers, many of them National Servicemen who had no link with or desire to fight in the African colonies, had lost their lives.³ The cost of the war on three fronts was accounting for over 50 per cent of the annual budget of Europe's poorest nation, and the total estimated cost over thirteen years was £2,500,000,000. This inevitably affected the economy of the metropolitan power, where at the time of the *coup d'état* inflation was running at 30 per cent, the illiteracy rate was the highest in Europe, and access to such amenities as clean water and electricity was the lowest.

In the immediate confused aftermath of the Portuguese *coup d'état* it was clear—except to those who believed that blacks could not successfully fight against whites—that the major factor leading to the *coup d'état* had been the pressure of the guerrilla wars, particularly in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. What was less immediately obvious was the ideology and intentions of the men who had overthrown Caetano. General Antonio de Spínola, an officer with a Prussian air and conservative philosophy, had become the new President but the real leaders of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), the Movement of the Armed Forces, remained behind the scenes. Who were they? Was Spínola really their leader? These, and many other questions, occupied the minds of the policy makers in Salisbury and Pretoria, as well as in Washington and other Western capitals, in the days after the *coup d'état*.

Spínola had been at the centre of a controversy a month earlier over the publication of his book *Portugal and the Future*. He had concluded in the book that Portugal could not win the African wars militarily and that a 'political solution' was necessary, but what he advocated fell far short of the total independence the guerrilla movements were fighting for. FRELIMO's Vice-President, Marcelino dos Santos, observed that 'Spínola is a 63-year-old general with a fascist philosophy, a fascist ideology.'⁴ He was mentally unable to accept real change, dos Santos said, and was advocating instead a new relationship between Portugal and her colonies which fell far short of

genuine independence and which sought to maintain oppression and exploitation.

While dos Santos was partially correct, Spínola's book and Caetano's response probably acted as a trigger for the *coup d'état*. Immediately after publication of the book, Caetano summoned 120 generals to swear an oath of allegiance to the government and its policies. Spínola, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of Staff, General Francisco Costa Gomes, refused to attend the ceremony and they were relieved of their posts.⁵ Of even greater importance was a fateful remark by Caetano. Spínola had gone to him advocating 'political solutions' after returning from Guinea Bissau. Caetano had responded by saying that in Africa he would prefer a military to a political defeat. This news spread through the officer corps who, recalling the Portuguese army's humiliation in Goa in 1961, recognized that the military was once again to become the scapegoat of the politicians.⁶

Spínola, Costa Gomes, and several other conservative military chiefs, were asked by the MFA to form a Junta of National Salvation, and their early observations about the colonies were certainly more heartening for Smith, the South Africans, and the planners in Western capitals, than they were for the liberation movements. Costa Gomes, on a visit to Mozambique immediately after the *coup d'état*, twice said that he believed the people of the colony would choose something between the 'extremes' of independence and the status quo at a planned referendum.⁷ Spínola, speaking on 29 April, said that while he accepted the principle of 'self determination' in the three African colonies he did not think the people there were ready to decide their future. If they were to vote for total independence then Portugal's policy towards them would have failed, he said. If, on the other hand, they chose a form of federation then this would show that Portugal's overseas policies had been fair and had succeeded.⁸

On 11 June, swearing in new Governors of Angola and Mozambique, Spínola insisted that decolonization must be a three-stage process starting with a ceasefire, then a referendum, and finally, only if the referendum called for it, independence. 'Immediate independence', as demanded by the liberation movements, would be a betrayal of universally accepted ideals, he said, adding: 'A people's right to self-determination in no way entitles anybody to enforce a choice in which the population has had no say.' However, before the people could be given that choice they had to be prepared to awaken their political sense. 'Then and then only, the populations of the

overseas territories will decide on their future.' That choice would be between a 'federation, confederation, community, or simple coexistence of fully independent states'.⁹

Fortunately, Spínola was not the leader of the MFA. Nor did his views reflect the thinking of the real leaders, who came from the middle-ranking officer corps. Those officers, if at first naïve and hesitant, recognized that FRELIMO, the MPLA and the PAIGC had been fighting for independence and that only independence would end the African wars. The programme of the MFA, announced on the day of the *coup d'état*, began by saying: 'Bearing in mind that, after thirteen years' struggle in the overseas territories, the ruling political system has proved unable to provide a concrete, objective definition of an overseas policy capable of bringing about peace . . . the Movement of the Armed Forces' was appointing a Junta of National Salvation which must be guided by the principles that a political and not a military solution was necessary to end the African wars and that an overseas policy must be pursued which would lead to peace.¹⁰ This policy, though ill-defined, drew support from the Portuguese Communist Party leader, Alvaro Cunhal, and the Socialist leader, Mario Soares (who was to become Foreign Minister and be in charge of negotiations with the liberation movements), when the two men returned to Portugal from exile. Soares, in an interview in June with the Algerian newspaper *El Moudjahid*, said Portugal's decolonization policy had run into trouble largely because of the attitude of Spínola and some of the other Junta members, and he significantly added: 'The main thing in my view is that the democratic and progressive forces, which are determined to put an end to colonial domination, are strong enough to carry through the decolonisation process.'¹¹

The contradictions between the MFA and Spínola had been reflected in the abortive attempt in Lusaka on 5 June to reach agreement between Portugal and FRELIMO. The liberation movement arrived fully prepared to discuss the details of independence, whereas Soares was tied to the Junta's plan of a referendum. Machel had observed at the OAU summit in Mogadishu that 'It is not possible to ask a slave if he wants to be free, particularly if the slave happens to be in full revolt.'¹² He declined to discuss a referendum and the meeting was suspended for Soares to consult his government. A joint statement said: 'Both delegations recognise that agreement on a ceasefire is conditional on a prior global agreement regarding fundamental political principles.'¹³ Soares was later to question this publicly, wondering about the morality of talking peace when a war was continuing.

FRELIMO's response to the confusion in the Portuguese camp was to leave the door open for talks while stressing their willingness to fight on to achieve their objectives. A Portuguese garrison in northern Mozambique was over-run by FRELIMO guerrillas, and a company of Portuguese troops was captured and marched to Tanzania as prisoners of war. A new front was opened in the Mozambique Province and within eight weeks the FRELIMO forces had seized control of the area from the demoralized Portuguese forces.

Meanwhile, Vorster—who had recognized the new Portuguese regime three days after the *coup d'état*—and Smith looked on, aware that these events still offered the possibility that the liberation movements they perceived to be communist would not become their new neighbours. The 'Unholy Alliance' of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa had certainly ended but the outcome of the power struggle in Lisbon remained uncertain.

Smith's first public reaction a day after the *coup d'état* had been: 'Rhodesia does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and therefore the political changes in Portugal are essentially matters for the Portuguese. Rhodesia has always enjoyed the best of relations with metropolitan Portugal and her provinces in Africa and we believe these relations will continue.'¹⁴ Such soothing words, aimed at his white constituents, could not disguise the considerable anxiety provoked by the change in Portugal. In May, Smith flew to Pretoria for talks with Vorster. At the end of their meeting they issued a typically bland statement saying: 'What we are concerned about is not whether there is a white or a black government in Mozambique, but that there is a good and stable government.'¹⁵

Smith visited South Africa against the backdrop of increasing rumours that Rhodesia was planning to link itself politically with South Africa, as a sort of fifth province, to guard against the implications of the Portuguese coup. Smith scotched that rumour at a public meeting and added: 'We are getting along very well in Rhodesia—people of all races discussing our mutual problems and arriving at well-thought-out, well-balanced solutions.' Commenting on the Portuguese decision to talk with the liberation movements, he observed: 'People who parley with terrorists do so at their own peril.'¹⁶ In private Smith was less unrealistic. His immediate concern, apart from the unfolding events in Lisbon, was his trade links, which were increasingly threatened by FRELIMO guerrillas. Rail traffic to Beira and Lourenço Marques had been suspended as a result of a strike by African workers and, in the case of the Beira link, because of

guerrilla attacks. Given those immediate problems and the political uncertainty about the future of Mozambique, Smith needed a new and more dependable route. The one chosen connected Rutenga in south-east Rhodesia with Beitbridge and thence on to Johannesburg. That was what he needed from Vorster. Work began on the new link in June and 145 kilometres of railway were completed after ninety-three days work on 10 September, twenty-one months ahead of schedule. This was a considerable tribute to Rhodesian determination and technical skill.

Spinola, meanwhile, was losing ground in the Lisbon power struggle. In July the middle-of-the road Prime Minister, Palma Carlos, and four similarly inclined Ministers, resigned. Spinola tried to replace him with his own man, Lieutenant-Colonel Firmino Miguel, a 42-year-old former Defence Minister, but the MFA acted decisively in asserting its authority and appointing one of its own men, Colonel Vasco Goncalves, as Premier. Six of the Ministers in his cabinet were members of the Movement and two of them, Major Vitor Alves and Major Melo Antunes, were to play a particularly key role in the unfolding crisis with Spinola and in getting the decolonization process on course.

On 27 July the Movement forced Spinola to make a broadcast to the nation which represented a total volte-face from his previous federalist position. He spoke of 'thirteen years of aimless war', the reasons for which 'have now ceased to exist'. He went on: 'As I have often stated, the African people are perfectly capable of organising themselves politically and of defending their own freedom.' That this was totally contradictory to all he had said before was blatantly obvious. '... the time has come for the President of the Republic solemnly to reiterate the recognition of the right of the peoples of the Portuguese Overseas Territories to self-determination, including the immediate recognition of their right to independence. . . . To be more specific so that there shall be no doubts about the historic importance of this moment or of the clarity of what we are now stating, this statement means that we are ready, as from now, to commence the process of the transfer of powers to the populations of the Overseas Provinces who are qualified to be recognised to this effect, namely: [Portuguese] Guinea, Angola, Mozambique. We are thus, and as from this moment, open to all initiatives to start the work of planning, programming and carrying out the decolonisation process with the acceptance as from now of the right to political independence to be proclaimed in the terms and dates to be agreed.'¹⁷ The Lisbon log-jam had finally been broken and

Soares went to Dar es Salaam on 16 August to resume the talks with FRELIMO. An agreement was signed on 7 September in Lusaka leading to the establishment of a transitional government in Mozambique and independence in June the following year.

Spinola's broadcast, only a few days before the Rhodesian general election, came as an added shock. It 'aroused widespread fears' among the whites but, observed a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Salisbury, 'it is also possible that the shut-in feeling caused by Portugal vanishing from the map of Africa may bring a desperate rallying of votes to Mr Ian Smith.'¹⁸ It did: in the election on 30 July the Rhodesian Front won all fifty white parliamentary seats.

The election result, Smith declared with another typical piece of wishful thinking, had strengthened his hand.¹⁹ The reality was that the defeat of Spinola by the MFA meant that there was a strong likelihood of an early agreement with FRELIMO. Once this occurred Rhodesia would have an additional 1,100 kilometres of frontier to guard against guerrilla infiltration. Except for the 200-kilometre frontier with South Africa along the Limpopo River, Rhodesia's 4,000 kilometres of border would adjoin hostile independent states. Further there was the probability that a FRELIMO government would impose United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, thereby cutting trade routes through Beira and Lourenço Marques.

In the March general election in Britain a Labour government led by Mr James Callaghan had been returned to power, had said sanctions against Rhodesia would be tightened, and had pledged that it would not accept any settlement unless it was first accepted by the African population. In early July Callaghan had told Parliament in London that all past settlement offers to Smith—*Tiger*, *Fearless* and the 1971 proposals—had been withdrawn. Smith must accept, Callaghan said, that he had no alternative to meaningful discussions with the Africans. 'The white Rhodesians should now aim at more realistic accommodation of African views than has been the case so far. For my part, I can assure you that the British Government will not agree to any settlement unless we are satisfied that it enjoys the support of the African majority.'²⁰ Callaghan's position fell short of any form of initiative, but nevertheless it made it clear to Smith what would not be accepted.

While the attitude of the Labour government might have been foreseen, the mounting hostility in South Africa came as a shock. The chairman of Johannesburg Investments, Sir Albert Robinson, a former Rhodesian Federal High Commissioner in London, said in

mid-June: 'The events in South Africa and Mozambique are in striking contrast to the situation in Rhodesia. Here the policies of partnership were abandoned in 1962 and were replaced by a more rigid system designed to entrench white domination. . . . The policy of conceding too little and too late is the fundamental weakness of the approach to our problems. More realistic policies are required to break the political log-jam.'²¹

Even tougher words came from the General Secretary of the Trades Union Council of South Africa, Mr A. Grobbelaar, at the opening of the Trades Union Congress of Rhodesia in Salisbury on 1 September. Since UDI, he noted, South Africa had stood firmly by Rhodesia, but as a result of the Portuguese *coup d'état* the situation in the region had changed. 'It is my duty to point out to you that a growing body of opinion in South Africa is saying that South Africa can no longer afford this support. They are saying this in terms of political, economic, and military involvement which South Africa has with Rhodesia. The open question being asked in South Africa is whether a much stricter policy of neutrality, as distinct from a policy of identification, would not be more in South Africa's interests.' This growing body of opinion, Grobbelaar said, favoured 'wooing' surrounding independent black states, including Angola and Mozambique once they attained independence. 'I think it is realistic to realise that while your country has until now acted as a buffer zone in blunting terrorist incursions from black Africa, your importance to South Africa for that purpose has now declined. Black Africa has now crept closer to us, and terrorists will probably soon have operational bases in Mozambique and direct access to South Africa's frontiers.'²²

Shrewder and more alert to the implications of the Portuguese coup and the ending of the white triumvirate, Vorster showed far greater foresight than his Rhodesian counterpart, who displayed his usual sterility and inability to understand the implications of what was happening outside his small fantasy world. Rhodesia, Smith claimed in an attempt to appeal for white South African support over Vorster's head, was holding the line against communism. The Rhodesian leader was still insisting as late as June that he foresaw no dramatic change in Mozambique as a result of events in Portugal, and he claimed that more and more Africans in his country were asking that Rhodesia should not go the same way as other black African countries.²³

Whether or not Smith believed what he was saying, he remained inflexible during negotiations with Muzorewa, which further under-

mined the Bishop's credibility among nationalists. The Bishop had been given a new mandate in March by the ANC executive to negotiate with Smith but the ANC General Secretary, Gordon Chavunduka, stressed that they would not accept any constitutional proposals which did not guarantee unimpeded progress to African majority rule. The Bishop emphasized that the ANC's priority was majority African rule based on 'one man, one vote'. Smith refused to budge from the rejected 1971 constitutional proposals and on 2 June the twenty-five members of the ANC central committee unanimously rejected the proposals he had put to Muzorewa. All Smith had offered by way of concession were six extra African seats in Parliament, but the proposed new total of twenty-two African seats still left the Africans short of a blocking third to prevent constitutional changes by the Rhodesian Front government. In addition, under the new proposals Africans would not qualify for an increase above twenty-two seats until there had been a 24 per cent increase in the number of Africans on the higher voters role where property, salary and educational qualifications were required. 'Under the proposals it would take between 40 and 50 years to reach parity,' the ANC Secretary for Information, Dr Edson Sithole, said. 'The ANC reiterates that the whole political solution in this country is based on representation and the franchise, and until there is agreement on these there can never be a settlement.'²⁴

A few days later Smith detained Dr Sithole, whose militancy he suspected was holding Muzorewa back and had led to the ANC rejection. The Bishop reacted on 20 June by suspending the constitutional talks. Smith then announced a plan to sponsor a round table conference of African opinion groups which, after the ANC refused to attend, he was forced to drop. Now embarrassing details began to leak out about Muzorewa's private negotiations with Smith, who claimed he had reached an agreement with the Bishop based on the 1971 proposals but that militant members of the ANC had blocked it. Muzorewa denied this, saying he had accepted the 1971 proposals only as 'a basis for negotiation'. He said he had insisted on this particular phrase being inserted in the agreement he had signed with Smith. The controversy over the document erupted again in September when Smith read part of it out in Parliament. The crucial part read: 'Bishop Muzorewa, in his capacity as President of the African National Council, gave an undertaking that he accepted the 1971 proposals for a settlement and that he would urge the British Government, on behalf of the African people, to implement the proposals.'²⁵

The agreement had been signed on 17 August 1973 and the key phrase 'as a basis for negotiation (or discussion)' was missing from Smith's version of the document which was reproduced in the *Rhodesia Herald* on 27 September.

On 15 October, in a circular distributed to ANC offices, the Bishop claimed he had been cheated into signing the document. He said he had initiated the talks, to which Smith had come with a prepared statement apparently under the assumption that the ANC had changed their minds over the 1971 settlement proposals and were now willing to accept them. This was not the case. 'When Mr Smith produced the prepared statement for signing, we signed, but I said that the 1971 settlement proposals could only form the basis for discussion. I asked Mr Smith to amend his copy of the document and I believed he had done so in the presence of the two witnesses.'²⁶ One of the witnesses, Chad Chipunza, an uncle of Muzorewa and a conservative politician from Federal days, who favoured a settlement based on the 1971 proposals, issued a statement saying he was amazed at the Bishop's claim that he had been cheated and suggested Muzorewa should gracefully retire from politics and shepherd his flock. Even taking into account Muzorewa's political ineptitude it is incredible that he should have signed an agreement which went totally against the African opinion expressed to the Pearce Commission. Even more incredible, or perhaps merely naïve, is the fact that—even if he really meant to include the phrase that the proposals were only a 'basis for discussion'—he signed the document before ensuring that it had been inserted.

8

Détente

Even before the acrimonious collapse of the negotiations between Muzorewa and Smith the seeds had been laid for a new phase in the struggle for Zimbabwe—détente. The contacts that led to this phase began in early 1973 and were initiated not because of the guerrilla war in north-eastern Rhodesia but because of the deteriorating situation in Mozambique. FRELIMO guerrillas had moved through Tete to open a new offensive in the Manica e Sofala province on 25 July 1972, sabotaging road and rail links from Rhodesia and Malawi to the port of Beira and taking the war into Portuguese white settler farming areas for the first time.

Soon after UDI, Kaunda had written to the Portuguese fascist dictator, Dr Antonio Salazar, seeking increased access for trade from his landlocked country, west over the Benguela railway through Angola's port of Lobito and east through Malawi to the port of Beira. Salazar had agreed and early in 1973, shortly after the war began in north-eastern Rhodesia and Kaunda closed his southern route through Rhodesia, the Zambian leader again sought assurances from Lisbon that his routes to the west and east would remain open. Despite the fact that FRELIMO guerrillas and armaments were travelling through Zambia to the Tete and Manica e Sofala fronts, the Portuguese government agreed.¹

Malawi was used as an intermediary in the 1973 contact with Lisbon, and Jorge Jardim, a wealthy entrepreneur who had moved to Mozambique in 1952 after serving as Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry in the Salazar administration, began a series of secret visits to Lusaka for discussions with Kaunda. Jardim, who had been Malawi's

consul in Mozambique since 1964, arranged the first of the meetings through the Lonrho chief, Roland 'Tiny' Rowland, a long-time friend of Kaunda whose name figures frequently in the Rhodesia story. Kaunda met Jardim at least four times in Lusaka and on the last occasion Jardim brought two of his daughters with him; Kaunda had breakfast with them and remembered them as 'charming girls'.² Kaunda was interested in protecting his communications routes through Mozambique, while Jardim was interested in protecting his considerable business interests in Mozambique and in Malawi which were increasingly threatened by FRELIMO's escalating war. Kaunda says he told Jardim what he had told Salazar in 1966: 'These people [FRELIMO] are not racists. Once you give them independence perhaps you'll be able to make your money in more peace than is the case at the moment.'³

Machel had just returned from attending the third national conference of FRELIMO's defence department in Tete when Kaunda met him. Kaunda told the FRELIMO leader that Jardim had laid out a plan for Mozambique: he had asked Kaunda to persuade FRELIMO not to intensify the war, not to bring sophisticated weapons into the war (because that could escalate it into a regional conflict involving South Africa), and to agree to the establishment of a 'moderate' FRELIMO inside Mozambique that could be a contact point between Portugal and the real FRELIMO. Kaunda said he had also been asked to see if he could arrange a meeting between Machel and Jardim, who had wanted to know if Machel was a communist. Kaunda, who had met Machel for the first time a year earlier, had assured Jardim that Machel was a nationalist and not a communist.⁴

Machel rejected these proposals and carefully explained to Kaunda the implications of the message he was relaying. The concept was highly dangerous, raising the possibility of civil war. FRELIMO wanted only two forces involved in the Mozambique conflict, the Portuguese forces on the one hand and itself on the other. When the time came for independence the discussions would be between FRELIMO and the Portuguese Government, and not third-party organizations who had not been involved in the fighting. Machel said he was not prepared to meet Jardim, and if Portugal wanted to talk to FRELIMO it should be done directly and officially.⁵ The FRELIMO leader explained Jardim's background, his links with Salazar and thereafter with Caetano. Jardim, Machel argued, was not just a businessman—he was a politician, and furthermore he was a reactionary politician. This viewpoint was borne out the following year when

Jardim supported Spinola's concept of a relationship between metropolitan Portugal and Mozambique which fell well short of complete independence.⁶

Machel's strong rejection of Jardim's proposals and explanation of their implications notwithstanding, new contacts followed and it was these which were to lead directly to détente. A British peer, Lord Colyton, was involved in the introductions for the new contacts.⁷ Lord Colyton had spent twenty-two years in the diplomatic service, including a wartime posting in Lisbon, before resigning from the Foreign Office in 1946 to go into politics. He became Member of Parliament for Taunton in Somerset, and from 1952 to 1955 was Minister of State for Colonial Affairs in the Conservative government. From 1966 to 1972 he was chairman of Tanganyika Concessions, a colonial-era multinational company which owned the Benguela railway, Kaunda's lifeline to the Atlantic Ocean through Angola.

In the second half of 1973 Lord Colyton acted as the link to introduce Kaunda to members of the Portuguese armed forces serving in Mozambique. In September or October the soldiers first travelled secretly to Lusaka to see Kaunda. 'I can't say what ranks they were,' Kaunda said.⁸ 'And I can't say whether they were actually PIDE [the Portuguese secret police] trying to find out what we were thinking here. But they did come and I would say they were quite clear, clearer than Jardim, that this thing [Mozambique] was going to collapse and they were talking in terms of . . . really I think they were talking of a truce. I'm not even sure that I spoke to Samora [Machel] about this because I thought it was more or less along the same lines as Jardim. So it was quite clear that it was not something that would work. Again, as I said, we did not establish the identity of these people.'

Kaunda did not tell Machel, but early in 1974 he briefed Rowland on the contacts with the Portuguese soldiers. 'I didn't establish the identity of these people so I didn't want to bother Samora about it. I just mentioned it to Tiny Rowland. It showed that FRELIMO was certainly being effective.'⁹ Even if the identity of the Portuguese soldiers was in doubt, the information they provided about the state of the war in Mozambique and the morale of the Portuguese forces was vital, both to Lonrho who learned of it and to FRELIMO who did not.

On 23 March, after Kaunda's briefing, Rowland met Dr Marquard de Villiers, an urbane Afrikaaner of the *verligte* school, in London. De Villiers occasionally played golf with Vorster and was on the board of Lonrho, South Africa. Over dinner at the Savoy Hotel, Rowland related to de Villiers what Kaunda had told him about the contacts

with the Portuguese soldiers. On 29 March, in Vorster's office in the Union Building which dominates Pretoria's skyline, de Villiers in turn briefed the South African Prime Minister. He told him that Mozambique had 'thrown in the towel—capitulated', and that this would become apparent within a few weeks, six at the outside.¹⁰

'I gave Mr Vorster the information on the 29th of March 1974 that the Mozambique government had been negotiating in Lusaka—Majors and Captains of the army had been negotiating in Lusaka for a handover of power.' The negotiations, de Villiers said, '... had been going on for some months and in fact the new constitution had already been drawn up at that stage.' De Villiers said he thought that Kaunda had kept Machel briefed about the contacts with the Portuguese soldiers.¹¹ Senior FRELIMO officials, however, confirm that they were not informed, and a Zambian who was a cabinet minister at the time said that FRELIMO were deliberately not informed because they would have opposed the negotiations. 'If FRELIMO had known it would have been the end of it. The Portuguese officers were told that FRELIMO would not accept the negotiations because they could see victory in sight.'¹²

A further insight into Zambia's position at the time is provided by a confidential memorandum from State House, Lusaka, dated 12 September 1973 and entitled 'Zambia's View of Trends in Portuguese African Territories'. The memorandum begins with the precept that 'The Portuguese Government has shown that, unlike South Africa and rebel Rhodesia, it shares in the fundamental principles of non-racialism.'¹³ That may have appeared to be the case to Zambian dignitaries visiting Mozambique, but it was certainly not the experience of the vast majority of the African population of the Portuguese colonies. Kaunda argued that Zambia's strategy was to try to divide the 'unholy alliance' of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, and he pointed out that the memorandum goes on to say that Portugal's policies in its African 'territories' and its political and military co-operation with Rhodesia and South Africa were barriers to the development of good relations and co-operation with Zambia. However it is noteworthy that the memorandum makes use of the word 'territories', the same euphemism used by Lisbon to pretend that the colonies were not colonies at all but part of the metropolis.

This memorandum was written while the contacts with members of the Portuguese forces in Mozambique were taking place and it illustrates Zambia's attitude towards FRELIMO: 'Nationalist movements

such as FRELIMO should be recognized as an important political factor whose assistance in the formulation of future political framework cannot be ignored.'¹⁴ As FRELIMO was the only liberation movement recognized by the OAU and as it was the only movement fighting for independence, the position of Zambia—a member of the OAU—should have been that FRELIMO was 'the' rather than 'an' important political factor. That negotiations had been taking place for months with Portuguese officers, that a new constitution had been drawn up, and that FRELIMO had not been informed would all appear to indicate that Zambia's thinking in this period was of a government in Mozambique which could include FRELIMO and not of a handover from the Portuguese colonial administration to FRELIMO, which actually occurred a year later.

De Villiers met Vorster again in the Union Building on 23 April, the day before South African elections and two days before the Portuguese *coup d'état*. General Hendrik van den Bergh, the powerful head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and one of Vorster's closest advisers, was present. De Villiers told them that on the basis of the latest information he had received, a major change in Mozambique was possible in the next two weeks. Van den Bergh said he did not believe 'that this information was correct. He in fact said there had been a rumour every few days to this effect and they ignored these rumours. But Mr Vorster took it seriously.'¹⁵

Lonrho's intention from the outset was to try to bring Kaunda and Vorster together. According to de Villiers, '... our appreciation at that time was that it was in the interests of South Africa that there should be a settlement in Rhodesia that would bring some stability to the area. I think when Tiny told me that Mozambique had thrown in the towel, it became obvious that it would be very bad for South Africa for a black victory in Rhodesia. In fact may I quote Mark Chona on this, and he was quoting President Kaunda: President Kaunda said that "a white victory in Rhodesia was impossible. A black [military] victory was not only possible but he thought undesirable." This impressed Mr Vorster enormously and it was one of the key phrases that made him appreciate that you had to have a settlement here that was not through the barrel of the gun.' The message was relayed to Vorster by Rowland soon after the Portuguese *coup d'état* and de Villiers said he interpreted it as meaning that 'Kaunda was genuinely interested in creating a victory by settlement rather than by confrontation. He foresaw that there would be a bloody struggle, he could

foresee that it would affect him enormously, that this would cause turmoil in the area.¹⁶

Zambia had become independent on 24 October 1964 and, even more than most other former colonies, it was a hostage state. Its economy was dependent upon a single product, copper, and its trade routes were through the states dominated by white minorities to the south, east and west. In the year of independence Zambia's trade with Rhodesia totalled £30,000,000 and with South Africa £16,000,000.¹⁷ The position was, as President Kaunda told the OAU summit in July that year, that 'our economy has been planned in such a way as to depend on copper alone, while we were made a cheap dumping ground for South African and Southern Rhodesian goods.'¹⁸ All exports and 95 per cent of imports travelled through the communications systems of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique or Rhodesia and South Africa. The turbines and switchgear for the power Zambia depended upon from Kariba were on the south bank of the Zambezi river: this meant the Rhodesians could cut off electricity at any time, blacking out Lusaka and the Copper Belt, and flooding the mines when the pumps ceased working.

A further problem was the military strength of Rhodesia. At the time of the break-up of the Federation, Britain had insisted on putting the Federal air force, in reality part of Britain's strategic world force, into the hands of the white minority in Salisbury. The Federal air force, equipped with Canberra bombers and Hawker Hunter jet fighters, was the most powerful air force on the African continent at the time. Ghana's late President Kwame Nkrumah led a move at the United Nations to try to block the transfer, arguing, prophetically, that the force might one day be used by the white minority against independent African states. Britain ridiculed such a suggestion and vetoed the Ghanaian resolution.¹⁹

Smith had become Prime Minister of Rhodesia on a white supremacist ticket six months before Zambia's independence, and the threat of a unilateral declaration of independence already hung heavily in the air as Zambians celebrated their newly won freedom. In 1965 Kaunda sent a delegation to London to discuss the need for contingency plans for Zambia in the event of UDI; they were told in Whitehall that possibility of UDI was remote, and anyway there was no need for a contingency plan for Zambia as Rhodesia's economy would swiftly crumble if confronted with sanctions.²⁰

Kaunda, who had made a state visit to Britain a few months earlier,

doubted this and made known his opposition to sanctions. Zambia, he argued, would be the main victim. When UDI came, and the Wilson government imposed sanctions, Smith wryly observed: 'I believe that the present British Government will forever stand condemned because of its policy of fighting the war of sanctions to the last Zambian.'²¹ The imposition of sanctions, as Kaunda feared, was to prove an economic disaster for Zambia while Rhodesia, with a great deal of help from the West—including Shell BP, in which the British government had a shareholding—prospered and expanded.

From the outset the British government pressed Zambia to reduce trade with Rhodesia, and in mid-1966 Wilson sent the Minister of State at the Commonwealth Office, Judith Hart, to Lusaka to urge the Zambians to stop all trade with Rhodesia by the end of 1966. Zambia tried: in 1965 her trade with Rhodesia totalled £35,538,000, a third of the import bill, but in 1966 this was reduced to 20 per cent and in 1967 to 11 per cent, while trade with South Africa rose in proportion to the decrease with Rhodesia.²² An emergency trucking operation was mounted to move fuel to Zambia from Dar es Salaam along the Great North Road, which became known as the 'Hell Run', and finally a £16,000,000 oil pipeline was built. The British discouraged this, just as they had discouraged the building of a new rail link from Dar es Salaam to the Copper Belt, a project costing over £160,000,000 which the Chinese finally financed and constructed. The Zambian government was forced to pay £14,000,000 in fuel transport subsidies and early in 1968 Kaunda estimated that sanctions had cost Zambia £35,000,000. That, in the view of many economists, was a conservative estimate.²³

Wilson kept up the pressure on Kaunda to implement sanctions, yet it was not until February 1967 that Britain signed the first support costs agreement with Zambia. The total was £13,850,000, about a third of what sanctions had already cost Zambia. In 1968 Britain's Ministry of Overseas Development claimed that this was bilateral aid, although it had been agreed that costs in support of Britain's sanctions policy were certainly not aid. In fact, of this total, only £9,900,000 was for support costs; half was to be spent outside Zambia, mainly improving road and transport facilities in Tanzania, and the bulk of the remainder was to cover the increased salaries of British expatriates working in Zambia.²⁴

In July 1968 Kaunda flew to London to see Wilson to try to get Britain to cover the cost to Zambia of sanctions, but he achieved nothing. The international community, in a series of UN resolutions,

undertook to cover the cost to Zambia, but, according to a statement to the UN Economic and Social Council in July 1976 by Sir Robert Jackson, co-ordinator of UN assistance to Zambia, the contribution of the international community had totalled only about £60,000,000. The visible cost to Zambia was considerably over £400,000,000.²⁵ That Zambia had been both a hostage and a victim was by then undeniable.

A further important change in southern Africa in this period was Vorster replacing the assassinated South African Prime Minister, Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, late in 1966. Vorster's background did not bode well for the region. He had been detained during the Second World War as a Nazi sympathizer; later, as Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, he had acquired a reputation for ruthlessness. Yet on 10 January 1967, four months after taking office, Vorster posed unsmiling and self-conscious on his home ground with Chief Leabua Jonathan, leader of newly independent Lesotho. Vorster had decided to try to break out of the laager. A few weeks later, at Bloemfontein University, he said: 'African states need leadership. We are not settlers, we are part of Africa and the most developed State in Africa. We therefore have a duty.'²⁶

The South African Prime Minister's major target was Zambia. Shortly before independence Kaunda had said at a civic reception in the central mining town of Kabwe that he was willing to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa if Zambia's envoys posted to the Republic enjoyed the same rights and freedom of movement as other diplomats.²⁷ That was before South Africa gave 'honorary white' status to black diplomats, and Verwoerd ignored the overture. Vorster did not, and through 1967 and early 1968 he sent out a series of feelers proposing co-operation in many fields including transport, airways, communications, commerce, industry and labour.

On 1 April 1968 Kaunda responded in a lengthy letter in which he criticized South African domestic policy. On Rhodesia he said that Zambia had never advocated that 'majority rule and independence will come tomorrow'. Kaunda went on to say that he did not believe it was in South Africa's interests to support Rhodesia, adding: '... I am convinced beyond doubt that you personally, Mr Prime Minister, hold the key to the future insofar as finding peaceful solutions to problems confronting the whole of Southern Africa is concerned.' Vorster responded angrily to criticism of domestic policy, describing Kaunda's letter as being 'as presumptuous as it is uninformed', and he

suggested Kaunda mind his own business when it came to other people's internal affairs.²⁸

Despite this bad beginning, coupled with Vorster's suggestion that Zambia co-operate with Rhodesia 'as an independent state on an equal footing', Kaunda met van den Bergh in Lusaka on 22 June. He wrote to Vorster again three weeks later saying he would not dwell upon points of difference and that he accepted that the solutions being proposed for Rhodesia 'are not applicable to the situation in South Africa'. He said he had learned a lot from the exchange of views with the South African official, and on a conciliatory note he went on to say: 'We are, therefore, interested to learn more of the evolutionary process of change which obviously is one of the most important phenomena in South Africa's future development.' The meeting with the South African official, Kaunda said, 'should be regarded as opening a possible channel of communication'.

On 29 August Vorster took the cue, sending van den Bergh to Lusaka to seek Kaunda's views on discussions he was about to have on Rhodesia with Lord Goodman, an envoy from Wilson. Kaunda proposed that Vorster should urge Britain to hold a referendum in Rhodesia in which everyone over the age of twenty-one would be entitled to vote. Political detainees would have to be released, the referendum should be supervised by a number of countries including South Africa, and a period of direct British rule under a Governor was also envisaged. Kaunda said he regretted that he could not meet Vorster as the South African so desperately wanted, because of 'the implications which would follow if the whole project misfired at the present moment'. Kaunda met van den Bergh again on 15 February 1969 and again the South African urged a direct meeting in secret between the two leaders.

None of this was known until after the Singapore Commonwealth summit in early 1971 when Vorster, apparently angered at Kaunda's identification with those opposing his policy of dialogue, threatened to expose him, a move calculated to embarrass the Zambian leader on the eve of a UNIP Congress and OAU summit. Another South African envoy flew to Lusaka in March 1971, and finally on 23 April 1971, over three years after Kaunda's first letter to Vorster, the Zambians published the correspondence, together with details of meetings with the envoys.²⁹

Thus, when Rowland and de Villiers set about trying to arrange a meeting between Kaunda and Vorster in 1974, the first hurdle they

had to overcome was the distrust caused by the deliberate leaking of the earlier correspondence. 'It was obviously impossible for either of the two parties to make an approach without loss of face and certainly there was not enough goodwill for that to take place,' de Villiers said.³⁰ 'So Mr Rowland and I undertook to use our good offices to approach these two leaders and we had the advantage of not being connected to any particular political viewpoint or party. We could not exploit the thing to our own advantage and secondly we could be repudiated by either party at any time. We were sufficiently small to be repudiated and that was always the strength of our negotiations. We could be the honest broker without ever being in a position to exploit whatever knowledge we gathered or gained in the process.'

De Villiers' initial Zambian contact was another Lonrho man, Tom Mtine, a close confidante of Kaunda and the chairman of Lonrho Zambia, based in Ndola, where he had become the first black mayor of the northern mining town after Zambia's independence. The two men met twice in London in June but Mtine's connection with détente was brief, and Mark Chona, Kaunda's Special Assistant (Political), soon took over as the link man. Chona and de Villiers met for the first time in Paris in early July with van den Bergh present. It was an exploratory meeting and Chona handed van den Bergh a copy of the 'Manifesto on Southern Africa' adopted by the fifth summit conference of East and Central African states in Lusaka in April 1969; this clearly laid out the position of the independent black states towards the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Rudely, van den Bergh thrust it back across the table at Chona, saying that he would not accept it because it had not been presented 'officially' to his government.³¹ Amazingly, this important policy document had never been read by Vorster or his Foreign Ministry, and if van den Bergh had ever seen it he had failed to pass it on.

Paragraph 20 of this document states: 'The Union [*sic*] of South Africa is itself an independent sovereign State and a member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.'³² With that paragraph independent African states, to the irritation of the South African liberation movements, put Pretoria in a different category from colonial territories, implying that the same justification for providing rear bases for guer-

rilla wars did not exist in South Africa's case. De Villiers said he was amazed by the document's 'conservative' position, and even if van den Bergh missed its significance the Lonrho man did not. He flew back to South Africa taking a copy personally to Vorster and paragraph 20 became the central point of Lonrho's approach.³³

Chona made the first of several visits to South Africa to meet Vorster in Cape Town soon after this, accompanied by George Chipampata, one of Kaunda's private secretaries.³⁴ The South African leader had grown impatient at the slow pace of events since his first meeting with de Villiers on 29 March, and the Portuguese *coup d'état* had increased the urgency of getting a settlement in Rhodesia. Throughout the early period of the détente contacts, only a handful of people in Zambia and South Africa knew what was occurring. Apart from Vorster and van den Bergh, as well as a number of their private staff, only the South African Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie, had been briefed.³⁵ Apart from the officials in the two countries only Lonrho knew, and it is a remarkable comment on their influence at this point that de Villiers was told by Vorster in late August to call Muller, who was staying at the Savoy Hotel in London on his way to the UN, to brief him on the latest developments.³⁶

Vorster's impatience stemmed from South Africa's assessment that the Portuguese *coup d'état* and the likelihood of FRELIMO coming to power in Mozambique meant that the only alternative to Rhodesia being slowly bled to death was a constitutional settlement. Despite the obvious contradiction insofar as its own domestic policies were concerned, South Africa accepted that minority rule in Rhodesia must end. Three factors dominated Pretoria's thinking. There was the need to establish some form of working relationship with any new government in Mozambique: South Africa needed the use of Lourenço Marques port to relieve the load on its own congested ports, it needed the continued flow of migrant labour from Mozambique which accounted for 25 per cent of its mine labour force, and it needed the supply of energy which was about to begin flowing from the Cabora Bassa Dam.³⁷ Furthermore Vorster recognized that the wars in the Portuguese colonies had forged radical movements like FRELIMO, and he needed to try to defuse the appeal of men like Machel, who overnight had become something of a cult hero among young South African blacks. By not hindering Mozambique's transition to independence and by being seen to be trying to help achieve a Rhodesian settlement, he hoped to create a measure of goodwill among the

'moderate' African states upon which he could revive his dream of a Southern African economic community dominated by Pretoria.

Two major stumbling blocks stood between Vorster and the realization of his grand design. One was Smith, whom Vorster hoped to prevail upon—'pressurize' being a word the South Africans studiously avoided in their dealings with the Rhodesian leader. The other was the guerrillas fighting in north-eastern Rhodesia. To achieve his objective Vorster needed an ally in Africa who had influence with the guerrillas or who was in a position to influence events. Countries like Malawi, Senegal and Ivory Coast could not do that. Tanzania, which provided the guerrillas with rear base training facilities, was out. President Julius Nyerere had played a forceful role in 1971 in blocking the dialogue offensive, and in a pamphlet at the time, entitled 'Why We Will Not Negotiate', he had concluded by saying: 'For the sake of the peoples of Southern Africa, and for the reputation, standing and dignity of free Africa, it is essential that all African States should reject the South African offer of a dialogue until the South African Government has stated clearly, and without equivocation, that its purpose is to abandon the principles of apartheid, and work towards the implementation of human equality and human dignity. Until that time our task must be to increase our support for the liberation movements, and to do it in unity.'³⁸ Equally, FRELIMO, which provided the guerrilla infiltration routes through Tete, was out. South Africa could not expect any help from the Marxist guerrilla movement, who anyway would not take over full power until independence in June 1975. That left only Zambia, which provided passage for the ZANLA guerrillas from their training camps in Tanzania to the infiltration routes in Tete, and which would benefit the most from a settlement.

Muller began a series of secret diplomatic contacts in mid-1974 with the two main proponents of the discredited dialogue initiative, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi.³⁹ In September, Vorster flew to Abijan to meet Houphouët-Boigny and Senegal President Leopold Senghor but, said 'Pik' Botha (who replaced Muller as Foreign Minister), the meeting was 'useless'.⁴⁰ The two African leaders would not even allow a photograph of themselves with Vorster to be released to the press. The real contact Vorster wanted was Kaunda, and quite contrary to the subsequent claims of the former South African Secretary of Information, Dr Eschel Rhoodie, Vorster did not have to be dragged 'kicking into Africa'.⁴¹ His problem was how to make contact with Kaunda,

and it was Lonrho who provided that bridge and not Rhoodie—who was to claim responsibility for détente with van den Bergh—or Harry Oppenheimer, the head of Anglo-American, or his man in Zambia, Dr Zac de Beer, who were both wrongly credited with responsibility.⁴²

The first hint Britain had of what was taking place came on 10 August when Chona, with Zambia's new Foreign Minister, Vernon Mwaanga, flew to Geneva to meet the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, who was engaged in negotiations over the Cyprus crisis. That meeting was 'the first time we had any clue what Zambia was up to', said Tom McNally, the former head of the International Affairs Department at Labour Party headquarters who had become Callaghan's political adviser after Labour's general election victory in March that year.⁴³ The Labour government's 'key determination' on Rhodesia was to avoid another *Tiger* or *Fearless* débâcle with Smith—and, before the Geneva meeting, all previous offers to Smith (including the 1971 settlement proposals) had been withdrawn. 'The [British] initiative in 1974 and early 1975 was not to take any initiative. The UK was not interested in bilateral relations, in visits or emissaries,' McNally said. In Geneva, Mwaanga proposed to Callaghan that a four-nation group—Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Britain—should be established at official level to review the Rhodesian situation and decide whether any progress could be made towards a settlement; the African leaders would guarantee the security and property of the white minority, he said, and they would accept a transition leading to majority rule and independence, provided that a settlement could be negotiated which provided for this ultimate objective.

Vorster, as he had done during their contacts in 1968, was again pushing for a meeting with Kaunda. The Zambian leader continued to insist that any meeting must first be at officials level, and South Africa variously proposed Paris, Geneva and Nairobi as possible venues. In case the whole exercise went wrong, Zambia wanted to ensure it was held under circumstances where it was unlikely to leak out, and it was finally decided that New York during the General Assembly in late September, when all the participants had a perfectly good reason to be in the same city at the same time, offered the best cover.

In New York, the South Africans contacted the Zambians, suggesting that the meeting should be at the South African mission. Mwaanga refused and proposed instead the Zambian mission or his hotel suite. The meeting finally took place in Mwaanga's suite, Rooms 1702/03 on

the seventeenth floor of the Summit Hotel on Lexington Avenue. For almost five hours Mwaanga and his counterpart, Muller, with their Permanent Representatives to the UN, Rupiah Banda and 'Pik' Botha, discussed Rhodesia and Namibia. Mwaanga wanted to find out whether Chona's optimistic reports—that South Africa was willing to help get rid of Smith and bring about majority rule and independence in Rhodesia—were justified, and whether South Africa was willing to withdraw from Namibia and allow the UN to assume responsibility for guiding the country to independence. The South Africans indicated willingness to help in Rhodesia but stressed that there must be adequate guarantee for the transition. They sought an undertaking that once majority rule had been achieved guerrillas would not be concentrated against South Africa. Mwaanga quoted the Lusaka Manifesto to allay Muller's fears.⁴⁴

Chona, de Villiers and van den Bergh, meanwhile, had been working on a remarkable document and the final draft was typed at State House in Lusaka on 8 October. Known as the détente 'scenario' and entitled 'Towards the Summit: An Approach to Peaceful Change in Southern Africa', it began by quoting paragraph 20 of the 'Manifesto on Southern Africa' and it was delivered to Vorster by de Villiers after he and Chona completed the final draft.⁴⁵ The introduction of the 'scenario' states:

The Zambian Government recognises the importance of the issues raised in the recent contacts with the representatives of the South African Government. The question of the summit has, therefore, been fully considered. Peace and the lives of the millions of people are now at stake. Provided risk is worth taking the Zambian Government is already ready to take it. The Zambian Government under the leadership of President Kaunda seeks no name in the great tasks of building peace in Southern Africa. Like its friends, Tanzania, Botswana and others including the new Government in Mozambique, Zambia is pledged to work for genuine peace which secures freedom and justice for all, in which people of all races, colour, creed and ethnic grouping can enjoy what this continent offers. For many years now attempts have been made to find a military solution to problems of Southern Africa. These efforts have been futile and very costly in terms of human lives and property. Zambia and its friends will not support efforts which increase cost of the war if peaceful conditions are possible.

The Zambian Government, together with those of Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, does not believe in holding summits unless they bring concrete results. In this case the South African Government has requested a meeting between his Excellency the President Dr. K. D. Kaunda and the South African Prime Minister Mr. Vorster. In principle there is no problem in arranging such a summit. But it is extremely important that the objectives of this summit be clearly defined, for it is unwise, in the view of the Zambian Government, to hold the summit at such a crucial time unless its success is guaranteed.

Hence the importance of the programmes outlined. The Zambian Government must justify such a historic summit by historic achievement. Such a summit must genuinely offer a new chapter of peace and co-operation based on equality, justice and freedom for all. It is, therefore, the hope of the Zambian Government that the implementation of the programme contained in this paper will facilitate the preparations for the historic summit.⁴⁶

During October, after the swearing in of the Mozambique transitional government, the six-month 'scenario' said that South Africa should declare *de jure*—and that word is underlined—recognition of the new FRELIMO government and contacts would be arranged between the two. South Africa would also 'declare its readiness to support the new Government in Mozambique politically, financially, economically and materially, etc., now and in the future'. In addition South Africa was to prevent mercenaries and other groups attacking Mozambique, to adopt a policy of non-interference in Mozambique, to discourage Rhodesia from aggressive action against Mozambique (including encouraging the disbanding of 'groups now under training in the Makuti area in Rhodesia') and generally to contribute to stability in Mozambique. Economically South Africa was to initiate action to renegotiate terms on harbours, railways and port charges, the supply of hydro-electric power from Cabora Bassa, migrant labour and any other South African interests in Mozambique.

Although the language might not have been FRELIMO's, some of the issues raised were valid ones; but the demand that South Africa declare its readiness to support Mozambique politically, financially, economically and materially was indicative of how little State House, Lusaka, understood FRELIMO. Subsequently, senior FRELIMO officials say, an intermediary came to them with a £250,000,000 aid offer, which they at first believed was financed by South Africa.⁴⁷ No

details were discussed because FRELIMO turned the offer down; but later, the officials say, they learned that the money was to come from the Shah's Iran and that a condition of the aid was to be that South Africa technicians were to be employed on the projects.

The 'scenario' made three commitments on behalf of the Mozambique government. The first of these—that ties inherited from Portugal should be assessed—does not raise difficulties, but points nine and ten do. In these the FRELIMO government undertakes to reaffirm 'its policy of non-aggression against South Africa and will not allow its territory to be used by mercenaries and insurgents against South Africa'; it also undertakes to reaffirm 'its decision of non-interference in the internal affairs of other independent countries including South Africa'.⁴⁸ These two undertakings imply that FRELIMO had been interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and also that it was 'reaffirming' agreements it already had with South Africa which did not exist.

Vorster had no difficulties in meeting the conditions on Mozambique or the following ones on Rhodesia. These laid down that he advise Smith 'that a political solution is most desirable and very urgent', that he not interfere in Rhodesian internal affairs, that he withdraw his security personnel and equipment from Rhodesia, that he declare that a negotiated settlement was in Rhodesia's best interests, and that he be against any further escalation of the war in Mozambique or tension in the area. All these conditions were supposed to be met by the end of November, with the South African government ensuring that the Rhodesian government moved quickly towards a constitutional conference by implementing the following six points:

- a. Releasing all political detainees and prisoners since their voice is both credible and final in any negotiations. In this connection Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and their Lieutenants command tremendous influence and will for a long time remain the voice of reason;
- b. Lifting the ban on ZAPU and ZANU and the restrictions of movements on leaders so that they participate fully and constructively in the search for a just political solution as an alternative to the current armed struggle;
- c. Suspend political trials and revoke death sentences for political offenders;
- d. Suspend all politically discriminatory legislation;
- e. Gearing the SAG [South African Government] administration

to help defuse racial tension and create a political climate for the acceptance of the proposal of the constitutional conference representing ZAPU and ZANU, the Rhodesian Front and other political parties in Rhodesia under British chairmanship. In these circumstances the current armed struggle will be replaced by a new spirit of co-operation and racial harmony which is the foundation for political stability and therefore justifying withdrawal of the South African security forces;

f. SAG to make it clear that they will support any legally constituted Government irrespective of its racial composition in Rhodesia.⁴⁹

Zambia 'and friends' would publicly welcome these moves and they would 'use their influence to ensure that ZANU and ZAPU desist from armed struggle and engage in the mechanics for finding a political solution in Rhodesia'. Had ZANU known about that undertaking when Chitepo was assassinated, when Tongogara and others were tried for his murder, when over a thousand of their guerrillas were detained by Zambia and when supplies to the fighters in the north-east were cut off, even graver questions would have been raised than those that were at the time. Pretoria's fears that FRELIMO in power in Mozambique and an independent Zimbabwe would unleash a wave of guerrilla activity against South Africa was met in the 'scenario' by an undertaking by Zambia 'and friends' that there would 'be no ANC or other insurgent activities directed against South Africa from their territories, namely from either Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana or Rhodesia'.

It is also worth noting from the détente 'scenario' how far Zambia was prepared to go in relation to Namibia. South Africa was asked to reaffirm its policy of self-determination in accordance with the will of the majority, to guarantee SWAPO freedom as a movement in Namibia, to cease floggings and other forms of corporal punishment, and 'at the highest level' to urge Namibians outside the country to return and participate in 'normal political activities'. No mention was made of the detainees held on Robben Island and elsewhere, of South Africa accepting Walvis Bay as an integral part of Namibia or of the demand that South Africa relinquish its mandate to the UN to carry out the process of decolonization. In return for those minimal commitments, Zambia 'and friends' undertook to persuade SWAPO 'to declare themselves as a party not committed to violence provided the SAG allows their registration as a political party and allows them to

function freely as such'. Point six of the section on Namibia reads: 'SWAPO to desist from armed struggle under conditions in paragraph 5 above.'⁵⁰ SWAPO were not consulted about this commitment being made on their behalf by Zambia and soon thereafter they received a letter from the Zambian government signed by the Minister of State for Defence, General Kingsley Chinkuli, ordering them to stop fighting from Zambia. Ultimately, in much the same way ZANU had been forced to seek a more reliable rear base in Mozambique, SWAPO moved its operations to Angola.

All of these commitments in the 'scenario' for October and November 1974 were supposed to be met by mid-December. Stress is laid on how South Africa's role 'as an instrument for bringing about the change in Rhodesia and Namibia (South West Africa) and consolidation of the stability in Mozambique will have become very clear to the world'. According to de Villiers, Kaunda made it clear throughout that he wanted the South African leader to take the credit internationally if the détente operation succeeded: 'The interesting thing about the whole exercise is that President Kaunda wanted Mr Vorster to get the credit for détente. He thought this would make it possible for him to sell Mr Vorster to Africa as a moderate and reasonable person.'⁵¹ This is borne out by a telex from Chona to de Villiers on 1 October 1974. The two men telexed each other regularly using a crude code (code references given in square brackets):

'If namesake's [de Villiers] management [the South African government] is genuine in decision to withdraw [its para-military police from Rhodesia] and accepting a formula outlined for next door [Rhodesia] then they should rightly get the credit for the expected change. This is in the hope that they are acting on the realisation of the genuine need for change in the neighbourhood. . . .' The telex continued: 'If namesake's management does not do so, people elsewhere will jump on the bandwagon of successful change and claim credit for the new events at the expense of namesake's management and this will leave them in the dock for all time. . . .' The telex then goes on to discuss a visit by van den Bergh to Zambia. 'There is no problem about Mr. Tallman's visit [van den Bergh is well over six feet tall] but it was strongly advised that the initial contact with the new management in the east [FRELIMO] must be made by namesake [Chona] for reasons already explained. Am pleased that action has already been taken. We are not idle. I sincerely hope that honesty and genuineness will

be the golden thread running through the current efforts. Any mishap will certainly be disastrous for a lot of effort based on sincerity is required to ensure that the other management in the neighbourhood [Tanzania, FRELIMO and Botswana] move in step. I am in Livingstone with the manager [Kaunda] for the day, Please discuss with Tallman and Overlord [Vorster] and come back to me with an answer soonest.'⁵²

The summit Vorster had long sought with Kaunda and, if possible, other front-line leaders, was set for the second half of December if the programme for the first two and a half months had been met. Thereafter a Rhodesian constitutional conference was scheduled for February. The summit did not take place because Vorster could not meet his side of the bargain, and he was forced to ask for a postponement of the withdrawal of his 2,000 paramilitary policemen.⁵³ They were not finally all withdrawn until August 1975; fifteen South African officers remained at Rhodesian military headquarters and fifty helicopter pilots and technicians with the Air Force until August 1976 under a secret assistance programme codenamed Operation Polo.

On 25 October, the day before the tenth anniversary of Zambia's independence, and after he had accepted the détente 'scenario', Vorster addressed the Senate in Cape Town. Southern Africa, he said, had come to a 'crossroads' where it must choose between peace and the escalation of violence. The price of violence, he went on, was far too high. Then, returning to a familiar theme, he spoke of a regional economic community, saying that what Africa most needed was development, capital and knowledge, and the stability to allow all three to be put to work. South Africa, he promised, would 'contribute its share towards bringing and giving order, development and technical and monetary aid . . . to countries in Africa and particularly to those who are close neighbours'.⁵⁴

Although Vorster had done no more than say that Southern Africa was at a crossroads and resurrect his economic community theme, Kaunda reacted euphorically. On 26 October, receiving an honorary law degree at the University of Zambia, he described Vorster's Cape Town speech as ' . . . the voice of reason for which Africa and the world have waited for many years'. He went on: ' . . . if South Africa is ready to follow the way of peace to achieve for this continent and its people, the best that is possible, then all I can say is that Africa, in accordance with the principle laid down in the Manifesto on Southern Africa, stands ready to help create conditions for peaceful change.' He urged

South Africa to militarily disengage from Rhodesia and warned Rhodesians that they had no more time to buy.⁵⁵

The Vorster and Kaunda speeches, as Kaunda later admitted, had been carefully orchestrated as part of the détente 'scenario'. On 5 November Vorster told his constituents at Nigel: 'We are not temporary sojourners in South Africa, we have a right to be here. This must be understood and accepted by all who write and talk about South Africa. There will always be those who purposely write and say things to harm South Africa. All I ask them is to give South Africa a chance of about six months. I do not ask for more than that. If South Africa is given that chance, they will be surprised at where the country will stand in six to twelve months time.'⁵⁶ He also made it clear that South Africa had no intention of moving from its rigid policy of separate developments: 'In white South Africa, the whites will rule, and let there be no mistake about that.' A few days later, addressing himself to black leaders, he emphasized the point: 'If there are any of you who nourish hope for one man one vote in the white Parliament, then you are being misled because it will not happen.'⁵⁷ Petty apartheid—the 'pinpricks' as Sports Minister Piet Koornhof described it—could be done away with. The fundamentals of apartheid remained unbending.

Machel had been briefed about the détente contacts in September after signing the agreement in Lusaka with Portugal on Mozambique's independence and, like Nyerere, he was extremely uneasy about what was taking place and about the motives of South Africa and Rhodesia. Their doubts were reflected in their questions to Kaunda and also to Chona, who was called into the meeting. Chona said that the South Africans did not want the war to go on and they were willing to pressurize Smith to agree to a negotiated settlement. How serious did he think the South Africans were? How did he assess their position? Chona said he believed they were serious. He had met Vorster and van den Bergh and, although all the details of the contacts were never given to the other front-line states, they agreed that as an independent Zimbabwe was their objective they would try.⁵⁸

The FRELIMO leader called the ZANU and ZAPU external leaders, Chitepo and Moyo, to see him separately at a house in Dar es Salaam's Changombe suburb, in order to try to warn them obliquely about what was happening, as Zambia had not consulted or briefed the nationalists. Machel said that changes might be about to take place in Rhodesia and they should be prepared. He suggested they meet

under the auspices of the Joint Military Council in order to analyse the situation. Finally Machel asked them what their reaction would be if Nkomo and Sithole were released. Both responded that that was impossible.⁵⁹

Kaunda, Machel and Nyerere met again during Zambia's tenth anniversary celebrations, the last two unaware that one of their fellow guests was de Villiers who was staying at the Intercontinental Hotel and being looked after by Mwaanga. (De Villiers' role in détente was almost at an end: during a lunch on 26 October, also attended by Rowland, the Zambian leader showed the two Lonrho men a message from Vorster saying that he wanted van den Bergh, who greatly resented the Lonrho connection, to take over the contacts.⁶⁰) In Lusaka the three African leaders drew up a series of conditions. Vorster, Machel later recalled, was not seeking a ceasefire in the war in north-eastern Rhodesia but 'paralysation' of the war. The conditions laid down by the African leaders included the release of all political prisoners, the lifting of the bans on ZANU and ZAPU, the withdrawal of South African forces from Rhodesia and, most important, a constitutional conference to transfer power to the majority.⁶¹

Then the seemingly impossible happened. Smith, under pressure from Vorster, agreed to release African nationalist leaders from detention to go to Lusaka, on the understanding that after consultations they return to detention in Rhodesia. It is important here to understand Smith's motives, which were greatly at variance with those of Kaunda and Vorster.

In 1973, according to official Rhodesian statistics, forty-four members of the security forces and twelve European civilians, several of whom were reservists, lost their lives in the war in the north-east. The number of guerrillas killed, a figure which was certainly exaggerated as it exceeded the total sent into the country by that point, was 179, while the number of African civilians killed was given as fifty-two. By the end of 1974 the security force death toll had risen to ninety-six, of whom twenty-nine were said to have died in accidents, while the total number of European civilians killed increased to sixteen. The number of guerrillas killed in the two-year period was given as 524, and the number of African civilians as 170.⁶² Even if, for the sake of argument, one accepts these Rhodesian figures, the guerrilla/security force kill ratio was little more than five to one, about half the acceptable figure for containment in a guerrilla war of this nature. Furthermore, in a

country where blacks outnumbered whites by twenty-two to one, it was a ratio the 260,000 whites could not afford.

A subsequent Rhodesian military intelligence lecture reveals some of the concern being felt in 1975 and the first eight months of 1974. Whereas, the report says, ZIPRA played no part in the war from 1970 to 1976 and sent guerrillas on extended courses to Russia, Cuba and North Korea, ZANLA had reassessed its strategy. 'The most significant development was that ZANU learnt the lessons of Mao Tse Tung, namely, that it was pointless to operate in remote areas without the support of the population. They learnt the true art of guerrilla warfare, namely, to move amongst the people like a fish in water.'⁶³ The attack on Altena Farm was 'the start of a whole new ball game. Instead of having the tribesmen coming forward willingly reporting the presence of terrorists, we now had a situation where the terrorists had prepared the ground before an overt act of terrorism took place. Generally speaking the Kore Kore [the tribe in the north-east] gave passive support to the terrorists by not reporting their presence and by being uncooperative with government agencies. Within a matter of weeks, we realized that the war proper had started. . . .'

Warfare can never be considered from the military standpoint alone, however, and there were serious political considerations for Smith. The September agreement in Lusaka, leading to a nine-month transition period preceding Mozambique independence in June 1975 with a FRELIMO government, meant that Smith had a new hostile neighbour to his east which had given the bulk of the support to ZANLA guerrillas. Not only was his Beira communications link threatened but also his route through Maputo—to date unaffected by guerrilla action—which carried almost all his sanction-breaking oil supplies. Once Mozambique became independent there was a real danger they would implement UN sanctions against Rhodesia, and South Africa was making uncooperative noises in public and in private about their ability to carry all Rhodesia's traffic if the Mozambique route was closed. The Portuguese *coup d'état* had increased Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa, and Smith could not afford to be seen as the stumbling block which wrecked Vorster's détente and his regional economic designs. A ceasefire, the Rhodesian leader hoped, would neutralize the military and economic threat from an independent Mozambique while retaining Vorster's patronage. That far Smith was prepared to go, but thoughts of majority rule were still not in his mind. The guerrillas had not yet done enough to change his thinking.

Thus it was under duress that Smith agreed to allow the detained nationalist leaders to go to Lusaka to meet Kaunda, Nyerere, Sir Seretse Khama and Machel. Independent African leaders saw unity among the nationalists as a prerequisite to a successful negotiating position at a constitutional conference leading to a ceasefire, majority rule elections and independence. To the Rhodesian leader, unity was dangerous. In early November, while in Salisbury to fetch the detained nationalist leaders, Chona saw Smith and spoke of the need for unity. Wagging his finger at the Zambian, Smith said: 'If you can achieve unity you can come back and cut this finger off.'⁶⁴ Smith was convinced that unity among the nationalists was impossible—a reasonable assumption given the disunity of the preceding twelve years, but, as we shall see later, each time an embryonic form of unity began to evolve, the Rhodesians acted to smash it. 'We were very concerned about the unity among the nationalist parties and whether it would hold,' a senior intelligence officer said later. 'We really had to keep abreast of this, it was one of our greatest concerns.'

The attempt by the African leaders to achieve unity ran into immediate trouble. ZANU's six central committee members detained in Que Que prison initially refused to go to Lusaka to negotiate when Chona visited the prison on 5 November 1974 to deliver a verbal invitation. They had decided earlier that they would negotiate only as free men; they did not know Chona and they suspected a trick. On 8 November, Chona, accompanied by Nyerere's private secretary, Joseph Butiku, arrived at Que Que prison with a written invitation signed by Kaunda, Nyerere, Sir Seretse and Machel. The letter simply said that in the light of certain developments taking place the African leaders wanted to see the detained ZANU leaders to discuss Zimbabwe. Butiku's arrival at Que Que prison caused something of a stir. The whole exercise was meant to be top secret but Butiku's Tanzanian suit, a lightweight two-piece buttoning up to the neck similar to a Chinese suit, made him embarrassingly conspicuous in the view of the SB officer accompanying them.

The African leaders had invited Sithole, whom they considered to be the militant leader of ZANU, and one other to come to Lusaka; however, unbeknown to anybody outside Que Que prison Sithole had been suspended as leader on 1 November by a majority of his detained central committee colleagues.⁶⁵ The sequence of events leading to Sithole's suspension had begun in February 1969, when he was brought to trial charged with incitement to murder and two alternate

charges. The case against him was that in a letter smuggled from prison by a woman known to be an SB informer, he had advocated the murder of Smith. Sithole, who pleaded not guilty and denied writing the letter was found guilty, and on 12 February he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Given leave to address the court after the verdict, Sithole said: 'I wish publicly to disassociate my name in word, thought, or deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities, and from any form of violence.'⁶⁶ That was seen as tantamount to betrayal of ZANU's commitment to armed struggle and to the young cadres who had fought and died in the war.

News of Sithole's denunciation of the armed struggle quickly reached the political detainees in Salisbury prison. They were extremely angry and their anger turned to fury a few days later during a meeting arranged in the prison by the head of SB, Derrick 'Robbie' Robinson, between Sithole, who was now in the criminal section, and Mugabe and Leopold Takawira, the latter ZANU Vice-President. Sithole proposed that they should renounce violence and agree to work within the constitution in return for their freedom. The struggle was virtually at a standstill, and once they were released they could begin to plan, he argued. It was not, he insisted, a renunciation of the struggle, but merely a means of obtaining their freedom in order to advance the struggle. Mugabe and Takawira said they found the proposal unacceptable, but they agreed to report to members of the central committee in Salisbury prison. In addition to those who were later involved in suspending Sithole, they included Takawira, who died in detention—on 15 June 1970—when he went into a diabetic coma and was not given proper medical treatment; Simon Muzenda, who later replaced him as ZANU Vice-President; and Eddison Zvobgo, elected deputy Secretary-General at Gwelo, who was to be Minister of Local Government and Housing after independence. Mugabe, Takawira, Nyagumbo and Malianga led the opposition to Sithole's proposal and finally the central committee rejected it unanimously.⁶⁷ Mugabe and Takawira reported the decision to Sithole. Over the next four years Sithole was kept apart from the political detainees while he served his sentence but when, in March 1973, after having two years cut off his sentence for good behaviour, Sithole rejoined his colleagues, the issue had not been forgotten.

The central committee did not meet formally in prison during 1973 because they suspected that a coloured man who had been put into their section three days after Sithole rejoined them might be a police informer. Finally, in March 1974, Sithole was asked to appear before

the central committee to explain his behaviour in 1969. Sithole refused and in his absence a resolution was passed condemning him, a copy of which was sent to ZANU leaders in Zambia. A few days later Sithole attended another meeting where he was denounced to his face and a second resolution was passed laying down that he could not discuss party or national business with any outsider unless he was accompanied by another member of the executive. On 31 May 1974 the central committee members were transferred from Salisbury to Connemara prison near Gwelo, and a few days later Sithole had a meeting on his own with an SB officer. He reported this to his colleagues, arguing that it was neither party nor national business as the SB officer had simply asked him what he would do if he got out of prison. Nyagumbo, who became Minister of Mines at independence, says he described Sithole as a 'quisling', but no further action was taken at the time. On 1 July, Sithole, Mugabe, Malianga, Tekere (who would become Minister of Manpower, Planning and Development), Nkala (later Minister of Finance) and Nyagumbo were transferred to Que Que prison, and there the last three began to agitate for Sithole's removal as leader; for Tekere, the last straw had been Sithole's comment to them that 'one man one vote' was not an immediate goal but a slogan to be used in mobilization and negotiation. Finally on 1 November, at a meeting chaired by Malianga, Sithole—who naturally voted against the resolution—was suspended. Malianga, as chairman, did not vote, but he was opposed to the move believing the action of such a small group in prison to be unconstitutional. Mugabe agreed. 'I felt it was wrong, unconstitutional,' he said later. 'We didn't constitute a quorum and even if we did, what purpose would we serve unseating a man in prison? Why not wait to combine forces with those in Lusaka and others who are outside?' Mugabe abstained from the voting. Tekere, Nkala and Nyagumbo voted in favour of the suspension.⁶⁸

This was the situation when Chona and Butiku came to collect Sithole on 8 November. The ZANU central committee members decided that Mugabe, the Secretary-General, and Malianga, who was Secretary for Youth and Culture, should go to Lusaka. They were flown to Salisbury in a Rhodesian Air Force Dakota and then from Salisbury to Lusaka in a South African Cessna with Chona, Butiku and Brand Fourie, Secretary of the South African Foreign Ministry. Nyerere opened the meeting the following day by demanding to know where Sithole was, and Mugabe explained that the central committee had decided to send himself and Malianga. Finally, under pressure

from the African leaders, Mugabe said that Sithole had been suspended because of unspecified irregularities and that he, as Secretary-General, was acting leader of the party. The two ZANU leaders were in some difficulty because the decision had only been taken a few days earlier, neither had regarded it as constitutional and their followers outside had not been told. They were afraid if they told the four African leaders, it would leak out before they had had the opportunity to communicate it to the leadership in Lusaka whom they had not been allowed to meet. Not surprisingly, as Mugabe and Malianga were unknown to them, the African leaders took a stern view. Machel's attitude, which was to have unfortunate repercussions for Mugabe later, was 'You've had a coup! A coup in Smith's prison. Whose coup is this?' Nyerere took the line that if the party wanted to dispose of Sithole then that was a matter for ZANU alone, but it had to be done constitutionally. Mugabe and Malianga were sent back to their room in State House without being briefed on why they had been called to Lusaka and then, without being able to see their colleagues in Lusaka, flown back to Rhodesia and detention at Que Que.⁶⁹

On 12 November Kaunda's private secretary, George Chipampata, arrived at Que Que prison to tell Sithole that Kaunda wanted to see him in his capacity as ZANU president or as an individual. The central committee decided they had to comply but sent Nyagumbo with him to tell the African leaders that Sithole had come as a private individual. Chona was at Salisbury airport with a South African executive jet and he accompanied them to Lusaka, where Kaunda told them they were to fly on to Dar es Salaam the next day to see Nyerere. Sithole asked for the flight to Dar es Salaam to be delayed so he could meet members of the Dare re Chimurenga, and the next morning there was an emotional reunion with Chitepo. According to Nyagumbo, Chitepo wept when he heard about the leadership crisis in prison and the suspension of Sithole. Kaunda left the three ZANU leaders to try to resolve the crisis, saying that while the front-line states did not wish to impose Sithole's leadership they believed the proper place for changing it was at a congress and not in prison. Three other members of the DARE—Mudzi, the Administrative Secretary, Tongogara, the Chief of Defence, and John Mataure, the Political Commissar—were called to join the meeting. They accused their colleagues in prison who had suspended Sithole of betraying themselves and the people who had died in the struggle. Tongogara said the decision put at risk ZANLA's training facilities in Tanzania, and Chitepo said it provided Kaunda with the excuse he believed Kaunda

wanted to throw ZANU out of Zambia. Nyagumbo, under attack from six of his colleagues, finally agreed he would try to persuade his fellow prisoners at Que Que to change their decision.⁷⁰

Kaunda was informed of the decision and, on 14 November, Sithole, Nyagumbo, Chitepo, Mataure, Tongogara and Mudzi flew to Dar es Salaam to see Nyerere. The Tanzanian leader said he and his colleagues wanted unity among the different Zimbabwean nationalist groups to present a common front to Smith. Nyerere related how Kaunda had telephoned him on 3 November asking him to come straight to Lusaka. He had left the same day and had found Sir Seretse Khama and Machel at State House in the Zambian capital. Kaunda had briefed them on the contacts with South Africa, saying Vorster had told them that if the nationalists stopped the war in the north-east Smith was ready to discuss majority rule. If this was true it would save lives; if it was not, Nyerere guaranteed continued material help to the guerrillas. Machel arrived to see them at 1 a.m. the next morning. He was very tough about the suspension of Sithole, saying he would arrest the ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique if ZANU's central committee maintained the decision. When Nyagumbo reported back to his colleagues at Que Que he was criticized by Nkala and Tekere for giving way. Two resolutions were then put to the meeting, the more conciliatory that the suspension should be withdrawn and the tougher one by Tekere to suspend the effect of the suspension pending a decision by congress.⁷¹ The latter was adopted.

All of these moves had been conducted in great secrecy. It was not until the beginning of December that the Africa correspondent of the London *Financial Times*, Bridget Bloom, broke the news that Sithole and Nkomo, who had gone to Lusaka on 3 November to the meeting ZANU initially refused to attend, had been released from detention to meet African leaders.⁷²

Kaunda, Nyerere, and Khama assembled again in Lusaka on 4 December, with Nkomo and the reinstated Sithole, accompanied by members of the central committee once more flying from prison to meet them. Chitepo, on the flight from Dar es Salaam with Nyerere, spelt out ZANU's uncompromising position to James MacManus of the *Guardian*: 'There will be no talks, no negotiations, no discussions involving our movement until Mr Smith recognises the right to immediate majority rule. That is not majority rule tomorrow, next week, next year or whenever. It is now. Until we hear that man, the rebel leader of the rebel regime, speak those words our war goes on and it will continue until we have liberated every acre of our country. I

do not know if we could even sit down with Smith until Rhodesia has gone back on the 1969 Constitution and returned to the pre-UDI position. We are not going to be bound by whatever is decided in Lusaka, great as is our respect for the leaders who are gathering there and who have helped us so much in the past.'⁷³ These remarks articulated the thinking of the rank and file of ZANU on the eve of the Lusaka summit, who viewed détente as a device to stop the war and achieve a solution which fell far short of their fundamental demands.

Kaunda was furious when Chitepo's remarks—which Chitepo apparently thought were off the record—appeared in the *Guardian* and were picked up by the BBC and other radio stations. For a month he had been trying to muzzle the press, believing premature publication could wreck the whole détente exercise. The Reuter correspondent in Lusaka had found out about the November flight of Nkomo and Sithole to Lusaka before it appeared in the *Financial Times* but had been forced to agree not to use the story. Nevertheless he prepared a telex tape and when the *Financial Times* story broke he released his story. The *Times of Zambia* editor decided to use it and was publicly denounced by Kaunda. The rest of the Zambia media ignored the story despite the fact that Zambians were hearing it from the BBC and other radio stations. Although the stories were not hostile towards South Africa, editors and reporters in Lusaka did not realize that Kaunda had made an agreement with Vorster affecting the press. 'The Zambian government undertook to have a low profile against South Africa,' de Villiers said. 'There would be no more attacks on us and they would control the media so that a climate would be created for friendly relations.'⁷⁴

Smith almost derailed the détente negotiations on 3 December, as a result of a message he sent to Kaunda. This read:

The Prime Minister is concerned over reports said to be emanating from African leaders who went to Lusaka for discussions with the four Presidents. The reports indicate that these leaders are expecting majority rule to be attained within five years, or the life of one Parliament.

It will be recalled that the Prime Minister told Mr. Chona that he would be prepared to consider variations of the present franchise, provided there was no lowering of standards.

In order that there should be no misunderstanding, the Prime

Minister hopes that the Presidents will make this clear to the African leaders.'⁷⁵

Kaunda and Vorster had agreed on a new qualified franchise of six years' primary education plus one further year's education; this would bring enough new African voters on to the electoral roll to bring a majority rule parliament after five years or the life of one parliament. Smith, as ever a very hard man to pin down, had not agreed, although at that point he also had not rejected the plan. A five-year transition to majority rule was the most Kaunda could hope to sell his colleagues and the nationalist leaders, and Smith's message made it clear that he was not thinking of conceding to majority rule within five years.

Fourie and de Villiers were sent to Lusaka to see Kaunda, whom they met on 9 December. The Zambian handed them a copy of Smith's message. The message, de Villiers said, represented a precondition by Smith which Kaunda felt was not in the spirit of the agreements between himself and Vorster: 'No lowering of standards could mean anything, no blacks in the cabinet, no black vote, etc. Brand Fourie was livid. We immediately hurried back to see our Prime Minister and on the following day Mr Smith was called to Pretoria, was told what Mr Vorster thought of the situation and he withdrew this precondition and the détente operation was on the rails again.'⁷⁶

Although that particular exchange was conducted behind the scenes another row had blown up in public before Vorster spoke to Smith. On 6 December two Rhodesian officials, the Cabinet Secretary, Jack Gaylard, and the Attorney General, Tony Smith, had flown to Lusaka where, according to Smith's version, they were told: '... there would be no cessation of terrorism unless it was agreed that a precondition of the constitutional conference was that it would be on the basis of immediate majority rule.' Smith rejected this and laid down two conditions for the conference, an immediate cessation of 'terrorism' and that the conference must accept that there would be 'no lowering of standards'.⁷⁷ In fact, as the franchise agreement between Kaunda and Vorster shows, the Africans were not talking of 'immediate' majority rule but offering a five-year transition during which the whites would largely be in charge.

Smith sought to blame Nyerere and the OAU for encouraging the nationalists to harden their position, while Vorster described the alternative to a negotiated settlement as 'too ghastly to contemplate'.⁷⁸

Nyerere had not shifted his position at all, but there was some suspicion that Chona might not have spelt out the fundamental principles of the African position or reported back the response of Smith and Vorster as clearly as he might have done. On 16 November the Tanzanian government newspaper, the *Daily News*, had carried an 'official' editorial; this meant that it had been written in State House, Dar as Salaam, and approved by Nyerere. This editorial made the Tanzanian leader's position perfectly clear. Part of this was repeated on 10 December, amidst accusations against Nyerere by Smith. The relevant part reads: 'In an editorial publicized on November 16 . . . the *Daily News* reiterated Africa's desire for negotiations to settle the Rhodesia problem. But it stated the Rhodesian negotiations could not be about whether there should be majority rule before independence. They could only be about "how, by what steps, and with what timing, independence on the basis of majority rule will be established".'⁷⁹ Africa did not want to fight unnecessarily, the editorial went on, but if the principle of majority rule was not accepted 'then the basis for a Rhodesian constitutional conference does not exist. Therefore fighting will continue, and will be intensified.' Smith had still to 'cross the Rubicon' by accepting this principle and, as a result, 'the fighting in Rhodesia will therefore continue. And it will be intensified, with the full support of Africa.'

While Nyerere was firm about the principles for talking peace he was equally determined to force unity among the nationalists, the ANC, ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI who had been brought into the Lusaka summit at ZANU's request. His initial plan was a unified movement with Nkomo as President, Muzorewa as Vice-President and Sithole as Secretary-General.⁸⁰ This strategy was partly based on misinformation supplied by Muzorewa at the first meeting in November. In private, Muzorewa had told the African leaders that the ANC had been formed by Nkomo. He repeated this later when Nkomo was present but never in front of any ZANU representatives, who had been kept out of the meeting because of Sithole's absence.⁸¹ Not realizing that the ANC had been formed by ZANU and ZAPU and that positions in the ANC were held equally between the two movements, the African leaders took this to mean that the ANC, which at that point undoubtedly had a large following, was in reality ZAPU. Neither ZANU nor ZAPU was willing then or thereafter—until the electorate made the choice in March 1980—to allow their leader to take second place to the leader of the other party, and thus the Lusaka unity bid appeared in danger of foundering on the

intense rivalries between the two. ZANU remained obdurate, unwilling to accept Nkomo, the dissolution of their party, or to abandon the armed struggle, and Sithole had the thankless task of commuting between his central committee in Mulungushi village and the increasingly irritated leaders in State House. At one point Nyerere angrily confronted all the nationalists, accusing ZANU of 'being married to disunity' and describing Chitepo as a 'black Napoleon'.⁸²

Angry and frustrated, Nyerere and Sir Seretse flew home. Smith had rejected the basic principles for a conference and the nationalists, it seemed, had rejected unity. Later, however, in a private meeting of the nationalists chaired by the ANC Secretary-General, Dr Gordon Chavunduka, agreement was reached. The nationalists had been stunned by the ferocity of the attacks by Nyerere and Kaunda, and they recognized they were in danger of losing their African front-line support. Initially they blamed each other, but within three hours a unity agreement of sorts had been hammered out. They called Chona, who passed on the news to Kaunda, who initially refused to believe it and then gave a banquet to celebrate. The next morning he called Nyerere to tell him that a Declaration of Unity had been drafted and would be signed two days later. Nyerere's response was to tell Kaunda to get it signed immediately before anyone changed his mind.⁸³

The seven-point agreement, signed by Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema in State House on 8 December, made the ANC the umbrella organization of the four movements, thereby removing the vexed question of the dissolution of ZANU. Muzorewa became the compromise chairman, and it was agreed that a congress would be held within four months to adopt a revised ANC constitution and to elect the leadership. The final point went some way to meeting ZANU's objections to abandoning the armed struggle. It read: 'The leaders recognise the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe.'⁸⁴

One compromise led to another. Vorster's envoys discovered that 'immediate' majority rule was not demanded: all that was being insisted on was that the principles of majority rule and independence were not negotiable. Nor were the African leaders demanding independence on the basis of 'one man one vote' elections; their own experience had been different and their parliaments had had seats reserved initially for minority groups. They were willing to negotiate the mechanics and timetable for the transfer of power to the African majority and were prepared to consider a transition period of up to five

years. It was to be a further five years before an independence agreement based on majority rule was signed in London but, instead of a peaceful transition, Smith opted for a war which cost an estimated 30,000 lives—and this to buy the same amount of time he could have bought peacefully in December 1974.

Smith's broadcast to the nation, scheduled for 8 December, was postponed until 11 December, while the difficulties about preconditions were ironed out between Lusaka and Pretoria. In the broadcast Smith claimed that he had received firm assurances that 'terrorist activity in Rhodesia would cease immediately'. The constitutional conference would be held without preconditions and, although he refrained from referring to 'no lowering of standards', he said: 'We are not prepared to deviate from our standards of civilization.'⁸⁵

Ever since those few hectic days there has been controversy as to which side, the nationalists or Smith, broke their side of the bargain. Smith said the nationalists had failed to observe the ceasefire, and in early January 1975 he stopped the release of political prisoners and detainees. This was the only one of the six undertakings—which the South African government had agreed to ensure were quickly implemented—which was partially implemented. The nationalists argued that Smith had failed to implement these full six points and that a ceasefire and constitutional conference could not take place until he had done so.

The truth is that neither side broke their side of the bargain. The only agreement that existed was the détente 'scenario', published here for the first time, and this was between Zambia and South Africa. There was never an agreement between the nationalists and the Rhodesian government, although Zambia and South Africa thought they could push them towards agreement. Insofar as the ceasefire was concerned the nationalists were willing to have a ceasefire in two stages. The first was a sort of stand-off during which neither side would escalate the war; the second phase would only occur once Smith had implemented the six détente 'scenario' conditions and once the date and venue for a constitutional conference had been fixed. Then, and only then, would the guerrillas be instructed to lay down their arms.⁸⁶ Muzorewa, on his return to Salisbury, spelt out the correct position: there would be no immediate ceasefire announcement, he said, but 'as a demonstration of our sincerity all freedom fighters will be instructed to suspend fighting as soon as a date for negotiations has been fixed.'⁸⁷ Mugabe spelt out the nationalists' political position for a constitutional conference: 'We want immediate majority rule

accepted as a fact, but we will deal with the mechanics after the fact has been accepted.'⁸⁸

The crucial question remaining is, did Smith accept the détente 'scenario'—and in particular the six points to be implemented—and then go back on his word? 'No,' said Kaunda. 'We were dealing with Smith, Ian Douglas Smith. In bringing this programme out we were depending on Vorster using his influence over Smith, but Vorster did tell us quite clearly that insofar as he was concerned Ian Smith was running his own show and he could not use any influence over him, although we knew he was applying some pressure on him. When he agreed with us totally he did apply some pressure on Ian Smith.'⁸⁹ Smith, Kaunda went on, 'was very slippery. He would indicate agreement while at the same time not agreeing as such.' Thus the whole weakness of détente was that Zambia assumed that if it forced the nationalist leaders to reach an agreement Vorster would do the same with Smith. And although Vorster was willing to exert some pressure it was never sufficient to force Smith to an agreement.

It was against this background that the paroled nationalist leaders, who in most cases had been detained for a decade, flew on 12 December from Lusaka to New Sarum Air Force base outside Salisbury, where they received their release papers. The Rhodesian Air Force immediately began dropping pamphlets in the north-east telling the guerrillas that the war was over and that they should lay down their arms. But in reality the war had barely begun.

The Other Face of Détente

While Zambia and South Africa pursued détente, the Rhodesians developed a strategy to destroy the guerrillas from within, to subvert and divide the liberation movement until it ceased to be a force in the bargaining. Their strategy, like détente itself, nearly succeeded, but was overcome by the resolve of a group of people who maintained: 'We have not been fighting to bring Smith to the talking table. We are fighting for majority rule.'¹ Among the most adamant was the ZANU national chairman, Herbert Chitepo.

Chitepo was born in 1923 near Inyanga in the eastern highlands of Rhodesia, and graduated in 1949 with a BA degree from Fort Hare University College in South Africa.² He read for the bar in London and returned home in 1954—as Southern Rhodesia's first African barrister—to build up an ample practice, often defending African nationalists in court. He served as legal adviser to Joshua Nkomo at the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference in 1961, and the following year went into voluntary exile in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) where he became the first African Director of Public Prosecutions. When the split occurred in ZAPU in 1963, he went with Sithole, Takawira and Mugabe to form ZANU and was instrumental in getting Tanzanian support for the move. He was elected ZANU national chairman at the Gwelo congress in 1964. A highly intelligent man with a strong sense of determination, Chitepo moved to Zambia in 1966, after the battle of Sinoia, to take up administration of the external wing of ZANU and co-ordination of the armed struggle. He was assassinated on 18 March 1975 when a bomb attached to his car

exploded, killing him, a bodyguard and a small child in a neighbouring garden.

His death, and the subsequent arrest in Zambia of most members of the DARE and the military high command of ZANLA, disrupted the war effort for almost a year.³ A senior member of the Rhodesian Special Branch later confirmed that the entire sequence of events from the 'Nhari Rebellion' to the death of Chitepo were interrelated, but, he said, 'we had a great deal of luck'.⁴ The motivation was intelligence and to 'strike a blow at the heart of the matter, if there was friction in the Central Committee we could turn it to our own advantage'.

This chain of events began with a low-key secret meeting in the north-east, near Mukumbura but just over the border in Mozambique. The meeting was arranged through a District Service Officer in the area, but it was a junior SB man who met clandestinely with two senior ZANLA commanders, Thomas Nhari and Dakarai Badza, on 21 September 1974, about the same time as Zambian and South African officials were meeting in New York.⁵ The second meeting—when Nhari and another commander, Cephas Tichatonga, met a member of military intelligence in a similar location—and the third—when the contact was again an army officer, possibly accompanied by an SB officer⁶—occurred on November 9 and 10. This coincided with the temporary release of detained nationalist leaders to attend exploratory talks in Zambia. 'It wasn't difficult to have chats in those days,' another senior SB officer said later, 'and our work dovetailed with military intelligence, especially in the border areas, if one of their chaps spoke Portuguese.'

The first meeting, on 21 September, was the day after the swearing-in of the transitional government in Mozambique. Fighting had virtually ceased and Portuguese troops were beginning to disengage as FRELIMO soldiers moved into their bases. It was possible to meet, without fear of attack or detection, on Mozambique territory. The settlement in Mozambique had made transit conditions much easier for the Zimbabwean guerrillas who could now even cross the Zambezi River in broad daylight, and it added urgency to Rhodesia's desire to neutralize the guerrillas, by any means, before they acquired a more secure rear base that offered another 1,100 kilometres of infiltration routes.

Junior commanders later told a party tribunal at Chifombo that they knew of the contacts but were afraid they would be killed if they sent out word. Badza in particular was known for his indiscipline and

ruthlessness, and his ill-treatment of cadres. Nhari, whose real name was Raphael Chinyanganya, was a teacher, educated to Form Two, when he was smuggled out of the Mount Darwin area by ZAPU in 1967 just before being charged with crimes against law and order. He was sent by ZAPU for training in Moscow at the same time as Nhongo, and he defected to ZANU at the same time in 1971. He was more respected than Badza by the cadres and was able to use his command position to play on a number of grievances and gather a following. At that time he was Provincial Field Operations Commander in MMZ (a ZANLA term used to describe the area of operations in the north-east bordering on Mozambique) and a senior member of the general staff.⁷

Their theme for mobilizing rebellion was that they were suffering in the bush, while their leaders were comfortable in Lusaka and Salisbury and were denying them better weapons to defend themselves with. Although they knew the ZANU philosophy was based on mobilization and protracted struggle, those like Nhari, who had trained on the more sophisticated Russian armaments, felt that the light weapons they were using, mostly from China, were inadequate. Times were tough for the young cadres and some were receptive. The opening of a new province of operations (ZZ) to the west of MMZ was stretching ZANLA's supply of equipment, ammunition and trained personnel. Young recruits, with or without a few months of training in Tanzania, were being pushed into the north-east, carrying heavy loads of war material 180 kilometres from the main base at Chifombo on the Mozambique-Zambia border. Their grievances ranged from blisters to ambushes. There were regular bombing raids and leaflets were dropped offering substantial rewards for the capture of senior commanders. Nhari claimed, when he and Badza left the front the first time for Chifombo soon after the first clandestine meeting, that the cadres had decided commanders should leave so they would no longer be a target for enemy attacks. This contradicted a decision by the high command and DARE that all senior commanders, including the high command, should go to the front. On that occasion the rebels were caught and disciplined and ordered to return to the front. They were given fifteen cuts each. Although Nhari returned to MMZ in the same capacity (PFOC), Badza was demoted to an ordinary cadre and another, Ceasar Molife, was stripped of his command after an attempt to shoot Nhongo.

By mid-1974 the Rhodesians had overcome their early complacency about the war and had also recognized the reliance of the guerrillas on

the local population. They began creating 'protected villages' to deprive them of food, intelligence and recruits. In Chiweshe TTL, 50,000 people were moved into twenty-one PVs in a three-week exercise, and a similar operation took place in Madziwa TTL. According to a Rhodesian military intelligence lecture, 'This effectively drove the terrorists, who were well ensconced in those TTLs, north, and we started to get the upper hand. By being able to concentrate the entire country's resources in a relatively small area of Rhodesia, we were able to have large force levels deployed, an improvement in the communication network and the creation of excellent airfields. With the assistance of the South African Police, who were mainly engaged in border control along the Zambezi, although a number were involved in hot operations, our kill rate increased considerably. In October and November of 1974 we killed more terrorists than we had killed in the total period from 1972 to October 1974. By the 11 December 1974 we estimated that there were only 70 terrorists left within Rhodesia.'⁸

On the night of 10 December 1974, the eve of Smith's 'ceasefire' broadcast, fighting erupted in Lusaka's Kamwala township when the Nhari rebels tried to ambush Tongogara. They had already kidnapped his wife and three small children, as well as nineteen ZANU officials including three members of the DARE and several members of the high command. The base of Chifombo had been taken over, the road was sealed, and the rebels were refusing to speak to anyone except three other members of the DARE, Mukono, Hamadziripi and Mataure. There was a report that twenty-five commanders had already been killed.

Half of the DARE and some senior members of the high command had been out on missions when the rebellion began ten days earlier. Tongogara and Chitepo were in Rumania, and DARE members Gumbo and Kangai, with Nhongo, Chauke and Mpunzarima of the high command, were in China when the rebels left the front in late November, just before the 'unity' talks were due to begin in Lusaka. Nhari and eight other members of the general staff took with them Tungamirai, the other senior commander present at the time, who had disagreed with their plans: 'They complained that the leadership is staying in Lusaka, the leadership is wasting money, the leadership is too old, we want young men. I disagreed with them, these were new stories to me. They told me they had decided to go to Chifombo and take over the leadership. But why? If there are individual members of the high command who cannot carry out duties then we must state

that to the party, because we have this system of self-criticism. They said, no, the whole high command, from Tongogara down, must be replaced.'

During the seven-day march to Chifombo, Tungamirai had an armed guard in front of him and behind him, and was tied to a tree at night. When they reached the Zambezi, there was a debate about what to do with him. 'They used a Shona term, *wafa wafa wasara wasara*, which means literally "in this event, some will die and some will survive, and who will survive is the fittest".' They finally decided to take him to Chifombo.

Nhari had brought a large group of cadres from the front, including the first trained women, who had just come from Nachingwea in Tanzania and had been carrying war materials to the front. Some were beaten and otherwise mistreated en route, and most were arrested by the rebels when they reached Chifombo. 'Most comrades supported him out of fear,' Tungamirai said. 'We were meeting other comrades carrying war materials. They were ordered to put down their guns. Most were junior commanders and when a senior tells them to put down their guns, they put them down straight. Some were accused of being puppets of Tongogara. There were shootings along the way.'⁹

Two commanders opposed to Nhari—Lovemore Chikadaya and Peter Ngwenya—were buried alive at Chifombo. Others were tortured, some beaten or burned with cigarettes. Tungamirai found Gava was already a prisoner. He had been co-ordinating operations in both MMZ and ZZ in the absence of Nhongo and was the only senior commander in the camp when the rebels struck. Born Viales Musungwa in 1943, his parents were peasant farmers in the Guta district. Like Tongogara and others, he left for Zambia in the early Sixties to pursue his education and was drawn into nationalist politics. One of his brothers was in the group trained in Ghana and spent many years in prison. Gava, whose name means 'fox', trained at Itumbi in 1968 and became ZANLA's head of security in 1977. He said the rebels sent commanders to Chifombo on the pretext of reporting that they had captured two white prisoners whom they did not want to bring into the camp, so he went out. 'When we got into the bush I found myself at gunpoint. They said, "We're taking over the camp, where is Tongogara?"' The other rebel group went to Lusaka to pick up Ndongana, Chief of Operations, Charles Dauramanzi, Logistics, and Chimurenga.

This was the situation Tongogara and Chitepo found when they

returned from Rumania early in December. They received the news in Tanzania. 'We just couldn't believe it,' Tongogara said later. 'There's been a coup! Couping who? Because if you conduct a coup you're couping the party and now what are you? They said some big fish in the party have supervised it.' Tongogara had a briefing from a senior FRELIMO commander, Francisco Langa, who told him the dissidents who did not want to fight had come from home and taken control of the camp. He said FRELIMO had been reluctant to interfere and trigger a battle, and had decided to wait until Tongogara returned. Tongogara took this information to Sithole, who was attending the meetings at Lusaka's Mulungushi Hall. Sithole asked him to keep it quiet because he felt it would weaken their position at the talks.

The unity accord was signed on 8 December. The following day a full meeting of the DARE was convened and Tongogara demanded an explanation of those members who had remained in Lusaka. He was told a gang had plotted and there was no way of stopping it, and he was advised not to go to the camp. The same afternoon a note arrived demanding money and food, a demand only he or Chitepo could approve and they both refused. Unknown to them, most of the rebels had arrived in Lusaka in two lorries. Another message arrived, threatening to round up more people unless there was a response in two hours. Tongogara agreed to meet them: 'They had their guns there, their submachine-guns, right in town. So I began to think, but Zambians are around, what is happening? Surely they should be arrested when they've got their guns here.' The same evening Tongogara went with Mataure to meet the rebels at a bar outside Lusaka. He found there were twenty-six, led by Nhari, and they had all been drinking. He told them they should be at the front and they again demanded money. Tongogara refused to discuss it in the bar and they agreed to return to the ZANU house in New Kabwata, Lusaka, at 93 Mpelembe Street. Tongogara later gave a dramatic account of what then happened:

They left eight of them outside guarding the place. I called the late Peter Baya, who was in charge of that house, to come and witness what these chaps are going to say. Mataure and ten commanders came inside. They locked up all the doors, closed all the curtains, and they produced a five-page document they had typed. Nhari started reading out the names of his new high command, starting with himself as Chief of Defence, Badza, Chief of Operations, and

the other officers. He said that members of the old high command failed to supply us with adequate weapons and refused to allow the DARE to get weapons from Russia. The old high command had been turned into a Chinese thing, all these complaints. Now we demand that members of the DARE should accept us as the legitimate high command, and we give them twelve hours to do so. If they don't do so, we will give them a surprise. Everyone cocking his gun and pointing at me. I was seated like a prisoner there.

No one can bulldoze me, they knew that. So others were saying, if you continue intimidating Tongo like this we are getting into trouble. So they went into the other room, then called Mataure for about ten minutes. They came back and said, 'Look, we think we can make some compromise here. Tongo, you will become our co-ordinating secretary and you will liaise with the DARE, and Mataure will be our chief political commissar.' I looked at the watch, it was 3.30 a.m. So what do you say? I said only one thing to them. 'Put down your guns. You are members of the general staff and I am your commander. I order you—Attention!' And I stood up. They started cocking their guns. I said, 'No, put your guns down or I will not listen to you. Come and see me in my office at 8 o'clock tomorrow morning, tell me your complaints and I can think it over.' 'Now,' they contradicted. Some were saying, 'Let's tie him up, take him to Chifombo where the others are.' Some are saying, 'Shoot him.' Finally, Mataure pleaded and they agreed, 'Okay you go. We will see you at lunchtime.' It is now 4.00 a.m. I went home, I couldn't sleep, even eat. I was really mad. I sat in the sitting room from 5 until 7.30. About quarter to eight, Mataure came and we drove to Mulungushi.

Sithole said, 'What is all this?' I said, 'You ask these chaps here, Mataure knows. Ask them.' So he went to talk to Mukono. When he [Sithole] came back to me he had changed his mind. 'You try to solve it,' he said, 'but don't cause any bloodshed. I think the best thing probably is if you find they resist, you can resign and go back to school.' I said, 'Gosh, thank-you very much, comrade president.' Then I told him, 'Look here, all this trouble I have is because I have stood firm for you. If I had accepted a change in ZANU, you wouldn't be here. Just ten days ago, when we were approached as DARE, by the Zambian government, to accept the leadership of the Bishop, we refused, because we thought you were our leader, and I'm one of those who stood firm.'¹⁰

After a reception the same evening at Mulungushi Hall, Tongogara returned to his home in Kamwala township with Nhongo. It was after midnight but as they approached they noticed the gate, which was always carefully locked at night, was wide open. An ambush had been laid by Nhari and Badza. Eight rebels armed with submachine-guns were taking cover in the vegetable garden. Tongogara and Nhongo escaped in opposite directions, but the firing went on for ten minutes, attracting the attention of Urimbo and Chauke who were staying nearby and who went for the police. One policeman, who came reluctantly with three colleagues, was fired on and had to go for reinforcements. When sixteen policemen arrived in three vehicles, the rebels ran away and Tongogara entered his bullet-riddled house to find it empty and looted of everything moveable. 'I said, "Where is my family?"' The police said, "There's nothing we can do." I said, "You get my family before I cause trouble."'

Tongogara remained, and the rebels soon returned. Mataure was with them in his car. He claimed he had been forced at gunpoint. 'As I'm talking to John, Nhari and others were driving the big lorry towards my place. They wanted to come and shell that house.' A Zambian police guard opened fire and the truck stopped. While they kept up sporadic fire to make the rebels think they were surrounded, police reinforcements were sent for. When the police disarmed Nhari and others in the truck they found, as well as submachine-guns and semi-automatics, some boxes of hand grenades and two bazookas. They also found DARE members Kangai and Mudzi who were being held hostage. The following day, Nhari led police to where Mrs Tongogara and the children, aged from four months to five years, were held. The two older boys were tied to trees and their mother had been stripped to her underpants and tortured.

Tongogara was furious but recognized it as an attempt to 'destroy the armed struggle. I told Sithole there were enemies in ZANU and enemies in Zambia. Whoever is doing it is not doing it in good faith. The whole thing is to eliminate ZANU. I just can't let it happen, we have been fighting, and I have sent young people home. I just can't.'

At a full meeting of the DARE on 12 December, the day the political leaders who had come from prison returned to Salisbury, Tongogara announced that he was going to Chifombo. Mukono tried to talk him out of it, but Chitepo and others urged him to go. Nhongo and Urimbo slipped into the camp on a reconnaissance mission and, a few days later, a strategy was worked out with

FRELIMO commander Moyane that the rebels would be called to a meeting and disarmed. Tongogara, with part of a force of 250 newly trained cadres brought from Tanzania by Robson Manyika and Webster Gwauya, entered Chifombo on Christmas Day. The reinforcements were dubbed *Gukurahundi*, which means literally the first rains of the season that sweep away the rubbish. Another section of *Gukurahundi*, commanded by Elias Hondo, was sent across the Zambezi to Teresera camp near the Rhodesian border where other members of the high command, including Ndangana, Gava and Dauramanzi, were being held. Tungamirai and Chimurenga had by this time escaped and were seeking a FRELIMO force to mount a rescue operation. Their captors had variously threatened to kill them by 9 January or to take them inside the country, which they interpreted to mean handing them over to the Rhodesians.

Badza and another rebel leader, Mathew Ndanga, who had been at Chifombo, were executed, as was Nhari, who with Tichatonga and others had escaped twice from Zambian police custody before being handed over to ZANU and brought before a parade where he confessed to the plot and the contacts with Rhodesian Special Branch. Mataure, who had studied economics in India and had been military attaché and chief representative in Tanzania before his election to the DARE in 1973, was suspended and detained, and later sentenced to death by cadres at Chifombo. His body was found buried near the camp. At a commission of inquiry at Chifombo, conducted by Chitepo, Kangai and Gumbo, some senior officials of the party were suspended or demoted. A document circulated some months later said 'men like Simpson Mutambanengwe, Noel Mukono and Stanley Parirewa were suspended by the party last January . . .', but Mukono denies he ever received any formal notice of suspension,¹¹ or that he was involved in the rebellion. Half of Nhari's supporters had already deserted and reintegrated themselves into the party. Many claimed they had been press-ganged. The number who died on both sides directly as a result of the revolt is believed to be about sixty.¹² By Nhari's own admission, which was tape-recorded, and eyewitness accounts, the rebels killed forty-nine.

The extent to which the Rhodesians were prepared to go to frame Tongogara and widen divisions within the party is illustrated by the use of a Rhodesian intelligence report allegedly taken from a captured guerrilla called John Kapurura. The report, which was given to State House, Lusaka, by Rhodesian intelligence as 'evidence' and supplied

by a senior Zambian official to representatives of at least one other front-line state, sought to convey the suggestion that Tongogara had shot Nhari, Badza and Sam Chandawa. The alleged eyewitness account claimed it was a joint execution; however, Nhari died at a different time and place to Badza, in fact more than a month later, and Sam Chandawa is still alive, as are several other commanders implicated in the revolt. The 'intelligence report' is dated 19 March, the day after Chitepo was assassinated.

Simbi Mubako, who was a law lecturer in Lusaka at the time, says there were three underlying causes for the Nhari rebellion: 'the sudden explosion in recruitment coupled with administrative deficiencies, enemy action, and the existence of disgruntled politicians'.¹³ Concerning the first cause, he states that 'Within two years ZANLA forces had expanded from about three hundred to five thousand. However, the party's capacity to absorb, equip and feed such a number had not expanded correspondingly. . . . The OAU liberation committee and the States which supplied were very slow in responding to the requirements of an expanding war.' It was in fact still difficult for ZANU to win support in countries where ZAPU was already well-entrenched, and the search for weapons in that period is evidenced by the high-level missions which were in Rumania and China at the time of the revolt.

Concerning the second cause, Mubako says, 'There is incontrovertible evidence that the Rhodesian regime had a very active hand in fomenting the revolt in ZANU. Rhodesian counter-subversion operated on three levels.' First, 'from its intelligence sources the party reckoned that out of every ten people who came voluntarily through certain routes there was only one enemy agent. . . . There was a good screening process but also a good chance that some agents might slip through the dragnet. The second level involved a direct propaganda barrage aimed at the cadres in the operational zones. Thousands of leaflets were dropped from the sky urging the comrades to give up, depicting their efforts as futile, their leaders as corrupt and tribally motivated, and exploiting some of the real grievances such as shortages of supplies. . . . The enemy's crown of success was its ability to meet Nhari and other commanders in the forefront,' telling them of the 'impending settlement plans to which they said the Smith regime, African States and the ZANU leadership had already agreed. . . . The prior knowledge of an impending accord was an important factor impelling Thomas Nhari to declare himself Chief of Defence over Tongogara and march on Lusaka at the same time as the African

leaders were assembled in the Zambian capital in December 1974.' The third level of subversion was 'the diplomatic effort to diffuse the armed struggle through the policy of détente'.

The third basic factor leading to the attempted *coup d'état* in ZANU, Mubako says, was the presence in Lusaka of 'disgruntled politicians who were prepared to exploit any situation to regain control of ZANU. This group was prepared to use tribal loyalties as well as army grievances, whether genuine or manufactured, to achieve their objectives. Their chief motive force was the quest for personal power and revenge for past defeats and not primarily tribal or regional hatred.' Mubako adds: 'Those to be condemned for the revolt are the military men and politicians who allowed themselves to be used as imperialist tools, and to try and whitewash their actions is callous irresponsibility. The natural consequence of their action was murder, kidnappings, and torture followed by a disruption of the war effort.'

The year leading to the Lusaka agreement had been bloody for both sides. War-related deaths were listed by the Rhodesians as 519, compared with 287 in 1973.¹⁴ In February, the Minister of Defence had announced a massive military expansion, changing its role from defensive to offensive. This included widening the call-up (by the end of the year it was an offence for a young Rhodesian eligible for call-up to leave the country without the written permission of the Minister of Defence), doubling the national service intake, and raising a second battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles. Extensive new powers were added for 'protecting authorities' in the north-east, the period a police officer could detain a suspect was extended to sixty days, and magistrates courts could not be set up without public notification. Under the new regulations, food supplies could be controlled to 'prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists'.¹⁵ The *Financial Mail*, published in South Africa, commented: 'Together with the practice (introduced last year) of imposing "collective fines" (usually seizing cattle) on tribal Africans, these powers suggest that Government has virtually given up on the struggle to win the allegiance of tribesmen.' Another new penalty which caused an outcry was the announcement in April of the resettlement of 200 tribesmen from Madziwa TTL, north-east of Salisbury in the southernmost part of the country, near Beitbridge, as punishment for 'assisting terrorists'.¹⁶

Figures from both sides suggest April and May were 'hot' months. Among other things, a ZANU statement from Lusaka said three

planes had been shot down, a Canberra on 5 April, a 'spotter aircraft' on 15 April, and a 'third plane' on 21 April. The Rhodesian Air Force admitted to the loss of 'one Canberra jet and two light aircraft' during missions over the area of anti-guerrilla operations in the north-east, but denied they were downed by guerrillas.¹⁷ The Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism stepped up its propaganda campaign in May with the publication of a booklet entitled *Anatomy of Terror*, which was illustrated with pictures of people who had been murdered or mutilated. In June, the State of Emergency was extended for another year and, a few weeks later, the forced movement of 60,000 people into twenty-one 'protected villages' in Chiweshe TTL, within a hundred kilometres of Salisbury, was seen as an indication that 'terrorists' were infiltrating closer to the capital. Known as Operation Overload, the movement of so many people into security-fenced and floodlit villages, at enormous cost, 'brings Rhodesians to the sharp realisation of the extent of the [guerrilla] infiltration despite the great success of the defence forces in active operations,' noted the *Rhodesia Herald*.

That realization was brought home again in August with the publication of the annual police report for 1973. It stated that almost 12,000 people had been arrested that year in connection with 'terrorist' activity in the north-east border area. More than 1,300 cases of 'terrorist' activity had been investigated. The arrests had been made in connection with crimes ranging from murders and attacks on farms to assisting and failing to report the presence of 'terrorists'. The report added that criminal elements outside the 'terrorist infected' area had capitalized on the situation and several burglaries, rapes and robberies had been committed by people posing as 'terrorists' but armed with imitation weapons.

Official estimates published in August showed a large increase in defence spending, up by £4.5 million, or 17 per cent, to £30.7 million. The vote for the police was increased by over 23 per cent.¹⁸ However, the cost of security operations was overshadowed by their conduct when a dossier was published containing ten documented cases of alleged brutality against African civilians by security forces. It was compiled by eleven Roman Catholic, Anglican and British Methodist church leaders, who said the government 'rejected our evidence and our plea for an open inquiry, and they appear to consider that such incidents as may have happened amount to nothing more than the mistakes and misadventures that are inevitable in any military campaign. . . . Our information points to something much more serious,

namely the deliberate use of illegal and inhuman acts of force when questioning civilians, even those against whom there is no prior evidence of complicity with the enemy.¹⁹ A few days later, a Rhodesian doctor alleged in a sworn affidavit that thirteen African women and children were massacred by Rhodesian troops operating in Mozambique. The doctor also said that a critically injured African man had died after he was ordered to stop treatment because Special Branch wanted to question the patient.²⁰

According to Rhodesian figures, 345 'terrorists' were killed in 1974.²¹ Among them were several senior commanders, including two who were already folk heroes in the north-east—Silas Paul, Murwira, whose *chimurenga* name was James Bond, and Patrick Tavengwa, known as Mao. They had been involved in such well-known operations as the abduction of students and teachers from St Albert's Mission a year earlier. One of the students, a fourteen-year-old girl who later trained in China and became a senior camp commander, crossed the border into Mozambique clinging to James Bond's belt.²² The Rhodesians accused the duo of murders, assaults and robberies, but their comrades saw it differently: 'That was the time when Bond was doing his miracles, and Mao was so famous, and Nhongo.'²³ Bond was a 'hard man', a good planner, courageous: 'He could give orders with nobody doubting. He used to hand-pick his own people, training his own soldiers. He did not like cowards. He would go and fight at daybreak, and in terms of mobilization he was very good among the masses.' Mao is described as being 'more politically mature. He would sit down and explain in detail the objectives of the war, why we were fighting and who we want to liberate, what we were going to do after liberation. . . .'

Senior Rhodesian officers claimed that 75 per cent of the 'insurgent' leadership had been killed by July 1974;²⁴ they also claimed that, because they had killed or captured many of the 'original hard core' and 'more dedicated' commanders, the calibre of the guerrillas had fallen considerably. Many were said to be what the Rhodesians called LLTs—'locally trained terrors'. In a military briefing in November, the officers said 350 to 400 'terrorists' remained in the north-east and claimed their average age was nineteen.²⁵

The South African Police, who had been in Rhodesia since 1967 and had more than 2,000 members involved over that period, also had a rough year. When a Rhodesian government spokesman announced in February 1975 that SAP elements were withdrawing from forward positions along the Zambezi, he added that seventeen SA police had

been killed in the war since December 1972. Most of them died in 1974. In March, a ZIPRA unit surprised a patrol swimming in the Zambezi, upstream of Victoria Falls, and killed five.²⁶ Within days, P. W. Botha, then South African Defence Minister, said 'terrorism' in southern Africa had reached a point where it was becoming a 'war of low intensity'. Smith went on record a few days later saying conventional warfare was a long way off. When two more SA police were killed by ZIPRA in early October, during five clashes in ten days along the Zambezi, the Salisbury press called it another 'front' (a misnomer because there was no permanent presence in the country as there was in the north-east).²⁷ The Zambian government rejected a formal protest note over the use of its territory for infiltration, and suggested instead that Rhodesian forces had killed the policemen to enlist sympathy in South Africa.²⁸ In late December, less than two weeks after Smith announced his 'ceasefire', six more SAP died in an ambush that became a legend among the local police as well as among the guerrillas. A senior ZANLA commander, Herbert Shungu, had sent an emissary to an SAP camp with a message that he was willing to discuss surrender terms. 'The SAP, somewhat naïvely, accepted the invitation and were ambushed on the Mazoe high level bridge where six of them were killed. So much for the ceasefire.'²⁹

The difficulty was that, at that time, none of the combatants themselves wanted a ceasefire.³⁰ A ZANU inner party circular called upon members at all levels to 'remain loyal to ZANU policies, principles, ideology and line, to propagate these to all Zimbabweans everywhere and to attempt to ensure that they are accepted by the forthcoming ANC Congress. But in all this the ZANLA wing of ZANU, the trump card of the revolution, must remain available to the people of Zimbabwe. . . . If we want a favourable result in the constitutional conference we must retain our arms in our hands and lay them down only when our goals have been achieved. . . . The reality is that ZANU had not declared a ceasefire. . . .'³¹ The Rhodesian military, for their part, believed they had been gaining ground and that the politicians had caused a setback. A military lecture written three years later spoke critically of 'the South African initiated détente exercise or ceasefire', and said Rhodesian acceptance 'militarily, may have been a mistake. . . . the terrorists were able to move out of Rhodesia with impunity, visiting all kraals en route out, stating that they had won the war and had brought Ian Smith to the negotiating table. . . . The ceasefire was well and truly over when a group of 60 ZANU terrorists infiltrated Rhodesia in mid-January. For the rest of 1975 the

Rhodesian Security Forces had to regain the psychological, and therefore the military, ground that we had lost during the ceasefire period and it was an uphill struggle.' This also contributed to the reluctance of the Rhodesian military to believe there was any prospect for peace when a formal ceasefire was agreed to and implemented five years later.

For the guerrillas, 1975 was also to be a very trying time. Many senior commanders had been lost in the war or the rebellion, and commanders with less experience had been rapidly promoted to fill gaps in the command structure. The OAU had withdrawn recognition of ZANU and ZAPU on 8 January at a meeting of the Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam, and had specified that funds and support would go only to the ANC. The transit of arms and ammunition through Zambia was reduced to a smuggled trickle as relations with Kaunda's government, committed to détente, deteriorated. The transitional government in Mozambique, preoccupied with its own independence set for June, was about to become a member of the front-line states grouping and the OAU, both of which backed the ANC and the 'ceasefire', and cadres who withdrew into Mozambique were disarmed.

The Rhodesians were able to add to the confusion early in the year by circulating 'ceasefire' leaflets telling guerrillas to hide their weapons and surrender to the nearest soldier, policeman or district commissioner, or leave the country. If caught with weapons, the leaflets said, they would be treated as enemies. When the ANC in Salisbury acquired some of the leaflets, the Publicity Secretary, Dr Edson Sithole, who was a member of ZANU, accused the Rhodesians of 'flagrant violations' of the agreement. 'A ceasefire means no more than stopping to shoot and to advance beyond the lines where the respective forces are found,' he said in a statement. 'It does not at all mean surrender.' He reiterated the nationalist position that a formal ceasefire would not be announced until after the date had been set for a constitutional conference and 'meaningful discussions' had begun.

Tungamirai was sent straight back into the country in January with the new trainees from Tanzania who had provided reinforcements at Chifombo (the *Gukurahundi*). Over the next few months many were captured and others killed or wounded in concentrated enemy action. For the guerrillas still active inside the country there were serious problems of sheer survival, especially in ZZ where the population was scattered and had not yet been properly mobilized. John Chimbande, who later became ZANU representative in Dar es Salaam, was in ZZ

in a company of about sixty which was ambushed near a river in flood. Their sectional security officer was Morrison Nyati, who later defected and led the Selous Scouts to Nyadzonja, a refugee camp in Mozambique. Chimbande says Nyati was ruthless, 'in the sense that if you felt you were tired and you could not do anything about it, he would pick up your weapon and say, "If you don't want to move, you are going to be killed."' Most of the company scattered but some were killed in the ambush, which was laid in such a way that 'if we wanted to run away it could be diving into the flooded river.' Chimbande, who escaped with another cadre, said it was a frightening experience. They walked and walked and then realized they had been walking in circles. 'You find these creeping plants growing so that they provide a kind of thicket, a ceiling, above you. You go for days without seeing the sun, so we got lost.' They were afraid to shoot an animal for fear of attracting the attention of the enemy or frightening villagers, so they existed on fruits and water, plentiful during the rainy season, and thought they would die of hunger until they came across some civilians whom they convinced to help them cross the Angwa River to the safety of Mozambique. That was in May 1975 and, after a communication blackout with the rear, they found that most of their military and political leadership had been locked up in Zambia, and that Chitepo was dead.

Just before 8 a.m. on 18 March 1975 an explosion had ripped through Chitepo's car as he reversed in his drive at 150 Muramba Road, Chilenje South; Chitepo, his bodyguard Silas Shamiso, and a child in the next garden were all killed. Another bodyguard, Sadat Kufamazuba, who was sitting in the back seat of the blue Volkswagen, was seriously injured. A Zambian bomb disposal team later established that an explosive device containing TNT and weighing 1.6 kilograms had been attached to the inside of the right front wheel fender with magnets. Their report said the device was fired by a 'pull fuse connected to moving parts'.³² A pathologist's report listed the cause of death as 'multiple injuries'.³³

The previous year two explosions had rocked the Liberation Centre in a nearby suburb, one of them destroying the ZANU office. A party statement blamed it on the 'Smith regime's sinister scheme, announced earlier this year, promising large sums of money to people who captured or eliminated' guerrilla leaders. The regime had announced in April 1974 that 'not less than' £3,500 would be paid for information leading to the 'death or capture of a senior terrorist

leader', £1,700 for a 'terrorist group leader', and 'not less than £675 for a 'trained terrorist'.³⁴ ZANU later accused the Smith regime of publicly offering £5,000 for Chitepo's head.³⁵ The ZAPU Chief of Security, Ethan Dube, was kidnapped from Francistown in mid-October, and a Botswana government statement some days later said it had been established that he was taken across the border to Rhodesia. They demanded his return but he was never seen again. In June 1975, several weeks after the death of Chitepo, the chief representative of ZANU in Botswana, Dick Moyo, was killed with a parcel bomb. Moyo, whose real name was Joseph Chikara, was one of the few members of the ZANLA high command who had escaped the sweeping detention of ZANU military and political leaders in Zambia after Chitepo died.

In Salisbury, Rhodesian authorities hastily denied responsibility for the murder of Chitepo. A government spokesman said that 'allegations were expected'.³⁶ A report in a London conservative newspaper, the *Daily Telegraph*, said Chitepo's death 'followed two weeks of rumours in Lusaka and Salisbury that he was about to be arrested or declared a prohibited immigrant from the Zambian capital'.³⁷ Robert Mugabe, the most senior ZANU official at liberty after the re-arrest of the Reverend Sithole two weeks earlier, blamed the 'evil work' on the Rhodesian regime operating through the 'willing hands of its Zambian agents'.³⁸ Dr Edson Sithole, the ANC Publicity Secretary and a ZANU member, told reporters that only the Smith government would have anything to gain from the assassination, which he said had 'shattered irreparably' any hope of a negotiated settlement.³⁹ He said he expected Rhodesian authorities to move against him and Mugabe at any time. Within two weeks, however, Mugabe left the country for Mozambique after a central committee decision that he and Tekere must go out to ensure the continuation of the war. Seven months later, in October 1975, Edson Sithole was bundled into a police van outside Salisbury's Ambassador Hotel, in front of several witnesses including Brother Arthur of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and disappeared. He was not found in prison when the cells were opened during an amnesty just prior to independence in 1980 and he is presumed dead. Evidence still secret, to be produced at such time as a public hearing is held, suggests that his body and that of a white priest may be found at the bottom of a disused mine-shaft.⁴⁰

In the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam, a statement on the death of Chitepo by the Youth League of the ruling party, TANU, warned Smith that 'he should not forget the effects of the murder' of Eduardo

Mondlane, first president of FRELIMO, and Amilcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC.⁴¹ Mondlane was killed by a parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam in 1969, and Cabral was gunned down in Conakry, Guinea, in 1973. Confessions of prisoners and evidence unearthed before and after the 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal connected both assassinations to the Portuguese secret police, PIDE. Smith, said TANU, 'should remember that instead of demoralising the mass of people in those countries, the deaths inspired them to fight more till they won their freedom'.

A footnote to the events of 18 March 1975 appeared as a paragraph the following day in the *Financial Times* in London: 'Talks between the South African Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, and the Rhodesian leader, Mr Ian Smith, ended today with a statement expressing unqualified desire that settlement negotiations should be resumed as soon as possible.' The story continued the next day: 'Rhodesian sources are remaining silent about the Smith-Vorster talks amid speculation that the two sides parted with less than full agreement. . . .' A *Times* editorial in London said Smith had emerged from the meeting with Vorster 'with the comfortable agreement for public consumption' that the Rhodesian issue must be solved around a conference table, but *The Times* questioned how and when a conference could be convened after the arrest of the Reverend Sithole. 'The killing of Mr Chitepo in Lusaka adds a fresh complication,' it said, describing him as 'committed to the tough ZANU line' and 'the hardest man to bring into the ANC front. Whose target then was he?'

In Lusaka, funeral arrangements proceeded with some difficulty. Plans to bury Chitepo in his home area were disrupted when the Rhodesian government refused to allow the body into the country—'in view of Chitepo's history as the leader of a terrorist organisation who was directly responsible for the murder of a considerable number of black and white Rhodesians', a Rhodesian government statement said.⁴² ZANU officials, who were trying to organize a small funeral at the request of Mrs Victoria Chitepo, found arrangements taken over by the Zambian government, which insisted on a 'state funeral with full military honours'.

A ZANU statement on the murder of their chairman was impounded by Zambian authorities, who granted permission to Bishop Muzorewa to broadcast a statement the following day in his capacity as leader of the ANC. He made two broadcasts beamed to Rhodesia, amending an earlier plan to call on the guerrillas to stop fighting and appealing instead for unity and urging whites to accept

majority rule.⁴³ The Bishop had arrived in Lusaka the day before Chitepo's death and had expressed surprise when he saw Chitepo at the airport, saying the word at home was that he had been arrested in Malawi. Another member of the delegation remarked that a Salisbury rumour said Chitepo was dead.⁴⁴ At a brief meeting at the State Lodge, Chitepo, aware of rumours of his imminent arrest by Zambian authorities, was circumspect in his remarks about ZANU, the ANC and the armed struggle, leading the Bishop to burst out, 'Why can't you speak your mind directly?' The reasons for Chitepo's circumspection would later be used at a commission of inquiry set up to clear the name of the Zambian government.

Chitepo had been under considerable pressure since the 'unity accord', which he disagreed with, and over attempts to end the armed struggle, which he refused to do. He was also extremely concerned about getting supplies to the young people at the front; the OAU Liberation Committee had stopped supplying ZANU and it was becoming increasingly difficult to transport existing weapons and supplies through Zambia. 'We were not free to carry weapons or transport more cadres to the front,' a senior member of ZANLA security said. 'There were no separate broadcasts, no singing songs, and we were under pressure to accept a military arrangement that meant surrendering the war to the people who had never fought it.' People close to Chitepo in this period deny he was drinking more than usual, as later suggested by the commission of inquiry, but they do admit that, as well as the overall pressures caused directly by the détente exercise, he was under personal pressure from a few people from his home area who tried to use tribalism to influence him and whom he firmly rebuffed. Chitepo did not have a bodyguard until February 1975, after threats against his life. Previously, no ZANU leader had had bodyguards: 'We weren't aware of the need, but after those death threats close security arrangements were tightened,' the security officer said. Chitepo had spoken with some alarm to diplomat friends in Lusaka and independent friends in Europe during this period about his deteriorating relations with Zambian authorities and his fear of what action they might take.

This was one reason why Chigowe, who was in charge of security, later accompanied Chitepo and Hamadziripi to Malawi, a trip that was to be cast as a mystery tour by the commission of inquiry, because of a list of names allegedly written by Chigowe and a contact with Mutambanengwe, who had gone to Malawi after the Nhari rebellion. ZANU had not had warm relations with the Malawi government, but a

delegation from Malawi attending an OAU meeting in Ethiopia in February had invited party representatives to visit. The Malawians suggested that they could offer beans to ease the problems of feeding Zimbabweans in the camps, and 'the Ngwazi', as President Banda is known, was now prepared to discuss other contributions to the struggle. The DARE decided that Chitepo and Hamadziripi should go and it was at Chitepo's request that Chigowe accompanied them. A shadow was cast over the invitation when the three ZANU officials were arrested by the Malawi authorities. Chitepo was released first. He was told, 'Sometimes when you catch fish with a net you catch others which are not fish. You are not a fish, you can go.' He returned to Lusaka to brief his colleagues in his usual thorough fashion and to begin representations to the Malawi High Commission for the release of the others, who were not in fact freed until after his death.

At the same OAU meeting in Ethiopia in February, Chitepo had clashed with members of the Zambian delegation over a statement issued by the ZANU office in Dar es Salaam. The statement criticized Zambia for refusing ZANU access to broadcasting facilities while allowing ZAPU to continue to broadcast. It accused Zambia of collaborating in the destruction of liberation movements in southern Africa and it spoke of Zambia's contacts with South Africa, including the visits to Lusaka by van den Bergh, head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). The ZANU office in Dar es Salaam had been visited by Tanzanian security, and the statement was reported in a Kenya newspaper which had been introduced into a session of the OAU Liberation Committee, to the fury of the Zambian delegates and the denials of the representative from Tanzania. A senior Zambian official told a senior ZANU official in a private meeting that 'Zambia would use muscle to crush ZANU.'⁴⁵

The Zambian government was also irritated by similar allegations made by ZANU representatives in the United States and Britain, and Kangai had ruffled feathers among the front-line states in February by saying during a BBC interview that ZANU had no intention of disbanding its forces or abandoning the armed struggle. He said ZANU had no objection to talks with Ian Smith but 'talks can continue and the armed struggle can continue.' Soon after that an editorial in the *Daily Mail*, the party newspaper in Lusaka, warned 'political leaders from Zimbabwe who are against unity. These people will soon find themselves in political limbo, they will be physically eliminated or they will find themselves in political limbo.'⁴⁶

Zimbabwean contacts in the Zambia Special Branch warned them early in March that arrests were imminent. Kangai wrote a letter to his brother to be posted by his wife in the event of his arrest, asking him to look after his family, and saying ZANU would retain its identity under any umbrella and would never change its stand. The letter is dated 15 March 1975.⁴⁷ Members of the DARE and high command began varying their patterns and sleeping at different houses. The night of 17 March was the first time for several days that Chitepo and other DARE members slept at home, thinking that the presence of the Bishop in Lusaka gave them protection from arrest.

After Chitepo's death on 18 March the SB contacts warned the others that the arrests would be made immediately after the funeral. The DARE met and decided to disperse the high command outside Zambia to ensure continuation of the armed struggle. Tongogara and others were to go to Mozambique, Nhongo to Tanzania, Urimbo to Chifombo, Chimurenga and others to the front. A handful, including Dauramanzi and Mpunzarima, were to remain at the camps in Zambia. Mass arrests began on Sunday 23 March, the day after the funeral, and fifty mourners were taken by police from the Chitepo residence.

Mrs Chitepo had arrived a few days earlier, accompanied by the ZANU chief representative to East Africa, Webster Gwauya. They were whisked away reluctantly in a motorcade to State House, where Mrs Chitepo was taken to meet President Kaunda. When she rejoined the others, she told them she had also been taken to meet the Bishop, who had tried to convince her that her husband was killed by ZANU. Since the funeral arrangements had been taken over by the Zambian authorities, Mrs Chitepo (who was later elected a Member of Parliament for Manicaland and took her place in the new government of Zimbabwe as Deputy Minister of Education and Culture) slipped a note to Mudzi during the service requesting one of the female cadres to speak in her place. Mudzi rapidly arranged for Catherine Garanewako to speak in Shona, with Kangai interpreting. The contacts in Zambian security later warned Kangai he was going to be arrested for making a revolutionary speech using the name of ZANU, an organization no longer recognized by Zambia. Kangai and Catherine were summoned to State Lodge and castigated by the Bishop for speaking in the time allocated for relatives. 'For me, we were burying my brother today, for her, she was burying her father,' Kangai told him. 'All those thousands of youngsters who were there mourning, in a revolutionary sense he was their father. The only

leader they had is Herbert Chitepo. The Bishop just couldn't understand.'

By 28 March, the Zambian Home Affairs Minister, Aaron Milner, was able to tell a news conference that 'quite a nice number' of ZANU members had been detained. He signed a banning order for ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI and closed their offices, saying they were being used for purposes 'prejudicial to the maintenance of peace, order and good government'.⁴⁸ Tanzania followed suit in May. The arrests were endorsed by Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Sithole and other ANC leaders, including Chikerema, who had already begun confiding to journalists the 'guilt' of the 'Karanga mafia' whom he called upon Zambian authorities to 'ruthlessly crush'.⁴⁹ The Reverend Sithole said '... it was the correct thing to do'.⁵⁰

British press commentators on the region saw it in a wider context. The 'weekend's arrests almost certainly have a wider significance for the stalemated Rhodesian détente' and 'will put Zambia in a much stronger position to try to force unity', wrote Bridget Bloom in the *Financial Times*. James McManus of the *Guardian* said: 'It is known that the Zambian Government has been planning for some time to close the Lusaka offices of the three nationalist movements and force them to carry out their promised merger with the ANC.' In the *Daily Telegraph*, Christopher Munnion wrote: 'This move has revived hopes in Salisbury of an early end of the guerrilla war and—observers believe—has salvaged the prospects of a constitutional conference on Rhodesia's future.' The move is 'expected to immediately affect the terrorist war being waged on Rhodesia's north-eastern border' and 'the removal of the ZANU leadership is certain to throw their organisation into disarray. . . . a Government statement denied Rhodesians had been told in advance of the move against Nationalist movements.' Rhodesian radio added its own postscript on the external service when it said, 'Thanks to President Kaunda for arresting the head of the ZANU terrorists. Ours is now to destroy the trail that is here in Rhodesia.'⁵¹

Tungamirai, in Petauke in eastern Zambia, heard on Monday 24 March that Radio Zambia had reported the arrest of 'those responsible for the death of Chitepo'. At Chifombo he met Tongogara, who told him of the mass arrest of ZANU leaders, members and supporters, and they held a rally to inform the cadres there, who numbered about 400, mostly recruits. When arrests had begun in town, several ZANU members who taught at the university, including Fay Chung, Sam Geza, Tungamirai Mudzi and Dzingai Mutumbuka, had gone racing

in two cars to the farm to warn them, and members of the high command had dispersed as directed by the DARE. Zambian soldiers arrived soon after and took over the farm. A few days later they loaded the cadres on to trucks at gunpoint—including Dauramanzi and Mpunzarima, who had remained in command—for the transfer to Mboroma where they would be held for the next nine months. The Zambian army was more circumspect about the ZANLA military headquarters at Chifombo and made the first tentative moves three days later when two officers in civilian clothes arrived at the camp gate. They were refused entry on the grounds that they should have been in uniform and accompanied by a soldier from the detachment at Petauke. A company of about seventy-five Zambian soldiers returned the following day and surrounded Chifombo. The senior commanders and most trained cadres, a group of about 100, slipped through the encirclement into Mozambique where they 'spent five days camping, trying to contact FRELIMO and find out what was going on in Lusaka.'⁵²

They went to a FRELIMO camp near Cabora Bassa called Fingoe, and within days a message arrived from Tete that Tongogara, Urimbo and Chimurenga were wanted there for questioning by FRELIMO. They went, and met with Machel's private secretary, Sergio Viera; unknown to them two Zambian Special Branch officers also sat in on the meeting.⁵³ Two weeks later another message arrived from Zambia requesting the return of the other three members of the high command still in Mozambique—Tungamirai, Chauke and Chinamaropa. 'FRELIMO thought it was genuine. They told us later that if they had known what was the case they wouldn't have sent us,' Tungamirai said. The FRELIMO commander explained that there was a commission of inquiry endorsed by the OAU and they could not defy the orders of an organization of which they were now a member. 'So we also thought it was genuine and they needed information which can lead us to find who killed our leader.' Tanzania adopted a different attitude and allowed Nhongo and others sanctuary there. However, the ZANU organization in Dar es Salaam was disrupted by the closure of the office and the arrest in Lusaka of Gwauya, the chief representative, who had accompanied Mrs Chitepo to the funeral.

'We flew to Katete', Tungamirai recalled, 'and were promptly arrested by the Zambian police, taken by Land-Rover to Lusaka, chained hands and feet. They were furious when we got to Lusaka but they were also excited that we were caught. We were sent to Central Prison and that's when we saw the thing was tough. We found

comrades who just couldn't sit or stand. Chimurenga, Dauramanzi, Chigowe, Mabika, they were really beaten. That's when we realized how serious this was.'⁵⁴ Tungamirai continued: 'I was called in by the police and asked to write what I know about what had happened. I wrote. Then the papers were torn. I was told, "This is rubbish. It's not what we want. You are said to have been involved in the creation of the bomb which killed Chitepo."' I said, "No." That's when they started beating me. First exercises—press-ups, arm stretching, put the forefinger down on the floor and circle around it. For about 48 hours. Then they beat me, using broken pieces of chairs, broomsticks and anything that was there, until I was unconscious. Then I was sent back to prison.'

Tungamirai's account of his treatment in prison is echoed by the other ZANLA prisoners who were interrogated. A letter smuggled out of prison said Dauramanzi and Mpunzarima had broken ribs and fingers. 'The most shocking phenomenon about our interrogation', the letter said, 'was that the Zambian security officers were not interested in our version of the events leading to the death of comrade Chitepo. They were interested in their neatly typed statements which they asked us to copy and sign in our own handwriting so that they would appear as if they were voluntarily made by us. . . . Another disturbing aspect of the Zambian security investigation was their insistence on asking us why we broke away from Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU and why we did not observe the ceasefire agreed upon by Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema. . . . The Zambian Government, or at least their security officers, were more interested in the process of the détente exercise and Nkomo's fortunes than in Chitepo's death.'⁵⁵

The case in the High Court of Zambia charging Tongogara, Chimurenga and Kufamazuba—whose real name is Benson Tafirenyika Gatsi Kadzinga, born in Mrewa in 1952—with Chitepo's murder was dismissed after a 'trial within a trial' over the admissibility of a police statement taken from the third accused. On 20 October 1976, the judge, Mr Justice Manival Moodley, ruled that Kufamazuba's 'confession' was inadmissible as evidence because it was not freely and voluntarily given. 'My conclusion would indicate beyond doubt that Accused 3 was a victim of unfair and improper conduct on the part of the police authorities,'⁵⁶ said the judge, who asked the Director of Public Prosecutions, Ernest Sakala, to begin criminal proceedings against the police. President Kaunda subsequently admitted that no action was taken, there had not been any

investigation into the conduct of the police, and he claimed the judge was 'anti-Zambian'.⁵⁷

The judge also found that prison records had been tampered with to obscure dates and that, despite the denial in court of Senior Assistant Commissioner Dickson Mpundu, who was in charge of the murder investigation, Kufamazuba had been kept at Force Headquarters for more than twenty-four hours at a time—on at least six occasions—which was illegal. Mpundu himself told the court there was no sleeping accommodation for prisoners being interrogated at Force Headquarters, yet prison records showed that Kufamazuba was kept there on one occasion for four days at a stretch. The judge found no evidence of facilities for 'food, refreshment and sleep'. He found that police evidence in court conflicted with prison records in terms of who collected whom from cells, when and for how long, and that two of the policemen involved in interrogations were not called as witnesses. Medical records from both the hospital and the prison clinic for Kufamazuba, who was still recovering from injuries he suffered in the blast, were 'unsatisfactory and of little assistance'. One submission by the defence lawyers, A. Pierce Annfield and M. F. Sikatana, was that Kufamazuba had undergone torture while still suffering from his injuries, for which he received little further treatment, and that stitches closing a wound in his arm were pulled out during interrogation. Chimurenga testified to seeing Kufamazuba with swollen hands and face, and two other witnesses from prison testified to seeing Chimurenga in a condition where he was unable to sit on a chair or to walk without support. Tongogara's wife, who visited him on 22 June 1975, four days after his alleged 'confession' is dated, reported that he could not comfortably stand or walk.

The accused had no access to lawyers until they appeared in court to be charged on 21 April 1976 and contacted Philip Banda and Beatrice Ngonomo, who visited them in the cells before they next appeared on 24 April. However they withdrew the case from Banda & Company and Walisko & Company after the lawyers held a press conference and issued a statement denying harassment. Niall McDermott of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) wrote to President Kaunda inquiring about allegations of harassment of lawyers, and the three accused wrote to a British lawyer asking for his services, because most local 'lawyers and judges are now prejudiced against us in view of the publication and wide circulation of the so-called Chitepo International Commission Report.'⁵⁸ Annfield and Sikatana finally handled the

case, and were later invited as special guests to the celebrations marking independence. Legal costs were paid by Amnesty International and moneys raised by defence committees set up in London and Lusaka.

These defence committees, consisting of lawyers, professors and priests as well as ZANU officials, were raising publicity for the case as well as money, and one pamphlet entitled 'The Price of Détente—Kaunda prepares to execute more ZANU freedom fighters for Smith' caused particular anger in Zambia. A letter concerning the trial and this and other documents, sent to the *Times of Zambia* by Ignatius Chigwendere, Secretary of the Catholic Commission for Racial Justice in London, drew an irate reply from the Zambian Minister of Legal Affairs and Attorney General, M. Mainza Chona, who had played a leading role in the commission of inquiry. Chona accused Chigwendere of 'playing dirty politics' and went on to say: 'My own personal view is that it is a pity that the ex-ZANU leaders, who killed Chitepo, were cowards. They could have simply told the Zambian Authorities that Chitepo was killed by them and they would have been bold enough to justify his elimination. . . . the anti-Zambian campaign you are now engaged in is designed to protect the assassins from being hanged.'⁵⁹ This letter was dated 23 June 1976; the case was still in the courts and, coming from the country's minister in charge of legal affairs, it raised serious questions among members of ZANU about the impartiality of the state apparatus.

The 'Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo' had been set up, not only to find Chitepo's assassins, but with the added objective 'to clear Zambia's name politically',⁶⁰ and the key commissioners were aware of this. Because of the détente exercise and Chitepo's head-on confrontation with the front-line states—particularly Zambia—over refusing to subvert the armed struggle, accusing fingers were being pointed at Zambia and questions were being asked among members of the OAU. The front-line states, finding their position as policy makers and implementers on southern Africa for the OAU weakened, needed to prove, especially to the OAU, that Zambia's credentials were intact. That they were able to do so—by accusing Chitepo's comrades in the continuation of the armed struggle, and locking them up for twenty months—benefited only the Rhodesians and eventually brought the war to a virtual standstill. That they were not in the end able to stop the war altogether reflects the courage and dedication of those in prison and

those committed people who managed to remain outside, and also of those among the front-line governments who finally supported them.

Most members of the commission, representing thirteen countries and the OAU Liberation Committee, were sworn in on 2 July 1975. President Kaunda then hosted a dinner for them. 'By coincidence,' the report said, 'leaders of the ANC, including Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, were in Lusaka at that time, and were also invited to dinner.' Later that week they were the first three to give evidence to the commission. The commission chairman, Reuben Kamanga, a member of the central committee of Zambia's ruling party, UNIP, told them at the opening that they should investigate not only the circumstances of the death of Chitepo but also the political set-up in the ANC.⁶¹ The *Times of Zambia*, the official government newspaper (although it is owned by Lonrho), said the commission must not only discover who killed Chitepo but must also 'sort out' the Zimbabwe liberation movement. The commissioners came from Botswana, the Congo, Ivory Coast, Libya, Malagasy, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Zaire and the OAU Liberation Committee. Countries nearby were represented by party or government officials and those farther away by members of their foreign missions based in Lusaka. A quorum constituted the chairman and five commissioners. The representative from Mozambique, Sergio Viera, was not sworn in until the end of January 1976, after the report was in first draft. The Liberation Committee was represented by its Executive Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Hashim Iddi Mbita. The Report of the Commission was signed and presented to President Kaunda on 8 March 1976, almost one year after the assassination.

The report itself contains innuendoes, half-truths and untruths. One-sided testimony is not put into any context, nor is the vested interest of any witness considered in the report. No expert opinion is quoted to verify that letters and bits of paper produced were in the handwriting of the person alleged, nor is it at all clear if these writings were actually seen by most of the commissioners. Some witnesses chose to speak in Shona but were refused the interpreter of their choice and given one they mistrusted in conveying their testimony accurately. The matter of translation, and thus understanding, was further complicated by the fact that the commission, which functioned in English, French and Arabic, the official languages of the OAU, did not have proper professional interpreters and stenog-

raphers for almost half of the time they were taking evidence. By their own admission these facilities were 'inadequate'.⁶²

The report's analysis of events, largely on the basis of tribalism, was so inaccurate as to cause a senior official of the other main Zimbabwean political party to suggest that it was more a reflection of Zambian society than Zimbabwean.⁶³ It had its basis in a misconception that internal difficulties within ZANU, from the Nhari rebellion to the death of Chitepo, were caused merely by 'The Karangas' trying to seize power from 'The Manyikas'. This, the report suggests, began in 1973 when 'The Karangas' replaced 'The Manyikas' as the majority on the DARE. There were three Manyikas, three Karangas, and two Zezurus on the DARE after the 1971 biennial review conference, the report claimed, and five Karangas and three Manyikas after the 1973 elections. It mentions that one Zezuru defected to join FROLIZI shortly after the 1971 election, but it does not mention that the other was replaced because he was not doing his job very well. Apart from errors of analysis, there is a factual error here in counting Kangai, who is a Manyika, among the Karangas: thus it was four and four after the 1973 election, and in fact the power balance had not shifted. The importance was that the whole face of the DARE changed, but the replacements did not follow tribal lines. Mukono, a Manyika, replaced Hove, a Karanga, as Secretary for External Affairs; Kangai and Gumbo came on to the DARE because they were 'new blood' and not because they were Karanga, as did Mataure, a Manyika, who replaced Mutambanengwe, another Manyika, as Political Commissar; Tongogara came on to the DARE because he represented the military, not because he was Karanga.⁶⁴ The 1973 election involved a series of Machiavellian political manoeuvres and there were Karangas and Manyikas among both the winners and the losers.

Equally the Nhari rebellion cut across tribal lines on both sides and was—as was the 1973 review conference—more about power than tribe. Nhari himself was a Zezuru, as was one of his main opponents, Nhongo; Chandawa of the Nhari group was a Karanga, while Ndan-gana, on the other side, was Manyika. There were some tribal elements on both sides, and some of those involved at the time say 'regionalism' surfaced more often than 'tribalism'. This was in the sense that people who grew up together or went to school together sometimes supported each other to the exclusion of others.⁶⁵ The widespread use of *chimurenga* names, often from another district, blurred tribal identities along with protecting families, and cadres and officials often did not know or care about another's tribe.

While several of Kangai's colleagues are still unable to reply with any certainty about his tribal affiliation, this was available to the Zambian chairman of the commission to produce to the inquiry, because it is clearly typed at the top of the Zambian police statement taken from Kangai at Kabwe prison after he was arrested.⁶⁶ Kangai, who was born in Buhera district in 1938 and who studied and represented ZANU in the United States for a time before his election to the DARE, became Minister of Labour and Social Welfare at Independence in 1980. He prefers to be known as a Zimbabwean, and he is amused by the confusion over his tribe. He recalls that during this same period in Lusaka, he was approached on the steps of State House by one of the Bishop's aides—whom it transpired later was passing information to Rhodesian Special Branch—who whispered, 'You can trust me, I'm a Karanga like you. . . .'

Tongogara and Chitepo abhorred tribalism, and each crossed swords at certain critical times with a handful of people from their respective areas because they firmly rebuffed tribal influences. Tongogara over the years supported Sithole, a Ndau, and Mugabe, a Zezuru, and relied heavily upon his Chief of Operations, Nhongo, who is also Zezuru. The commission's report goes so far as to suggest that because Chitepo did not practise tribalism he 'might have lost his thinking. His fellow Manyikas, like Sanyanga, Dziruni and Mutambanengwe, mistrusted him,' the report said, 'for it appeared to them that Chitepo was aiding and abetting their adversaries. . . . Mutambanengwe gave the longest testimony to the commission, two days; Chikerema was next in length of time with eight hours.'⁶⁷ Cornelius Martin Ditima Sanyanga, a Lonrho company secretary, former chairman of the Lusaka Central Branch of ZANU and a provincial committee member until his suspension from the party after the Nhari rebellion, also testified to the commission—and later at the trial as Prosecution Witness One—about tribal differences within the party. 'This was from general talk,' he told the court. 'I wouldn't have heard it myself. . . . and there was one person within the ZANU leadership who was aspiring to take over Mr Chitepo's post but I won't mention his name.' Nor, in court, was he asked to mention the name. Sanyanga also talked of arranging through Mark Chona to meet with Chitepo a week before his death, and claimed he later asked State House, again through Chona, for protection for Chitepo.⁶⁸

An example of the nature of the questioning at the inquiry, led largely by Mainza Chona, shows up in Chemist Ncube's account of his testimony:⁶⁹

Commissioner: You said you were taken by Nhari group on their second trip when they were armed, do you think that it was the same thing which happened to Mataure when he drove you to Tongogara's place on 9th December, 1974? Maybe those were bribes?

NCUBE: I cannot answer that question on his behalf, those questions leave them to him, but the funny thing I noticed was the exceptional treatment given to letter which I sent to the Party Publicity Offices. I was ordered to give it to the chairman but why to Mataure or Mukono? Second, Mataure was supposed to appear at the meeting at Mautsa. He was Badza's first choice when he sent Nyabadza to make the first contacts.

Commissioner: Answer yes or no to the following question. Did you give Tongogara a document which listed the names of those involved in the coup?

NCUBE: No.

[The same question was posed again up to the third time.]

NCUBE: Which document do you mean? Are you suggesting that I drafted the document or I was given it by someone and I then gave it to Comrade Tongogara?

Chairman: You are not the Commissioner. Just answer the question, yes, or no.

NCUBE: I am sorry, I cannot answer your question in the way you want or feel. It seems you are satisfied with my answer. Apart from the names I mentioned as I developed my biography, is there any other name you feel I have left out?

Commissioner: Do you agree that there were problems in the Party?

NCUBE: Yes. ZANU like any other liberation movement had and has problems. These problems increase as the war develops.

Commissioner: Do you agree that there was tribalism in the Party?

NCUBE: No. Unless you count people's heads and call it tribalism. Our Party was guided by revolutionary ideology which shunned tribalism sectarianism. The promotion of the fighting forces was based on merit and experience. Most of the members of the High Command were veterans who had been in the field for more than six years, and most of us in the forefront got promotions after only a few months. For example, Sam Chandawa who later turned against the Party was promoted to the position of Sectorial Commander in November 1973 after 5 months from training. If there was tribalism in the party why was it that we were not led by the people from

the North East who constituted more than 60 per cent of the party? Tribalism is a reactionary attitude used by opportunistic elements in order to gain power. It fits well in the enemy propaganda machinery.

Chona (in his bull-dog attitude): What did you say? Where do you come from? You Makorekore have made an alliance with the Makarangas. (He grinned sarcastically at me.)

This was the procedure and mood of the commission. I wonder there was anything sensible that came out of the commission. Though I am neither Karanga nor Kore Kore I did not see what was wrong with the people of Zimbabwe to achieve unity through armed struggle as ZANU always suggested.

A substantial amount of the 'evidence' presented to the Chitepo Commission of Enquiry was subsequently denied in statements taken by defence lawyers representing Tongogara and his co-accused and although this shed further light on police methods of investigation and attitudes it was by then too late to influence the findings of the Commission. Enos Musalapasi, known by his comrades as Short, who worked as a mechanic for ZANU, signed a police statement on 16 June 1975 saying he had left the farm in the middle of the night of 17 March, together with Chimurenga and others who had gone to plant the bomb at Chitepo's house. A lawyer's statement recorded later gives a different version of events and says: 'I was taken to the Force Headquarters. I was beaten severely for full 5 days. And finally they forced me to sign a prepared statement which said that we came to the Chairman's house and set a bomb.'⁷⁰

Chimurenga told the commission he had been tortured and forced to sign a statement; he denied that he had taken police to the grave of another ZANU official, Edgar Madekorozwa, and said he had been taken there by police, who then took pictures of him at the site.⁷¹ Chimurenga, Manyika, Kufamazuba and Tongogara were not, however, called upon to testify until January 1976, after the commission's report was in first draft.

In April 1976 the detainees replied to the accusations that members of the DARE and ZANLA high command totalling twenty-three people 'jointly and severally ... actively desired to bring about Mr. Chitepo's death, and did in fact bring it about'.⁷² In a letter smuggled from prison and copied to the front-line presidents, the OAU and the UN Secretary-General, the detainees said the commission was 'international' in name only since the chairman, the secretary and the 'chief

inquisitor' were Zambians, all evidence was collected and all witnesses selected by Zambian authorities, and the 'Zambian Government was itself a suspect'. The letter singled out the commissioner from Sierra Leone—High Court Judge Mr Justice S. M. F. Kutubu—as one who voiced concern about the role of the group and 'whether they were called only to applaud the Zambian law enforcement agencies'. Secondly, the letter said, the methods of the commission were 'perfunctory and highly prejudicial to our case': evidence was heard *in camera*, there was no cross-examination, the accused were not allowed to be present or to call witnesses in their defence and were themselves called on short notice without ample time to consult lawyers. 'On two occasions two of us saw our lawyer harassed and intimidated until the lawyer was forced to abandon the clients.'

The commission condemned eighteen members of the military high command but called only three to give evidence, the letter said, and commissioners did not see forty-six of the fifty-seven prisoners. 'Why did they not even meet any of the 1,300 ZANU soldiers who were detained by the Zambian authorities at Mboroma Mukushi from March 1975 to January 1976? If all these people were in fact not involved in Comrade Chitepo's death, why were they disarmed and detained? Why did the commission not ask the Zambian Government for an explanation? If only members of the DARE and High Command were responsible, why did the commission not order the immediate release of 34 other ZANU comrades and 40 recruits illegally detained for 13 months?' The letter accused the commission of not considering other possible suspects, and criticized its naivety in suggesting that the only possible motive for Chitepo's death was tribal differences: 'Whoever said that a man cannot be murdered by people from his own tribe?' Evidence given to the commission was 'doctored and deliberately distorted', the letter charged. 'The eagerness with which the commission report "rules out the possible involvement of racists, imperialists or their agents" is startling and most disturbing ... for the future of the revolution in Zimbabwe and the lives of thousands of young Zimbabweans now under arms. ... We are convinced now more than ever before, that it is for the resolute stand against détente and Nkomo which Chitepo and us took, that Comrade Chitepo was killed and we are now being processed for our legalized murder. The commission was set up not to get the truth but as a self-cleansing exercise by the Zambian authorities. ... We wish to reiterate at least for the benefit of posterity that the members of the ZANU Supreme Council DARE, and ZANLA

High Command as a whole are innocent of Comrade Chitepo's death. . . .'

The judge from Sierra Leone, who later became one of eleven official Commonwealth observers of the independence elections, oversaw the first draft of the report. He saw it in legalistic terms and was strongly critical of some of Zambia's actions, but delegates from front-line states led a successful assault to amend the draft. 'Lots of other things should have gone into the report,' one commissioner said later, 'but you should keep in mind that the main objective was to clear Zambia's name.' President Kaunda later confirmed this and said the commission was set up because 'all fingers had been pointed at us, that we had killed the late Chitepo.'⁷³

In attempting to absolve Zambia, the commission smeared the name of—among others—the man whom even President Kaunda was later to admit was the key figure in bringing a settlement at Lancaster House: Josiah Magama Tongogara. After the 18 April 1980 Independence, when incriminating documents had been shredded and Tongogara was dead, three senior members of the former Rhodesian Special Branch said in separate interviews that Tongogara was not involved in the death of Chitepo. None would say who *was* involved, but in each case the firmness of conviction suggested knowledge of the other half of the equation. When some senior members of SB were asked later by a cabinet minister if they were involved in these dirty tricks, they said yes and, to the minister's amazement, offered their services to the new government. At the time of this writing, a journalist, George Gordon, is finishing a book in London after lengthy interviews with a man claiming to be the assassin responsible for the murders of Chitepo, J. Z. Moyo, and others, as well as several acts of sabotage in Zambia and Botswana.

On 24 December 1979, two days before he died in a road accident as he was rushing to Chimoio to inform his commanders of the ceasefire, Tongogara had his last meeting with President Machel in Maputo. He spoke of the need for unity and of his belief in the strength and courage of the young people of Zimbabwe, and just before he stood up to go he looked at the FRELIMO leader with tears in his eyes and said quietly, 'I want to tell you I knew nothing about the death of Chitepo. . . .'⁷⁴

Mugabe Takes Over

The Lusaka 'Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity' and the whole détente exercise had been constructed on two assumptions. The first was that Smith, under pressure from South Africa and confronted with the new realities in Mozambique, was now prepared to reach a settlement based on majority rule and independence; to the nationalists and African leaders, these principles were non-negotiable. The second assumption was that the unity forced on the nationalists could be sustained.

The Lusaka accord had done no more than paper over the yawning void between Smith and the nationalists. In a BBC interview of 16 December 1974 Smith observed: 'I believe in majority rule with, of course, the qualification of a qualified franchise, not just a counting of heads like a counting of sheep.' He went on to say that he believed his earlier comment that there would not be black rule in his lifetime was 'fair comment'. He added: 'I stand by that. I believe that we shall see Rhodesia governed by all the people of Rhodesia, black and white. If we ever get to the stage of having black rule, then I think our policy would have failed. I would be sad if there was white rule one day and black rule the next. I would do what I could to avoid that.'¹

In his New Year message Smith promised white Rhodesians that there would be 'no dramatic changes' in the country. A fortnight later he declared it was not, and had never been, the government's policy to hand the country over to black majority rule. Rhodesia's philosophy, he said, was one of preserving 'that Christian civilisation which our forefathers brought with them when they pioneered this country and settled here for all time'.² With no apparent common ground between

Smith and the nationalists the chances of a constitutional conference succeeding, or even taking place, looked very remote. On 9 January the Minister of Justice and of Law and Order, Lardner-Burke, announced that no more political detainees would be released because of continued fighting in the north-east. The next day he banned a football match, where many of the detainees who had already been released were to have been guests of honour. 'The government's political moves towards a conference look nothing else but a *danse macabre* performed for the benefit of Rhodesia's one hesitant ally, South Africa,' wrote James MacManus, the *Guardian* correspondent in Salisbury.³

While the nationalists were demanding 'immediate' majority rule, in fact they were more flexible than that word implied. In an interview with *The Times* on 22 January, Sithole said that if Smith was willing to think of majority rule in three to five years time that would put a different complexion on the settlement negotiations.⁴ South Africa and Zambia had in fact put forward a plan which included a common roll based on a qualified franchise: the franchise was seven years' primary education plus one further year of education. At that point there were 7,319 Africans on the electoral roll and 84,490 whites; the new franchise would add an estimated 70,000 to 90,000 Africans to the electoral roll, making majority rule possible in five years, after the life of one transitional parliament.⁵ Men like Sithole and Mugabe, seen by the Rhodesians as the most militant of the nationalists, were apparently prepared to consider a transition of that length in early 1975. The Rhodesian National Party, a right wing extremist group led by Len Idensohn, was horrified by any suggestion of change: 'How many more Christmases will we be able to spend in Rhodesia? How would a Spinola-Mozambique sell-out affect you?', an RNP advertisement in a local paper asked.⁶ Later in the year, after Smith had told an American news agency that Rhodesia could one day have a black prime minister, the Rhodesian Front chairman, Des Frost, demanded an explanation, saying the remark had shocked the party and damaged Rhodesia's image.⁷

The dispute over what had been agreed in Lusaka further undermined the chances of progress. The nationalists insisted that Smith had accepted an eight-point agreement and had only met part of one clause by releasing some of the political prisoners. Smith denied there had been any such agreement, but then appeared to contradict this statement by saying that what had been agreed was conditional on an effective ceasefire. The nationalists denied there had been any such

condition, adding they were not prepared to attend a constitutional conference until Smith met his side of the bargain. With nothing in writing to prove who was right and who was wrong the debate became a semantic struggle over an undocumented agreement. Two brief meetings finally occurred between Smith and the nationalists early in February, but on 4 March Smith ordered the arrest of Sithole. Initially he was charged with plotting the assassination of other nationalist leaders, including Muzorewa, Nkomo and Dr Elliot Gabellah, the ANC Vice-President. Muzorewa immediately announced that there would be no more talks until Sithole was released. On 2 April the first charge was dropped and instead Sithole was charged with being head of ZANLA, which was carrying out acts of 'terrorism'. Two days later Smith, under pressure from South Africa, the nationalists and front-line states, announced that Sithole was to be released to attend an extraordinary meeting of OAU foreign ministers in Dar es Salaam.

The nationalists insisted that a constitutional conference had to be convened and chaired by Britain, as the colonial power, and held outside Rhodesia. Smith refused, saying it was a matter between Rhodesians and must be held in Rhodesia. Callaghan's political adviser, Tom McNally, was sent to Lusaka in December 1974 to try to find out just how far détente had gone. From Chona he discovered that there was very little in writing, although the Zambian believed there was considerable understanding about what would and would not happen. Chona also told him about the qualified franchise plan which, it was envisaged, would lead to a majority rule election in 1980 or 1981. In McNally's view, 'The Zambians—and the South Africans—were a bit naïve in their dealings with Smith and the understandings of what would happen were so far apart.'⁸

Callaghan followed this up at the end of the year by flying to Africa to hold talks with Kaunda, Nyerere, Sir Seretse and Vorster. The clear message he received was that Britain should stay out of the initiative at the moment. Later, if things went wrong, it might be necessary for Britain to become involved. Nyerere's line was that Britain should call a constitutional conference but, as had been the case in Tanganyika's pre-independence election, it was not necessary for the first election to be on the basis of one man one vote. Vorster stressed it was necessary to agree on a constitution first, and Britain should not lay stress on majority rule. Everyone would know that this was what the new constitution meant. Throughout 1974 and up until late August 1975 the initiative was almost entirely in the hands of the

Zambians and South Africans. 'There was a good deal of confidence that the Africans and South Africans could pull it off. I think Vorster was genuine that he wanted majority rule but he counted without Smith,' McNally said.⁹

The killing of six South African policemen soon after the Lusaka agreement, the death of another a few days later, and the wounding of five more, infuriated Vorster, but he kept up the pressure on Smith to convene a conference. Vorster confined his paramilitary police to their base camps in Rhodesia, and by early August 1975 they had all been withdrawn from the country, despite earlier statements that this would not occur until a ceasefire had been effected. In late May, Smith and the ANC met for the first time since Sithole's arrest in early March, and on 26 June Smith said in an interview that he was willing to consider Victoria Falls as the venue for a conference.¹⁰

After months of haggling, and without prior consultation with the nationalists or other front-line states, Vorster, Smith and Chona signed an agreement in Pretoria on 9 August. This laid down that Smith and the ANC would hold a formal conference without preconditions on the Victoria Falls bridge, not later than 25 August, in railway coaches supplied by South Africa. To add to the bizarreness of the meeting South Africa supplied what was known as the 'white train'. The Pretoria agreement said the object of the meeting was to give both parties the opportunity to 'publicly express their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement'. Thereafter the conference would adjourn into committees within Rhodesia. Once agreement was reached, a formal conference would be held. Chona declined to sign a second section saying, 'It stands to reason if we want it to succeed there must be no infiltration of terrorists.' Finally Smith gave an undertaking that there would be no new detentions while the committee stage was in progress.¹¹

The conference was a farce from the outset. Muzorewa was not equipped to deal with Smith, and the Rhodesian had to lend him a copy of the Pretoria agreement because the nationalist delegation had neglected to bring one to the meeting. A bar aboard the conference train proved a mistake, and two members of the ANC delegation drank too much and became loud and disputatious. Smith had said that as far as he was concerned the conference would last only thirty minutes, but it dragged on throughout the day, finally collapsing when Smith refused to give immunity to members of the ANC, like Sithole and Chikerema, who could face prosecution if they entered

Rhodesia during the committee negotiations. For Vorster, however, the conference achieved two things: firstly it greatly enhanced his international standing and secondly, amidst a spate of publicity, he finally got his meeting with Kaunda. Members of Kaunda's ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) held aloft official posters as the South African Prime Minister drove to a hotel on the Zambian side of the river. One, which even Vorster must have found incredible, greeted the man dedicated to apartheid with the words 'Vorster becomes great today'. A Mozambique minister, Oscar Monteiro, who had not been told Vorster was coming, was furious when he was propelled forward to shake hands with the South African leader. Vorster and Kaunda told each other jokes, the South African said grace in Afrikaans at lunch, and Kaunda made his first visit to Rhodesia for over a decade to have tea with Vorster, but despite all the publicity and ballyhoo Smith and the nationalists remained poles apart. The attempt to force the unwilling together to achieve the impossible had failed.

In the wake of the collapse of the Victoria Falls conference Smith said he would talk to the Chiefs instead, and the ANC's frail unity collapsed. Nkomo flew home to Rhodesia, allegedly to see his sick wife, and after a series of denunciations and counter-denunciations Muzorewa, who was in Lusaka, ill-advisedly expelled Nkomo from the ANC on 11 September. Nkomo countered by convening what he described as an ANC congress on 28 September at a Salisbury football stadium, where he contrived to have himself elected as ANC president. Forgotten were his words on 4 March: 'I am not a contender for the ANC leadership.'¹² The African states now found themselves confronted with both an internal and an external ANC, with the guerrilla war virtually at a standstill, and with the possibility of a constitutional settlement as remote as ever. In addition they were confronted with guerrillas who had insisted at the outset that the war had not gone far enough to make Smith negotiate seriously, and who now wanted to resume fighting.

The guerrillas watched with growing dismay the power struggle taking place within the ANC. Chikerema and Nyandoro, as the leaders of the least consequential movement, FROLIZI, gained considerable influence over Muzorewa, who was out of his depth amidst the nationalist infighting. Sithole, although reinstated, remained uncertain of his position and sought comfort among men who were discredited with the guerrillas. Nkomo, his disclaimers notwithstanding, remained determined to take control. Smith's insistence that he

would not give way to black rule only served to convince the guerrillas of what they had believed throughout, that armed struggle was the only way to majority rule and independence.

The breaking point between Sithole and the ZANLA guerrillas followed the decision in Dar es Salaam on 8 July by the ANC executive to establish the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC) and to send Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema to visit the guerrilla camps. The ZLC was supposedly the external wing of the ANC, but in reality it was an attempt by Sithole and Chikerema to gain control over the ZANLA guerrillas; these numbered about 6,000 at this point, their ranks in Mozambique having been greatly increased by the influx of young people following the clandestine recruitment drive being carried out at home by ZANU's released leaders and in anticipation of Mozambique independence. The composition of the ZLC was to doom it to failure from the outset.¹³ The four movements who had been party to the Lusaka agreement seven months earlier all appointed representatives to the ZLC. As two of his nominees Sithole chose Mukono, who had been replaced by Tongogara as Secretary of Defence at the September 1973 DARE biennial review conference, and Simpson Mutambanengwe, who had lost his place on the DARE as political commissar at the same meeting. To make matters worse, Mukono had been suspended from the DARE by Chitepo, following the Nhari uprising.

Chikerema in particular was involved in considerable gerrymandering in the creation of the ZLC, which was chaired by Sithole, with Moyo as vice-chairman and Chikerema as secretary. Tensions between Chikerema and Moyo were intense and when the six committees of the ZLC were set up, in the absence of the ZAPU members, none of them was chaired by ZAPU. Mukono became the chairman of the committee for military affairs and Mutambanengwe chairman of the committee for diplomatic and international labour relations. By making Mukono head of the military committee Sithole was in fact overturning the decision of the previous September which made Tongogara Secretary of Defence—a decision which the guerrillas had considered to be a considerable triumph, bringing a soldier on to the DARE for the first time and thereby recognizing the importance of ZANLA. Furthermore, by putting Mukono and Mutambanengwe on the ZLC at all, Sithole was seen to be reversing the decision of Chitepo and taking sides in the internal crisis which had rocked ZANU.¹⁴

A number of the guerrilla commanders, including Machingura,

Gwauya, Hondo, Peter Murambo (who crossed to Sithole) and Saul Sadza, were summoned to Lusaka by Sithole. At this point they still recognized Sithole as the leader of ZANU and the commander-in-chief of ZANLA, but their loyalties were torn by Sithole's ZLC appointments, as they recognized Tongogara as their commander and not Mukono. They told Sithole that they would not work with Mukono but that they would work with the ZLC if he appointed people to it who were not discredited and who the guerrillas recognized as their leaders. Sithole appears to have been misled into believing that Mukono had considerable support in the camps in Tanzania and Mozambique, and at Mboroma in Zambia where over 1,000 members of ZANLA were detained. At first he took the line that he was the commander-in-chief and they must obey his orders and work with his appointees; later he agreed that he would consider what they had had to say. The commanders were confused about what they should do, so they went to Mubako's house in Lusaka's Kabulonga suburb; there they met Mubako and Dr Joseph Taderera, who told them that Sithole had turned against Tongogara and other detained leaders, and that they suspected Sithole intended to give evidence to the Chitepo commission of inquiry against the detained leaders.¹⁵

The situation at Mboroma was a further source of aggravation. Guerrillas from ZANLA, ZIPRA and FROLIZI were all detained there, with the ZANLA guerrillas staying separately from the other two smaller groups. The distribution of food was controlled by FROLIZI, and the ZANLA forces believed that they were being deprived of their fair share and that this was the reason for the malnutrition and kwashiorkor which existed. Sithole did not visit them until August, when they had been detained for five months, and they asked him for money to buy food and other essentials. Money had been received from a number of ZANU's supporters overseas, and Sithole promised he would send them about £2,000 and change some Rhodesian dollars and Mozambique *escudos* they had into Zambian currency; but no money arrived at Mboroma or at the guerrilla camps in Tanzania and Mozambique. The ZANLA commanders who had come to Lusaka considered that they were being neglected and decided that a group of them should go to see Tongogara at Mpima prison in Kabwe to the north of Lusaka, where he was detained.¹⁶

On 11 September, Tongogara's wife, Kumbirai, accompanied four of the young commanders—Machingura, Sadza, James Nyikadzinashu

and Parker Chipovera—to Mpima prison, where they pretended to be relatives of detainees. The commanders split up, each seeing a separate leader—Tongogara, Kangai, Gumbo and Chigowe. Mubako, who had returned from the United States in August and who acted as a link man on a number of occasions between the detainees and the party, using the cover he had as a lawyer, said: 'They pledged their loyalty saying that they remained loyal and all the camps remained loyal to the detained leaders, to the whole high command and DARE, but they had trouble with the commander-in-chief [Sithole], that since he had come out of detention he seemed to be confusing the situation. They discussed the whole problem of leadership, of Sithole's problem, that Sithole had sided with the rebels, and he seems to be undoing everything Chitepo has done. The people in prison were already aware of this. We had been telling them what was happening. The people in detention in fact knew more about this than the commanders who came.'¹⁷

One of the detained leaders, Kangai, said they knew in advance about the visit by the commanders and they had prepared a document on the necessity of a united front in the Zimbabwe struggle. A written document containing the leaders' ideas on unity was handed to the commanders. Unknown to the ZANLA commanders, their leaders at Mpima had already had meetings at the prison with Jason Moyo to discuss military unity.¹⁸ The timing of this unity move and the creation of the Joint Military Command in 1972 needs some explanation. The JMC had been formed after the FROLIZI split and although part of the reason was to take pressure—emanating from the OAU—off ZANU and ZAPU, there was a second important reason for creating the JMC: FROLIZI was claiming, erroneously, to be a product of unity between ZANU and ZAPU and in some African states this claim was gaining credence. By creating the JMC and displaying a measure of unity, ZANU and ZAPU sought to and succeeded in undermining FROLIZI's claims. Similarly in 1975, with the ANC claiming to be the umbrella of unity for all the nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU once again needed a display of military unity if they were to politically survive in their own right.

One further important discussion had been taking place among the detained leaders. As a result of the information reaching them, 'all of us agreed that Sithole has to go,' Kangai said.¹⁹ The DARE consisted of eight members, and the voting procedure was that once four votes were received by the chairman on a given resolution it was automatically taken to have been passed or defeated, and the decision

became binding on all members. With the deaths of Chitepo and Mataure, and the suspension of Mukono, the DARE had been reduced to five members, and four of them—Tongogara, Mudzi, Kangai and Gumbo—were detained together at Mpima. They decided unanimously that Sithole must be removed. As the DARE was only an external committee to prosecute the war, appointed by members of the central committee detained in Rhodesia—and as, of the four at Mpima, only Hamadziripi was on the central committee at that time—it is arguable how constitutional their action was. However, they had sounded out branch officials in Zambia and found considerable support for their views. The decision was passed on to the four young commanders at Mpima who, despite some reservations, agreed to take the decision to the guerrillas in the camps, as well as the document on the need for military unity.

Kangai subsequently admitted that they were taking a considerable political chance by doing this from prison, where they would be in no position to defend their decision and explain their case if things went wrong. 'We took the risk of being denounced by the fighters because we didn't know what they were thinking, whether they were aware of the kind of things Sithole was doing, but we said whatever action might be taken against us we can accept because it is our revolutionary duty to guide these people. We just told them [the commanders] that this is it. Then the word went out and I was told later that when the unity document we wrote got to Mgagao it was more or less like a bible. They broke into small groups, studied that document and then after that when this issue of Sithole came up there was a lot of discussion.'²⁰ The position of the detained leaders had been strengthened, however, by an incident which had occurred at Mboroma on 11 September, when Zambian troops opened fire, killing eleven ZANLA guerrillas and wounding thirteen others. The Zambian version of the incident was that the guerrillas had speared to death a Zambian officer and his men had then opened fire.²¹ The account of members of ZANLA who were present was quite different. They said that some of their women comrades who had gone to collect rations from the ZAPU-FROLIZI camp had been held there; a group had gone to secure their release and an altercation developed during which the Zambian troops opened fire, killing their own officer in crossfire.²² This incident caused further hostility between Zambia and the guerrillas. When Sithole failed to challenge the Zambian account of the incident and, instead of visiting the wounded, flew to America to see his indisposed daughter, the guerrillas' anger moved against him.

The final result of the secret contacts at Mpima prison was one of the most important documents of the liberation struggle—the Mgagao Declaration, signed by forty-three of the camp officers.²³ It began by expressing their gratitude to the OAU Liberation Committee, the Tanzanian government and FRELIMO, and saying they wished to make their 'standpoint unequivocally clear to you in the interest of the liberation of Zimbabwe'. Events and facts had shown that armed struggle was the only way to liberate their country: 'We therefore strongly, unreservedly, categorically and totally condemn any moves to continue talks with the Smith regime in whatever form. We the freedom fighters will do the fighting and nobody under heaven has the power to deny us the right to die for our country.' They affirmed their support for the Lusaka Declaration of Unity but added, 'to us unity is not an end in itself but a means to an end. Unity is not a magic formula to liberation but is one of the weapons in the struggle for liberation. For unity to be meaningful in the Zimbabwe revolution it should be based on an arduous and relentless armed struggle because any other course of action would make this same unity inimical to the liberation of Zimbabwe.'

The guerrillas then went on to attack all the ANC leaders: 'We strongly condemn and completely dissociate ourselves from the Nkomo faction of the ANC. The move taken by Nkomo in building his congress in Salisbury is clearly reactionary and divisive in the eyes of all revolutionaries and progressives of the world. It is a manifestation of various schemes worked out in the political laboratories of Salisbury and Pretoria aimed at depriving the Zimbabwe people of their right to independence based on majority rule, on one man one vote.' Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema had 'proved to be completely hopeless and ineffective as leaders of the Zimbabwe revolution'. The commanders went on to accuse them of hampering the struggle and of not having the interests of the revolution at heart. They listed eight specific complaints against Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema, and concluded: 'In our opinion the three leaders are incapable of leading the ANC.'

Sithole was singled out for the harshest criticism. This began with the vexed question of the appointments of Mukono and Mutambanengwe to the ZLC: 'We will therefore not be part and parcel of whatsoever is done by the ZLC as currently constituted. We do, however, accept the ZLC in principle provided the necessary rectifications and restructuring are made.' Six further complaints were listed against Sithole, ranging from his attitude towards the

detainees to his failure to get money to their families to help feed them. The Zambian government was also strongly condemned over the Mboroma shootings: 'Clearly and beyond any doubt the Zambian action has generated hostilities between itself and the Zimbabwe freedom fighters. It is for this reason that we seek for co-operation of the OAU Liberation Committee, the Tanzanian Government and the Mozambique Government, in ensuring the evacuation of our Comrades in Zambia into a safer territory. We consider Zambia to be a hostile enemy territory. After having shot the leading cadres including girl cadres of our fellow fighters at Mboroma it will be ridiculous and stupid of anyone to expect co-operation between our fighters and the Zambian Government. The earlier they get out of Zambia the better.'

Finally, the commanders appealed to the Liberation Committee and the Tanzanian and Mozambique governments to allow them to resume the war. They asked for transit for their trained guerrillas, for the consignment of arms and ammunition which had come from China to be given to them, and for training facilities for the thousands of recruits who had poured into Mozambique. 'We have at present sixty military instructors without any work at all because of the current situation. You can either allow our fighters to undergo military training in Mozambique or here in Tanzania so long as they are out of Zambia or not in Zambia.' If the OAU, Tanzania and Mozambique felt unable to support the armed struggle in Zimbabwe, 'we shall kindly request to be deported back to Zimbabwe where we shall start from throwing stones. The fighting skill is already here, the weapons we shall get from the enemy, and food we shall get from our masses of the people who have always supported our armed struggle. We just cannot afford to stand and stare at the Smith regime and allied forces of reaction whittling away every ounce of rights of the people of Zimbabwe. If we cannot live as free men, we rather choose to die as FREE MEN.'

This document marked the end of Sithole's chance of reasserting himself as leader of the ZANLA forces. Although Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema were to claim that Tanzania—and in particular the Tanzanian Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee, Colonel Hashim Mbita—was responsible for turning the guerrillas against them and denying them access to the camps, the truth was that the movement against them had arisen out of their own fundamental mistakes, had begun to take shape at the Mpima meeting and had culminated in the Mgagao document which was circulated to the other ZANLA camps and accepted. Had Sithole not been seen to side

against the detained high Command and DARE members, had he not appointed discredited politicians to the ZLC, and had he taken a position in support of the guerrillas over the Mboroma killings, he might have survived as leader of Zimbabwe's main liberation movement.

During the Mpima meeting in September the detained leaders had told the four commanders that the next man in the ZANU political hierarchy, Robert Mugabe, the party Secretary-General, should take over as leader, pending confirmation by a congress. The commanders did not go that far in the Mgagao Declaration but they did say: 'An executive member who has been outstanding is Robert Mugabe. He has demonstrated this by defying the rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique. Since we respect him most, in all our dealings with the ANC leadership, he is the only person who can act as a middleman. We will not accept any direct discussions with any of the three leading members of the ANC we have described above. We can only talk through Robert Mugabe to them.' Thus the Mgagao Declaration not only marked Sithole's demise but also the beginning of Mugabe's emergence as leader of ZANU.

Mugabe was born on 21 February 1924 in the 'Christian village' at Kutama mission run by Jesuit Fathers in the Sinoia district north-west of Salisbury.²⁴ The village was reserved for people who had been baptized and he was christened Robert Gabriel. His early life was traditional, tending his grandfather's cattle in a nearby forest, fishing and 'boxing quite often' with other boys, an activity which today seems strangely out of place for this rather gentle, mild-mannered man. He received six years' primary education at Kutama and two years' teacher-training before becoming a Standard 2 teacher. In those days few African children were fortunate enough to get education to that level, and Mugabe spent his spare time studying. He was to obtain six university degrees, three of them, a Master's and Bachelor's in Law and a Bachelor's in Public Administration, during eleven years in prison and under detention. His father was a mission-trained carpenter and his mother thought 'I was going to join the priestly vocation.' He first taught at Kutama, earning £2.25 a month, from which he had to find his own food and accommodation. He changed teaching posts frequently in those early days, looking for better wages, and once, after Garfield Todd deducted 60 pence from his monthly salary of £3 to cover the fees of a student whose parents had not paid, Mugabe threatened to 'box' Todd. 'I raised quite a hell of a row,' he




1 Jubilant ZANLA guerrillas and villagers as they hear the election result.
Photo: Neil Libbert

2 ZANU supporters celebrate in Salisbury. *Photo: Neil Libbert*





3 A ZANLA supporter holds their symbol, the cock, aloft. *Photo: Neil Libbert*




4 Power to the people. *Photo: Neil Libbert*

5 *opposite*: Robert Mugabe greets supporters. *Photo: Associated Press*





6-7 ZANLA guerrillas on their way to rendezvous points after the cease-fire.
Photo: Neil Libbert



8 The bullet-riddled windows of Altena Farm which was the first target attacked by ZANLA forces on 21 December 1972 at the start of the decisive phase of the war

9 The vehicle buried by guerrillas after they captured Gerald Hawksworth, the first white prisoner taken during the war, in January 1973





10 *opposite*: Zimbabwean victims of a Rhodesian massacre in Mozambique.
Photo: Jill Sheppard

11 *above*: Captured suspected guerrillas being forced to do press-ups at gun-point by a Rhodesian soldier. *Photo: R. Baughman*

12 *below*: A Rhodesian soldier, his face contorted, swings an African child by the arm





13 *above:* Josiah Tongogara in happy mood at Lancaster House. *Photo: Neil Libbert*

14 *opposite above:* Rex Nhongo, ZANLA's Chief of Operations, who became acting Commander after Tongogara's death

15 *opposite below:* Tongogara with ZANLA's Political Commissar, Josiah Tungamirai








16 Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, co-leaders of the Patriotic Front, intensely scrutinize a paper during the Lancaster House conference. *Photo: Francis Dias*

17 *below left*: The Revd Canaan Banana, Zimbabwe's first President. *Photo: CAPA – Camera Press*

18 *below right*: Herbert Chitepo, Chairman of ZANU, who was assassinated in March 1975. *Photo: William Raynor*




19, 20, 21 Presidents Machel (*above left*), Nyerere (*below left*) and Kaunda (*below right*), the three most important front-line leaders during the Zimbabwean struggle. *Photo: 19 – Camera Press, 20 – Marion Kaplan, 21 – Francis Diaf*





22 Ian Smith is comforted by his Deputy, David Smith, following his emotional farewell address at the closing of Rhodesia's last white-dominated parliament. *Photo: Associated Press Ltd.*



23 Rhodesia in a state of siege: a roadside notice warns motorists just outside Salisbury not to travel on the Mazoe road after 3 pm because of the danger of guerrilla attacks



24 A white woman on a Salisbury street carries a submachine-gun instead of the usual handbag. *Photo: Haugar Shour*




25 Rhodesian Military Commander General Peter Walls laying a wreath at the foot of the bronze effigy of Cecil Rhodes, which was removed soon after Independence.
Photo: CAPA – Camera Press



27 James Chikerema, an early hero of the Nationalist struggle and (28 right) the Revd Ndabaningi Sithole, who joined the Internal Settlement. *Photo 27: CAPA – Camera Press*

29 American Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, and British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, look pensive as they flank Bishop Abel Muzorewa in a Salisbury garden. *Photo: Neil Libbert*




26 South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, to whom Britain, America and Kaunda looked to pressurize Smith into submission.
Photo: CAPA – Camera Press





30 British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, who hammered out an agreement at the Lancaster House conference, and (31) Lord Soames, who as Britain's Governor had the difficult task of implementing it. *Photo 31: Van Parys*



MUGABE TAKES OVER

recalled years later. In 1950 he went to Fort Hare University College in South Africa, where he obtained his first degree and his political baptism. He came into contact with the youth wing of the ANC of South Africa, read Marxist literature and talked with South African communists; but, he said, the most important political influence on his life at that point was Mahatma Gandhi, whose 'passive resistance' campaign in India fired the imagination of many young nationalists.

He returned to Rhodesia, befriending a fellow teacher, the late Takawira, who had considerable influence over many of his colleagues in those days. 'I felt that I was a revolutionary, militant, and so on,' Mugabe said later of that period. In fact his earliest attempt at politics in Rhodesia ended in frustration because he found the nationalist leadership too conservative. He moved to Northern Rhodesia, coming into contact with men like Harry Nkumbula and Kaunda, who was then known as 'the black mamba' by some whites. Four years later, after Ghana's independence, he took a teaching post there, and became exposed to the heady influence of the late Kwame Nkrumah. In May 1960 he went home, joined the NDP, and was a popular speaker in Salisbury's Highfield township, where he talked about what he had seen in Ghana and what independence meant. In October that year he chaired the NDP congress and was elected Information and Publicity Secretary. In 1961 the NDP was banned and the leadership formed ZAPU. Within a year ZAPU was also banned, and early in 1963 Mugabe and some of his colleagues decided 'that we would establish an underground movement which would train an army and start the armed struggle'. That was the year Mugabe was charged with 'sedition and subversive statements' after he described the Rhodesian Front as a 'bunch of cowboys', and his Ghanaian-born wife, Sally, was charged with bringing the Queen's name into 'dis-esteem' for saying she was doing nothing to help the Africans. While they were both out on bail Nkomo summoned his colleagues to Dar es Salaam in an abortive bid to form a government-in-exile; Mugabe and his wife were forced to jump bail and they made their way through Botswana to Tanzania. He returned home from Dar es Salaam in December 1963 and was imprisoned for four months for breaking bail. Sally was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment on her charge.

That journey to Dar es Salaam was the breaking point with Nkomo for Mugabe and many other nationalists, and Mugabe became a main force in the formation of ZANU at Nkala's house in Highfield on 8 August 1963. Shortly before that meeting he had returned to Ghana, persuading Nkrumah's government to train fifty guerrillas and supply

tickets for them to get to Ghana. A year after ZANU's creation it too was banned and Mugabe began a decade in detention where, in addition to the three degrees he took, he taught other detainees and with his colleagues laid the groundwork for the war.

The détente exercise brought his release in December 1974, but Mugabe and his colleagues remained convinced that the war had not progressed far enough to force Smith to give way to majority rule. In Lusaka, during the meeting which agreed on the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity, ZANU's paroled central committee and members of the DARE met secretly and decided that, irrespective of the view of the African presidents, it was necessary to escalate the war. The joint meeting decided that the six members of the central committee must go home, get their release orders which had been promised, and immediately begin recruiting. 'So we went back. Our primary task was to recruit. As I have often put it, to preach nothing else but war,' Tekere said.²⁵ None of them believed that a peaceful transition was possible and they were reluctant brides in the ANC marriage.

Edgar Ziganai Tekere was born near Rusape in April 1937, the son of a teacher who later became an Anglican priest. The second son, he became known as 'Two-boy', a nickname that stuck with him to adulthood. During secondary school at St Augustine's, a mission school near Umtali, he joined the City Youth League, run by Chikerema and Nyandoro 'from a little office in Salisbury'. Political debate was encouraged at St Augustine's and the government threatened to close it several times 'as a communist school because the principal allowed us to debate very controversial issues. We talked freely against the government, the way the country was being run.' Detained briefly in 1959 as a member of the old ANC, he joined ZANU at its inception and was elected Deputy Secretary for Youth and Culture at the Gwelo congress in 1964. Soon thereafter he was detained for recruiting people to go for military training. He remained in detention for the next ten years, and, like his colleagues, on his release in 1974 went straight back into the countryside addressing meetings.

Each of the leaders was assigned an area of the country for recruitment. Mugabe was given Salisbury and Mashonaland North, Tekere the Midlands and Southern Province, Nkala was given Matabeleland, Malinga took Manicaland and Sithole had a roving brief. Nyagumbo was the supervisor of the recruiting programme. At New Sarum, the Rhodesian Air Force base near Salisbury, the six men were handed their release orders and a white member of SB drove Tekere to his

parents' home in Highfield. 'My mother and my father were not at home, so I just threw down my bag, picked up a few shirts and trousers I wanted. One of my brother's wife was there. I greeted her, patted her on the back . . . my shirts under my arm, and off.'²⁶ That same night Tekere was addressing a meeting of about thirty people in Que Que, over 200 kilometres south of Salisbury. He travelled with Nkala who went straight on to Bulawayo, while Mugabe stayed in Salisbury and Nyagumbo went to address a meeting in Rusape on the way to the eastern border town of Umtali.

'What we were preaching quickly spread to the schools, and caught on very well, especially when you take into account that our meetings were not mass meetings, but small house-to-house meetings. The schools got affected because what we said in these small meetings spread very quickly.' As many as three meetings could be addressed in one night, all in private houses and usually with audiences of twenty to thirty people. They explained 'the events that happened in Lusaka, the Lusaka talks leading up to the signing of the so-called unity agreement, telling them bluntly that that thing was meaningless, ZANU was still at war, forget all that talk about a ceasefire. They must not be lulled by all this talk of negotiation. Our job is to replenish the war effort. You go out and join the fighters. They will show you how to shoot guns and they will show you where to find guns, arm you, come back and fight.'²⁷ They found that the people had been confused by the events in Lusaka and were relieved by the explanation they were given.

The trickle of recruits of earlier years turned into a flood. On 25 July the Rhodesian government announced a curfew from dusk to dawn along a one-kilometre-wide strip stretching 400 kilometres along the Mozambique border, which encompassed twenty-three mission schools. Rhodesian radio said the decision followed several hundred children absconding from schools near the border, 'presumably to train as terrorists'.²⁸ On 6 August a similar curfew was announced covering a 4.8-kilometre-wide strip along 640 kilometres of the Botswana border. The Rhodesians could not possibly hope to patrol such a large area and, in September and October 1975, recruits were crossing into Mozambique at the rate of 1,000 a week.²⁹

Among those who crossed the border to Mozambique were Mugabe and Tekere. Sithole had been re-arrested on 4 March, Chitepo assassinated on 18 March, and most of the ZANU political and military leadership in Zambia detained after his funeral. The only member of the DARE briefly at liberty was Tongogara, and the only established

member of the high command to escape the Zambian net was Nhongo, who had gone to Tanzania. On the afternoon of 25 March, the members of ZANU's central committee at liberty in Rhodesia held an emergency meeting in the Mushandira Pamwe (Shona for 'co-operation') Hotel in Salisbury's Highfield township.³⁰ Mugabe was in the chair and the others present included Nkala, Muzenda, Malianga, Nyagumbo (who would be arrested a few days later), Tekere, Mandizvidza and Dr Edson Sithole (who subsequently disappeared and is presumed to have been arrested and killed by the Rhodesians).

'The paramount consideration was, what are we going to do to save the war? The external leadership that had managed things had been locked up. Herbert was dead. And it was quite clear if the fighting forces were left leaderless numerous problems were going to arise. Unless we acted quickly the war was going to collapse.' The central committee decided to send two members, Mugabe and Tekere, out of the country immediately to give leadership to ZANU's external followers. An extraordinary meeting of the OAU foreign ministers was scheduled for Dar es Salaam at the beginning of April, and Mugabe and Tekere were to cross the border into Mozambique and if possible make their way to Dar es Salaam for the meeting. They were sent as ZANU, not ANC, officials; as Tanzania had by then formally banned ZANU and ZAPU, it is questionable what reception they would have received had they reached Dar es Salaam. China, they judged, was a secure ZANU friend, but among the African states, Mugabe and Tekere needed to study attitudes 'and then choose the timing to announce that ZANU was once again on its own'.

'Another task we were given,' Tekere said, 'was to get into Mozambique, make contact with the fighters in the bases, assist them as much as we could and get them to fight on. This meant examining the supplies situation and trying to do something about it, and also making contact with thousands of recruits we had been sending out from home, looking into their conditions and making sure they were well integrated with the veterans. That was the major task.' Nyagumbo, who spent a total of twenty years and eight months in Smith's prisons—the longest period by any nationalist—was detained again while Mugabe and Tekere were preparing to go, and as a result the two went underground. A Roman Catholic nun, Sister Mary Aquina, helped them to get to Inyanga in the Eastern Highlands, where Chief Tangwena hid them and, despite his considerable age, guided them across the border. Tangwena himself was a national

symbol of the struggle for land, having stubbornly resisted all government attempts, some of them violent, to move his people from their ancestral home, which had been designated a 'white farming area'. When they resisted efforts to move them, their huts were burned, cattle confiscated and crops destroyed; Tangwena and some 600 of his followers fled into the nearby mountains, preferring to be fugitives on the land that had been their home for centuries rather than to leave it.³¹ He guided Mugabe and Tekere through familiar terrain and left them in a village just across the border in Mozambique while he went ahead to make contact with FRELIMO. The old chief, a man of enormous dignity and conviction, said Mugabe and Tekere had come on "'Business, war business". He was very, very, very intense about this.³² His standard argument was "You want our country to be free? Then you cannot afford to delay these leaders, you must let them through so they can fight for liberation of our country".'

Early on 5 April, soon after they reached Mozambique, they heard on the radio that Sithole had been released to attend the Dar es Salaam meeting; Tekere, who had led the group in prison which demanded Sithole's removal the previous year, insisted that Sithole would cause trouble. They were taken to a small FRELIMO camp which was near the border and then moved on to a larger camp which contained about 300 FRELIMO guerrillas and 155 of the recruits who had come from Rhodesia. This was during the latter part of the transition which preceded Mozambique's independence, and secrecy was important so that the Portuguese, who had for so long collaborated with the Rhodesians, would not tell the latter what was happening or about the arrival of Mugabe and Tekere. At a FRELIMO base named Seguranca, a word meaning 'security' or 'safety' which was given to many FRELIMO bases so that they could not be pinpointed by the enemy, some of the recruits recalled attending meetings addressed by the leaders, which had encouraged them to come out and join the guerrillas. Shortly before Mozambique independence on 25 June 1975 the FRELIMO soldiers, ZANLA recruits, Mugabe and Tekere were moved to a barracks (vacated by the withdrawing Portuguese forces) at Vila Gouveia, where they found other recruits. New recruits were arriving daily, and when they were moved on to another barracks at Vila Pery the recruits numbered between 1,500 and 1,700. Mugabe and Tekere spent their time politicizing the recruits, teaching them what the revolution was about, why Zimbabwe was at war and why they had to come to join the war. They taught them about the history

of their country, the formation of the Youth League and what had occurred thereafter. 'We recognized one fact, that ZANU had been banned way back in 1964 and now this was 1975. Many of these young men, when ZANU was banned, did not really appreciate what was going on. So they had a lot to make up, the fine details of the political history, our struggle. So we emphasized this a lot, explaining why only ZANU was active in the war.'³³

Their work among the recruits was cut short immediately after Mozambique's independence. Mugabe subsequently wrote in a letter: 'The Governor of Manica received word that Cde. Tekere and I were to leave the area of Manica, allegedly for security reasons, as it was felt Smith's agents frequented it. We were thus transferred to Quelimane. Now it appears that the reasons for our transfer were not those given us originally.'³⁴ He was correct. The two of them had initially worked with local officials and commanders of FRELIMO, but news of their presence had finally filtered back to the FRELIMO leadership, and they were far from happy to learn about the arrival of Mugabe and Tekere. Mugabe in particular was then viewed with great suspicion by FRELIMO's leadership, from Machel down, because of the confrontation in Lusaka the previous November, when Mugabe instead of Sithole had arrived in the Zambian capital to meet the African front-line leaders. The detailed reasons for Sithole's removal as ZANU leader in 1974 had not been given to the African leaders, and a senior Mozambique official later explained: 'We knew nothing about any mandates or anything they had. We just thought, here comes this guy again. A refugee? Mugabe? Eventually we said this man must not be in Chimoio [the new name for Vila Pery], he must be separated from everyone. If they had said they had a mandate from the executive, we would have said we've heard that story before. You are just creating trouble.'³⁵

Rumours were already circulating before Mugabe and Tekere were rusticated at Quelimane, north of Beira on the Indian Ocean, that they were either dead or detained. Tekere was in touch with a close friend in London, Didymus Mutasa, and also his wife, Ann, and had had word passed to his mother to say he was safe and well; but they had all been instructed not to give any details of their whereabouts or what they were doing. No other leaders were coming to visit the recruits or the trained guerrillas, and Mugabe's and Tekere's mission was to assert ZANU's political authority and philosophy over them. They did not want leaders from the ANC, ZAPU and FROLIZI coming to the camps to compete for their allegiance and cause confusion.³⁶ Some

news was reaching them through the radio and a few letters about what was happening outside but they knew nothing about the new contradictions between Sithole and the detained leaders.

One man who played a vital role in this period was Simon Muzenda, who later became ZANU Vice-President and, after independence in 1980, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Born in Gutu district in Victoria Province in October 1922, he trained as a carpenter in South Africa and in 1953 became Secretary-General of the British African National Voice Association led by Burombo. He held posts in the NDP and ZAPU and joined ZANU at the time of the 1963 split, becoming Deputy Organizing Secretary. On 13 May 1975, after the Lusaka Declaration of Unity, he was sent to Lusaka as the ANC's Deputy Organizing Secretary, but after the Muzorewa-Nkomo split he reverted to his real party, ZANU. Muzenda was to become the link man between the detainees and the outside world from September 1975, when he was able to get to see them at Mpima. He organized money for the defence of those who had been charged, got food and other essentials for their destitute dependants and, when the new crisis about Sithole's leadership occurred, was told by the detained leaders to go to Mozambique, make contact with Mugabe and brief him what had been happening and about the decision that he should take over the leadership.³⁷ Muzenda, and Mubako who tried to reach Mugabe by travelling through Rhodesia, were unable to get to him at Quelimane.

The breakthrough came in January 1976 when Mugabe was allowed to leave Mozambique to visit Britain. On 21 January Mugabe was interviewed by Robin White on the BBC African Service programme, 'Focus on Africa', which was listened to by the detainees at Mpima. He talked first about what he and Tekere had been doing in Mozambique, about the need to supervise and guide the recruits, to ensure they were well cared for and placed under the direction of ZANLA: 'We decided that our first responsibility was, in the circumstances, to the recruits.'³⁸ Asked about the Mgagao Declaration, described by White in his question as an act of 'mutiny', Mugabe said he appreciated the stand taken by the guerrillas:

I think the ANC external wing has not recognized its full responsibility. The freedom fighters in Mgagao and the freedom fighters in all the camps in Tanzania and Mozambique are ready for action. In order to undertake this action, they needed the guidance and

direction of the external wing of the ANC. This action wasn't forthcoming. They were left without food, left without clothing, left without medical supplies, and those in the front were not given arms and ammunition. And so the situation has developed to the extent that there was a belief in the camps that the ANC was bent on destroying the revolution rather than promoting it.

Asked what he wanted to occur, he said:

The main thing is really to build up an organ which is viable. Now, in my opinion, the entirety of the army is a ZANU army. The ANC external wing is predominantly a ZANU body and ZANU must of necessity command a dominant position in all the organs. There cannot be any unfolding of the revolution unless it takes into account that the main body is ZANU. The distribution of power between the various parties just now does not reflect the dominance of ZANU, and in fact the feelings expressed by the Mgagao comrades, and which have been echoed elsewhere, is mainly because these comrades do not see the continuation of the armed programme as originally launched by ZANU. In my opinion, the whole ZLC must be disbanded.

Mugabe's toughest remarks were reserved for Kaunda when he was asked about ZANU's criticism of the Zambian leader:

MUGABE: Well, I think President Kaunda has been the principal factor in slowing down our revolution. He has arrested our men, locked them up, and within his prisons and restriction areas there have been cases of poisoning, and there's also been murders.

WHITE: By who?

MUGABE: By his men. By Kaunda's army.

WHITE: You have proof of that, do you?

MUGABE: Yes, thirteen of our people were shot dead, cold bloodedly. And one cannot regard this as an act conforming to principles of humanism.

WHITE: Those are very strong charges. I mean a lot of people would say that nobody's done more for Rhodesian nationalists than President Kaunda. He has suffered more and Zambia has suffered more than any other country.

MUGABE: True, no one denies that in the past President Kaunda has done quite a lot for us. But that's no reason for negating his past is it?³⁹

Mugabe's outspoken condemnation of Kaunda, the ANC and ZLC, and his clear position on the need to resume the armed struggle, struck a responsive chord in the camps and among the detainees. On 24 January, Tongogara, Kangai and Gumbo wrote to him from Mpima congratulating him on the broadcast.⁴⁰ 'Despite thousands of miles and months of separation we still found ourselves operating on the same wavelength. Actually none could have presented our case better. We fully support everything you said and all our supporters here were tremendously inspired.' They went on to accuse Sithole of 'defection and capitulation', and informed Mugabe about their consultations in prison leading to their decision to remove Sithole:

On line with our party policy and party procedure, we decided that you as the number two man in the party would automatically take over the leadership of the party until the party congress was convened. We communicated this decision to the Comrades at Mgagao and they in turn made the famous Mgagao statement denouncing ANC-ZLC and calling upon you to lead the ANC. We also started an extensive campaign to inform all our members and organs of our decision and urged them to openly and publicly support the stand taken by the Comrades at Mgagao. The response of our party members and ordinary Zimbabweans has been overwhelming.

Because of lack of communication with you it was difficult for us to make a formal statement to the world of our decision until we got to know your stand. Now that we know your position we are in a position to make a formal declaration calling upon you to immediately take over the party leadership. . . . The burden and responsibility of leading our party and revolution now rests on YOU. Should we be released by our captors we shall be glad to join you in the field. Let us stress again that our decision to have you as our party leader was reached after exhaustive consultations and takes into account the views of most of the rank and file members of the party.

The three DARE leaders attached a 'Declaration formally pledging support to Comrade Robert Mugabe's leadership of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)' which was distributed to the guerrilla camps and party branches. This declaration said:

Our revolution is passing a highly critical period. The crisis coincides with the great crisis within our party (ZANU) which was

initially sparked off by the tragic and untimely murder of our dynamic chairman Comrade Herbert Chitepo on the 18th March 1975 by agents of imperialism and the enemies of the Zimbabwe revolution and the subsequent attempted decimation of the leadership of the party's external wing by the Zambian Government and later the defection and capitulation of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole to the dark reactionary forces in the African National Council (ANC). A gigantic task is therefore being presented to the responsible leaders of our party and failure to perform it will involve the danger of a complete collapse of our revolution. The situation is such that any further delay will be fatal. It is within the perspective that after much soul-searching and extensive consultations with all the external organs of the party (armed forces in the camps, branches, districts, and provincial councils in Zambia and abroad) DARE has come to the final and irrevocable conclusion that the only man who can serve our revolution by providing a viable leadership in our liberation movement is Robert Gabriel Mugabe. We members of DARE solemnly, publicly declare:

1. That Comrade Robert Mugabe is now the provisional leader of our party (ZANU) and our revolution pending the convening of a party Congress and we call upon all Zimbabweans and all progressive forces in the world to support the dynamic leadership of Comrade Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

2. That Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole ceases with immediate effect to be the party leader and spokesman.

3. That Comrade Mugabe from now onwards will be the party's spokesman in the ANC national united front and other forums.

4. That the statement by the Comrades at Mgagao, Tanzania, pledging their support to Comrade Mugabe's leadership was in full conformity with the party's revolutionary line.

5. That the unity of our people, the identity of their aims, the unity of their views and their disposition to unite in carrying out the struggle are the elements characterizing the common strategy that must be opposed to that which imperialism is developing on a continental scale in Africa.

6. That the principal objective of our revolution is the seizure of power by means of destruction of the racist political-military machine and its replacement by the people in arms in order to change the existing economic and social order.

7. That armed revolutionary struggle constitutes the fundamental and principal form of our revolution.

8. That all other forms of struggle must serve to advance and not to retard the development of this fundamental form of struggle.

9. That guerrilla warfare as a genuine expression of the people's armed struggle is the most adequate form of waging and developing revolutionary warfare in our country in particular and Southern Africa in general.

10. That the leadership of the revolution requires an organizing principle, the existence of a unified political and military command, in order to guarantee victory.

11. That our revolutionary struggle constitutes a decisive contribution to the historic struggle of Africa and humanity to liberate themselves from slavery and exploitation.⁴¹

Webster Gwauya, one of the commanders who had signed the Mgagao Declaration and whom Sithole had tried to win over to his side, personally delivered the letter to Mugabe in Mozambique. Mugabe did not reply until 4 April, and when he did he outlined why he and Tekere had been sent to Mozambique and he told the detained leaders that they had kept Sithole informed, '... although we never gave details of the work we were doing for fear information might reach our opponents somehow and our efforts would get thwarted before we had turned the camps into ZANU. We least suspected that he was in fact pursuing a counter-revolutionary line fraught with danger for the party. Our suspicion was only raised when it appeared that there was a determined bid to ignore us completely in taking decisions and measures affecting the party. . . . The ZANU march has been, and continues to be, long and arduous, and, like the historic long march of China, there will be many traitors.' Mugabe went on to quote the case of Chang Kuo-tao, Commander of the Fourth Front Army during the long march, who turned against his fellow leaders and was in turn rejected by his soldiers. With the firm support of ZANU's central committee members, the DARE and guerrillas, ZANU's long march—like China's—would succeed, Mugabe said.

Once again Mugabe's toughest attack was upon Kaunda, '... the man has chosen to make you his compulsory guests,' Mugabe wrote.⁴² The ZLC, he said, had 'no claim to any semblance of legality'. The ANC had failed to formulate a constitution spelling out its policies. 'Is this really a serious party to which we should surrender our army, the toil of thirteen years, and the only military pride of the masses of Zimbabwe? In any case, why should we suffer the greatest humiliation

of our time by being brought under the control of FROLIZI which we salvaged out of mercy by including it into the ANC even against the desire of the four Presidents?’

11

Enter ZIPA and Kissinger

On 17 January 1976, four days before Mugabe's BBC broadcast, a joint guerrilla force, called the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), resumed the war. The new army, which included cadres from ZANLA and ZIPRA, was led by an eighteen-member military committee, nine from each of the two guerrilla forces. The overall commander of ZIPA was Rex Nhongo, the most senior ZANLA guerrilla at liberty, and the second position of political commissar was filled by Alfred 'Nikita' Mangena, the commander of ZIPRA.

By late 1975 the détente exercise had brought the guerrilla war to a virtual standstill, as Smith had hoped it would, and the Rhodesians estimated that there were only three guerrilla groups with about ten men in each still active inside the country.¹ Guerrilla commanders say the figure was slightly higher but admit that, of a force of more than 400 early in the year, about half had been killed and most of the remainder had retreated to Mozambique.² 'We were not complacent,' a Rhodesian military intelligence officer said in a subsequent lecture, 'because we knew that there were still large numbers of trained and semi-trained ZANU terrorists outside Rhodesia.'³

Several hundred trained guerrillas and thousands of recruits were, in fact, effectively restricted in camps in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. They had watched the bickering among the political leaders with an increasingly jaundiced eye, and they viewed the failure to make any progress in negotiations as confirmation of their belief that détente had been a fraud aimed at halting the war. Sithole's fateful nominations to the ZLC, the meeting at Mpima prison with members of the DARE and the Mgagao Declaration with its emotional last

sentence—'If we cannot live as free men, we rather choose to die as FREE MEN'—were some of the factors leading to the creation of ZIPA and resumption of the war.

Unbeknown to the guerrillas in the camps, when the front-line leaders met in Dar es Salaam in July 1975, two of them, Machel and Nyerere, had also reached the conclusion that the talks were going nowhere. They met Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema, who, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, accepted the view that the time had come to 'de-escalate the talks about talks and escalate the war', a compromise phrase reflecting the differences among the African leaders and nationalists, some of whom clung to the forlorn hope that a negotiated settlement was still possible.⁴ Kaunda was one of those who still pinned their hopes to negotiation and in the wake of the Dar es Salaam meeting, his envoy, Mark Chona, began a fresh round of contacts with South Africa; this culminated in the Pretoria agreement and the new exercise in futility at Victoria Falls.

That Zambian initiative did no more than stall the resumption of the war for a few weeks, and when the front-line leaders met again in Lusaka on 15 September, after the Victoria Falls débâcle, there was no rational alternative but to endorse the Dar es Salaam decision in July. Nyerere said later that he had been sceptical about the chances of a negotiated settlement from the moment he learned about Kaunda's contacts with Vorster, but he and his colleagues had gone to extreme lengths to ascertain if a negotiated settlement was possible. 'We went to that extent to give talks a chance, to that almost ridiculous extent. I kept saying that we wanted to be believed on both proposals, that we mean it when we say we want majority rule to be achieved through peaceful means, but if that fails there is the second proposal. The decision to die for independence must be made by people who want to try through negotiation. And if negotiations fail we will back them up fully.'⁵

At the Lusaka meeting the front-line leaders agreed that all of the trained fighters, other than those in detention on specific charges, should be transferred from Tanzania and Zambia to camps in Mozambique in preparation for the resumption of the war. Nyerere pointed out to Muzorewa at the meeting that the ANC was not a party but a front, 'a front of ZAPU, ZANU and little FROLIZI'. No ZAPU member had been given the chairmanship of any of the six ZLC standing committees, and by expelling Nkomo from the ANC the Bishop was in fact expelling ZAPU. This was a position the front-line presidents could not accept. 'We were continuing to work for unity

but in the meantime carrying out the decision which we reached in Dar es Salaam in July,' Nyerere said.⁶ If unity among the politicians was impossible then the front-line states were determined to have unity among the fighters, which, it was hoped, would encourage the politicians to co-operate.

These two front-line meetings are important, for the origins of ZIPA remain the subject of considerable controversy. Some argue that the decision to create a unified force was taken by the detained leaders at Mpima prison; others say it was the creation of Tongogara and Jason Moyo, who visited him in prison on a number of occasions. Some of the guerrilla commanders, particularly those who were later expelled from ZANU, argue that the creation of ZIPA was the initiative of the guerrillas at Mgagao. Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema viewed ZIPA as the creation of the front-line states and the OAU Liberation Committee Executive Secretary, Mbita. The truth is that ZIPA was born from a combination of several of these factors. The presidents of the front-line states had decided as early as July to resume the war. They were frustrated by the divisive squabbling among the nationalist leaders and were determined to try to forge unity in the struggle. Machel insisted that if the guerrillas were to use Mozambique as a rear base they must fight as one army and not two. Nyerere expressed his frustration with the nationalist leaders: Muzorewa, he said, had done a good job during the Pearce Commission, 'but now he should go back to the pulpit'; Sithole he dismissed as 'bogus'; Nkomo, he said, was the only statesman among them but in a sense he was a man who had 'died from praise'.⁷ It was six weeks after the war had resumed before the creation of ZIPA became known. At this point, Mugabe, whom the ZANLA fighters now regarded as their leader, was not even considered by the front-line states.

Tongogara and his colleagues in prison and also Moyo and his own colleagues recognized the mood of the front-line presidents. Both sides wanted to resume the armed struggle, recognizing that Smith was not ready to negotiate seriously. Both sides also realized that military unity was a prerequisite the front-line leaders would insist upon for the resumption of the struggle. Both had a common interest—as they had when they created the JMC to block FROLIZI's attempts to win recognition—in creating a degree of unity which would nullify the claims by Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema that the ANC represented unity of the nationalist forces. Tongogara asked Moyo to come and see him in prison and on a

number of occasions, with Mangena and other officials, Moyo visited the ZANLA commander. Muzenda, who had arrived in Lusaka on 13 May from Salisbury to help forge unity within the ANC and who had been named to the ZLC, became increasingly disenchanted with what he found and, after leaving the ANC, was mandated in a note signed by Mudzi, Kangai, Tongogara and Gumbo as the 'party principal functionary' at liberty.⁸ Muzenda thereafter led a four-member ZANU sub-committee which met on three occasions at Mubako's house in Lusaka with a ZAPU team led by Moyo to discuss unity of the guerrilla forces.⁹

The third element involved in the creation of ZIPA was the ZANLA guerrillas, particularly those at Mgagao. In late August, Sithole, as chairman of the ZLC, called four commanders from Mgagao—Sadza, Nyikadzinashwe, Chipopera and Mulambo—and Machingura from Mboroma. A military wing of the ZLC, called the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA), had been created and Sithole had chosen his nephew, John Gwindingwi, who was training in India as a pilot, to command the new force. Gwindingwi was unpopular with many of the guerrilla commanders.¹⁰ His appointment by Sithole meant he was being promoted from a junior position over the heads of members of the ZANLA and ZIPRA high commands, some of whom—such as Nhongo—were excluded altogether from the new command. The guerrillas also found that men like Mukono, who had been suspended from the DARE, and Mutambanengwe, were now nominated by Sithole to the ZLC as ZANU representatives. At this point the guerrillas still supported Sithole and they were not opposed to the creation of the ZLC or ZLA as vehicles to resume the armed struggle, but they protested to Sithole about the people chosen to participate. If Sithole had heeded their protests and replaced those particular people the guerrillas might have continued to accept him as their leader of ZANU; by ignoring their protests he sealed his fate.

In a joint interview in Geneva in December 1976 with Tongogara and Kangai, Nhongo and Machingura (the last two were members of the ZIPA military committee) confirmed that when the guerrilla commanders went to Mpina prison on 11 September 1975 to see their detained leaders they were given copies of a document, drawn up by the detainees, on the need for a united front with ZIPRA. Machingura said they were instructed to give one copy to Muzenda, who was based in Lusaka, and to take the other one with them to Mgagao.¹¹

Tongogara recalled that Sadza, Machingura, Nyikadzinashwe and

Chipopera came to Mpima and asked their leaders what they should do: 'We said, "Look, there is nothing we can do in prison. The only contribution we can give you is our experience." We reviewed our policy. ZANU had succeeded in launching armed struggle and was pursuing a policy of uniting all the people of Zimbabwe and it was trying to create more friends in the revolution and less enemies. So we said, "Comrades you are out, you go to comrade Rex [Nhongo] and see how you can continue with the party policy, uniting all the people of Zimbabwe, particularly those who are interested in seeing the total destruction of imperialism, colonialism and racialism in Zimbabwe." The major issue was that we had reached the point where we had to decide whether the armed struggle should be buried or should be revived and continued. We decided it must be revived.'¹² From this decision the discussion turned to the need for unity. 'The people of Zimbabwe were divided into two camps and everyone knew it. There had been ZANU and ZAPU for over thirteen years. So if you wanted to achieve unity you had to unite the two organizations. So we said, "Comrades in arms, go and see what you can do to bring in ZAPU." We knew ZAPU wasn't fighting, that ZAPU had no experience, but we felt they had reason to fight, that they had the desire to liberate the country through armed struggle and that therefore they should be brought in. We all agreed on this.'¹³

Kangai said the detained leaders had had a number of meetings in prison before the commanders came to see them, and had discussed the need to remove Sithole, resume the war and create military unity through what they referred to as a 'joint provisional high command': 'ZANU alone could not go and get ammunition from the OAU Liberation Committee, but together with ZAPU they could get ammunition and they could get assistance. This was our line of thinking. This was the period when those problems in Angola were surfacing and we were very concerned that we would not like to see those kind of things happening in Zimbabwe. So we thought that if we could have our fighters come together with the ZAPU fighters and form a joint provisional high command it would enable us to get weapons to fight in Zimbabwe and it would lessen the chances of a civil war in Zimbabwe.'¹⁴

Sadza, Machingura, Nyikadzinashwe and Chipopera were forced to leave Lusaka in a hurry after meeting the detained leaders. Some members of ZANU, including Tongogara's wife, were picked up by the police and the four young commanders, believing they were under surveillance, thought their arrest was imminent. They went to

Tanzania and at Mgagao reported on the differences with Sithole and the discussions at Mpima. The guerrillas at Mgagao had not known about the composition of the ZLC or the ZLA and there was considerable anger when they heard what Sithole had done. Sithole, who until that point had the support of the guerrillas at Mgagao, was denounced at a meeting of the General Staff and a delegation was sent to Dar es Salaam, where he was staying in the Kilimanjaro Hotel, to express the collective feelings of the guerrillas. Sithole again turned a deaf ear.¹⁵ The guerrillas' response was the Mgagao Declaration.

Nhongo and Sadza had been sent to Mozambique to try to make contact with the guerrillas at Tembwe and to ascertain the attitude of the Mozambique government towards the resumption of the war. They found Mozambique sympathetic and mainly concerned about the availability of armaments. They told Mozambique officials that Tanzania was holding arms for 2,500 guerrillas, which had arrived from China at the beginning of the year. Nhongo and Sadza then returned to Dar es Salaam, where they were met at the airport by Mbita who told them that a meeting was scheduled for 10 a.m. the next day.¹⁶ Unbeknown to the two commanders it had been arranged that a delegation from ZAPU led by Moyo and including Mangena would arrive from Lusaka the next morning in time for the meeting.

Nhongo and Sadza had been briefed on the discussions and developments in Lusaka and when Mbita told them that ZANLA would not be allowed to resume the war on its own, that there must be a joint guerrilla force, Nhongo's reaction was, 'There's no problem. We can start talking about it.'¹⁷ Further encouragement came from the detained leaders in a ten-point memorandum from Mpima bearing the names of Mudzi, Tongogara, Gumbo, Kangai and Hamadziripi, the last of whom was detained in another prison. Described as a 'brief to the ZANU members of the provisional joint military command', it stressed the need for a broad national united front and said the only route open in Zimbabwe was armed struggle: '... we fully endorse and support the revolutionary stand that you have taken in forming a provisional joint military command with the militant Comrades of ZAPU. This is in line with the general party strategy to achieve genuine unity with forces that are interested in uniting with us in action.'¹⁸

The first problem which arose in creating ZIPA was what role, if any, the political leaders of ZANU and ZAPU would play. ZAPU's main political leaders were free, Nkomo in Rhodesia and Moyo in

charge of the external wing in Zambia. By contrast, and having rejected Sithole, almost all of ZANU's political leaders were in detention in Zambia and Rhodesia or, in the case of Mugabe and Tekere, rusticated in Mozambique. ZAPU wanted its executive members like Moyo involved in ZIPA but the ZANLA guerrillas refused, arguing that as their political leaders were detained they could not deal with men like Nkomo and Moyo as equals. Nyerere and Machel supported the ZANLA position, and guerrilla commanders from the two sides flew to Maputo, where ZIPA was formed at a three-hour meeting in the FRELIMO 'Zona Militar'. Nhongo, Sadza, Machingura, Nyikadzinashé and Hondo, the only ZANLA high command members at liberty, represented their side and they chose the other four ZANLA members to go on to the military committee. Mangena represented ZIPRA with John Dube (Chief of Operations, known as Comrade 'J.D.'), Ambrose Mutinhiri, Dr Augustus Mudzingwa and Gordon Munyani. That final decision to form ZIPA and the actual formation of the military committee was done with uncharacteristic haste as Chikerema was in Maputo with some of the ZLA leaders, trying to get to the guerrilla camps, and ZANLA was determined to prevent them doing so.¹⁹

The original ZIPA military committee appointed on 12 November 1975 was as follows:²⁰

Army Commander	Rex Nhongo (ZANLA)
Deputy	John Dube (ZIPRA)
Political Commissar	Alfred 'Nikita' Mangena (ZIPRA)
Deputy	Dzinashé Machingura (ZANLA)
Director of Operations	Elias Hondo (ZANLA)
Deputy	Enoch Tsangano (ZIPRA)
Director of Security and Intelligence	Gordon Munyanyi (ZIPRA)
Deputy	James Nyikadzinashé (ZANLA)
Director of Political Affairs	Webster Gwauya (ZANLA)
Deputy	David Moyana (ZIPRA)
Director of Logistics and Supplies	Report Mpoko (ZIPRA)
Deputy	Edmund Kagure (ZANLA)
Director of Training and Personnel	Ambrose Mutinhiri (ZIPRA)
Deputy	Parker Chipora (ZANLA)
Director of Medical Services	Dr Augustus Mudzingwa (ZIPRA)
Deputy	Tendai Pfefferere (ZANLA)
Director of Finance	Saul Sadza (ZANLA)
Deputy	Dangani Mulilo (ZIPRA)

Although ZANLA had many more trained guerrillas they agreed, after protest and on instructions from Tongogara, to give ZIPRA equal representation on the military committee; but they rejected a ZIPRA proposal that Mangena should be overall army commander. The ZANLA commanders wanted all the strategic positions on the military committee and while they conceded five departments to ZIPRA, the four they controlled—overall army commander, operations, political affairs, and finance—put them in a very strong position. In addition to this, reports from the front came first through the ZANLA structures because of their numerically greater numbers and the posts they controlled and were generally received by a ZANLA deputy rather than his ZIPRA director.²¹

The war was supposed to resume in the second half of December 1975 before Christmas Day. The guerrillas were to infiltrate from Mozambique's three provinces adjoining Rhodesia—Tete, Manica and Gaza—and to begin their attacks simultaneously. But there were logistical delays. The situation was further disrupted by a brief mutiny in Maputo by a small group of FRELIMO troops. There were also disagreements about the Gaza front in the southern part of Rhodesia bordering on South Africa. Some commanders argued that an offensive into this zone could bring the South Africans, who had only completed the withdrawal of their paramilitary police in early August, back into Rhodesia on a larger scale. A further dispute about the Gaza front was that ZIPRA argued that Tete should be exclusively ZANLA, Manica shared by the two forces and Gaza should be exclusively a ZIPRA operation; this would have given them access to Matabeleland, where most of the ZIPRA guerrillas came from. The ZANLA commanders and Mozambique refused, insisting that joint forces must operate on all three fronts. 'We said we were not regionalists,' Nhongo said, 'and Samora said if that is your plan you can go back to Zambia.'²²

Infiltration of the guerrillas did not finally begin until January. Over 400 were deployed in Tete, 150 in Manica and somewhat less than 150 into Gaza. Although ZANLA and ZIPRA had agreed to commit all their trained cadres to the new offensive from Mozambique, less than 200 from ZIPRA were sent to the joint force and of these only about 100 crossed into Rhodesia. The bulk of the force who resumed the war came from Mgagao; 422 of them were flown from Tanzania in early January. The ZIPRA guerrillas arrived without arms and had to be armed by ZANLA with weapons from

FRELIMO, and while ZANLA committed all its transport to the joint force ZIPRA sent no vehicles. ZIPRA strategy, the ZANLA commanders insist, was to commit as few guerrillas as possible to the new offensive while holding the bulk of their force in Zambia in anticipation of opening a new front from there if Nkomo failed to negotiate a settlement with Smith. The ZIPRA cadres who were sent to Mozambique and the war zones were told to recruit and head for Botswana with the recruits. A meeting at Dondo in July addressed by Enoch Sebele, who had replaced Moyana on the ZIPA military committee, was tape-recorded by a ZIPRA guerrilla who was covertly working with ZANLA. Sebele told the assembled ZIPRA cadres that once they arrived in Rhodesia they should desert, head for Matabeleland, get recruits and then leave the country with them for Botswana, from where they would be flown to Zambia for training. Sebele said that although ZIPRA's numbers were small at that time they would be able to challenge ZANLA as a result of this recruiting policy by the end of 1977. The tape-recording was given to FRELIMO.²³

Further evidence of this ZIPRA policy is contained in a Rhodesian military intelligence lecture which spoke of the difficulties in the joint training camps in Tanzania—where there had been two serious clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas—and of ZIPRA's failure to commit more guerrillas. These difficulties '... had a side effect that when these combined groups, normally consisting of eight ZANLA and two ZIPRA terrorists, entered Rhodesia, the ZIPRA elements would desert and head back for their home areas. In mid-1976 therefore we saw the gradual drift of these ZIPRA elements through Rhodesia towards Francistown. The more dedicated of them collected recruits as they went through the country and committed various acts of terrorism. At this time, ZAPU had been told in no uncertain fashion by the OAU Liberation Committee that unless they took a more active role in the war they were to be cut off from all sources of funds. As a result we started to see ZAPU, led by Russian-trained intelligence agents, infiltrating across the Zambezi. This led to Operation Tangent being opened in August 1976.'²⁴

The same intelligence lecture gives the Rhodesian account of the resumption of the war on three fronts. 'On the 21st January 1976 a crossing of 90 terrorists took place south of Nyamapanda. We contacted that group the morning after they crossed. Four were killed and one was captured. The story he gave us was that they were part of a simultaneous three-pronged assault on Rhodesia. However, their plan did not work in that the second assault in the Melssetter area by 130

terrorists took place some five weeks later and the third assault in the south-eastern area took place seven weeks later, i.e. three months after the first assault. In February 1976 Operation Thrasher started and in May 1976 Operation Repulse began.²⁵ Thus within four months of ZIPA resuming the war the whole of Rhodesia's eastern border with Mozambique had been divided into three operational war zones—codenamed (from north to south) Hurricane, Thrasher and Repulse—covering the offensives from Tete, Manica and Gaza provinces.

Each of the new fronts had a co-ordinating committee based in Mozambique and a provincial field command in the war zones. Destabilization of the Rhodesian economy and social fabric was the principal objective, although strategy varied from province to province. In the Tete front the strategy was to continue mass mobilization while also attacking economic targets like mines and farms. In Manica the targets were bridges, farms and, until FRELIMO closed the border in March, the railway line to Beira. In Gaza the main target was the new railway link to South Africa via Rutenga.²⁶

On 6 February 1976, the front-line leaders gathered at Quelimane at Machel's request. The Mozambique leader reported that the decision to resume the armed struggle had been carried out. He said Mozambique had received the guerrillas from Tanzania and Zambia, the Chinese arms Tanzania had been holding, and that the war had resumed on 17 January. Muzorewa, who had moved to Maputo to a house supplied by Machel in late November, and Sithole, who had joined him in December, looked on blankly as Machel spoke of the 'Third Force' (ZIPA) commanded by an eighteen-member committee. Machel said a group of guerrilla commanders had been to see him. 'They said that they always tried to fight, but the leadership always failed them. They said that they were tired of the existing political leadership because it was divided.'²⁷ It was the first time that Muzorewa, who claimed to be commander-in-chief of the guerrillas, had heard about ZIPA, its military committee or the resumption of the war. The creation of ZIPA, he argued, was a serious setback to the liberation struggle, it would create further divisions and the guerrillas had no right to take action without the consent of his leadership. 'You people seem to think that power comes from the barrel of the mouth instead of the barrel of the gun,' Nyerere bluntly replied.²⁸

The reality of Muzorewa's position was that, although he had been accepted as compromise leader of the umbrella ANC in December

1974, the ZANLA guerrillas had continued to regard Sithole as their leader and the ZIPRA guerrillas, Nkomo. Once Muzorewa expelled Nkomo from the ANC any tenuous claim he may have had to the support of the ZIPRA guerrillas was lost; and once the ZANLA guerrillas at Mgagao expelled Sithole, and gained the support of the ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique and Zambia, the Bishop lost any claim to their support. Nor could he claim that the recruits pouring into Mozambique were being mobilized by him: the decision to send recruits had been taken at a ZANU central committee meeting in Lusaka during the December 1974 unity talks, and the Bishop knew nothing about the meeting or the decision. In his book *Rise up and Walk* Muzorewa admits that when he arrived in Maputo in November 1975, 'I sought to establish the whereabouts of the Zimbabwean camps.'²⁹ That a man claiming to be commander-in-chief of the guerrillas did not even know where their camps were speaks for itself. Nor is Muzorewa's claim that the front-line states prevented him, Sithole and Chikerema from visiting the camps valid: they visited Mgagao and Mboroma and a camp in Mozambique before the Mgagao Declaration rejected them as leaders, and thereafter it was the guerrillas who refused to have any of them in the camps unless they came together as a united group. The only army Muzorewa was to command during the struggle was the Rhodesian forces fighting against the guerrillas, which killed thousands of Zimbabweans.

Machel also indicated to his colleagues at Quelimane in February his intention to close the border with Rhodesia in compliance with UN sanctions. The decision to close the border was announced by Machel on 3 March, and his announcement that he was putting Mozambique on a war footing was initially widely misinterpreted by the press as a declaration of war on Rhodesia. At the time of the Portuguese *coup d'état* almost two years earlier, 80 per cent of Rhodesian imports and exports had passed through the ports of Beira and Maputo (then Lourenço Marques).³⁰ The Rhodesians, fearing that a FRELIMO government might close the frontier, completed the new Rutenga rail link via Beitbridge to South Africa well ahead of schedule soon after the Portuguese coup; they had begun to divert goods away from Mozambique over this new route and, when Machel acted, had also increased traffic on the railway through Botswana. Even so, Rhodesia still depended upon Mozambique at that time for about 50 per cent of its 4,000,000 tons of trade, and the cost to Mozambique of closing the border and applying UN sanctions was enormous.

A United Nations Economic and Social Council report on assistance

to Mozambique seven weeks later estimated the cost to Mozambique of applying sanctions in the first twelve months after the border closure would be between £70,000,000 and £82,000,000; thereafter the cost was estimated at between £54,000,000 and £67,000,000 a year.³¹ Mozambique was to find, as Zambia had previously, that when it came to financially supporting countries which suffered as a result of the imposition of sanctions, the international community was far from generous. In May 1975 Britain's Minister of Overseas Development, Judith Hart, had flown to Dar es Salaam to see Machel and had talked of aid totalling £15,000,000 over one to two years if sanctions were applied against Rhodesia. The money would either be in the form of a grant or an extremely soft loan with an 86 per cent grant equivalent. Judith Hart, British officials later said, had overstepped her mandate. Britain's opening offer was an interest-free loan of only £5,000,000, repayable over twenty-five years with a seven-year grace period; where it involved imports it was tied to British goods and services.³²

Mozambique retorted that it wanted grants and not loans which would be counted as part of overall development assistance. Britain did finally give more assistance but in the final analysis Mozambique, whose legacy from 500 years of Portuguese colonialism had been a country in dire economic straits with only enough foreign exchange to cover six days' imports, was forced to bear the bulk of the burden.

Having concluded that there was no immediate chance of a negotiated settlement and having provided the base for the resumption of the war, Mozambique politically had no choice but to close the border. The move trapped 2,300 Rhodesian railway wagons, a sixth of the country's total rolling stock, worth an estimated £23,000,000, inside Mozambique.³³ Despite this loss and Rhodesia's degree of dependence on the Mozambique routes, the impact of the FRELIMO government applying sanctions was over-estimated in Whitehall and Washington. The Rhodesians had shown considerable ingenuity over the years in getting around sanctions and other economic difficulties and they were to prove equal to the new challenge. One further tightening of the screw at this point might have achieved the desired effect, but Sir Seretse Khama was discouraged by his front-line colleagues from similar action because of Botswana's vulnerability.

As part of their policy of diverting goods away from the Mozambique routes the Rhodesians had increased their traffic over the Botswana line through Mafeking by 25 per cent.³⁴ Sir Seretse, who did not even have an army to defend his country against attack, seriously

considered closing this route to the Rhodesians. In early April he left on a state visit to China where he raised the possibility of Chinese personnel being sent to take over the running of the railway. Almost all the technicians operating the railway through Botswana were Rhodesian, Rhodesia owned all of the rolling stock, and Rhodesian—and South African—reaction to such a move was uncertain. 'I know we would certainly be applauded by the rest of the world if we did. But it could do us a great deal of harm, poor as we are,' Sir Seretse said just before leaving for China.³⁵ The Chinese agreed, and so did Nyerere, and the Botswana link remained open to Rhodesia throughout the war.

While plans were being laid to resume the war and Mozambique was preparing to close its border, negotiations were under way in Salisbury where Smith had once again found someone willing to talk to him. An American diplomat remarked wryly at the time that part of the difficulty in persuading Smith to leave the arena was that he always managed to find a new 'dancing partner'.³⁶ On 1 December 1975 Smith and Nkomo had signed a 'declaration of intention to negotiate a settlement', and during the next two and a half months ten full plenary and five smaller working sessions were held between the two delegations. Nkomo publicly insisted that he was demanding majority rule 'now', while Smith said from the outset that negotiations on the basis of immediate majority rule were unacceptable. Nkomo was to claim subsequently that his negotiations with Smith resulted from the initiatives of the front-line presidents: 'we in the African National Council had serious reservations from the outset. . . . ' he said.³⁷ Mozambique and Tanzania were even more sceptical than Nkomo. The official Tanzanian government newspaper, the *Daily News*, sharply criticized him in an editorial for holding talks with Smith without the other nationalist leaders, adding that he did not command the support of the guerrillas. Nyerere warned Britain's Minister of State in the Foreign Office, David Ennals, in December that the guerrillas could be expected to reject any agreement they had not been a party to.³⁸ Tanzania's Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Kaduma, publicly questioned Nkomo's decision to negotiate with Smith and even Kaunda raised doubts. 'If Mr Nkomo clinches an agreement with Mr Smith on the basis of majority rule, then the Zimbabwe Liberation Council led by Bishop Muzorewa would become irrelevant,' Kaunda said. 'And if he does not then he will become irrelevant.'³⁹

White extremists loudly condemned Smith even though he did not

appear to be giving anything away. 'I believe you want a handover settlement as much as you want a hole in the head,' said William Harper, a former Smith Cabinet Minister who had resigned and become leader of the United Conservative Party.⁴⁰ The Southern African Solidarity Congress, Rhodesian National Party and Candour League joined the protest. Smith was called a 'traitor' by the RNP leader, Len Idensohn, who went on to describe the negotiations as 'part of the same filthy, treacherous, lying, double-crossing' that had been going on for years. The guerrillas, he said, were 'jackals', but he added: 'The black is not your enemy—your enemy is the white man.'⁴¹ Nkomo came under attack also from the faction of the ANC led by Muzorewa, Chikerema and Sithole. Sithole dismissed the negotiations as irrelevant, adding: 'We intend shooting our way back into Zimbabwe until majority rule now is established in our country'⁴²—a pledge he ignored in early 1978 when he returned to negotiate with Smith.

By mid-February it had become apparent to everybody but Nkomo that Smith had no intention of giving majority rule 'now' or in the foreseeable future. Kaunda said he had again warned Nkomo about the danger of his becoming politically irrelevant—'Africa has been patient enough. That patience has been exhausted and now the blood-bath must follow,' the Zambian said⁴³—but Nkomo persisted for another month. Finally, in mid-March, Nyerere sent his Minister of Labour, Alfred Tandau, to Lusaka to see Kaunda with a message to be passed on to Nkomo telling him that he must break off the negotiations.⁴⁴ Nyerere and his front-line colleagues were convinced that the talks must end because it was obvious that Smith was playing for time, because they feared a contrived settlement acceptable to Britain but not to the African majority in Rhodesia, and because the continued talks were causing confusion in nationalist ranks. On 19 March a terse statement was released in Salisbury which said: 'We have now reached an impasse and are therefore breaking off the talks.' Kaunda described the breakdown as the 'gravest hour' in the history of the subcontinent, while Smith added his own epitaph: 'I don't believe in black majority rule ever in Rhodesia—not in a thousand years.'⁴⁵

The negotiations did considerable harm to Nkomo's political reputation among Rhodesian nationalists. At a rally in Gwelo, with a population of 45,000, Nkomo drew only 2,000 people. In Salisbury's Highfield township Muzorewa drew 30,000 supporters of ZANU and the ANC. Smith realized that Nkomo was not as popular as he had

supposed, and during the negotiations a secret approach was made to Muzorewa, trying to draw him into the talks.⁴⁶ Of even greater consequence than Nkomo's reputation was the damage it did to the front-line states' attempt to forge unity among the guerrillas. Reluctance on the part of ZIPRA guerrillas to go home and fight and risk dying while their leader was negotiating in Salisbury with the enemy was understandable. Nkomo's commitment to armed struggle lacked the consistency of men like Mugabe, who had long recognized that Smith would not concede majority rule until the guerrillas had escalated the war to a point where he had no other choice.

The failure of the Nkomo-Smith negotiations brought a new group of players on stage. Smith had made a series of overtures to Britain—suggesting among other things that Whitehall should appoint a council of 'wise men' to put forward the terms for a settlement—before the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, rose to address Parliament in London on 22 March, three days after the collapse of the talks with Nkomo. A month earlier Callaghan had sent officials to Salisbury to assess Smith's position and the possibility of a settlement. Smith had not moved sufficiently to make a settlement possible and Callaghan dismissed the Rhodesian overtures as 'designed to do no more than buy even more time for Mr Smith's regime. He does not seem to realize that he no longer has much time to buy.'⁴⁷

A number of preconditions must be agreed by all parties before a constitutional conference could be convened, the Foreign Secretary said. These were the principle of majority rule, elections for majority rule in eighteen months to two years, that independence would only occur after majority rule, that negotiations must not be protracted and that no attempt should be made to thwart the progress towards majority rule and independence. If these preconditions were agreed—and Callaghan stressed that he was not optimistic that Smith would agree—a conference could then be convened by Britain. 'As things are, Mr Smith is leading his country on the path of death and destruction. Even at this late stage I ask the European population of Rhodesia to believe that there is an alternative path. It is still just possible for Mr Smith to follow it. If not, I hope other leaders will emerge who recognize the realities of the hour and that the time is here when the legitimate aspirations of the African people can be met and reconciled with the desires of the European population. Only in this way can there be hope for a peaceful future in Rhodesia.'⁴⁸

The reaction in Salisbury was predictable. 'There would be a bloody uproar in my party if the government agreed to terms of that nature,' said Des Frost, chairman of the RF. 'What's he offering us? Absolutely nothing. They are a bankrupt government and they seem to be bankrupt in ideas as well.'⁴⁹ Smith rejected Callaghan's preconditions for a constitutional conference, saying he found them 'extreme', and then went on to illustrate the bankruptcy of his own political thinking by bringing four Chiefs and three tribally elected Members of Parliament into his Cabinet, men far removed from the main stream of nationalist thinking and with little support in the country.

Smith formally brought the Chiefs into his Cabinet on 28 April; the timing of his action contained a hollow ring of defiance, for it came the day after the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had spelt out his country's African policy, and particularly its southern African policy, in a speech across the Zambezi in Lusaka. Kissinger had arrived three days earlier in Kenya on the first leg of a six-nation African tour. There were grave misgivings about his visit and Ghana, Mozambique and Nigeria, for differing reasons, indicated that they did not want him to come to their countries. In Tanzania, Kissinger's second stop, Nyerere ran into considerable opposition to the visit. His two Vice-Presidents, Aboud Jumbe and Rashidi Kawawa, both opposed the visit, and his Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Kaduma, argued that Kissinger was only the equivalent of a Foreign Minister and therefore, in terms of protocol, should be his guest and should not insist on being the guest of the President. Kawawa, who referred to Kissinger as *mshenzi*, a Swahili word for someone uncivilized, was ordered by Nyerere to attend the official talks, and the Tanzanian leader had Kaduma's speech at a banquet for Kissinger toned down, arguing that you did not invite a guest to dinner to abuse him.⁵⁰

Reservations about asking Kissinger to dinner were quite understandable. In 1969, under his direction and guidance, the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, comprising the CIA, State and Defence Departments, had carried out a review of the African policy of the United States. This now infamous document, NSSM 39, nicknamed 'Tarbaby', reveals America's and Kissinger's real thinking. The total indifference to the legitimate aspirations of the African people is revealed in the document, which was not supposed to become public. Those who had tried to negotiate for their rights with the white minorities and who, once this avenue was closed,

resorted to armed struggle, were seen as a dangerous destabilizing factor. In the view of NSSM 39, the guerrillas—and not the obdurate white minorities—were viewed as a threat which could open the door to the Soviet Union and China in what was perceived as a traditional area of capitalist influence. This cynical lack of concern stands out in marked contrast to the public platitudes and rhetoric of American spokesmen.

NSSM 39 listed five policy options for the United States in reassessing its African policy. The objectives of these were to consider methods of enhancing American standing in Africa, to protect American economic, scientific and strategic interests, to contain the possibility of violence, encourage moderation of rigid racial and colonial attitudes by the whites and to minimize the opportunities for the Russians and Chinese to score propaganda points and gain political influence. Option 2, which many people argue that Kissinger and the then President, Richard Nixon, partially pursued for the next six years, began with the premise: 'The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists.'⁵¹ The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, a direct result of the wars fought by the guerrillas in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, was to prove the fallacy—if proof was needed—of this racist premise.

Although it is generally argued that Kissinger ignored the importance of Africa until 1975, his indifference was far from benign. Nixon and Kissinger pursued the NSSM 39 Option 2 recommendation that 'without openly taking a position undermining the UK and UN on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime'.⁵² According to Edgar Lockwood, head of the Washington Committee on Africa, in his article 'Testimony on Rhodesia and United States Foreign Policy', Kissinger specifically advocated the gradual relaxation of sanctions against Rhodesia, and in January 1970 proposed to Nixon that the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce begin to formulate alternative approaches to American participation in sanctions.⁵³ In 1971 the Nixon administration, despite its previous support for UN sanctions against Rhodesia, endorsed the Byrd Amendment exempting chrome from the embargo, at a time when the US had a chrome surplus, and released 1,300,000 tons from military stockpiles for civilian consumption. Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, observed that he could 'think of no

act more calculated to outrage moderate African feeling and to give aid and comfort to racialists south of the Zambezi and indeed north and south of the Limpopo'.⁵⁴ At his confirmation hearing as Secretary of State in September 1973 Kissinger promised that 'The administration will support the repeal of the Byrd Amendment',⁵⁵ but the White House and Kissinger failed to support moves to reintroduce sanctions on chrome. Neither was any action taken to stop American tourists, who made up a fifth of the total Rhodesian tourist trade and brought in about £8,000,000 a year in much-needed foreign exchange.⁵⁶

In Washington the Rhodesian Information Office was allowed to remain open, disseminating information, lobbying on Capitol Hill, encouraging American tourism and recruiting Americans for the Rhodesian armed forces. In New York the Air Rhodesia office worked closely with American airlines, travel agencies and credit card companies promoting tourism to Rhodesia. 'The Nixon administration closed its eyes to all of these violations which, together, gave the Smith regime a material and psychological lift at a time when the Rhodesian economy was weak and when domestic opposition had been mounting in favour of a compromise settlement.' The Ford administration was little better. Promises of support for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment were not translated into action, and the White House failed to contact Congressmen who would have voted in favour of repeal if the President had asked them to. While the US was not alone in cynically allowing the violation of sanctions it theoretically supported at the UN, it was the only country at that time to legalize the violation of those sanctions which the then Secretary of State, William Rogers, admitted in March 1972 were placing strains on the Rhodesian economy: they had brought a 30 per cent loss in foreign trade, reduced foreign exchange earnings by almost two-thirds and led to controls on economic growth by the Smith regime.⁵⁷

Of even greater consequence when Kissinger arrived in Africa in April 1976 was his and the United States' recent role in Angola, a débâcle which had involved Zambia and Zaire and the South African invasion of Angola. Kissinger and the CIA had been determined to prevent the MPLA coming to power in Angola and had pumped millions of dollars worth of covert funds to the rival FNLA and UNITA movements. Although the full extent of the involvement of Kaunda and Mobutu was not known when Kissinger arrived in those countries, the third and fourth stops on his African safari, it was well known that they had supported the movements opposed to the MPLA. In his book *In Search of Enemies*, John Stockwell, the chief of

the CIA Angola task force, wrote of the South African invasion of Angola: 'The South Africans had some encouragement to go into Angola. Savimbi invited them, after conferring with Mobutu, Kaunda, Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Leopold Senghor of Senegal, all of whom favoured a moderate, pro-Western Government in Angola.'⁵⁸ Stockwell said that a CIA team in Lusaka co-ordinated with Kaunda and used the Zambian media for propaganda against the MPLA and the Cubans. He added that on 10 September 1975 Kaunda had given UNITA's leader, Dr Jonas Savimbi, sixty days—until Angolan independence on 11 November—to ensure that the Benguela railway, Zambia's western route to the Atlantic Ocean at Lobito, was open. If it was not he said he could not guarantee continued support for Savimbi.⁵⁹

It was the Angolan débâcle that brought Kissinger to southern Africa. In the spring of 1975 Callaghan, during a visit to Washington, had tried to elicit Kissinger's active support for détente, but 'Kissinger had no interest at all in southern African problems at that time,' said a Callaghan aide.⁶⁰ In early 1976, Kissinger began to see Africa—because of the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola—in its international perspective. 'Kissinger felt his reputation had been stained over the collapse of his Vietnam agreement and he had got a black eye in Angola. Now time was running out on him. And you have always to regard the principal purpose of the Kissinger initiative as to restore Kissinger's image and ego. And where else could he go but southern Africa? He thought it was a little rural backwater which needed the Kissinger style and it could have worked even though he went in for the wrong reasons,' said another Callaghan aide.⁶¹

In his speech on 27 April in Lusaka Kissinger cynically sought to brush aside his country's record: 'There is nothing to be gained in a debate about whether in the past America has neglected Africa or has been insufficiently committed to African goals. The United States has many responsibilities in the world. Given the burden it has carried in the post-war period, it could not do everything simultaneously. African nations too have their own priorities and concerns, which have not always accorded with our own. No good can come of mutual recrimination.'⁶² For Kissinger, Africa was suddenly one of the challenges of the era, a modern frontier where 'without peace, racial justice and growing prosperity . . . we cannot speak of a just international order'. His journey was intended to usher in a new era of American policy in Africa. America, he said, supported African unity; solutions to Africa's problems must be African solutions and the

United States supported 'self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of Southern Africa—in the name of moral principle, international law and world peace'. In Rhodesia the United States was totally dedicated 'to seeing to it that the majority becomes the ruling power'.⁶³

Kissinger went on to list a ten-point action plan on Rhodesia. Washington would support the preconditions for a constitutional conference laid down on 22 March by Callaghan; Smith could not expect American diplomatic or material support; the US Administration would urge Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment, would stress to Smith the urgent need for a negotiated settlement, would discourage American tourists from visiting Rhodesia and encourage American residents to leave, would provide Mozambique with £6,500,000 assistance, would assist other neighbouring states who applied sanctions, would assist Rhodesian refugees and would provide economic assistance to an independent Zimbabwe. 'The United States is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid, just and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia.'⁶⁴ It sounded a long way from NSSM 39.

12

Exit Kissinger and ZIPA

Three weeks after ZIPA resumed the war, Smith, in a radio and television address to the nation, sombrely told Rhodesians: 'On the evidence before us, I believe that this will be the most serious incursion that we have as yet experienced.' The communists, he claimed, were intent on creating a 'saddle' across Africa from Angola to Tanzania and Mozambique in preparation for a new offensive in which Rhodesia and Namibia would be the next targets. Thereafter they would deny the 'free world' the vast natural resources of southern Africa and use of the Cape sea route. 'Regrettably, we can anticipate that the Western powers, blind to the consequences of their action, will not only acquiesce but will join in the chorus orchestrated by the Russian baton. Unfortunately, there is no Churchill alive today to bring home to them the folly of such appeasement.'¹

Unfortunately for Smith, the so-called free world recognized Rhodesia as one of the least free places on earth for the vast majority of its citizens. That might not have mattered, as is demonstrated by the cynicism of NSSM 39, had it not been for Kissinger's Angolan experience. He had recognized that wars of national liberation could turn nationalist movements into ideologically radical organizations. Kissinger was determined to prevent what he referred to as 'radicalization', and he subsequently described his Rhodesian strategy as being '... to co-opt the programme of moderate evolutionary reform, that is to say majority rule, and minority rights. At the same time we sought to create a kind of firebreak between those whose radicalism was ideological and those whose radicalism was geared to specific issues. We could meet the demands for majority rule; we

never thought we could co-opt the ideological radicals; our goal was to isolate them.²

To prevent the radicalization of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement through armed struggle Kissinger had to remove the cause of the war by making Smith concede majority rule. The Rhodesian leader, with his narrow vision of world realities, was not only expendable but had become a liability. By his obduracy he was inviting the spread of communist influence rather than containing it, for the longer the war went on the more the guerrillas would be forced to turn to communist countries for aid and the more radical the guerrillas would become. If Smith would not agree to majority rule then he would have to be forced from office. White Rhodesians had always looked to South Africa and then to the United States—as leaders of the ‘free world’—for support, and Smith found comfort in Kissinger’s emphasis in the wake of the Angolan débâcle that the communist threat in Africa must be kept at bay. Surely, the Rhodesian leader reasoned, he and Kissinger were talking about the same thing, and he spoke increasingly about the imagined Soviet and Cuban threat to Rhodesia from Mozambique. ‘But he miscalculated the shift in American thinking based on the experience of Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam and Laos,’ Machel said.³ ‘That shift was that you did not try to fight against national liberation wars, you sought to subvert them, and instead of trying to protect the rights of privileged minorities individually, you sought to protect the overall rights of capitalism. You sought to enlarge the bourgeoisie and the capitalist base, thereby undermining the revolutionary process. This was what the Americans were now doing in southern Africa and particularly in Rhodesia.’ In Zimbabwe the war was in the phase of armed struggle. ‘That is the secondary school. When it becomes a revolutionary struggle that is the university. Dr Kissinger is coming to close the university before they can get there.’

Smith was also in considerable difficulty with Vorster. When the South African Prime Minister began the détente exercise with Kaunda he believed that Smith was an honourable man who was serious about negotiating a Rhodesian settlement, but in an interview transmitted on 12 October 1975 on the British ITV programme ‘Weekend World’ Smith attacked Vorster by inference, saying that had it not been for détente a settlement would already have been achieved.⁴ Vorster replied the same evening saying that if the reports of what Smith had said were correct ‘then it went without saying that the many discussions in which the Rhodesians were involved in

Pretoria, Cape Town, Salisbury and Lusaka had served no purpose at all’.⁵ In South Africa the Afrikaans press reacted furiously, and Smith accused the press of quoting him out of context. He repeated his statement that détente had prevented a settlement with Muzorewa, arguing that this did not constitute criticism, actual or implied, of Vorster. Eight days later, accompanied by three ministers, Smith flew to Pretoria and, in a joint communiqué with Vorster, was forced to make a humiliating public apology. His remarks, the communiqué said, had not been intended to criticize Vorster’s ‘laudable’ efforts, to which he had been a willing party. He had apologized to Vorster for any embarrassment his remarks may have caused, and the communiqué ended by saying: ‘Both Prime Ministers have agreed that genuine attempts should be made to pursue policies leading to peace in Southern Africa.’⁶ Vorster had extracted an apology and a commitment on paper from Smith to work seriously for a peaceful settlement, but after the stormy four-hour Pretoria meeting Vorster no longer trusted Smith.

Before that meeting ‘Vorster had not realized how much Smith had been lying to him,’ said a senior Rhodesian intelligence official who was present at the Pretoria meeting. ‘After years of co-operation Vorster found it was all a sham. Thereafter they could no longer talk politely to each other. I don’t think Vorster ever believed Smith again on any important point.’⁷ Another blunder, the same official said, was the appointment of van der Byl as Rhodesia’s Foreign Minister. ‘Vorster hated P.K. He was an anathema to South Africa and he should never have been appointed while our emphasis was on South African support.’⁸ His South African counterpart, Muller, had been Professor of Law at Witwatersrand University when van der Byl went there as a student, and regarded him as a dilettante. The result was that van der Byl became an embarrassment in discussions with the South Africans and when Smith and others visited South Africa, the principal country with whom they had foreign relations, the Foreign Minister frequently remained at home.

A third factor complicated Rhodesian–South African relations. The Afrikaaner establishment disliked the British and had never trusted the British running Rhodesia. Historically they blamed them for starting the Boer War through the Jameson raid, and they had not forgotten that in 1922 the Rhodesian settlers had voted against union with South Africa. One incident before the withdrawal of the South African paramilitary police illustrates these feelings. An Afrikaaner South African policeman, in front of a number of witnesses at

Darwendale, had taken a baby off an African woman's back and slit its throat with a knife. The policeman was arrested and charged. South Africa began to exert pressure for his return, suggesting that if the case went ahead they would have to reconsider their support for Rhodesia, including withdrawing their paramilitary police. A senior intelligence officer was sent to see South Africa's Minister of Police, Jimmy Kruger, who demanded to know what sort of friends Rhodesians were, imprisoning 'a poor white SAP constable who was only doing his duty'. The officer pointed out that it was murder committed in front of eyewitnesses, and Kruger replied that the constable had a medical history and therefore it must have been a case of temporary insanity. The intelligence officer insisted that nevertheless it was murder, and Kruger finally lost his temper and shouted at him: 'You bastards, you started the Boer War with the Jameson raid.'⁹

Given the personal animosity between Vorster and Smith and Muller and van der Byl, the historical mistrust between Afrikaners and 'the bloody British', and Rhodesia's enormous economic dependence upon South Africa, Smith's government was extremely vulnerable in 1976. With the closure of the Mozambique border, Smith was forced to rely totally upon South Africa for his trade routes, his ammunition and small arms, his oil and spare parts for mining and other vital areas. The Rhodesian private sector was receiving between £16,000,000 and £20,000,000 a year in credit loans from South African banks but there were no direct South African government or bank loans to the Rhodesian government, contrary to reports that loans from South Africa had been used to balance Rhodesia's budget. The main help from South Africa came in the form of military equipment—much of it theoretically written off by South Africa's forces—or, in the case of planes, helicopters and armoured vehicles, on loan. It is hard to quantify the value of this assistance but it certainly saved Rhodesia enormous quantities of foreign exchange. Serious congestion occurred on the routes through South Africa early in the second half of 1976, with fuel stocks and ammunition supplies falling to dangerous levels.¹⁰ While this was probably contrived to pressurize Rhodesia, this was impossible to prove at a time when Rhodesia was completing the diversion of over 3,000,000 tons of goods—which had previously passed through Mozambique—through South Africa's already congested rail and ports system.

Thus Smith's dilemma in the middle of 1976, as Kissinger explored the possibility of a negotiated settlement, was that he had become a

liability to those to whom he looked for support—and a hostage of South Africa. The British, following the lessons they had learned during the *Tiger* and *Fearless* negotiations, told Kissinger that a settlement was impossible as long as Smith remained in office. 'The pessimistic view held that until you get rid of Smith you will not get a settlement because he's congenitally unable to settle,' said McNally, then Callaghan's political adviser, adding: 'This is Smith's genius of course, the appearance of movement and momentum he can give to negotiations without conceding anything of substance.'¹¹

Contacts between South Africa and the United States, and between Kissinger and the African front-line presidents and Britain, followed the Secretary of State's first African shuttle as he sought a way of breaking the Rhodesia impasse. Like Kaunda before him he saw Vorster as the man most likely to be able to deliver Smith, and even if he did not know about the animosity between the two men he certainly knew about Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa. In Washington in May 1976, after his return from Africa, Kissinger met the then South African Ambassador, 'Pik' Botha, and in late June, amidst stringent security, he met Vorster for the first time in the Bavarian mountain resort of Grafenau. On the eve of the meeting Kissinger told the House of Representatives International Relations Committee: 'The question which I want to explore with Prime Minister Vorster is whether South Africa is prepared to separate its own future from that of Rhodesia and Namibia.'¹² The Grafenau meeting took place during the Soweto uprising and Vorster, under pressure from the international community over the Soweto slaughter, was very definitely prepared to ditch Smith in order to ease the pressure on South Africa.

Kissinger sent the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, William Schaufele, to Ivory Coast, Senegal, Zaire, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, ostensibly to brief the African leaders on his meeting with Vorster. The last three countries were the most important and from them the message was clear—the war would continue and would escalate until majority rule was achieved. Africa would prefer this to occur through negotiation, but if that was not possible it would morally and materially support the guerrillas. Three American and two British missions visited Africa as Kissinger, Vorster and Callaghan tried to find a way of stopping the war and finding an acceptable negotiated settlement.

Britain's Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Ted Rowlands, was sent to Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Nigeria in late August on what he described as 'an initial scouting run'. It was much

more than that, and what he actually said to the three front-line presidents illustrates the direction of thinking in Washington and Whitehall at that time. Kaunda, Nyerere and Machel all subsequently confirmed that what Rowlands put to them was that Britain and the United States thought it possible to get rid of Smith and replace him with a caretaker government, which would then negotiate with the nationalists the details of how majority rule and independence would be brought about.¹³ 'I have to confirm that we were saying that we would get rid of Smith,' Rowlands said later. 'There were indications that the Kissinger-Vorster connection would work and produce an arrangement with a caretaker government. That was Kissinger's view, but he was keeping his options open as to whether Smith should be part of it. Britain was stressing that any arrangement must be minus Smith.'¹⁴ The scenario Rowlands said he put to Kaunda, Nyerere and Machel was: 'Look, a situation could well be arising where we could have the possibility of setting up an interim or transitional government which would follow Smith's departure. Kissinger felt he had certain assurances that Vorster was willing to create a new transitional government and Britain was stressing that it would not get off the ground unless Smith went.' Kaunda, said Rowlands, was baffled because he found what was being put to him too hypothetical. Nyerere gave him a dissertation on constitutional issues and Machel talked of Mozambique's transitional experience.

While Kaunda appeared to be mainly concerned about how Smith would be removed, Nyerere's concern was what would happen if he was. With the nationalists deeply divided, and now that the war had resumed, Nyerere feared that Britain and the United States would impose a caretaker administration unacceptable to the guerrillas and some of the nationalist groups, and that the war would continue with Britain and the United States forced to back the caretaker administration they had put in office. His first reaction to the plan Rowlands put to him was to reject it, but thereafter he reasoned that if Britain and the United States were determined to remove Smith they would do so irrespective of what he said. Therefore it was necessary to try again to achieve unity among the nationalists so they would present a united front to the caretaker government.¹⁵

On 5 September 1976 in Dar es Salaam's Kilimanjaro Hotel, Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel and Khama began meeting with the divided nationalists and four ZIPA commanders led by Nhongo. The meeting came against the backdrop of the Nyadzonja massacre on 9 August,

when Rhodesian troops attacked a camp in Mozambique, killing and wounding well over 1,000 Zimbabweans, almost all of them refugees. The Rhodesians claimed that Nyadzonja was a guerrilla camp but the authors, who had visited the camp in March, and who were allowed to wander around all over the complex, saw no evidence to suggest that it was military. A member of the Selous Scouts unit which undertook the raid—a Rhodesian African soldier who was later taken prisoner and held in Mozambique—subsequently described the pre-raid briefing: 'We were told that Nyadzonja was a camp containing several thousand unarmed refugees who could be recruited to join the guerrillas. It would be easier if we went in and wiped them out while they were unarmed and before they were trained rather than waiting for the possibility of them being trained and sent back armed into Rhodesia.'¹⁶ The soldier, whose mother turned him over to the guerrillas when she learned about his part in the Nyadzonja massacre, said they received bonuses for the high kill rate and were blessed by the unit's white chaplain.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) representative in Maputo, Mr H. Idoyaga, who had visited the camp in May, was taken to the scene. In his confidential report to his headquarters in Geneva he described how the Rhodesian troops had crossed into Mozambique and followed bush trails before attacking the camp soon after dawn: 'Soldiers [Rhodesians] wore Mozambiquan uniforms, had same type weapons as Mozambique forces, drove vehicles with Mozambiquan army registration numbers including armoured cars. White soldiers had painted hands and face black and it would appear some black Rhodesian soldiers also participated; after gathering together part of the camp population and shouting slogans they opened fire indiscriminately with light weapons but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, ample evidence of which is available on spot. Soldiers pursued fleeing refugees, smashing dead bodies with armoured cars.'¹⁷ The report went on: 'Visit to camp was desolating. Ten mass graves were being covered by bulldozers and burned huts including bushstyle hospitals, dormitories and food warehouses, dried up blood stains on ground, stench from graves, thousands of bullet shells, testified what must have been a horrifying scene. Counted dead so far 675 but more likely have died in surrounding bush or expected die among wounded. This figure includes five civilians and two military Mozambiquans, two Portuguese engineers from Cabora Bassa and one Spanish priest. Latter three killed near bridge to avoid alert being given. Wounded 295 in Chimoio

hospital and 204 in temporary camp. In addition, 176 serious cases in Beira hospital, plus unknown number in Tete, Gorongozo and Catandica.'

On 25 August the High Commissioner of the UNHCR, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, issued a statement in Geneva saying that, as a result of the investigation by his organization, 'I have no doubt that a settlement of Zimbabwean refugees which has been receiving United Nations assistance was attacked and that hundreds of refugees were killed and wounded. To be a refugee is in itself a tragedy. That such a large group of refugees should have been made victims of indiscriminate bloodshed makes this incident particularly shocking and abominable. It escapes my understanding as to what those responsible for it thought they were accomplishing through such an atrocity.'¹⁸ Van der Byl insisted that it was a guerrilla camp and invited the United Nations to set up a commission of inquiry to ascertain who was telling the truth. The UN ignored the Rhodesian protests for there was no doubt that Nyadzonja was a refugee camp. Journalists and UN officials were not taken to guerrilla camps; furthermore Nyadzonja was one of three Zimbabwean refugee camps in Mozambique earmarked for UNHCR assistance under a project proposal which had already been submitted. That atrocities occurred on both sides during the Rhodesian war is undeniable, but in comparison to the Nyadzonja massacre all others pale into insignificance.

After the massacre Machel called all the nationalist leaders to Maputo. At a meeting he asked them to identify themselves and their movements. Muzorewa began by saying he was leader of the ANC; Chikerema and Sithole identified with him, the latter saying he was also chairman of the ZLC. Next came Mugabe: 'Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Secretary-General of ZANU,' he said.¹⁹ Muzenda followed, identifying himself as a member of ZANU's central committee 'at present working with the freedom fighters'. Moyo and his group identified themselves as Nkomo's version of the ANC and finally Nhongo, Machingura and Gwauya identified themselves by their positions in ZIPA. This moment, in the wake of Nyadzonja, marked the first public re-emergence of ZANU. Machel, who said he had called the leaders to give his condolences to the Zimbabwean people, sent them all to the massacre scene to view it for themselves.

The 5 September Dar es Salaam summit followed this series of events. At the meeting Machel persuaded Nyerere, who was somewhat perplexed by the request, to get the nationalists to again identify themselves and the movements they represented.²⁰ When Nyerere

questioned Sithole after he had again identified with Muzorewa's ANC, Sithole became angry, saying that he had already said he was with the Bishop. The reasons for this somewhat elaborate and contrived exercise were that Machel regarded it as vital to ascertain which political leaders the ZIPA guerrillas recognized. Six months earlier in March in Maputo he had asked the ZIPA commanders to write a list for him of their political leaders and the ZANU members had written ten names: Robert Mugabe (Quelimane, Mozambique) and Edgar Tekere; in Zimbabwe, Enos Nkala and Maurice Nyagumbo; in Zambia, Muzenda (outside), Hamadziripi, Mudzi, Tongogara, Kangai and Gumbo. Gwauya, who wrote the list, said that to the irritation of the guerrillas Machel questioned Mugabe's name heading the list and asked whether they were sure they could work with him. Thus, during the first nine months of 1976, when Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema were claiming to be the leaders of the guerrillas, the guerrilla leaders were saying very definitely that they were not. Machel forwarded the list to Nyerere and during the Dar es Salaam summit asked the ZIPA commanders to again write a list of their political leaders. They wrote the same ten names plus Chrispen Mandizvidza, who was one of Mugabe's delegates at the summit. On this occasion Machel did not comment.²¹

The presidents met each of the delegations separately, and when ZIPA went in last with Machingura as spokesman Nyerere told them that Nkomo had argued that they were ZANLA and not ZIPA and as such should not be a separate delegation at the summit but part of Mugabe's delegation. Although a few of the ZIPRA guerrillas were still in Mozambique, and a few had crossed over to ZANLA, what Nkomo was arguing was essentially true. There had been difficulties between ZANLA and ZIPRA from the outset, and at two joint training camps in Tanzania—Mgagao and Kingolwira—there had been clashes and a considerable number of ZIPRA guerrillas had been killed. There had been differences over political education, strategy and methods of mobilization, and Nkomo's negotiations with Smith in Salisbury in the first quarter of the year had heightened ZANLA's mistrust and ZIPRA's reluctance to fight while talks were going on. A group of seventy ZIPRA guerrillas had been detained in May by I'RELIMO after refusing to go home from the Gaza front to fight, and three of the ZIPRA members of the ZIPA military committee had left Mozambique in late July or early August and not returned.²² By the time of the Dar es Salaam meeting almost all of the ZIPRA members of the military committee and the ZIPRA guerrillas, including those

who had been detained, had left Mozambique and returned to Zambia without making any real contribution to the resumed war from the eastern front, although thereafter they were to become increasingly involved from Zambia.

The second question put to Machingura by Khama was the allegation against them by Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema: was it true that most of ZIPA were from the southern part of Rhodesia and from the Karanga grouping of the Mashona? Machingura pointed out that recruits were coming out to Mozambique along the whole 1,100-kilometre border with Rhodesia and Machel supported him. In fact, and Machingura did not mention this, the leader of their delegation, Nhongo, was Zezuru and Gwauya was Matabele; on the ZANU delegation Mugabe was Zezuru and Tekere a Manyika. The tribal argument held no more water on this occasion than it had during the Chitepo inquiry.

Both Nyerere and Machel thought highly of the young leaders of ZIPA: they did not dwell upon divisions like the two wings of the ANC, they told the presidents of their need for more weapons and of their difficulties in coping with the recruit and refugee influx into Mozambique (which at this point was averaging about a hundred people a week) and they briefed the presidents on the development of the war on the three fronts. There are indications that Nyerere, who had become totally frustrated with the nationalist politicians, may have been thinking in this period that a new Zimbabwe nationalist leader might emerge from the ranks of the guerrillas as Machel had done in Mozambique. In between sessions with the various delegations Nyerere sent his Minister of State responsible for security, Peter Siyovelwa, and his private secretary, Joseph Butiku, to brief the ZIPA commanders on what the other delegations were saying; in turn the ZIPA commanders briefed Mugabe and his delegation.

When the leaders assembled for their second plenary session Sithole vociferously claimed that the guerrillas in the camps wanted him to visit them but he was being prevented from doing so by the ZIPA commanders. Nyerere pointedly asked Muzorewa if he knew what a *coup d'état* was. The Tanzanian leader explained that when you lost control of your army and commanders and you tried to send other commanders to discipline the mutinous leaders and they were unable to do so then there had been a *coup d'état*. The ZIPA commanders kept emphasizing the need for political unity, the need for more assistance for the war and larger training camps to cope with the vast number of recruits. The African presidents then left the nationalists to try to

forge unity, but as soon as they left the room an acrimonious debate ensued. Muzenda, who chaired the meeting, proposed that all the delegations should sign a document saying that Zimbabwe could only be liberated through armed struggle and that they supported the war and not negotiations. Nkomo refused, saying he would not sign a document with the ZIPA commanders because Mugabe as their leader should sign on their behalf; nor was he prepared to sign a document with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema, as he alleged that they had repudiated a document he had signed a year earlier with them before the ink was even dry.²³

The heated debate went on for twelve hours through the night, and Nkomo finally agreed to sign with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema but not with ZIPA. When the presidents were called in the next morning they expressed amazement that the nationalists could meet for twelve hours and still achieve nothing. Nyerere said the front-line states had decided to give all their political, military and diplomatic support to ZIPA, and he added that Mugabe and Nkomo should meet to thrash out the problems in ZIPA. If anything, the Dar es Salaam summit caused even more disunity than before, for at the end of it, on 9 September, Sithole announced his resignation from the Muzorewa wing of the ANC. He attacked the ANC for its failure to achieve unity and its lack of control over the guerrillas, and he claimed that as President of ZANU he was withdrawing from the ANC. So the summit, which had begun with two wings of the ANC and the re-emergence of ZANU led by Mugabe, concluded with two wings of the ANC and two ZANUs, with each of the leaders claiming to be leader of the authentic wing and to have the support of the guerrillas. Only Mugabe and Nkomo had the support of the guerrillas, and in the former's case a new crisis with ZIPA was only weeks away. Sithole, clearly a very sick man, was admitted to hospital in Dar es Salaam soon after resigning from the ANC. His desperate bid to regain control of ZANU failed but he persisted in claiming that he had the support of the guerrillas. A few weeks later he visited Mozambique, saying the guerrillas supported him and that he wanted to visit the camps. Then he asked for an armed FRELIMO guard to accompany him. FRELIMO refused: if the guerrillas supported him, why did he need armed guards from another force to accompany him, they asked.²⁴ Sithole left Mozambique and never returned.

The ZIPA commanders went to see Machel to ask him to approach Kaunda to secure the release of their leaders in Zambia, and Machel told them that this would be better handled by Nyerere because of his

closer personal relationship with the Zambian. Next they went to see Nyerere who, in his private study at his Msasani home on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, briefed them on the international political developments taking place. In January, he told them, Britain had wanted to start fresh negotiations, but he said he had refused because the war had only just been resumed and had not developed sufficiently to put the nationalists in a strong position at a conference. Now they were in a stronger position and the time might soon come to begin talks. Meanwhile, he said, the front-line states would throw their full weight behind the guerrillas. He had decided to give them the huge Nachingwea training camp in southern Tanzania vacated by FRELIMO the previous year; they could send 5,000 recruits to it immediately, half of them ZANLA and half ZIPRA. At Nachingwea military, police and immigration training would be given to the recruits. The commanders again raised the question of their leaders detained in Zambia, and Nyerere said he had already talked to Kaunda who had assured him they would be released soon.²⁵

Kissinger and Vorster had met for the second time, this time in Zurich on 4 and 5 September, while the Dar es Salaam summit was taking place. The pledge by the African leaders to the 'further intensification of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe' and the dangerous escalation of the war with the Nyadzonia raid brought added impetus to Kissinger's and Vorster's determination to achieve a negotiated settlement. The extent to which the Rhodesians were preparing to internationalize the conflict—with the inevitable possibility of drawing other powers into it—is demonstrated in a section of the history of the Rhodesian Special Air Services (SAS), written by the unit's then second-in-command, Major Michael Graham:

Nyadzonia had come and gone, and be it professional jealousy, sour grapes, or whatever, we in the SAS were disappointed and rather bitter about our exclusion. We had been involved in the planning to some extent. We believed a far greater kill could have been achieved had we para-dropped in behind the camp and we were annoyed when asked to recover a Ferret scout car that had rolled off a narrow bridge. The latter we refused to do, and the former view was also held by Capt. Rob Warraker who led the raid.

The SAS diary entry for Monday 9 August 1976 reads as follows: '... today we learnt of a Selous Scouts operation that killed over 300 ters. A good incentive for us to start planning in getting one thousand in one operation.' And that is exactly what we did.²⁶

That afternoon, in the Vumba National Park, three top SAS officers began planning an 'external' strike against a guerrilla base which would satisfy their desire to prove that anything the Selous Scouts could do, the SAS—whose motto is 'who dares wins'—could do bigger and better. 'The discussion was lengthy but by the time the pleasant late winter sun had dipped behind the hills we had decided on two possibilities. The first was Mgagao base, near Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and the second Tembwe base in Mozambique well north of Cabora Bassa.' Mgagao was in fact not near Dar es Salaam but in southern central Tanzania near Iringa, but even so a raid on the ZANLA training camp would have involved the SAS in a 2,000-kilometre round trip! The planned Mgagao raid was finally vetoed on political as well as military grounds; the Tembwe attack, originally planned for late October 1976 during the Geneva conference, was rejected at the time but was carried out in November 1977 immediately after another base complex in Mozambique at Chimoio was attacked.

Kissinger arrived in Dar es Salaam on the evening of 14 September 1976 on his second African shuttle. At a Washington press conference three days earlier he had referred to the 'so-called armed struggle' in Rhodesia, adding: 'The history of these struggles is that they lead to escalating violence, drawing in more and more countries, and have the danger of foreign intervention and the probability of the radicalization of the whole continent. . . .' The consequences of radicalization could be serious for other parts of the world and Kissinger, who had been accused by a southern state Governor of 'Lone Ranger' diplomacy, stressed that his purpose was to achieve 'majority rule and protection of minority rights in Rhodesia'.²⁷

Kissinger said he had no specific plan and, despite his meetings with Vorster, the shuttles to Africa by British and American officials, and the willingness of the front-line presidents to co-operate in achieving a negotiated settlement, the omens were far from promising when Kissinger landed in Dar es Salaam. Smith sounded as obdurate as ever, and as a result of difficulties within ZIPA the pressure of the war was showing signs of easing. On 25 August, in an interview published in the *Washington Post*, Smith had rejected majority rule within two years as demanded by Callaghan: 'This question of quick majority rule is a facile, superficial argument to our own plan. I want to assure you that not only the whites in Rhodesia but the majority of the black people in Rhodesia oppose that sort of thing.'²⁸ On 13 September, on the eve of going to meet Vorster in Pretoria and the day before

Kissinger arrived in Dar es Salaam, Smith said: 'We can have no truck with some of the political gimmicks that are so much in credence today—things such as one man one vote or majority rule, which means the counting of heads in the same way as the counting of sheep.'²⁹ It was little wonder that soon after Kissinger's arrival Nyerere urged him to concentrate on Namibia, where Vorster had the political power to bring about a solution.

Kissinger was more confident. During an in-flight briefing on deep background between Europe and Dar es Salaam, he told journalists accompanying him: 'Vorster would not have gone this far if he did not want to make a major effort. He knows what the US needs in terms of concessions. We have to assume he is doing it in good faith. We have evidence that South Africa is putting the screws on Rhodesia.'³⁰ Pressure was certainly being exerted. 'The heat came on bloody suddenly. As a build-up to Kissinger's thing Vorster started applying maximum pressure on Smith,' said one of the members of the Rhodesian delegation who went to Pretoria on 13 September to meet Vorster and a few days later to meet Kissinger.³¹

Pressures within Rhodesia itself were also building up. David Smith, the man favoured by Britain to lead the caretaker administration, had become Minister of Finance on 16 January 1976 and had told his Prime Minister that because of an escalating budget deficit, falling foreign reserves and the general projections of recession, there had to be a settlement not later than 30 June 1977, the end of Rhodesia's financial year. A series of factors led to Rhodesia's worsening economic situation: the loss of the Mozambique routes meant among other things that Rhodesia's citrus exports, which had previously been exported under Mozambique labels, were to a large extent written-off, and prices for exports were falling while there were steep increases for imports, particularly oil.³²

The impact of these various factors are reflected in Rhodesian statistics six to nine months later. 1977 showed a negative growth rate of 7.8 per cent, by far the worst during the UDI years. 'It was a manifestation of the worst aspects of the situation,' a senior Treasury official said later.³³ After Smith returned from seeing Vorster in Pretoria, in the Queen's Hall in Umtali on 15 September he listened to his Finance Minister spelling out some unpalatable truths. Rhodesia's foreign exchange reserves, David Smith said, had fallen alarmingly; without a substantial injection of soft loans, Rhodesia could not pay for the war, import the spare parts and new equipment industry needed, or cope with inflation. It was a politician's speech to members

of the Rhodesian Front Congress, who, even if they did not understand the political realities of their situation, were able to grasp economic truths put in plain language. In political terms the speech helped Smith, for he was having difficulty with RF extremists, some of whom a few months earlier had discussed his removal. Smith, in a new sleight of hand—which he hoped would win over Kissinger—had conceived a plan to bring more Africans into his cabinet in the hope that Kissinger would be satisfied with this cosmetic deception. The party chairman, Des Frost, argued that a large proportion of the party believed the government was 'watering down' RF principles. Decisions such as multi-racial sport in government schools was not in the interests of RF unity, he said. Backed by David Smith's gloomy predictions, Smith called for a vote of confidence: 'Are you coming with me or not? For God's sake, let's be honest.' He won a standing ovation and then returned to Pretoria to meet Kissinger.

Smith ostensibly flew to Pretoria to watch a rugby match and Kissinger went there ostensibly to see Vorster, but for both the goal was a meeting with the other. Nyerere had told Kissinger before he flew south from Dar es Salaam to Pretoria via Lusaka: 'If you are saying you can convert Smith the chances are nil.'³⁴ Kissinger, who had said during his in-flight briefing on the way to Dar es Salaam that his minimum hope would be a commitment from South Africa to work towards majority rule in Rhodesia, told Nyerere: 'If you hear I have seen Smith it is because Vorster has assured me that Smith accepts this thing [majority rule].' In the event of such an improbable miracle occurring Nyerere advised Kissinger to stick to the principles and leave the details to the British, who had greater experience in those things than the American Secretary. It was a piece of sound advice Kissinger ignored, as he had also ignored Britain's repeated insistence that a settlement with Smith in the chair was not possible. These factors were to combine to undo what he was trying to achieve.

On 17 September, when Kissinger flew to South Africa, another six Africans had been gunned down in renewed rioting in Soweto. Kissinger met Vorster the following day. Promptly at 10 a.m. on 19 September, Smith arrived at the residence of the American Ambassador, William Bowdler, in the capital's luxurious Waterkloof suburb overlooking Pretoria, to meet Kissinger. The meeting was scheduled for an hour but lasted for four hours; in all the two men met for eight

hours that day, while Nyerere and Kaunda wondered whether Kissinger had held his promise not to meet Smith unless the latter first accepted majority rule.

The key to what occurred on 19 September between Kissinger and Smith lay in the meeting a few days earlier between Vorster and Smith. Unknown to anyone Vorster had forced Smith to accept the principle of majority rule within two years. Smith had gone back to his RF congress and, without telling them what he had agreed with Vorster, obtained from them a mandate to negotiate with Kissinger.

One of Smith's aides who sat through both meetings on 19 September described what happened. 'Before the meeting started Kissinger had twenty minutes alone with Smith. I don't know what was said but Smith was far more pliable when we assembled than I had ever known him to be. Kissinger was disarming. He knew his subject, he was forthright, and he kept saying he had no mandate for negotiations, he was only trying to help. He said his proposals were essentially British proposals, with American backing, and he stressed he would support them as long as he was in power, which might be another six weeks. If Carter came in there would be no prospect of a settlement, he said. Kissinger said "We have our own intelligence and you have yours. If you continue the war there will be no end. You will finish up raiding deeper into Zambia and Mozambique." He stressed he was not making threats or bringing pressure to bear, he saw the situation as a tragedy. Kissinger impressed the Rhodesians with his knowledge of their economic and military difficulties and an accurate analysis of their situation. Aides said he drew a word map of the world for Smith, beginning with the most important spheres of American interest and reducing Rhodesia to a microscopic point near the end. Then he unfolded his five points. Since Smith's meeting with Vorster we knew roughly what to expect. There was a lot of backchat and Kissinger finally said "Let's not play games." Those points included progression to majority rule within two years and an executive council.'³⁵

Smith began a rearguard action to save what he could. The chairman of the executive council, he said, must be white; in addition two key cabinet portfolios, those of Defence and of Law and Order must be filled by whites during the life of the interim government; the white commanders of the forces must also remain in their posts. Kissinger said that he would have to get the reaction of the front-line leaders to these points of detail. It would be easier, he said, if one of the two key portfolios was filled by a white and the other by a black; Smith

countered that, although members of his delegation were prepared to accept a black Defence Minister, he would not be able to sell this to his party. There was also some debate over the method of appointing the members of the executive council, which Smith was intent upon chairing. Smith asked how the members would be appointed, saying that the black members would have to be acceptable to white Rhodesians; Kissinger rejected this, arguing that they would have to be acceptable to the front-line leaders. Kaunda wanted Nkomo, he said, and Nyerere was likely to want a ZANU presence—probably Mugabe, Schaufele interjected. Kissinger said that there was no problem with Kaunda over the proposals but added that he was uncertain about Nyerere; he told the Rhodesians that he did not trust Nyerere and accused him of having leaked details in the past. It was essential, Kissinger said, to keep the details of any deal they reached secret. If the Russians found out they would intrude and try to influence the nominations to get their own men on to the executive council.³⁶

Kissinger made one serious gaffe during the negotiations, which upset the CIA. Although he did not produce any intelligence reports or other documents he kept referring to 'our intelligence and your intelligence'. The United States had theoretically withdrawn official links with Rhodesia in 1969 but the CIA, with the full knowledge of their Rhodesian counterparts, had maintained a fullscale operation in Rhodesia. Kissinger, by referring to 'our own intelligence links', confirmed this clandestine operation, and this embarrassed the CIA who had told the President and State Department that they had withdrawn from Rhodesia.³⁷

At 2 p.m. the delegations adjourned to 'pause for reflection', with Kissinger saying he wanted to leave that night but if Smith wanted more time he would remain. There was almost a mood of relief in the Rhodesian delegation as they assessed the situation during the afternoon. They met at the residence of Rhodesia's diplomatic representative in Pretoria, Harold Hawkins, and Smith took the line that they had no choice but to give in but they should not do so too quickly. One of the delegation observed that 'anyone asked to commit political suicide should be allowed to do it in his own time.' They would insist on the two key portfolios—and finance if they could get it—being in white hands, and Smith said he thought he should chair the executive council. These thoughts were relayed to Vorster by Smith during the afternoon and just before 6 p.m., this time with Vorster in attendance, the delegation reassembled. The meeting was interrupted before it got under way by Kissinger's wife, Nancy. During the morning session

Kissinger had said that Nancy would never forgive him if she missed Smith because he was a 'great hero of hers'; as the second session was beginning Nancy arrived on the balcony of Vorster's official residence, Libertas, and upon seeing Smith, burst into the room and embraced the embarrassed Rhodesian leader.³⁸

During the morning session Smith had raised the possibility of renouncing UDI and returning to the 1961 constitution. Kissinger said he was unsure what Britain's reaction would be but it was not his impression that they wished to assume their colonial responsibility. During the lunch break Kissinger contacted the British Ambassador, who sent a message to London to get reaction. The reply was negative, Britain did not want to get drawn into the Rhodesian crisis any further.³⁹ Smith indicated his acceptance of Kissinger's proposals during this session on the understanding that the Secretary of State obtained agreement from the front-line leaders on the points he had raised. Late in the meeting Kissinger and Vorster with their advisers left the Rhodesian delegation and went and held private discussions, and when they returned they proposed that Smith should indicate the whole plan was his idea. Kissinger and Vorster felt they could not be seen to have been pressurizing Smith, and thus if the plan failed there would be no recriminations against them. However, Smith had to face his parliamentary caucus and party and explain why, having said there would not be majority rule in his life or in a thousand years, he had now accepted majority rule within two years, and he could not possibly suggest the whole plan was his idea.

On 20 September Kissinger indicated to journalists (during his in-flight briefing on the way to Lusaka) that he had secured an agreement, but a lot of unanticipated detail had come up. On deep background, in reply to a question as to whether there was not a danger of Smith double-crossing him, Kissinger replied: 'It would not be costless for Smith to double-cross me or con me in the presence of the South African Prime Minister who got us to talk in the first place.'⁴⁰ It was one thing to double-cross Kaunda and quite another to double-cross South Africa and the United States jointly.

Kissinger had been impressed by Smith. The Rhodesian, he said, had offered him his 'head on a platter', and he added: 'For what must have been the most painful day of their lives the Rhodesians behaved with great dignity.'⁴¹ Contrary to the British view Kissinger and Vorster had concluded that Smith could play a useful role in a settlement, although Kissinger observed that the 'process will continue with or without him'. He said the factors which had made Smith give

way were the poor weapons the Rhodesian forces had compared to the new ones the guerrillas possessed, ancient helicopters which could not be replaced, the mounting exodus of whites, the increasing call-up, which was affecting the economy, the general state of the economy and the mounting war casualties. 'The clincher is Vorster putting the screws on,' Kissinger added.⁴²

Kaunda's response to the proposals Kissinger laid out was cautious, and Nkomo, the only one of the nationalists Kissinger met, said the proposals had 'very serious flaws'.⁴³ On 21 September Nkomo was given the outline of the broadcast Smith was to make three days later; part of this said: 'In the Council of Ministers the Rhodesians specifically requested that they control the two Ministers of Defence and Law and Order. The reasons for this is the fear of a possible breakdown of the administration during the period of transition. They refer to the problems in Angola in which case there were arrests and counter-arrests which finally led to the breakdown of Government machinery.'⁴⁴ The next day Kissinger flew to Dar es Salaam to meet Nyerere, whose earlier mood of pessimism gave way to optimism. On 22 September Smith received a message from Kissinger saying that Nyerere had found the five-point plan 'an acceptable basis for settlement of the Rhodesian question'. The Secretary of State also told Smith he could make two additions to the original five-point plan given to him: he could add the reference to a white chairman of the Council of State, and 'We also believe on the basis of our discussions in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam that, in point three, a new sentence can be added.' This sentence was: 'For the period of the interim Government, the Ministers of Defence and of Law and Order would be white.'⁴⁵

Kissinger did not say that Nyerere and Kaunda had approved these insertions but he certainly implied that they had. Kissinger later said he had told Nyerere the details, but Nyerere's aides insisted that he had not. Asked subsequently who was telling the truth, Kissinger replied that both sides were. Kaunda thought that Kissinger, after the Zambian's cautious response, had not given Nyerere the details, and certainly Kissinger's comments in Pretoria to the Rhodesians about Nyerere would seem to support this view. One of Callaghan's aides said Kissinger used 'constructive ambiguity, to use his own phrase, which means lying to both sides'.⁴⁶

At 8 p.m. on 24 September, Smith addressed the nation. His cabinet and the RF parliamentary caucus had endorsed the plan. In Pretoria, Smith said, it had been made abundantly clear that in the present

circumstances Rhodesia could expect no support from the 'free world'. On the contrary, pressure would continue to mount. 'Dr Kissinger assured me that we share a common aim and a common purpose, namely to keep Rhodesia in the free world, and to keep it free from Communist penetration,' Smith said. The proposals he had accepted were a 'package deal', some parts of which were more acceptable than others, but he had been assured by the United States and Britain that, once the 'preliminaries' were completed, sanctions would be lifted and the war would end. Then he read the five points Kissinger had put to him in Pretoria plus the insertions he had been told he could make. Rhodesia agreed to majority rule within two years, to the establishment of an interim government consisting of a Council of State with equal numbers of blacks and whites with a white chairman, to a Council of Ministers with a black majority and black Prime Minister but with the two portfolios he had demanded remaining in white hands, and that once these steps had been taken sanctions would be lifted and the war would end. Smith continued by quoting a phrase used by Winston Churchill during the Second World War: 'Now is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end; but it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.'⁴⁷

During his speech Smith also spoke of a substantial internationally financed trust fund to develop the country and train technicians. On 30 March 1976, after the breakdown of the Smith-Nkomo talks, Nyerere had circulated a memorandum to his Commonwealth colleagues pointing out that an intensification of the war was inevitable and proposing a fund to buy out the white hardliners and racials. He divided the whites into three categories—those who were racials who would be ideologically unable to live under black rule, those who were paternalists who would not be able to adjust to treating Africans as equals, and the 'minority of the minority' who would be able to make the transition. Nyerere had proposed a Commonwealth fund to finance the movement and resettlement of those in the first two categories, and the easing of emigration requirements by countries where they wanted to settle. By undermining Smith's hardline constituency, Nyerere argued that it would be possible to shorten the war.⁴⁸

The flaw in Nyerere's argument was that what he was proposing ran completely against capitalist interests, which were to persuade the whites to stay and enlarge the capitalist base. Britain immediately rejected the plan and Kissinger began working on a plan to establish a

fund to persuade the whites to stay. Late in 1976 a United States inter-agency group which included the State Department, the CIA and Pentagon, completed a confidential paper for a £750,000,000 Zimbabwe Fund to be managed by the World Bank and supported by eighteen industrialized and OPEC nations. The United States was to subscribe about a third of the fund and the objective was to steer an independent Zimbabwe on a 'moderate' course on the lines of the Kenya model. 'It seems to us,' said Mugabe 'as if its purpose is to bind Zimbabwe politically and economically and it would compromise our independence.'⁴⁹

Kissinger's plane was high over the western Atlantic approaching Newfoundland when Smith made his broadcast. The crew picked up the BBC World Service and piped it into the plane's public address system. Kissinger, in slippers and wearing a rumpled white shirt and baggy trousers, listened impassively. He showed no signs of jubilation as Smith's monotone voice, 9,600 kilometres away, spelled out the terms of his surrender. 'Kissinger's face', wrote one correspondent on the plane, 'was impassive, almost like a scowling Buddha.'⁵⁰ He realized that this agreement had committed Smith to a course from which he could not retreat, but that considerable difficulty lay ahead in reaching a settlement which would stop the war and the 'radicalization' of the nationalist movements.

Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel, Khama and Neto met in Lusaka on 25 and 26 September to consider the proposals Smith had broadcast. They hailed Smith's surrender to majority rule as a victory for the guerrillas, but added: 'The Presidents have carefully studied the proposals as outlined by the illegal and racist regime which if accepted would be tantamount to legalising the colonialist and racist structures of power. And details relating to the structure and functions of the transitional Government should be left to the conference' which they called upon Britain to convene immediately outside Rhodesia.⁵¹ By agreeing to Smith's demands that Ministries of Defence and of Law and Order remain in white hands during the transition, by accepting a two-tier government structure and agreeing to a white chairman on the Council of State, Kissinger had overstepped his mandate from Britain and the front-line states: he had become involved in detail that was properly a matter for negotiation between Smith and the nationalists.

Kissinger had misunderstood two important things. The first was that Nyerere was not giving him a negotiating position when he flew

south to Pretoria—it was the minimum position only. On his way to Dar es Salaam from Europe at the start of his second shuttle Kissinger had expressed the view that Africans did not respond to Middle East remedies and that he was having difficulty interpreting what they said. What he meant was that they did not bargain like Arabs, and at one point Nyerere bluntly told him: 'I am not a trade unionist. This is not a bargaining point.'⁵² One of Callaghan's aides said: 'He also misunderstood the nature of the relations between the front-line states and nationalists, that the paymasters did not control. He admitted in private that he misunderstood this and that it was a bad mistake. So Kissinger felt that all he had to do was talk to the front-line presidents while ignoring the nationalists and they would be knocked into line by the presidents. His overwhelming mistake was Smith. He believed Smith was an honourable and brave man whom he could deal with, and therefore what Vorster and Kissinger put to Smith he was allowed to amend because he was a good and honest man. The proposition that Kissinger and Vorster put to Smith was that you go and we then have a caretaker white government who will commit themselves to majority rule, but Smith ditched them. He said there was no other leader who could carry the Europeans, and basically the caretaker government and his departure was not necessary because he would commit himself to majority rule. And that was where it fell apart. We knew Geneva had no hope because Smith was trying to get out of the commitment and we had no hand to play. I said to Kissinger later, "Henry, where you went wrong was that you had Smith down but you did not nail him to the floor."'⁵³

A further difficulty Kissinger had was understanding the British cabinet system of government and decision-making. All Kissinger had to do was convince his President when he wanted to do something; but Anthony Crosland, who had become Foreign Secretary on 1 April, had to win over his colleagues. In 1976 the Cabinet's instinct was stay well clear of Rhodesia, which several Ministers regarded as another potentially debilitating Northern Ireland crisis for Britain. Crosland had a battle in Cabinet to persuade his colleagues that there should be a British chairman at the Geneva conference: 'The view was that Britain should not get involved, that it did not have the power, money or will to intervene,' said one of Crosland's advisers. 'Crosland thought Britain should have the will without overestimating the power.'⁵⁴ With the Africans insisting that Britain as the colonial power could not sit on the sidelines as an umpire and must be a direct participant, Crosland announced on 29 September the convening of a

conference 'anywhere in Southern Africa acceptable to the parties concerned', to be chaired by the British Ambassador to the UN, Ivor Richard. An African venue could not be agreed and the conference finally opened in Geneva on 28 October, by which time several important developments had taken place.

Early in October 1976 Mugabe and Moyo had begun negotiations which concluded in Maputo with the creation of the Patriotic Front, an organization embracing ZANU and ZAPU. This brought them together as a joint negotiating team at Geneva and all subsequent conferences before independence in 1980, and reduced the possibility of Smith, the British and Americans being able to play upon divisions during negotiations. A further important development was that on 17 October Kaunda began releasing the detained ZANU leaders. Tongogara was acquitted on 20 October and released the following day.

This sequence of events was, however, to lead to a new crisis within ZANU. Although in March and again in September the ZANLA members of the ZIPA military committee had given Machel the list of the men they recognized as their political leaders, when the detained leaders were released they sought to reject them. Gwaunya, the ZIPA Director of Political Affairs, in a letter dated 26 January 1976 to all ZANU central committee members and representatives abroad, spelt out the position of the party and guerrillas:

For your own information, Comrades, we would like again to inform you that ZANLA holds all the key posts in this Committee [the ZIPA military committee]. In order to save the party you and us here should work as one, and if you have any suggestions to make to us, please Comrades, do so freely as revolutionaries, that is including criticisms of our party. We did this in full consultation with our leaders in prison in Zambia. They fully know what is going on.

Now to make this committee work we ask you to work for it so that within months we will be in a position to speak our beloved ZANU again. We will also be in a position to release our beloved ZANU again.

Your work abroad is to preach for ZANU while talking the language of the Zimbabwe People's Army. You must highlight ZANU and never allow the name of the party to fade away. We in ZANLA say 'Pamberi ne Mutupo', which is ZANU.⁵⁵

Thus, during the months preceding the Geneva conference, the guerrillas had acknowledged Mugabe, Tongogara and other detainees as their leaders, had actively sought the release of the detainees, had acknowledged the role the detainees had played in creating ZIPA, and had committed themselves to resurrecting ZANU. However, at a press conference in Maputo on 30 October at which he rejected the settlement plan and proposal for an interim government, Machingura, ZIPA's deputy Political Commissar and a member of the ZANLA high command, said that the transformation of ZIPA into a political movement was an inevitable process. A fortnight later he rejected Mugabe's political leadership and in an interview with the Tanzanian government newspaper, the *Daily News*, he said '... ZIPA is a unique and revolutionary army in the sense that it has a strategic role of transforming itself into a political movement.' He went on to say: 'We have to establish a formal political structure in order to give better political direction to the armed body that is now fighting inside Zimbabwe. And moves to do this are already well under way, moves to transform this organisation into a revolutionary vanguard for the people's struggle.'⁵⁶ Members of the ZANLA high command released from prison in Zambia were denied entry to the camps in Mozambique by the ZIPRA commanders, and in Lusaka at a consultative conference Machingura refused to accept the authority of ZANU or to agree to ZIPRA attending the Geneva conference as members of ZANU.

Without telling Mugabe, Machingura and his colleagues flew to Dar es Salaam and then on to Zanzibar to see Nyerere where, accidentally or otherwise, they misinterpreted what he said. Geneva was the political front, Nyerere told them; their task was at the military front and they should go and intensify the struggle. At Chimoio ZIPA had already elected an eight-member delegation headed by Nhongo and including Machingura to go to Geneva separate from ZANU, and Machingura and his colleagues interpreted Nyerere's remarks as meaning that he recognized ZIPA as a separate entity and that they should not attend the Geneva conference.⁵⁷ Only one of the ZIPA commanders whom Mugabe had ordered to join his delegation, Joe Taderera, actually accompanied the ZANU leader to Geneva. Nhongo, whom Tongogara had tried to persuade to go with them, argued that if he did, none of the leadership would ever get into the camps in Mozambique after the conference and that he must therefore remain behind to try to resolve the crisis.⁵⁸

The Geneva conference, despite the stoic persistence of chairman Ivor Richard, was doomed before it started. Kissinger had conceded details to Smith in Pretoria—and in his message from Dar es Salaam—which should have been points of negotiation; Smith argued that his agreement with Kissinger, about which the nationalists had not even been consulted, was a solemn and binding agreement not subject to negotiation. Furthermore two confidential Rhodesian documents dated October 1976 reveal that Smith had little or no intention of reaching an agreement. One of these, headed 'Presentation of the Pretoria Agreement', provides an insight into why Smith accepted the Kissinger plan:

The economic and social fabric of the country was under severe strain due to restricted transport facilities for exports, the repercussive effects of the international recession and the intensification of military operations.

The flow of essential war material had slowed considerably and the availability of finance for the purchase of military hardware was diminishing.

It was clear, therefore, that if we were to reject any proposal we would have to be frank with the Rhodesian public and, in particular, the Security Forces, and indicate that we would be fighting the war in a deteriorating economic situation and with the essential wherewithal to fight in shorter and shorter supply.⁵⁹

The second document, 'Directive for National Psychological Campaign', put out by the Psychological Action Unit and dated 15 October, said the Kissinger package would benefit Rhodesia in three ways. The lifting of sanctions and tacit support of the West would make it easier for Rhodesia to obtain modern weapons and recruit mercenaries, and would put the country in a stronger position to conduct counter-insurgency and a classical war role. Ten appendices to this document were aimed at various 'target groups'. The one for members of the security forces stressed that 50 per cent white membership on the Council of State ensured that no dramatic changes could take place and the existing laws and regulations would remain unchanged; as a last resort the Rhodesian Front parliamentarians could block any proposed new constitution. Those 'selling' the package were instructed to 'emphasise that this is an achievement for moderation and responsibility and a defeat for terrorism, Marxism and extremism; therefore, it is not in any sense a sell-out or a capitulation'. The United States, the document said, wanted to establish

moderate governments in Rhodesia and Namibia who would form a block with Zambia, Zaire, Malawi, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to prevent further communist penetration: the group would be given substantial economic aid and armaments to strengthen its capacity to resist 'the Communist expansion plans'.

Richard opened the Geneva conference on 28 October and the first four weeks were taken up by an inconclusive debate about a date for independence. Nkomo and Mugabe wanted independence in a little over ten months on 1 September 1977; Smith clung to the outside limit of two years; Muzorewa and Sithole remained in the middle, and Richard tried to get a compromise date of 1 March 1978. Finally it was agreed that Richard's date was the latest date for independence but this could be achieved earlier, by 1 December 1977. In reality the matter was deferred without an independence date being fixed and the conference moved into another inconclusive phase. All of the nationalist delegations rejected Kissinger's proposed Council of State with a white chairman and the retention of the Ministries of Defence and of Law and Order in white hands during the interim; Smith stuck to his contention that he had an agreement and the purpose of Geneva was simply to fill in the details. Finally, on 14 December, after almost nine fruitless weeks, Richard adjourned the conference.

While all this had been taking place the simmering ZIPA crisis had erupted in Mozambique. There were reports of arms being brought back from the front into Mozambique and of some members of the ZIPA military committee creating private armies with the intention of, as a minimum, arresting the ZANU leadership on its return from Geneva. Mugabe was dissuaded by the front-line representatives in Geneva from leaving the conference and flying to Mozambique to try to resolve the crisis personally, and instead he sent Tongogara, Hamadziripi and Kangai. A delegation of three members of the ZIPA high command—Mudzingwa, Todlana and Nyikadzinashé—arrived in Maputo at the same time and met the Mozambique Minister of Defence, Alberto Chipande; they were accompanied by John Chifamba, one of the guerrillas working on the 'Voice of Zimbabwe' radio programme which was beamed nightly to Rhodesia from Maputo. Mudzingwa and Todlana, both former ZIPRA guerrillas, did most of the talking. The political and military leaders who had been released in Zambia after twenty months' imprisonment were out of touch with what was taking place at home and within the army and thus were not in a position to resume command; they had therefore been barred from the camps to avoid confusion. Mudzingwa and

Todlana went on to denounce the released leaders as 'reactionaries and bourgeois who were not fit to lead an army which had been transforming, which had attained a certain ideological platform'.⁶⁰ Chipande said this was a serious matter which he could report to Machel, and the ZIPA commanders left feeling they had Mozambique's support. They ordered Chifamba to destroy the minutes, saying: 'They are dangerous. Things might not be well tomorrow and we'll be in the soup.'

The three ZIPA commanders returned to Chimoio not realizing that FRELIMO was briefing Tongogara, Hamadziripi and Kangai on exactly what was happening. A week later Machel called the whole ZIPA military committee to Maputo. They arrived with four documents written by some members of the committee: one condemned Mugabe, Tekere and Muzenda, another denounced Geneva, and a third was about a new revolutionary committee they planned to form to transform ZIPA into a political party. The documents were given to the Tanzanian and socialist bloc embassies and taken to the Mozambique Ministry of Information to be broadcast on the 'Voice of Zimbabwe' that night. The Minister, Jorge Robello, ordered that the documents should be withheld until he had time to consult Machel, and the President ordered that all copies must be impounded, including those which had gone to embassies. The next day the ZIPA commanders were called to Belem, where Machel was on holiday. The Mozambique leader pointed out that the guerrillas had created the Geneva conference through the military front and now they were playing down its importance. On the following day Machel attacked the commanders, demanding to know who Machingura, the apparent ring-leader, thought he was: he was not fit to be a section commander and after independence would have difficulty getting in the back door of State House, the Mozambiquan said. Machel forced them to send a message of solidarity from the guerrillas to Mugabe and dispatched six of them—Nhongo, Chimurenga, Hondo, Machingura, Mudende and Pfeferere—to Geneva to join the ZANU delegation, refusing to allow them even to return to Chimoio to collect extra clothes.⁶¹

When Richard adjourned the Geneva conference in mid-December, the ZIPA commanders, with the exception of Nhongo, were sent on various overseas missions so that Tongogara and Nhongo could get back to Mozambique ahead of them, get into the camps and begin to take control of the situation. In late December, in Maputo's Cardoso Hotel, a ZIPA cadre, Abel Sibanda, who also worked on the 'Voice of Zimbabwe', told Tongogara to his face: 'You are finished. You cannot do anything now. You don't have an army. You are

finished.⁶² The reverse was in fact the case: the ZIPA commanders had ignored the extremely close relations Tongogara had developed before his detention with members of the high command of the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM), the attitude of FRELIMO towards attempted *coups d'état* within liberation movements, and their determination to prevent killings within the liberation movement. On 18 January members of ZANU's central committee, the high command and the ZIPA military committee met in a military base a few hundred yards from Beira airport. The FRELIMO Governor of Manica e Sofala opened the meeting, saying the affairs of Mozambique and Zimbabwe were interrelated; FRELIMO wanted an independent and united Zimbabwe and anyone who opposed that was an enemy of FRELIMO. Muzenda, who chaired the meeting, accused the ZIPA commanders of planning a *coup d'état*: 'Do you think you boys can go and rule Zimbabwe?' he asked. Tongogara read the names of people required at a special meeting elsewhere. Twenty-five unsuspecting ZIPA military committee and general staff members boarded buses to go to the meeting and found themselves taken into FRELIMO custody for the next three years.⁶³

Chifamba, who was to later join them in custody but returned to ZANU after his release early in 1980, later gave his analysis of the underlying reasons for the crisis. 'In retrospect I think it was a combination of factors. Ambition, yes. People had been used to practising power, authority, for quite some time. They had been prematurely planted into leadership by the situation created in Zambia, and after having exercised leadership for over a year to think of handing over that leadership to some other people, to think of being subservient to other authorities, was very difficult for most of those young people to take, so it was the question of ambition which led some to resist the authority of the party. They were already thinking in terms of transforming themselves, so to think of others giving them orders was impossible. By the end of 1976 most of them believed that there was no one in Zimbabwe let alone in ZANU who could give them political or ideological direction. They were the know-alls. They knew everything. They were the teachers, they had to teach the people and not receive education from the people.' Their ultra-leftism, Chifamba said, 'bordered on the premise of these infantile disorders spoken of by Lenin—left-wing Communism—this blind ideological direction which reaches absurdity'.⁶⁴

Ivor Richard had meanwhile arrived in Salisbury on New Year's Day on a protracted shuttle. He had a new plan for a transitional government headed by a British interim Commissioner: the government would be led by a Council of Ministers comprising equal representation by each of the delegations represented at Geneva plus representatives of the European Community appointed by the Commissioner. Such a council would have a substantial African majority. The Commissioner would be guided by an Advisory Council consisting of the heads of delegations at Geneva, and they would also serve on a National Security Council headed by the Commissioner and including the heads of the army and police force. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal Security would come under the Commissioner. This plan scrapped the details Kissinger had conceded to Smith in Pretoria, including the white chairmanship of a Council of State and the Ministries of Defence and of Law and Order remaining in RF hands. In Salisbury almost four weeks after he began his shuttle Richard admitted defeat. Smith rejected the new proposals, insisting that he would not accept anything other than the Kissinger proposals. Richard described it as 'a tragic and fateful decision',⁶⁵ while Smith in a radio and television broadcast said: 'After all our efforts and the sacrifices which have been made, there can be no question of surrender. If we were to give way now, it would not be to majority rule, it would be to a Marxist-indoctrinated minority.'⁶⁶

Smith had chosen his moment well to block further discussion. Jimmy Carter's victory over Ford in the American presidential election had led to the departure of Kissinger and—at least until the new administration found its feet—the removal of American pressure. Nevertheless Kissinger's mission achieved a number of important things: Smith had finally conceded to the principle of majority rule and it was a position he was never able to retreat from. Future negotiations would be about the methods of achieving this, and not whether there should be majority rule.

This period had also seen the re-emergence of ZANU, the start of Mugabe asserting his authority as party leader, the creation of the Patriotic Front and the release of ZANU's detained leaders—the most important of whom, in terms of the war, was Tongogara. The young rebellious commanders of ZIPA had done well in resuming the war—191 members of the Rhodesian security forces died during 1976, forty-five European civilians were killed and the war covered a far larger area than ever before—but they lacked Tongogara's authority and conspicuous qualities of leadership.

The Storm Gathers

When a suave new British Foreign Secretary jogged down the steps of the Royal Air Force VC-10 at Dar es Salaam airport on 11 April 1977, it marked the start of yet another initiative. It could not succeed because the pressure of war was not yet sufficient to make the Rhodesians capitulate to reality, but it would add new links to the chain of events begun by Kissinger and, as it ran its two-year course, the war would spread across the country like the *Gukurahundi*, encircling the cities and dampening white morale.

Facing the tropical heat of Dar es Salaam on that sunny April day, Dr David Owen spoke of a 'peaceful transition' to majority rule in Rhodesia and of independence by 1978. He said he had come to listen and to look for 'a way forward'. Dr Owen, a neurologist, was thirty-eight, the youngest member of the British cabinet and the youngest Foreign Secretary in thirty years. He was described as 'candid and forthright', and he later wrote: 'Sooner or later the conditions in Southern Africa that today mock human dignity and stir up racial tension will be eliminated. The only question is whether the transition will come peacefully or through further violence. Our task is to ensure that it is the path of peace that leads to justice. . . . We and other Western democracies can justify our economic stake . . . only if it can be used, and be seen to be used, as an effective instrument for promoting change. . . .'¹

Dr Owen was a novice in Africa and British officials described this first visit as a 'familiarization' tour, but they conceded that the convening and chairing of a full-scale constitutional conference on Rhodesia

was an 'option' being considered.² The Geneva conference had become bogged down in the details for interim arrangements and Owen felt those could be sorted out after a constitution had been agreed. His reception, through seven nations in less than two weeks, was lukewarm, although he impressed officials in Salisbury with his energetic schedule. He insisted on meeting leaders of the People's Movement, which had emerged after Geneva as the internal wing of the banned ZANU party, and the Rev. Canaan Banana and Nolan Makombe—who would become after independence the President of Zimbabwe and Speaker of the Senate respectively—were released from prison and redetained after becoming leaders of the Movement. The front-line states mistrusted British motives and questioned whether they were seriously seeking a solution. Two years earlier, Harold Wilson had promised an imminent constitutional conference which had not materialized, three more attempts to talk to Smith had failed in the meantime, and the front-line grouping had long since committed itself to intensification of the fighting. Owen's reception in Zambia was publicly hostile over the question of sanctions-busting. Kaunda had accused the British government of 'oiling Smith's war machine' and was threatening to sue five Western oil companies, including one partly owned by the British government. Owen tried to thaw relations by announcing, a few days before his departure for Africa, that there would be an inquiry into the question of oil to Rhodesia. The inquiry was completed eighteen months later when Thomas Bingham, Q.C., issued his controversial report revealing details of sanctions-breaking operations. The Zambian suit against the oil companies for three thousand million pounds was already in the courts.³

The path through the front-line states was well worn and Owen found himself in the immediate wake of several other international travellers. Two weeks earlier the Soviet President, Podgorny, had set nerves on edge in the white south when he visited Zambia and peered across the Zambezi River at Rhodesia, where Vorster had stood several months before him. The nineteen-month interval between the visits by those two balding, sombre men, in grey suits and hats, had fostered further impatience with negotiations and most of the front-line governments were now committed to the war. They needed heavier weapons and equipment for their own defence, as well as for the guerrillas, and Podgorny had some military officials in his delegation who could discuss that. There was, however, no need for the paranoia that occurred over the visit because the front-line states

mistrusted both superpowers to varying degrees and were firm in their conviction of 'non-alignment'.

The Tanzanians refused to allow Podgorny's visit to coincide with an important national day or to let him address a mammoth rally as had Chou en-Lai, or even to hold wide discussions. Nyerere was highly principled about refusing any aid with political strings attached, as Kissinger had discovered, and, besides, the Russians had not yet finished the Kiwiri hydro-electric project which they began in 1964 and Tanzania was threatening to cancel the whole thing. The Russians were behaving over Zimbabwe much as the Americans had behaved over Angola two years earlier, in failing, or refusing, to recognize which liberation movement was the choice of the majority of people of the country. They refused military support to ZANU for the duration of the war—the East Germans told ZANU towards the end that they regarded them as a 'splinter group' that should rejoin ZAPU—and the heavier Soviet-made equipment that ZANLA needed so desperately in the later stages they acquired from FRELIMO.

The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, had flitted through the front-line states in uniform just ahead of Podgorny to a boisterous and enthusiastic folk-hero's welcome that emphasized the lack of enthusiasm towards the Soviet visitor. The visitor preceding Castro—though a proponent of Western capitalism—had been equally flamboyant and outspoken in the cause of racial justice in southern Africa. Andrew Young, the black American congressman who had recently been appointed Ambassador to the United Nations, reflected new American economic realities in Africa: 'You can't go on doing business with black Africa with one set of principles and then deny those principles in dealing with South Africa,' was his theme.⁴ Behind his comments lay statistics showing that US trade with black Africa had mushroomed to such an extent that by the time Carter visited West Africa a year later, trade with Nigeria alone had surpassed that with South Africa.⁵

Nyerere, who hoped to resurrect the kind of understanding he associated with the United States during the era of President Kennedy, had dispatched a senior official to Washington during the 1976 election campaign to poll candidates on their Africa policy.⁶ He now hoped to appeal to the new President, Jimmy Carter, on the basis of human rights, a change from having constantly to assure Kissinger and Ford that African independence did not mean a Russian takeover. Carter, who had taken office in January, felt that a positive

interest in Africa would encourage black voters who had helped to put him into power, and one of his first acts was to call for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which allowed American companies to buy Rhodesian chrome in spite of sanctions. The amendment was repealed in March as a signal to the Rhodesians that 'under no circumstances can they count on any form of American assistance.'⁷ British Prime Minister Callaghan visited Washington at about the same time, searching for American assistance in finding a Rhodesian solution; instead of running alongside while Kissinger carried the ball, they would now take the leading role with American support. Dr Owen and Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, agreed to sponsor a conference to discuss a constitution. Throughout Dr Owen's exploratory shuttle, he emphasized two points: that an 'independence conference', as he preferred to call it, must reflect as many shades of Rhodesian opinion as possible, and that the British government had little power to implement an agreement and would rely on the muscle of the United States.

It was on that very point that Dr Owen got into immediate difficulty with the Patriotic Front, whose leaders argued that they did not want any outside powers involved and that any negotiations must take place between the British government, as the colonial authority, and the guerrillas, represented by the Patriotic Front. Smith, they said, could attend as part of the British delegation.⁸ Dr Owen began to realize that another formal conference, no matter what the order of discussion, would go the way of Geneva and he began hinting that he may not propose a single conference. A series of mini-conferences or formal consultations could be used to maintain the momentum. That decision set the pattern for the 'Anglo-American initiative' and two years of constant shuttle negotiations.

Dr Owen was hardly back in London when the envoys were named for the first shuttle—John Graham, a deputy under-secretary in charge of supervising African departments in the Foreign Office, and Stephen Low, the American Ambassador to Zambia. They began their tour through the region late in May, soon after a United Nations conference in Mozambique 'in support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia'. The location of the conference was its *raison d'être*: it transported 600 delegates from fifty countries to southern Africa, the actual centre of those problems normally debated within the cloisters of the UN headquarters in New York. Samora Machel told the delegates it was incorrect to speak of a 'peaceful' solution when a war

was already going on; the only solution, he said, would be to remove the causes of the war. Young, who headed the American delegation, again emphasized American interest in African affairs and particularly black American interest—‘the hand that picked the cotton picked the President,’ he observed.

The US Vice-President, Walter Mondale, met Vorster in Vienna in May 1977, and the lack of enthusiasm reflected South Africa’s dissatisfaction with the new American administration whose UN ambassador had described the apartheid regime as ‘illegitimate’.⁹ In July, in Gabon, the annual summit of OAU heads of state recognized the Patriotic Front as the ‘fighting force’ in Rhodesia. In Salisbury, van der Byl exploded over Owen’s description of the Patriotic Front as ‘men of peace forced into violence’ and said they were ‘criminal terrorists’ who should never have been allowed to go to Geneva.

This was the atmosphere when Owen and Young visited Africa at the end of August, carrying a document entitled *Rhodesia—Proposals for a Settlement*.¹⁰ It had had a difficult birth. The Graham–Low shuttle team had been rebuffed on both sides of the Zambezi in July. Smith accused them of trying to orchestrate a ‘handover’ to the Patriotic Front and said they would have to change their attitude on ‘fundamental issues’ relating to white confidence. Mugabe said that while proposing debate on ‘the niceties of constitutional arrangements, franchise, Bill of Rights, amnesty and indemnification’, the British had ignored the ‘vital issue of who holds power during the interim period—whose army will be in control?’¹¹ Nkomo told them the whole plan was upside down and out of date.

When Owen took a draft to his cabinet colleagues a few days later, he found himself under attack from Wedgwood Benn on the left to Denis Healey on the right at the prospect of British military involvement and the whole mission was described as stalled and the plan ‘effectively dead’.¹² A majority of cabinet ministers thought the plan contained the ‘dangerous seed of a “British Vietnam”’. Their refusal to commit ‘a single British troop’ was reinforced by emphatic American rejection of a military role and reluctance to provide even logistical support. Owen’s cabinet colleagues then began to recoil from the previously agreed notion of providing some form of interim civil administration under a Resident Commissioner, and they refused to heed his assurance that involvement of any form was wholly conditional on acceptance of the constitutional proposals and cessation of the armed conflict.

The shuttles continued and extended across the Atlantic. Owen,

Vance, Graham and Low met in Washington, then regrouped a few days later in London. They consulted with Callaghan and Carter. President Nyerere went to Washington. Bishop Muzorewa went to London and so did the South African Foreign Minister, ‘Pik’ Botha. It was a much more abrasive, less candid, and more knowledgeable Owen who embarked with Young—and with heavily amended and still secret proposals—in August. They immediately ran into difficulties and Dr Owen’s new ‘take it or leave it’ approach left a trail of hostility throughout their deliberations.

After the first meeting in Lusaka with the front-line presidents and the Patriotic Front, a Tanzanian official shook his head morosely and said: ‘Our positions are absolutely irreconcilable.’ The Botswana Foreign Minister, Archie Mogwe, said very loudly as he emerged from the meeting, ‘Owen missed his chance’, and he accused the British Foreign Secretary of slapping the proposals down on the table as the final solution. A British official confirmed that ‘nothing in broad terms’ was intended to be changed.¹³

President Nyerere told a news conference that the forthcoming proposals would be unacceptable in Africa unless they included the removal of Ian Smith and his army. A negotiated settlement two years earlier, he said, would have left the entire infrastructure intact, including the civil service, economy, police and the army, but Smith had been stubborn and lost the opportunity. He had done the same three years earlier when the front line pressed the nationalists to accept a qualified franchise. Now, Nyerere said, it was too late. The police, civil service and economy could remain intact to be restructured later, ‘but we are saying that it is no longer possible for the new government of Zimbabwe to inherit the army of Smith.’¹⁴

Returning from Washington, Nyerere had met Owen in London and he believed the British government was backtracking on a resolution accepted by Commonwealth leaders at their summit in June. He had refused to meet the Anglo-American officials until he received clarification. The resolution had called for ‘not only the removal of the illegal Smith regime but also the dismantling of its apparatus of repression in order to pave the way for the creation of police and armed forces which would be responsible to the needs of the people of Zimbabwe, and assure the orderly and effective transfer of power’. Nyerere insisted on having a written clarification and Owen and Young were forced to draft an amendment, which was never printed as part of the proposals and was not shown to Smith when they met him several days later. It was released to the press, however, and it

represented the fundamental barrier between Smith and the Patriotic Front. Both sides were adamant about the retention of their forces to the exclusion of the opposing forces. A senior guerrilla commander said: 'No reasonable person could expect us to integrate our forces that have been fighting for majority rule with Smith troops who have been fighting against it.' Smith spoke scathingly of plans to 'infiltrate' terrorists into the Rhodesian army. The amendment said that a Zimbabwe National Army would be formed 'based on the Liberation Forces' and including 'acceptable elements of the Rhodesian Defence Forces'.¹⁵

Owen and Young flew to Pretoria without the endorsement of African states and thus with little hope of persuading Vorster to put pressure on Smith. The mood in South Africa was already hostile after the Americans had hinted to Vorster in Vienna and had bluntly told Botha in London that if the South Africans did not co-operate, the United States might fail to use its veto in the Security Council, thus allowing sanctions, including oil sanctions, to be imposed against South Africa. The removal of American investment guarantees for South Africa had been mentioned and also an arrangement with the Shah of Iran, who supplied 75 per cent of South Africa's oil and who badly wanted a sophisticated new American radar system which was 'under consideration'. South African government officials spoke bitterly and publicly of international 'terrorism and blackmail'.¹⁶

Dr Owen had told the House of Commons before he left London that he was pessimistic 'about the extent and genuineness' of Smith's 'commitment to black majority rule'. He cited examples of recent raids into Mozambique and threats to detain more members of ZANU and ZAPU, and he hinted that Smith might have to go if any plan was to succeed: 'There has always been a recognition by all sides that this transitional period would require some people who had become very exposed to personal and political criticism to make way for others. . . . There is an acceptance that this is a legitimate problem, and there is some understanding of it amongst white Rhodesians.'¹⁷ Smith, however, was busy taking care of that possibility. He called a general election—'general' only in the sense of the white population—for 31 August, and while Owen and Young cooled their heels in Kenya waiting for the result, he gained all fifty white seats in a resounding endorsement of 'good old Smithy'.

This was the culmination of a crisis in the Rhodesian Front over constitutional reform. Smith had decided after the Ivor Richard

shuttle foundered in January that he could woo Bishop Muzorewa into negotiations by scrapping some of the racial legislation. He already had the previous year's Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination, the Quenet Report, which proposed among other things that inter-school sport should be multiracial (though not attendance at government schools or hospitals) and that racial discrimination in hotels and restaurants should end in commercial areas (though not in residential areas).¹⁸ The Commission opposed multiracial swimming pools, giving rise to an exchange in the letters-to-the-editor column of the *Rhodesia Herald* between black and white writers. Its most radical proposal was for change in the Land Tenure Act—the core of Rhodesian Front policy for fifteen years—which divided the land roughly into forty-five million acres for 250,000 whites and forty-five million acres for six million blacks. The Commission suggested that land categories be replaced with two new sectors, private land and state land; Tribal Trust Lands would continue to be reserved for Africans and residential areas would continue to be segregated, but Africans who could afford to do so—and they were very few—would be allowed to buy land in industrial areas and commercial agricultural areas. A progress report six months after publication of the report said that, among other things, multiracial sport and social activities were now permitted in schools, the government had accepted the principle of home ownership in the African townships and the acquisition of freehold title by tribesmen, and that selections had been made for the first Africans to attend officers courses in the army.

In mid-January 1977 Smith had proposed to his RF parliamentary caucus that 'hurtful discriminatory measures' should be repealed.¹⁹ The meeting erupted when he proposed the acceptance of an amendment to the Land Tenure Act that would retain exclusive African rights to land in TTLs but would reduce land restricted to white occupation to half a million acres. The RF Chairman, Des Frost, who later resigned, accused the regime of trying to 'break faith with its party members by disregarding one of its basic principles'.²⁰ Twelve RF MPs refused to support the amendment in the National Assembly, calling it 'national suicide', and Smith pulled together the two-thirds vote necessary for constitutional change only when six African MPs voted with his thirty-eight loyal RF members. The other ten African MPs refused to vote because they felt the measures did not go far enough.

To add to this acrimonious division within RF ranks, the twelve 'rebels' demanded a full-scale military offensive to defeat the

guerrillas, the banning of Muzorewa and the ANC, and a decisive move towards separate development. Blacks could have more rights and privileges, they conceded, but only in their own areas. The twelve were finally expelled from the RF for 'conduct offensive to party discipline' and they formed the Rhodesia Action Party (RAP), accusing the Smith government of being 'soft on terrorists' and contesting the white election on the platform of a 'positive military and psychological attitude to completely eradicate terrorism and organisations sympathetic to terrorism'.²¹ For the most part they lost their deposits, the more liberal National Unifying Force (NUF) did better than anyone expected—Smith called it a most interesting development—and 'good old Smithy' gained a mandate from more than 80 per cent of the white electorate. Gone were the references to 'high standards' being maintained in 'civilized hands'. Smith spoke of a 'broadbased government' that would rule responsibly but would do away with discrimination that 'infringes upon human dignity'.²² He campaigned on the need for white unity and won with the slogan 'no sell-out'. The electorate, for the most part, did not bat an eyelid when less than three months later he turned around and accepted the concept of one man one vote.

When the Anglo-American proposals were finally published complete—Mugabe had accused the duo of making public only selected passages in an attempt to get a positive response—they were no more acceptable than when they were secret. There were three parts. An independence constitution for the sovereign republic of Zimbabwe included a president, vice-president or prime minister, and a single-chamber National Assembly to be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. A Bill of Rights sought to protect fundamental human rights and outlaw discrimination, while the public service and the judiciary were retained virtually in their existing form. Then there was the Zimbabwe Development Fund of about £750 million, internationally funded and managed, but dependent upon acceptance of the package as a whole. The most difficult part remained the transition, which it was envisaged would last about six months with the administration headed by a British Resident Commissioner and his deputy; they, together with a representative appointed by the United Nations, would oversee elections and the transfer of power. Law and order would be in the hands of the existing police, under a new commissioner, and a United Nations Zimbabwe Force. A Transitional Constitution Order would validate existing laws and previous transac-

tions, adapt some existing laws and declare an amnesty. A ceasefire and procedures to lift sanctions would take effect with the transitional government. The careful wording of the section dealing with the formation of a Zimbabwe National Army was so bland as to be meaningless: the UN Representative would 'enter into discussions, before the transition period . . . with all the parties with a view to establishing in detail the respective roles of all the forces in Rhodesia'.²³ Then of course there was the amendment which either did or did not exist depending on which party was considering the proposals.

No one turned down the proposals but nor were they accepted by anyone. Smith said he was having them 'analysed', but he added that universal suffrage was not in the best interests of Rhodesia; he attacked the concept of a United Nations military force and called it 'insane' to suggest guerrillas should form the basis of a national defence force. Smith was particularly livid about a reference in the opening paragraphs that the Rhodesians must 'surrender power', a phrase Dr Owen admitted was 'unfortunate'.²⁴ The co-leaders of the Patriotic Front countered with their own white paper, entitled *The Zimbabwe Patriotic Front on British 'Proposals for a Settlement' in Rhodesia*, in which they said they were pleased the British government had accepted certain principles such as the non-negotiable right of independence, democratic elections based on universal suffrage, and recognition that they were dealing with a situation of war, evidenced further by the appointment of a military man, Field Marshal Lord Carver, as the British Resident Commissioner. The eight-page paper, however, called for some 'improvements': it said the police as a paramilitary body working with the army must be dismantled, the civil service and judiciary screened, and that the liberation army could not surrender but must participate in an interim period leading to elections and independence. 'By what faith,' the statement asked, 'can an election booth be regarded as democratic, free and impartial if it is surrounded at its four corners by Smith's policeman, his soldier, his district commissioner and his judge?'²⁵

In trying to accommodate all parties to the Rhodesian conflict they had failed to accommodate any, but the proposals remained, as Nyerere had said cautiously, a 'basis for negotiation'.²⁶ 'Everybody agreed with enough of the plan to keep it going,' said Ambassador Young.²⁷ Owen's approach, said a journalist, 'seems calculated to upset everybody, but then as he pointed out here the exercise is ongoing in that the document is now on the table and the parties

concerned may be forced by circumstances to come back for a second look.²⁸ As it turned out, the document was hardly given a second glance by the principal parties involved, as one turned inwards looking for alternatives and the other got on with escalating the war. There were others who 'kept up the momentum': Owen and Young went to the United Nations, where Indian Major-General Prem Chand was named UN Representative. The UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, said he had received a communication from 'someone purporting to be the Rhodesian Foreign Minister'.²⁹ The Commander of the Rhodesian army, Lieutenant-General John Hickman, said there was no question of giving in to the 'predictable ludicrous demands' of certain African nationalist leaders that the army be dismantled and replaced by an 'undisciplined shower of terrorists'.³⁰ President Kaunda imposed a curfew and blackout on most cities in Zambia and the head of state of Nigeria, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, which was tipped to provide the core of the peacekeeping force, visited the front-line states. At Dar es Salaam airport, two Nigerian planes stood by to ferry trained guerrillas from Nachingwea to Mozambique.³¹

When the details of the Anglo-American proposals had first been leaked to selected journalists during an anti-apartheid conference in Lagos by Young's deputy, Don McHenry, he had suggested the possible use of what became glibly known as a 'third force' in solving the knotty problem of 'keeping the peace' and creating a national army. This would be a force of 5,000 guerrillas from Nachingwea, whom he suggested were trained but uncommitted, 'not under the control of the Patriotic Front'.³² This had been intended to be a joint force but ZIPRA did not send any recruits. Political training had been denied to the ZANLA recruits by the Tanzanian authorities and the Liberation Committee Executive Secretary Mbita, and a group of political commissars sent to the camp by ZANLA had been arrested. The 'third force', however, still comprised ZANLA recruits and was no more acceptable to the Rhodesians than the 'shower of terrorists'. The Nachingwea group was soon transported to Mozambique where they received a crash course in political education. That cadres with the most expert military training in that period lacked combined political education was to cause some difficulty, and it was not until the following year that the question of political education at Nachingwea was sorted out. This involved the teaching of Zimbabwe history and reasons for the struggle, as well as ideology, the party and military structures, and more sophisticated courses for political commissars in

the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao. In this period 'Mao was theoretically important and FRELIMO was practically important', one commissar said later.

When the Anglo-American proposals were published, Mugabe was already back in Chimoio for the Central Committee meeting that elected him President of ZANU—he had previously, as Secretary-General, been referred to as 'leader'—and marked the final re-emergence of ZANU from the depths of the dislocation caused by détente and almost three years of underground determination to continue the armed struggle. 1977 became the 'year of the party', when it was reorganized and restructured, a process Mugabe had in fact begun from Chimoio in April 1976. The new Central Committee contained leaders from home, members of the DARE who had been detained in Zambia, and one or two ZIPA leaders who still wanted to work within the party. The most important new element was a strong representation from the military, which now comprised almost half of the governing body. Muzenda became Vice-President, Tekere Secretary-General and Tongogara Secretary of Defence. Six heads of department, eight deputies, and four members without special functions had had military training.

It also contained the catalyst for an internal contradiction that manifested itself several months later when, one year after the detention of ZIPA/ZANU leaders, three former DARE members and several supporters were also detained in FRELIMO custody at ZANU's request. They included Hamadziripi—who had dropped from number three to number nine in the chain of command at the Chimoio meeting—Gumbo, Mudzi, Mandizvidza, Chigowe, Taderera and Musikavanhu. A plot to seize power and join ZAPU had been discovered and the new detainees—who began sending out documents from detention through a courier who unknown to them was working for FRELIMO security—became labelled with the misnomer of 'the unity group'.³³ They were detained after a senior FRELIMO official received a letter signed by Gumbo that said '... any change would have to be an internal affair as FRELIMO cannot solve our problems. However, they [militants] don't know how the Government would interpret any attempt to change some of the military leaders by force.'³⁴ FRELIMO feared this would lead to bloodshed. The detainees were released two years later at British insistence during the transition to independence, and most joined Sithole's party—despite having denounced it as reactionary—and not Nkomo's, despite the posturing for unity.³⁵

When the ZANU leaders had returned to the camps in Mozambique after Geneva they found them in disarray. 'Strategy, discipline, organization and training within ZIPA had become very poor and that was why Smith was having a lot of success.'³⁶ There was also confusion over political direction after individual commanders had built ideological fiefdoms in different camps. 'Camp life had broken down at Chimoio. It was like a village. We had to reshape it and return discipline and structure. You stay here, and this goes here. We all get up early and do exercises and have a programme. You don't wander about doing as you please. It's a military camp. People in the camp told us when we got there, "there's no army, no camp, just *povo*" [Portuguese for "people"]. They wanted leadership. It was a big lesson to the cadres on the importance of leadership.'³⁷

Proper provision had not been made for the massive influx of recruits and refugees, or for screening and separating them. In early 1977 there were 29,000 refugees—excluding recruits, who numbered about 10,000 trained and in training—in three camps: Chibabawa, Mavudzi and Gondola, where Nyadzonias survivors were living in appalling conditions. They were later moved to Doeroi, which eventually became a virtual city of mud-and-wattle huts housing the bulk of the estimated 150,000 refugees in Mozambique at the end of the war. By March 1977, however, total contributions through the UN, largely from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the government of Norway, totalled little more than 3,000,000 dollars and was hopelessly inadequate, according to UNHCR officials.³⁸ Food was scarce—mostly mealie meal and beans and occasional dried fish from World Food Program rations—and it was to be another year before they could get seeds and implements to begin planting in an attempt to make the refugees self-sufficient. The need for shoes, clothing and blankets was desperate and medicine was virtually non-existent, increasing the danger of epidemics. Sickneses ranged from malaria and bilharzia to worms and kwashiorkor, and gastroenteritis could kill a child through dehydration because there were no drips. There was also a strange disease that caused leg paralysis, screaming and often suicide attempts among young girls who had survived the Nyadzonias massacre; it was thought to be psychological, arising from that experience. Poisons were often introduced by enemy agents into both refugee and military camps, and many people died from a poison soaked into jeans and T-shirts which caused bleeding from the nose, mouth and ears. It was later discovered that there was a unit in

Salisbury experimenting with poison and that tests had been conducted on captured guerrillas at Mount Darwin and elsewhere, with an unknown number of casualties.³⁹

When Dr Herbert Ushewokunze—who had left his practice in Bulawayo to join the ZANU delegation in Geneva—arrived on the scene, Chibabawa had one stethoscope, two thermometers and 12,000 people. Local anaesthetics had run out; 'if a general surgery arises right now, I don't know what I will do,' said Ushewokunze. The doctor had previously been involved in underground cell activities and recruiting in Matabeleland under the command of Nyagumbo, whom he said acted 'like an army general. At night our cars were running to the border with recruits. I would tell the family that I had been out on a medical call.'⁴⁰ Ushewokunze (who became ZANU Secretary of Health and later Minister of Health) was the refugees' only doctor until he was joined by Dr Sydney Sekeramayi (ZANU representative in Sweden for many years and later Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development) and other qualified medical personnel. Both doctors did military training, travelled between camps with an AK slung over their shoulders, organized training courses for new medical assistants and pleaded for donations of medicine and equipment. 'People have talked of unity,' Dr Sekeramayi said later. 'It's different when you're in Salisbury and difficult to know what it is to be united. You are attached, propelled by the need to help the injured. The totality of that situation is with you. You carry each other; you can never get closer to a comrade than that. . . . As we carried him to hospital he could only say, "Comrade, comrade, Pamberi ne ZANU." We could not hold his hand. He had two bleeding stumps. That is what unites people.'⁴¹

The same conditions existed in education, where there was no shelter other than trees and never enough books, blackboards and pens for the thousands of children who were taught—along with reading, writing and arithmetic—a new history of themselves and their struggle. Responsibility for reorganizing education fell to Dr Dzingai Mutumbuka, educated at Gokomere Mission near Fort Victoria, with a doctorate in chemistry from Sussex University in England, who had been involved in ZANU activities while teaching at the University of Zambia and had worked at the ZANU office in London; he became ZANU Secretary for Education and Culture and later Minister with the same portfolio. 'Our young people make their own drama,' said Dr Mutumbuka. 'It's about the struggle between progressives and collaborators in Zimbabwe, or about the Selous

Scouts, or the internal settlement. It shows the level of their awareness. The reality of the struggle produces this. After one Rhodesian attack we didn't have any huts, or any cover. Our clothes had been destroyed, our books, everything. I remember one night it was raining non-stop and these kids were lying under trees, drenched, but they were singing, and they kept on singing. They laughed the whole night, and they said we shall conquer. That kind of spirit could only have been produced by the struggle.⁴² By the end of the war there were almost 30,000 Zimbabwe children in nine schools in Mozambique and more than 700 teachers.

In Zambia also there were thousands of schoolchildren who studied in ZAPU schools and, towards the end of the war, suffered enemy attacks. In 1977 there were crowded refugee camps in Botswana, as thousands of recruits and refugees poured out across the western border. In one incident early in 1977, 400 students left Manama mission and crossed the border in a group. The Rhodesian authorities said they had been kidnapped, but when the Botswana government allowed parents to visit them, only fifty agreed to return home. The rest went to the refugee camps at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe that for a time in the mid-year cold season were so short of blankets that children slept on the ground on pieces of cardboard. Some related how their parents had been arrested or shot. An airlift to Zambia mounted in mid-1977 was carrying almost 1,000 a week at its peak, and by mid-1978 ZAPU officials said there were 18,000 children under the age of fifteen in camps in Zambia.⁴³ Salisbury officials labelled them 'prospective terrorists'.

They were educated in two camps, the girls at Victory camp a few kilometres outside Lusaka, and the boys at a camp named in honour of the late J. Z. Moyo. Moyo had been second Vice-President of ZAPU and leader of the external wing; like Chitepo he was an outspoken advocate of the armed struggle and of unity, and he had played a key role in creating the Patriotic Front and in keeping a united front at the Geneva conference. A few weeks after he returned from Geneva, on 22 January 1977, he opened a parcel in his Lusaka office; he had been expecting it; it was addressed to him in handwriting he recognized and sent from someone he knew in Botswana. The parcel blew up in his face, killing him and injuring several officials, and another dedicated leader was lost. Members of Rhodesian Special Branch later admitted that they had listened in on a phone call about the package and had intercepted it in the post to insert an explosive device. Again they were lucky, one SB member said: 'We didn't expect to get Moyo. We

thought it might kill a secretary.'⁴⁴ The loss of their leading proponent of armed struggle was to weaken the hand of those in ZAPU who wanted to fight.

Moyo's last journey before his death was to Maputo to discuss the setting up of a Military Co-ordinating Committee to investigate problems and discuss possible areas of military unity between ZANU and ZAPU.⁴⁵ One of the difficulties had always been which unity would come first, military or political. ZANU, with the most experienced military structure, preferred military unity, and ZAPU, with older more experienced political structures, preferred unity of the politicians. The terms of reference of the military subcommittee—headed by Muzenda for ZANU and Silundika for ZAPU and including Nhongo and Mangena—were to visit transit and training and operational headquarters in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.⁴⁶ There was some agreement on the importance of training together, although a senior ZAPU official gave as an example of the difficulties their objection to Chinese instructors at Nachingwea.⁴⁷ They were not particularly well received in each other's camps and at one ZAPU camp outside Lusaka the cadres said they would not unite, and reminded the leaders of the casualties at Mgagao the previous year. The main training was at Nachingwea in Tanzania, with an intake of 5,000 ZANLA recruits every six months, and localized training in Mozambique. ZIPRA trained in Angola and Zambia.

Most trained cadres still in the operational zone after the ZIPA crisis were experienced ZANLA guerrillas who had never really accepted the ideas of the 'newcomers', and they returned easily to the former pattern. Senior ZANLA commanders who had been withdrawn by the ZIPA leaders were redeployed soon after their arrest. Their task was to reconstruct the organization and communication structures that required close links with the leadership (senior commanders and political commissars returned to the rear at intervals for full discussions of strategy and tactics).⁴⁸ By mid-1977 there were 3,000 ZANLA guerrillas in the country spreading the war through the east, north and south.⁴⁹

That the war rapidly escalated from early in 1977 is borne out by a variety of Rhodesian statistics, for even the possibility that the figures may be inaccurately low would only emphasize the point. The number of Rhodesian soldiers killed in action in 1977 (197) is almost the same as the total from 1972 to 1976 (215), and the same applies to their figures for 'terrorists' killed: 1,774 in 1977 and 1,917 from 1972 to

1976.⁵⁰ Emigration figures—referred to by whites as the ‘yellow route’ or the ‘chicken run’—rose to 1,500 a month for the first six months of the year; by May, the net monthly outflow was 1,339, the highest departure figure since January 1964.⁵¹ Net emigration for 1978 was 13,709 and for the first nine months of 1979, it was 14,149.⁵¹ In terms of the war, those figures were even worse than they appeared to be: many people left pretending they were going on holiday and thus did not figure in departure statistics, and also the new arrivals were not liable for military service for two years, so the potential conscript group was shrinking even more rapidly than was apparent at first glance. The number of tourists visiting the country, an important generator of foreign currency, was down from 339,210 in 1972 to 87,943 in 1978—a drop of 74 per cent. The defence budget announced in June 1977 for the fiscal year beginning 1 July showed a 44 per cent increase to almost a million dollars a day.⁵² ‘They [the guerrillas] are now keeping the Rhodesian armed forces very stretched over large areas of the country,’ a senior Foreign Office official said in June 1977. ‘They are seriously disrupting local administrations—schools, tax collections, etc.—and they are forging pretty close links with the people in those areas.’ The official also noted that the security force/guerrilla kill ratio had fallen from one to ten to about one to seven, that the security forces were losing about one man a day, and that Mr Smith, unlike the guerrillas, did not have an inexhaustible supply of recruits.

To whites in the cities, the most invidious part of the war was still the call-up, which was causing more and more disruption to industry and agriculture. By mid-1977, men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-eight who were of white, coloured or Asian descent were called up for just over six months out of every twelve; those between the ages of thirty-eight and fifty did seventy days a year and were dubbed the ‘Dads Army’; men aged fifty to sixty were expected to volunteer for police ‘specials’ duties. The Minister responsible, Roger Hawkins, said the measures were taken ‘to ensure greater equitability in the system and for easier allocation of manpower . . . He denied it resulted from an escalation of the terrorist war.’⁵³ Later in the year compulsory national service was extended to two years, by mid-1978 there was talk of ‘spreading the load’, and conscription for blacks was introduced amidst much outcry in early 1979. Blacks who volunteered, largely for economic reasons, were reported to comprise about three-quarters of the 8,000-member regular army.⁵⁴ Non-black conscripts, who were serving up to seven months a year by this time, numbered about

35,000. The extent to which the regime would go to enforce the call-up was illustrated in the case of journalist Michael Holman, who challenged the draft in the courts: the law that allowed a conscriptee to avoid call-up while a case was in court was changed overnight, but when the police went round to collect Holman they found he had been tipped off and gone underground. He later fled the country.

Hawkins’ predecessor as Minister of Defence, Reginald Cowper (who, a senior intelligence officer said, ‘wanted to fight the war flat-out using all-out methods, not just martial law’⁵⁵), had been forced to resign earlier in the year after a public row over extending the call-up and cutting exemptions, which he claimed allowed more than half of those eligible for call-up to avoid it. Cowper, who was also Minister of Co-operation and Government Leader in the House, said his main concern was the morale of white Rhodesians who had ‘unfortunately been subjected to a public debate on the country’s ability or otherwise to win the terrorist war’.⁵⁶ He was one of twelve RF MPs who later became involved in a confrontation with Smith over his plans to change some discriminatory legislation and his refusal to take a more offensive role in the war.

At about this time questions were being increasingly raised by some missionaries and a large section of the African population about the conduct of the Rhodesian forces in a number of incidents including the murder of four Dominican nuns and three Jesuit priests at St Paul’s Mission near Musami, 50 kilometres north-east of Salisbury. A priest left alive in the incident, Father Myerscough, who did not speak Shona, said later that he heard the killers talking and he claimed they were guerrillas. Rhodesian ballistics experts produced guns they said had fired the bullets found at the scene, which was not surprising since there was mounting belief that it was a Selous Scouts ‘pseudo gang’ operation. An SB officer confirmed this after independence and so did an initially incredulous inspector in the police who had asked questions of some of his colleagues.⁵⁷ A student at the mission school said she had known the group were not guerrillas because she and her classmates knew all ‘the boys’ in the area. The guerrillas normally gave three warnings and then addressed a mass meeting before punishing ‘sell-outs’ and none of these things had occurred. A deserter from the Rhodesian Army, Gordon Thomas Wood, 37, an ex-Grenadier Guardsman, told a British newspaper that ‘it was in the interests of the Rhodesians that missionaries should be stopped from helping the blacks. It was common knowledge that the Selous Scouts

had gone in and wiped them out [at Musami].’ He produced his army boots, the soles of which matched the footprints of the killers as shown in press photographs.⁵⁸

Wood had spent seven months in the army and said he left because of the atrocities. The newspaper report said he did not seek, nor receive, payment for the story. He said he had killed sixteen people. ‘One soldier called me a murderer for shooting two men who turned out not to have weapons. But they were out during curfew, and you can’t say: “Excuse me, have you got a grenade or gun?” You shoot first and ask questions after if you want to continue living. Even so, it’s all wrong. The curfew begins in daylight hours, 6 p.m. when people are still working. Dozens of innocent people are knocked off during curfew hours. The army puts it down to “terrorists running away”. But they’re killing more of their own blacks than terrorists.’

Another British mercenary, Trooper Tony Rogersson, spoke of the psychological effect of the war.⁵⁹ The regime always denied they recruited mercenaries and argued that all soldiers were signed on at regular pay. ‘In his diary on 12 January Rogersson expressed the hope that he does not become like the callous soldiers who enjoy killing. . . . By late April only “contacts” relax him. . . . By 7 May he is admitting to himself that he enjoys the fighting. . . . On 20 May another soldier has to prevent him killing two civilians.’ He spoke of a mercenary who collected ears cut off dead guerrillas, of another who posed holding severed heads, and of a third who gouged out a captured guerrilla’s eye during interrogation.

A particularly brutal massacre later in the war at the Elim Pentecostal mission in the eastern border area was never solved, though each side claimed the other was responsible. Even now, past and present security officials are loath to talk about the bludgeoning to death of nine British missionaries and their four children. Rhodesian military authorities claimed war diaries were found on the bodies of two dead guerrillas detailing the killings,⁶⁰ but an African who said he had served with the Selous Scouts told a team of four lawyers from the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) that security forces—who discovered that a guerrilla unit had learned of their movements from the missionaries—were responsible.⁶¹ The massacre came at a time—June 1978—when internal settlement leaders were trying to discredit the guerrillas and seek recognition at the OAU summit in Khartoum, and shortly after a group of forty-eight men recruited by Sithole had returned from training in Amin’s

Uganda.⁶² Sithole’s auxiliaries, who soon established a reputation for violence, had to be removed from one area and were wiped out by security forces in another. About the same time an entirely false story about the alleged escape from Mozambique of fifteen detained members of the ZANU Central Committee was planted in the international media.⁶³ More than thirty missionaries were killed throughout the war; a small number of them wandered into guerrilla-controlled areas without having made the proper contacts, including one who died only weeks before the independence elections, Father Machikicho of Gokomere mission near Fort Victoria.⁶⁴ However, considering the vast number of remote mission stations deep in operational zones, the number of casualties was few. Many missionaries supplied guerrillas with food, medicine and medical care, and were generally sympathetic, and were a more obvious target for the Rhodesians than the guerrillas, many of whom had been educated at mission schools.

‘Can we presume that it was the guerrillas who killed them?’ asked the Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donal Lamont, who expressed his doubts by recounting an incident that occurred to one of his priests: ‘I had a visit from one of my African clergy who reported he was terrorized by European members of the Security Forces and they said to him: “You’d better watch out. One dead missionary is as good as a hundred dead terrorists to us.”’⁶⁵ Bishop Lamont said his life had been threatened—once to his face and frequently by telephone and letter—and he added: ‘I would say this, that if it were the object of the guerrillas to kill missionaries, there shouldn’t be one of us alive.’ He was sentenced to one year in prison for failing to report the presence of guerrillas and was later deported and stripped of his citizenship. Several other missionaries, such as Sister Janice MacLaughlin whom the regime described as ‘Marxist’, were expelled or imprisoned by the regime. A priest on a very isolated mission station outside Fort Victoria said early in 1980 that law and order had improved considerably in the area during the past year since the guerrillas had moved in and taken it over; he described them as a well-disciplined group who were very popular among the people and who did not drink, except for one commander who came by the mission occasionally for a tot of brandy.⁶⁶ Perhaps the most bizarre case was that of the man who escaped from police custody at Victoria Falls and disappeared into the bush clad in bright red shorts and a yellow T-shirt after allegedly escaping from leg irons and handcuffs. He had been arrested for the murders of a retired bishop, Adolf Gregor Schmitt, a nun and a priest,

which had been pinned on ZIPRA by the regime, and he was thought to be a member of the Selous Scouts.

The rainy season—providing the guerrillas with plentiful water to drink and greenery for cover and hampering the mobility of the security forces—was fast advancing as the teams of Graham and Low, and Carver and Chand, set out on new shuttles late in 1977. Smith, however, already had 'other irons in the fire'.⁶⁷ The Reverend Sithole had returned in July, tiring of exile much as he had tired of prison and ignoring his statement two years earlier that he would 'never return to Salisbury in Rhodesia', only 'Salisbury in Zimbabwe'.⁶⁸ He renounced 'terrorism' as he had done from the dock in 1969, and most Africans still saw this as a move to foster his own ambitions. Asked at the time how Muzorewa—who had been out canvassing international support—fitted into his plans, Smith replied in exasperation: 'God knows. He's been out of the country so much he's almost a foreigner.'⁶⁹ A week before the white election, however, Muzorewa flew back to Salisbury. The presence of Muzorewa and Sithole, coupled with the white election mandate, offered Smith the outlet he needed to spurn the Anglo-American proposals and go for an internal settlement on terms more acceptable to him.

However, before he began serious talks with the internal leaders, Smith made a secret visit to Zambia to meet President Kaunda, which caused a furore when news of it leaked out, irritating Muzorewa and Sithole and causing a deep rift between the two wings of the Patriotic Front and among the front-line states. Officials described the meeting as 'more dramatic than substantial',⁷⁰ yet less than three weeks later another Rhodesian delegation, led by Cabinet Secretary George Smith, travelled to Luangwa Game Reserve in Zambia to negotiate 'on all points concerning pensions, concerning certain rights of minorities and representation in parliament and so on'.⁷¹ Within two months of the meeting with Smith, Kaunda proposed to his front-line colleagues a new strategy that was fundamentally opposed to their long-held principles of elections based on 'one man one vote' and 'no independence before majority rule' (NIBMAR). 'Now he wants us to accept NEBMAR—no elections before majority rule,' one nationalist figure remarked wryly.⁷²

These meetings were arranged by 'Tiny' Rowland, the head of Lonrho, which had vast investments in mining, land, commerce, industry and the oil pipeline connecting Umtali to the port of Beira. Lonrho is the largest employer of black labour in the country after

government.⁷³ Rowland provided the executive jet to transport the Rhodesian delegation to Lusaka for a meeting which apparently each side believed the other wanted. Officials who were present at the first meeting say Smith did not allude to the possibility of drawing Nkomo into the internal settlement talks, but aides say it was one of Smith's objectives and could have been raised in initial private talks when Kaunda and Smith were alone.⁷⁴

'They had half an hour of private audience and I spoke to President Kaunda after and he was most impressed with Ian Smith,' said Marquard de Villiers, a director of Lonrho in South Africa who was also involved in the 1974 détente exercise. 'He said it would be difficult to explain to other members of the OAU how impressed he was with Mr Smith's honesty and integrity of purpose, and he found him a very pleasant individual. . . . Ian Smith was equally impressed with President Kaunda. It was a meeting that was conducted with the greatest sense of endeavour to get together and to stay together and to find a solution.'

When ZANU found out about the meeting a few days later they were furious and cancelled a trip to Lusaka for talks with ZAPU. It was to be some time before the co-leaders of the Patriotic Front were to meet again, a display of disunity that must have delighted Smith. 'We felt ourselves excluded from the circle of people who had been informed,' Mugabe said later, and he let it be known in public that he did not really believe Kaunda's version of the meeting: 'We understood his explanations, not necessarily accepting them. . . . It will be a difficult task to persuade our supporters to believe that in fact our counterparts in the Patriotic Front were not party to the discussions.'⁷⁵ De Villiers said Nkomo did not attend the meeting, though he was present in State House at the time and entered the cabinet room soon after Smith had left. 'I said to Mr Rowland at the time, the picture tells it all. He thought he was going to be President of Zimbabwe pretty soon.'

Kaunda reacted angrily and in public to Mugabe's criticism, and some of his government officials called for the banning of Mugabe and ZANU, but Kaunda's front-line colleagues were equally critical, perhaps more at the outcome than at the fact of the meeting. 'In fact President Nyerere decided that Lonrho, and Mr Rowland, was engineering such a split and he confiscated our property in Tanzania,' de Villiers said. 'It was also the beginning of a problem between Kaunda and Nyerere.' (Smith, Lonrho and the South Africans all saw Nyerere as having undue influence on the type of settlement that

would be acceptable.) Nyerere, the chairman of the front-line grouping, objected to Kaunda's proposal, during a meeting at Mbala in northern Zambia in November, that the principle of elections, now written into the Anglo-American proposals, be dropped and Zimbabwe instead become independent with a 'Government of National Unity' based on the Patriotic Front.⁷⁶ Internal leaders could join if they wished.

Nyerere, who had always trusted the motives of 'my brother, Ken', began to ask himself searching questions after an acrimonious front-line summit in Beira four weeks later. It was held at the insistence of the Angolan President, Dr Agostinho Neto, who admitted to Nyerere that both he and Kaunda had been training ZIPRA guerrillas, despite a front-line decision to conduct all training of ZANLA and ZIPRA jointly at Nachingwea in Tanzania. Nyerere had never heard this from Kaunda, and he had refused to listen to officials and others who tried to tell him. The Tanzanian leader was furious and exchanged words with both Kaunda and Nkomo, who told his aides angrily during a break: 'I'm not a kid, if I have refused, I have refused.'⁷⁷ What Nkomo did not know at the time and never really believed was that Nyerere believed in this period that Nkomo was 'the statesman' and the man who should lead Zimbabwe.⁷⁸

At the Beira summit the Mozambique delegation showed a film of a recent Rhodesian attack; the script stated that 'troops had been moved by the Smith regime from the Zambian border to the Mozambique border and were concentrating on attacks into Mozambique'. There had been more than 200 Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique by this time, including some massive attacks; well over 2,000 civilians had died, and hundreds of others had been wounded.⁷⁹ There was not much activity from the Zambian side—ZIPRA had infiltrated less than a hundred guerrillas—and fighting involving Zambia had been restricted to intermittent exchanges of fire across the Zambezi River border, although there had been considerable infiltration of agents into southern Zambia to commit acts of sabotage. 'Kaunda was saddened' and Nkomo angered 'by the assessment that his organization wasn't doing enough fighting,' said a FRELIMO official, who described it as a blunt meeting where 'we analysed imperialist strategy' and also 'our own lack of cohesive strategy'. After that 'there was a new openness' and frankness at front-line gatherings.

After the earlier meeting with Kaunda at Mbala, Nyerere had promptly circulated to his colleagues a secret document outlining the dangers of doing away with elections.⁸⁰ 'We have said that the war will

continue until the victory of the Liberation Forces, or until the people of Zimbabwe have an opportunity to elect their own Government, whichever comes first. This has been our consistent stand since 1965. . . . To suggest at this juncture that . . . Independence be granted without elections is to throw into disarray all those forces which we have so far succeeded in uniting against the Smith Regime.' First, the document said, 'it will divide Africa'; and second, 'with Africa itself divided and confused, most of our Third World supporters at the United Nations will be divided and confused. Third, it will greatly weaken (if not destroy) Western, including Scandinavian, support for the Liberation struggle' which is 'based on a commitment to the people's right to self-determination. Fourth, it will weaken, if not destroy, the will to fight both among the Freedom Fighters and in the Front Line States. . . . OAU support for the Patriotic Front Forces was only achieved when a distinction was made between support for the military struggle and political support for a particular nationalist. Without this distinction it would not have been possible for us to get unanimous OAU support for the Patriotic Front at Libreville. Africa is united on the demand for *Uhuru* [freedom]. . . . If the Patriotic Front are confident that they can win elections, they have to answer the question why do they reject them,' Nyerere said. 'If in fact they are afraid that they may lose the election, it will be asked why we want the international community to help us to get power transferred to them.' The sudden proposal to do away with elections was interpreted as indicating that Kaunda doubted that Nkomo would win an election, an inference the Zambians vigorously denied.

A senior Rhodesian intelligence man who was involved in most of the contacts with nationalist leaders said that even after the Nkomo-Smith talks collapsed in early 1976 there were 'no great lapses' in contact with the ZAPU leader.⁸¹ Nkomo 'still wanted to talk in the hopes of getting a settlement. He always said he didn't believe in the armed struggle, that he wanted a settlement, but it had to include Mugabe. He never gave us a straight answer on his relations with the Russians, Josh didn't, but he always seemed to us a typical capitalist.' Nkomo's political skill in marshalling a wide variety of international supporters—putting Lonrho and South Africa in bed with the Soviet Union—was to be a distinct advantage in the coming months. A journalist once observed that 'Nkomo could have breakfast at the Kremlin, lunch in the Lonrho boardroom, and dinner at the White House in the same day.'

A series of secret contacts in London and New York, and a new

Nigerian involvement, would lead to another Smith visit to Lusaka a year later and another meeting there with Nkomo that would again cause deep mistrust within the Patriotic Front and the front-line states. In the meantime, however, Smith made a deal with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Chirau—a government-paid Chief who called his virtually non-existent political party the Zimbabwe United Peoples Organisation (ZUPO).

A month after the white election and one week after he met Kaunda, Smith shocked his followers by publicly agreeing to consider a universal franchise, the disbanding of the Selous Scouts, and the return of guerrillas to 'normal lives' inside the country.⁸² On 19 November, just after Kaunda made his 'Government of National Unity' proposal to Nyerere at Mbala, Smith dismissed the Anglo-American proposals as a 'dismal failure', described Carver and Chand as a 'travelling circus', and hinted at a settlement 'reached by Rhodesians'. Five days later, after a series of secret meetings with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau, Smith announced his intention to 'bring peace to the country' by entering into constitutional negotiations with 'leaders of the black political parties', whom he said had impressed upon him the need for a 'firm commitment to the principle of majority rule based on adult suffrage'. He said the black political leaders had 'fully endorsed the desirability of retaining white confidence'.⁸³

Even as Smith released his statement, the SAS and other elements of the Rhodesian army were involved in the biggest and bloodiest air and ground attack of the entire war inside Mozambique. It satisfied the desire of the SAS for a 'one thousand kill raid'. More than one thousand people were killed—the dead included hospital patients and almost a hundred schoolchildren, and some of the mass graves contained only women—and hundreds were wounded in the two-pronged attack on the ZANLA headquarters at Chimoio, seventy-five kilometres across the border, and on two camps at Tembwe, 225 kilometres into Tete province. The huge complex at Chimoio was actually several camps, some military and some civilian, around a central administration core; it included a school, a hospital, and massive stores of food and clothing. The camp was destroyed in an attack that began at dawn on 23 November 1977 with a bombing raid followed by the heliborne landing of troops; the attack lasted for three days, and the Rhodesians hoped it would be a setback for ZANLA, who were infiltrating 5,000 trainees just arrived from Nachingwea. In

a sense it was, Tongogara said later, because 'in ZANLA the loss of one soldier is great because we have got a theory that if you have lost one soldier you have lost one thousand masses. One soldier can get in and mobilize one thousand masses.'

A member of SAS wrote later that accumulation of intelligence took nine months ('aerial photographs were taken, an agent was infiltrated') and that 'during this time three events occurred that warrant mention.'⁸⁴ The first was the formation of Combined Operations, he wrote, 'under the command of Lt Gen Peter Walls, who moved one step up from Army Commander. "Comops" largely usurped operational power from the Army headquarters, particularly in respect of special operations.' The second point was that 'most of us managed to see one of the films on the Israeli raid at Entebbe': apart from 'enthusing over the Israeli house-cleaning techniques and admiring their boldness, we learnt one good lesson. . . . '—that was the use of a 'high-powered command element to preside over a raid', and a VIP Air Force Dakota was fitted out with teleprinters, high frequency and very high frequency communications and comfortable seating; it was capable of remaining aloft for several hours. The third point he mentioned was updated aerial photography of the Chimoio area, that discovered a large camp seven kilometres from the main base where hundreds of people were marching on a parade square and which had not been revealed in the interrogation of captives. Tongogara, who was shown some of the Rhodesian intelligence reports on Chimoio during the Lancaster House conference, remarked that they were exceptionally accurate, except for one thing—they thought there were 4,000 people at Chimoio and there were actually twice that number.

The Mozambique raid irritated the Bishop, who called for a week of mourning and refused to attend the first session of talks with Smith, although Sithole and Chirau went along to the meeting. The Bishop wrote Smith a letter of protest about the 'tragic massacre' and said the victims were 'non-combatants in the present conflict . . . I personally visited the Tembwe camp in 1975 and the Chimoio camp in 1976. I stood on the ground covered with blood and empty cartridges at Nyadzonia at which the massacre claimed 765 [sic] lives of Zimbabwe refugees. I gazed at the 14 mass graves under which the Zimbabweans were buried. I know what I am talking about. The world was informed that the victims of Nyadzonia were guerrillas. I know they were refugees.'⁸⁵ But none of this sentiment prevented the Bishop from attending the second session of talks with Smith, nor did it prevent future massacres of civilians, which the following year were conducted

by the same army in the name of a government that included Muzorewa.

The attacks considerably boosted white morale; one letter in the *Rhodesia Herald* said: 'I am absolutely delighted at the success our wonderful Rhodesian fighting forces have had recently! Keep it up, guys, you're the greatest, but remember to thank God for the success!' But not everyone agreed—another letter said: 'When we heard the news on RBC on November 28 I know that many were appalled and really saddened to hear the words similar to "the white population will be delighted to hear. . . ." Then followed the account of two major attacks in Mozambique by our forces resulting in 1,200 or more deaths—in all probability all young or very young African lads. How can any be delighted?'

Dr Owen, while acknowledging the massacre as a 'savage and pretty brutal attack', warned the Patriotic Front in a manner that was to affect relations with ZANU for some time. 'This', he said, 'might show the Patriotic Front—and this may have some advantages in getting overall compromise—that the Rhodesian defence forces are simply not on its back.'⁸⁶ Owen also took a rather 'wait and see' attitude to the internal talks, and this attitude reinforced FRELIMO's analysis presented to the Beira summit: 'The objectives of the imperialist system and South Africa are opposed to ours. They effectively propose to maintain Zimbabwe as a South African zone of influence, a zone of imperialist domination. Their recent drawing back from Smith is more apparent than real. Its main aim is to substitute a discredited card (Smith's regime) by a new and credible card (a black regime). . . . Our main and decisive force for the achievement of our objectives lies in the determination of the Zimbabwean masses to fight united for total and complete independence.' Not surprisingly after Owen's ill-advised comments, the Patriotic Front leaders refused to go to London to continue discussions on the Anglo-American proposals and, to keep up his 'momentum', Owen finally had to arrange a meeting on the Mediterranean island state of Malta.

The Malta meeting—attended by Mugabe and Nkomo, Owen and Young, Carver and Chand, and the American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose—was notable for Young's observation that 'there were more degrees on their side of the table than there were on ours', and for a parliamentary attack on Owen by Conservative MP Winston Churchill, who accused him of 'cavorting

with terrorist leaders in the Mediterranean'.⁸⁷ The Foreign Secretary replied, before leaving Malta, that 'If you're going to have a settlement, you've got to have a ceasefire. If you're going to have a ceasefire, you've got to talk to the people who are fighting.' There was more achievement at Malta than Owen—who clung to the word 'inconclusive'—was prepared to publicly acknowledge lest Smith think negotiations had gone too far without him.⁸⁸ The Patriotic Front accepted a United Nations role during the interim period in supervising elections (though not in keeping the peace), and they proposed a Governing Council to assist in administration during the transition. The Resident Commissioner would be required to act when directed by a two-thirds vote in the Council—of ten members, two from each of the five delegations to Geneva—with the exception of defence, internal security, external affairs and the operations of a proposed electoral commission. They had accepted a limited amnesty in respect of Rhodesian politicians, soldiers, judges and civil servants, and had agreed officials could be seconded from Britain during the interim period to fill the posts of judges, magistrates and senior civil servants, whom they insisted must resign. Of particular irritation to Smith was the point that the Chief Justice, the Police Commissioner and the Secretary to the Cabinet would have to vacate their posts, and 'it was not envisaged . . . that the three offices named would be the only ones in which change would be necessary.'

Muzorewa had meanwhile walked out on the internal talks again, accusing Smith of lying; and at Chimoio, in the wake of the detention of Gumbo, Hamadziripi and others, two members of the Central Committee had been taken hostage by their sympathizers. Tekere and Ushewokunze were captured and badly beaten before being rescued by Nhongo after a tip-off from an alert young guard at a camp entrance who became suspicious when Chigowe drove up with a van full of weapons. There was a Central Committee ruling that drivers would be assigned and would be the only ones authorized to operate vehicles; and the leaders did not drive themselves.⁸⁹

Three documents labelled secret and detailing the Malta amendments were sent via South Africa to Smith, Muzorewa and Sithole (but not to ZUPO, which Britain did not recognize as a party to the negotiations). They were promptly leaked in Salisbury and branded 'totally unacceptable', and Smith returned to his internal talks. The front-line presidents, however, were greatly encouraged by the progress and insisted that discussions continue as soon as possible. Nyerere told the British High Commissioner, Mervyn Brown,

and the American ambassador, Jim Spain, that the PF must be the predominant factor in the proposed Governing Council and that the Council must not be merely an advisory group but must have real power.

The conference that came to be known as 'Malta Two' took place in mid-April 1978 in Dar es Salaam; basically the same cast re-assembled, with the addition of American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Though the Anglo-American delegation was again loath to admit it, there was considerable progress regarding the military monitoring role of the UN, and the roles of the Liberation Forces and the Resident Commissioner, although the PF still argued it should play a major role in the Governing Council and that the internal leaders and Smith now represented a single entity. A Patriotic Front statement said: 'It has been agreed that a full Constitutional Conference be held as soon as possible.' That was the most extensive point of agreement for the next two years—that an 'all party' conference should be held. Although no party refused outright to attend, none were very enthusiastic, and Owen was determined not to convene the conference until he was reasonably certain it would work. The Labour government had shown during the Geneva débâcle that the person dealing with Rhodesia in cabinet had a lonely job and could not count on firm backing from his colleagues; Owen also put his finger on the problem when he told the House of Commons that 'there are still major differences between the parties, both of whom think they are winning....'

The ZANU leadership, having strengthened the party, had declared 1978 'the Year of the People' with emphasis on political organization, and was preparing for 'the Year of the People's Storm'—*Gore re Gukurahundi*—which would spread *chimurenga* across most of the country the following year. The war had entered a new phase in March 1978 when a group of 450 ZANLA guerrillas, including the first women combatants under their own command, had crossed the border near Umtali to begin to consolidate and defend territory. By mid-year there were more than 13,000 ZANLA guerrillas in the country, besides those locally trained, and *chimurenga* had spread in Tete province to Chinamora and Mangwende near Salisbury with infiltrations into the capital as well. In Manica province there were large concentrations of forces in Wedza, Buhera and Gutu, and in Gaza province the penetration stretched across the Rutenga rail line, with small groups reaching Bulawayo.

On 3 March, Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau had met in the Governor's Lodge in Salisbury under a portrait of Cecil Rhodes and signed an internal agreement for a one-year transitional arrangement leading to the hyphenated state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Though Smith had finally signed away exclusive white rule in Rhodesia, he had by no means signed away white power: the four signatories would form an Executive Council during the transition, rotating the chairmanship, but Smith would retain the title of Prime Minister. The Council's task would be to organize a ceasefire, to remove racial discrimination, to draft a new constitution and to hold elections later in the year before a handover to 'black' government at the end of December. Day-to-day administration would be handled by a Ministerial Council consisting of nine whites nominated by Smith and three from each of the black political parties. The Rhodesian Front was guaranteed enough seats in parliament to block any constitutional change—twenty-eight seats out of 100, with twenty elected on a separate roll and eight on a common roll but from a list of sixteen submitted by the other twenty. The Patriotic Front rejected this agreement outright because it left military and political power in the hands of the minority and accepted the trappings of UDI.⁹⁰ Owen described it as a 'step in the right direction', although he allowed it was 'not adequate' in certain areas such as the control of law and order. Owen did, however, encourage them to hold elections even if the PF leaders did not participate and the war continued, hoping presumably to frighten the PF into taking part. The internal settlers—who became known in PF publications as 'the three blacksmiths'—were promptly snubbed by the United Nations when the Security Council allowed Mugabe and Nkomo to address them but refused permission to a delegation from Salisbury on the grounds that it still regarded the regime as illegal.

The arrangement was in trouble almost immediately because Smith did not perceive the need to meet the expectations of the black electorate. His overriding concern continued to be the welfare of the whites. The first public manifestation of this came in April with the arrival and departure of Byron Hove (of the Bishop's UANC) as co-Minister of Justice, Law and Order. Hove spoke out against police brutality in his first public statement, and immediately clashed with his co-Minister, Hilary Squires, over changes in the judiciary and over career opportunities for blacks in the police. Squires accused him of 'breaking the spirit of the agreement', the Executive Council demanded that Hove withdraw his remarks, but he said he had 'no

apologies'. Returning to his legal practice in London after only a few days in office, he said: 'I feel sorry for my bishop because he is an honest man dealing with a bunch of rogues.' The Hove affair cost the Bishop support among those who had believed that the agreement was a sincere attempt to move towards black rule, and black ministers from then on either conformed or kept their mouths shut. Any remaining doubts about the real nature of the government were soon quashed by the co-Minister of Lands, Natural Resources and Water Development, Jack Mussett, who said that while the removal of race discrimination was high on the list of duties for the transitional government, a ceasefire and the lifting of sanctions were its prime functions. Any further criticisms, such as those concerning living conditions for the half million black inhabitants of 'protected villages', the perpetuation of hanging as punishment for political offences, and 'reports of torture and rape by the security forces' in the eastern border area—were made by UANC officials and not members of the government, but to little effect.⁹¹

Even more irritating to Smith, it became apparent they could not stop the war. Elaborate plans for an amnesty, including offers of jobs, education and money, were ignored by the guerrillas, who by now controlled zones which were semi-liberated in the sense that the old administration had broken down, they moved relatively freely, and the security forces were able to penetrate only by air or concentrated ground attack. Smith decided to put out feelers again to Nkomo and he sent his security adviser, Derrick 'Robbie' Robinson, to London—as an intelligence officer known to the British government he could have only been present with their approval—for a series of secret contacts. The Nigerians had begun to take a more active interest after Carter's visit to Lagos in March and they too participated in the contacts, in the person of the former Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Joseph Garba, an immaculately turned out soldier who impressed the Rhodesians. Another participant was the omnipresent chairman of Lonrho, 'Tiny' Rowland. The Nigerians were willing to visit Salisbury but it was decided that was inappropriate so most of the contacts took place in London.⁹²

Garba met Sithole and Rowland in London in April, and a few weeks later—although ZAPU officials denied that their leader was in London—Nkomo and Garba met Chief Chirau and Chief Ndiweni. The Chiefs echoed the message that had been communicated over the past several weeks by churchmen, educationalists and businessmen from Rhodesia who visited Zambia to try to persuade Nkomo to

return home. Also, echoing the frustration of Smith, the two Chiefs said Muzorewa and Sithole had misled them into believing the internal settlement would end the war. Nkomo, also aware of the need to end the war, told them he would not return without Mugabe. At a second meeting Nkomo told the Chiefs that Muzorewa and Sithole must be dumped and replaced by the leaders of the Patriotic Front. Between those two meetings, Nkomo, Chinamano, Robinson and Garba met at the Nigerian embassy, and Nkomo and Chinamano later met Robinson and Rowland. On his return to Salisbury, Chirau openly advocated an all-party conference, and, in the meantime, Smith had made another visit to Lusaka.

Again transported in a Lonrho executive jet, Smith flew to Zambia on 14 August for a meeting at the State Lodge just outside Lusaka which was attended by Garba and Nkomo, each with one or two officials, and a Zambian presidential adviser. President Kaunda opened the meeting and then left, popping in from time to time. At the first session, 'Smith gave a chat about a possible settlement and Nkomo said Mugabe must be included.' Garba and Nkomo met afterwards and then a second session was held to deal with specific points; the main decision was that a second meeting should be held, with Mugabe in attendance.

Although the meeting was ostensibly secret, there were leaks, and the first press reports suggested that Mugabe had also been present. In fact, the participants were all reluctant to inform him and he was flown to Lagos to be briefed by Garba. The ZANU Central Committee turned down the invitation to attend a further meeting. Nyerere accused Britain and the United States of trying to split the Patriotic Front, and Nkomo and Smith accused Nyerere of trying to wreck the initiative. They had both initially denied that the meeting took place, but then Nkomo decided to reveal his version and he told a news conference in Lusaka that Smith had agreed to hand over power to the Patriotic Front. Smith furiously denied this version in Salisbury, but further contacts became academic the following day when ZIPRA guerrillas shot down an Air Rhodesia Viscount, Hunyani, near Kariba. Thirty-eight people, mostly holiday-makers, died in the crash, and ten of the eighteen survivors were shot after they escaped from the wreckage. The BBC telephoned Nkomo early the following morning and he immediately claimed responsibility for the shooting down of the plane, but in the course of the interview he emitted a nervous chuckle that was to cause almost as much outcry in Salisbury as the murder of the survivors, which he denied his men had been

involved in. The plane, he said, was a military target because it had been used to ferry Rhodesian troops and arms. The following February, when another Viscount was shot down at Kariba, killing all passengers and crew, Nkomo claimed military personnel were on board; they were in fact in another aircraft a few minutes behind.

This incident was not, however, without reprisal. On 18 October the Rhodesians bombed 'Freedom Camp' a few kilometres north of Lusaka, bluntly bringing the reality of war to the Zambian capital. More than 200 people were killed and several hundred wounded, most of them young men, but again they were unarmed civilians—the ill-defined line between recruits and refugees—and the UNHCR and ICRC confirmed it was a refugee camp which they had visited. Three days later there were several hundred more casualties in a second attack further north on a camp near Mkushi. Nkomo said the dead and wounded were mostly young women, and this was borne out later by a senior member of Rhodesian Special Branch who said the wrong camp was attacked.⁹³ Mike Edden, who was SB liaison with 'Com-ops', said that when a ground force landed and found that the casualties were nearly all women they decided to fly a handful of journalists 600 kilometres from Salisbury for a cover-up operation: they rearranged the bodies, Edden said, so the visitors saw mostly men and lots of captured equipment. The journalists were shown records that said the camp contained 1,082 'trainees', thirty-eight old-aged people and 916 instructors, administrators and security personnel; what they were not told was that the 'trainees' were young women learning to be police and customs officers. One journalist wrote that 'corpses, large quantities of communist small-arms and literature, camping equipment and boots by the hundred lay strewn among the bomb craters and smouldering mud-and-thatch barracks of the Mkushi terrorist training centre...';⁹⁴ another wrote of flying over a tranquil area nearby where elephants and rhino grazed.

A few days after the attacks, RBC broadcast an exchange between 'Green Leader', the Rhodesian Air Force raid commander, and Lusaka control tower: 'This is a message for the station commander at Mumbwa [a Zambia air base] from the Rhodesian Air Force. We are attacking the terrorist base at Westlands Farm at this time. This attack is against Rhodesian dissidents and not against Zambia. Rhodesia has no quarrel with Zambia or her security forces. We therefore ask you not to intervene or oppose our attack. However, we are orbiting your airfields at this time and we are under orders to shoot

down any Zambian air force aircraft which does not comply with this request and attempts to take off. Did you copy all that?' Lusaka tower replied: 'Roger. Thanks. Cheers.' Again that was not the entire story but it succeeded in its aim of boosting white morale. A copy of the unabridged cockpit recording reveals that the exchange occurred as the plane was leaving Zambian airspace: the attack had already taken place, and the message was a publicity gimmick. What the pilots were actually saying as they went in for the attack was not so tame: 'Steady, steady... I'm gonna get them... Yah, steady now, bomb's gone, they're running... Beautiful, Jesus Christ those fuckin' bombs are beautiful... Roger, just let me get onto the fuckin' tower and give them our bloody message here. Where's this fuckin' piece of speech... I think it'll be better when we've climbed up... Yah, I'm just trying to get the thing ready... That was mushi, fuckin' hundreds of gooks... There are fuckin' kaffirs everywhere... Are the K-cars in there? Yah, they've got K-cars in there, they'll have a beautiful time... They're like fuckin' ants running around there, eh? Jesus, there's a swarm of them...'⁹⁵

Smith, who had been in the United States at the time of the attack at the invitation of right-wing Congressmen, congratulated the security forces, and Muzorewa said: 'I think the Army was doing its duty in defending the people.'⁹⁶ Zambia threatened to ask the Soviet Union for weapons to defend itself and Britain promptly airlifted weapons to its former colony, including anti-aircraft guns. Owen was more discreet on this occasion and condemned the escalation of the conflict and the loss of life. None of that prevented a daring attack a few months later into the heart of Lusaka, a few hundred metres from State House, that destroyed Nkomo's residence. He was not in the house at the time. All this activity made ZIPRA guerrillas in camps in Zambia nervous. There were some nasty incidents with local white farmers and some civilian Zambian aircraft were fired on. Meanwhile, on 26 October, Kaunda had reopened the southern rail route through Rhodesia to ship copper out through South African ports and bring food and fertiliser in. Machel and Nyerere had flown to Lusaka to talk to their colleague but were unable to dissuade him. They received a cold reception from Zambian officials, who insisted the measure was economic necessity, but the two presidents remained strongly opposed to it and Mozambique kept its border firmly closed. South African Railways was soon complaining—as had officials of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad (TAZARA) to the north—that the

appallingly slow return of rolling stock from Zambia was a costly inefficiency.

Graham and Low flitted through the region from time to time to determine whether all parties would attend an 'all party' conference and whether such a conference would succeed. A Conservative MP called for British military intervention. Smith did not rule out the possibility of renouncing UDI and Washington did not rule out the possibility of Smith 'arranging his own exit'. Both Smith and Chirau made obvious their view that the internal settlement had failed, yet they proceeded with the others to draft a Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution and to endeavour to hold elections under that constitution, which a Commonwealth analysis said retained 'virtually every lever of institutional power . . . in white hands: those few surrendered have been effectively emasculated.'

The front-line states tried to defend themselves militarily and to urge the Patriotic Front into greater unity, which—on paper—they achieved. A constitution was drafted for a single political party, plans were worked out for military integration; both sides described them as sound, yet the problem of implementation remained. A new face appeared in the shuttle, Cledwyn Hughes, who was in the British Labour government at the time of UDI as Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations. Owen continued to talk of the need to end the war and he told the House of Commons that 'the alternative to talks is continued war.' White morale plummeted as, with blacks in government, it became unclear who or what they were fighting for. Sanctions were not lifted. The economy—which had felt the rock-bottom effect of 1977 about the time the transition began in March the following year, with ten days' reserves of foreign currency instead of the normal forty-two—began to ease slightly as more international money was made available to a partly black regime, but it was eaten away by the costs of defence. 'Censorship in Rhodesia is now virtually total. Telephones are tapped. Mail is opened. Torture of the African population is widespread,' a white Rhodesian wrote in a letter smuggled out of the country. Whites voted 'Yes' in a referendum on majority rule and elections were organized on the basis of universal adult suffrage but with separate racial rolls, and with the entire country in the grip of martial law. ZANLA had long since stopped recruiting, with an instruction 'that no one should pass through our operational area', Tongogara said. 'If he feels that he wants to fight, to contribute to the armed struggle, stay there, we are training people there, training doesn't mean shooting, but liberating their minds.'⁹⁷

Small groups of ZANLA guerrillas had crossed the Bulawayo—Plumtree rail line and were advancing towards the western border. There were large concentrations along the main rail line through Gatooma, Hartley and Que Que. There were guarded convoys on virtually every main road, and the second *chimurenga* was moving towards its goal of encircling the cities. 'Our purpose was to isolate the cities and cut them off, not to attack them,' Tungamirai said.⁹⁸ 'A few well-planned strikes to frighten the white population. Salisbury had been vulnerable for some time, we had cadres in Bulawayo but it was further away from our areas.' ZIPRA was increasingly entering the war in the west and north-west and on one occasion a company of 150 ZIPRA guerrillas fought jointly with a company of ZANLA north of Karoi for a month or two before withdrawing. Between February and May 1979 members of the ZANLA high command were instructed to go inside the country to help to set up formal structures of administration, and during the intense security of the internal elections their advice to the people was: 'If you are forced, don't resist, go and vote—for Muzorewa.' Among their tasks for 1979 were to create a people's militia to defend the liberated zones, consolidate semi-liberated zones, step up attacks on enemy bases and economic targets, and intensify the programme of politicization.

'We are now entering a decisive phase of the war,' Tongogara said, 'when the enemy commits all sorts of atrocities in the battlefield and right in the capital he mushrooms up some groups to form a government. So all these symptoms we are seeing now convince us that we are really entering the decisive stage. I think this is the beginning, the internal arrangement, there's something more coming, because he's going to try Sithole and Muzorewa and everybody up to a point then something else is going to come out.'⁹⁹

From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe

Margaret Thatcher's convincing victory in the British general election on 3 May 1979, less than a fortnight after Muzorewa had won an equally comfortable victory in the controversial Zimbabwe-Rhodesia election, brought a potentially dangerous new dimension to the tortuous Rhodesian epic. Callaghan's government, defeated on 1 April on a vote of no confidence, had refused to send observers to the Rhodesian election on the grounds that this would imply recognition. Thatcher, however, had dispatched a team of five observers led by Viscount Boyd, who was Colonial Secretary in the Eden and Macmillan Conservative governments from 1954 to 1959. Their task was to ascertain whether the elections were 'free and fair', and after Thatcher's election it seemed the Conservative government's decisions on whether to recognize Muzorewa's administration, return Rhodesia to legality and try to persuade the UN to lift sanctions, would hinge upon Boyd's findings.

Referring to Rhodesia's elections, the Conservative spokesman on foreign affairs, Francis Pym, had told his constituents: '... I would like to reiterate that if the election takes place in reasonably free and fair conditions and with a reasonable turn-out the last of the traditional six principles which have governed British policy for so long will have been satisfied. In that case it would be the duty of any British Government to bring Rhodesia back to legality and to do everything possible to make sure that the new independent State receives international recognition.'¹

The principles to which Pym referred had begun to evolve before UDI. These were unimpeded progress towards majority rule, guaran-

tees against retrogressive amendments of the constitution, the immediate improvement of the political status of Africans, progress towards ending racial discrimination, the need for the British government to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence 'was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole', and the need to ensure, regardless of race, that there was no oppression of the majority by the minority or *vice versa*. Later Wilson, at the insistence of Commonwealth leaders, gave an undertaking that there would not be independence until majority rule was established—the NIBMAR principle.

The Boyd Report was released in London on 24 May 1979 after being given to Thatcher. It found, judging by 'the strictest Western European criteria', that the electoral process was 'fairly conducted and above reproach'.² Unlike the report by another group of observers led by Lord Chitnis, a Liberal peer, it contained no criticism of the security forces for rounding up voters and taking them to the polling stations. Chitnis had concluded: 'The recent election in Rhodesia was nothing more than a gigantic confidence trick designed to foist on a cowed and indoctrinated black electorate a settlement and a constitution which were formulated without its consent and which are being implemented without its approval.' Under war conditions which made a democratic election impossible, the electorate had been brainwashed by propaganda, cajoled by false and dishonest promises, and intimidated; the whole exercise had been designed to win international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. 'We cannot play our appointed role in this process and endorse this blatant attempt to perpetrate a fraud and justify a lie,' Chitnis concluded.³ Boyd saw it quite differently. Going well beyond the mandate he had been given by Thatcher he argued that the election was a kind of referendum on the 3 March 1978 constitution agreed between Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau: 'The great jubilation among blacks and whites when the high poll was announced, before the count had even started, must lead to the conclusion that the election was not merely about which party would win, but contained within it a further, perhaps more profound, question. We are satisfied that the election did, in fact, constitute a kind of referendum of the constitution.'⁴

Thus Boyd had found that the elections were free and fair (a viewpoint several observer groups as well as Chitnis disagreed with), that a 64 per cent turn-out meant that the new constitution and Muzorewa government were acceptable to the people as a whole, and that now a majority-rule government existed, there was, theoretically,

no barrier to granting independence. Less than a year later, when the Patriotic Front parties won seventy-seven seats and Muzorewa only three in a properly supervised election, Zimbabweans were to prove just how wrong Boyd had been. However, in May 1979 the danger was that Thatcher—who in Parliament right after the publication of the Boyd report had called the Patriotic Front ‘a terrorist organization’⁵—would now recognize the Muzorewa government, grant independence and ask the UN to lift sanctions.

The Rhodesians had been euphoric over Thatcher’s election and the departure of the Labour Foreign Secretary, David Owen, whom they particularly detested. The change of government in Britain would inject ‘realism into the Anglo-Rhodesia issue’, said Muzorewa. ‘I am naturally much happier than I would have been if the old guard had been returned to power, for I believe that one of the greatest impediments to an honest and just settlement has now been removed.’ He expressed the hope that the Conservatives would not succumb to pressures and would carry out the policy they had indicated while in opposition. ‘If they do so then I believe this will be quickly resolved and we can look forward to the early lifting of sanctions and international recognition.’⁶ Sithole said he believed that Thatcher would bring a new approach, while Smith and van der Byl also welcomed the Conservative victory: it was, said Smith, ‘good news’.⁷ The *Rhodesia Herald* in an editorial observed: ‘People in this part of the world will share the elation of the Tories over Mrs Thatcher’s handsome victory in the general election. It is the best possible result for Britain and for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.’⁸

They would have been well advised to ponder on a remark by Owen the day after the British election: ‘Now that they [the Conservatives] are in power they will find it a very different proposition from being in opposition.’⁹ Pym had also somewhat backtracked from his pronouncement on 10 April. A Conservative government would not rush into recognizing Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, he said; it might first be necessary to consult the United States and other nations. Muzorewa, Smith, General Walls and others appealed for recognition but already pressures were beginning to mount. Nigeria, Britain’s largest trading partner in Africa, on 24 May—the same day the Boyd report was released—rejected all British tenders for a £101,000,000 port project which it had been assumed would go to a British consortium because a British interest-free loan was involved. The Permanent Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Works said bluntly, as the tenders were being

opened: ‘Until the British government clarifies its attitude [on Rhodesia] to black Africa the Nigerian government is not prepared to entertain any new proposals from British companies.’¹⁰ That decision, it was intimated, would even include companies in which there was a Nigerian majority and British minority shareholding. With many millions of pounds worth of contracts coming up in Nigeria in the following months the British business sector was suitably impressed by the point Nigeria was making. It was further emphasized by the front-line states’ invitation to Nigeria to participate in their deliberations. What the front-line states lacked in economic importance to persuade Britain, Nigeria could provide.

In early June the Africans sought and obtained strong condemnation of the ‘internal settlement’ at the non-aligned nations summit in Colombo, and in July the OAU summit in Liberia took an even stronger position. Amidst the mounting pressure Britain could not even count on her more carefully cultivated African friends like Kenya. In London the High Commissioners of thirty-four Commonwealth countries, only two days after Thatcher’s victory, agreed unanimously to warn the new government about the perils of recognizing Muzorewa’s regime and lifting sanctions which, the same day in Parliament, Owen described as potentially ‘an error as grave as Suez’.¹¹

There were also consequential pressure groups in favour of recognition. While the *Financial Times* advocated caution, papers such as the *Daily Express* and *Daily Telegraph* called for immediate recognition. ‘Rhodesia has always been a decent, well-governed little country seeking to interfere in the affairs of nobody,’ the *Daily Express* said. ‘Now it is making the immensely difficult transition to black majority rule, a multi-racial democracy, Rhodesia needs, and deserves, help.’ The editorial went on: ‘The aim [of critics of the government] will be to break the nerve of the Tory Government to prevent it from making a change in British policy. Beyond that, they want to see Rhodesia pass into the hands of the Russian-backed terror bands of Mugabe and Nkomo, a fine pair of butchers, who would establish a one party tyranny there after fighting among themselves for supremacy. On the moral level, then, there is no doubt that Bishop Muzorewa must be given a chance.’¹² This sort of simplistic thinking became the clarion of the right wing in the US Senate, Fleet Street and elsewhere as they demanded recognition for Muzorewa and the lifting of sanctions. That Rhodesia had never been a ‘decent little country’ for the majority of its people escaped the *Daily Express*. Obsessed with the Russian

bogey, the fact that Mugabe did not receive any aid from Moscow was conveniently ignored.

Rhodesians found comfort in the attempts of the United States Senate to force Carter to lift sanctions and from Thatcher's policy, which became known as 'creeping recognition' and which included sending a senior Foreign Office diplomat, Derek Day, to be based in Salisbury. However, one of Thatcher's earliest and most critical decisions, and one which was to have an important impact on the outcome of the controversy, was the appointment of Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary. She lacked any real knowledge of foreign affairs, particularly in Africa, and a combination of her political instinct and Carrington's knowledge was to provide a tough combination in the difficult months ahead. On 21 May, Carrington met the American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in London and told him that, while Britain would move cautiously over Rhodesia, the elections had been a significant step and it would be 'morally wrong' to disregard them. 'It is our responsibility to try to bring Rhodesia to legal independence in conditions which will afford that country the prospect of a more peaceful future. To that end, it will be our objective to achieve a return to legality in conditions of the widest possible international recognition.'¹³

Carrington sent Lord Harlech, Britain's former Ambassador in Washington, to Africa to sound the views of the continent's leaders. It was emphasized to him that the issue was not whether the elections were free and fair—which the African leaders did not accept—but that the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution, which left powers such as control of the forces, judiciary and public service, and the right to veto constitutional change in white hands, was not really majority rule at all. In these circumstances the war would continue and if Britain recognized Muzorewa she would be aligning herself with those whom Africa was fighting. The same message was relayed to Carter and other Western leaders and it was at this point that the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, began to play a critical role within the white Commonwealth. Fraser, domestically a conservative but a strong opponent of racism, sent a message to the new Canadian Prime Minister, Joe Clark, urging him not to act precipitously over recognition of the Muzorewa government. Any such move by any Commonwealth country could wreck the Commonwealth summit in Lusaka in August and even worse, Fraser believed, it could wreck the Commonwealth.¹⁴ Fraser, who was also concerned about whether Thatcher could withstand Tory backbench pressure, relayed the same

feelings to Carrington. Fraser's concern had increased when in Canberra on 1 July, Thatcher publicly stated that 'British sanctions will lapse in November, and we doubt very much whether any renewal will go through the British Parliament.'¹⁵

On 1 June, when the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution came into effect and the Executive Council was sworn in, only a handful of people knew just how close Rhodesia had been to becoming the focal point of an internationalized war in southern Africa, which would have certainly brought the South Africans, Cubans and Russians into the conflict and forced the Western powers to decide which side they supported. At the end of May, the Mozambique government received an urgent message saying that a Cuban envoy, Raul Valdez Vivo, one of the top men in the Cuban Communist Party, in charge of foreign affairs, was flying to see Machel. In Maputo, Vivo argued that once the Muzorewa government was sworn in there was a real danger that a number of Western powers would recognize it, and it was therefore necessary to try to pre-empt this. The Mozambiquans were deeply concerned about the possibility of recognition for Muzorewa which could isolate them and could lead to far greater South African participation in Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique; they were therefore susceptible to any plan which would bring widespread international support for the guerrillas and for themselves.

The framework for the plan Vivo proposed was taken from a front-line state document, the 'Dar es Salaam agreement on the unity of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe', dated 9 April 1979, which Machel had been largely responsible for drafting. This had proposed closer political unity within the Patriotic Front by the creation of an Executive Committee and National Council. The members of the Executive Committee would be the agreed Chairman and Secretary-General of the Patriotic Front plus the heads and deputies of four departments or commissions—External Relations, Defence and Security, Finance and Administration (including logistics) and Information and Publicity—which it was proposed to create. The National Council would comprise the ten members of the Executive Committee plus twenty from each wing of the Patriotic Front. The Chairman and Secretary-General would come from the different wings of the Front with parity at all levels of the new structure and the Chairman overseeing the departments of External Affairs, and Information and Publicity, and the Secretary-General the other two.¹⁶

The front-line states had concluded that the principal obstacle to

greater unity within the Patriotic Front was the question of political leadership. ZANU would not accept Nkomo and ZAPU would not accept Mugabe as overall leader, and the front-line leaders believed that Nkomo would never voluntarily accept the number two place in any organization. Their plan was that Nkomo should become Chairman and Mugabe Secretary-General. The most important department, Defence and Security, would be controlled by Mugabe, whose army was doing the bulk of the fighting. Nkomo had read the document in Dar es Salaam in the presence of Mugabe and the front-line leaders, realized immediately what the plan was, and thrust it away across the table.

Vivo's plan was that Nkomo and Mugabe should be taken into one of the guerrilla-controlled areas of Zimbabwe from Mozambique and, before Muzorewa was sworn in, should pronounce the formation of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe headed by Nkomo with Mugabe as the number two man in charge of defence.¹⁷ Journalists would be taken into the country to record the ceremony and a substantial number of Socialist bloc, African and Caribbean countries, possibly as many as sixty, would recognize the Patriotic Front government within a matter of days, thereby confronting Western countries with the dilemma that if they recognized Muzorewa they would be declaring their opposition to the Patriotic Front and its supporters. Vivo, who had visited Addis Ababa, Luanda and Lusaka, said that Mengistu, Neto and Kaunda all supported his plan and so did Nkomo. 'We said if everyone agrees then it is no problem with us because we had in fact proposed a structure for the Patriotic Front which was fairly similar to what Vivo was proposing,' a Mozambique official said.¹⁸ 'We would not have had any problems if it was serious and he said that in fact he was talking on behalf of the whole socialist community. Moscow might have originated it or had certainly been consulted and without any doubt, we thought, they were in agreement with it. Where this consultation had been done we did not ask.' Vivo proposed that Machel immediately summon a front-line state summit. He would return to attend it and he asked that Mengistu should also be invited; he would take the invitation to Neto and relay one to Mengistu. Kaunda was asked to inform Khama, and Nyerere was invited through his embassy in Maputo. At the summit the seven countries would announce their recognition of the Patriotic Front government.

Mugabe and Nkomo, depending upon the security situation, would probably have remained in the country for only a brief period. There-

after they were to drop from sight with deputies fronting externally for the Patriotic Front government. One site considered for the installation of Nkomo and Mugabe was the Chiredzi area in south-east Rhodesia some eighty kilometres from the Mozambique border and 150 kilometres from the South African border. The Mozambique army was mobilized to protect the capital, Maputo, and the country's borders and strategic installations, in case of Rhodesian and South African retaliation. A full FPLM mechanized battalion with artillery and anti-aircraft and other support units was on stand-by to go with Nkomo and Mugabe, and contingents of ZANLA and ZIPRA troops, into the country for the ceremony.

Mugabe said that Vivo came to see him while he was in Maputo. He said that 'we should act to forestall the internal settlement.'¹⁹ Vivo outlined the same plan to Mugabe, who said he understood the plan was that the installation would take place in Tete or Manica, the two northernmost ZANLA war provinces, which were further away from South Africa's frontier than Chiredzi. Vivo asked Mugabe for his reaction. 'I said I wanted to think about it. It was not a matter I could react to there and then because it was a question of policy, fundamental policy, and we had to look at various issues. First, what would it mean in terms of the struggle? Secondly, what would it mean in terms of unity between ourselves? And so we went to discuss it and we felt it was a non-starter.'²⁰

For the next few days ZANU were deeply worried. They had been pushed into things like détente before against their better judgement and on this occasion both Nyerere and Machel might see the plan as offering the possibility of getting Soviet arms and other support for ZANLA—which Moscow had hitherto refused to give—and of forging political unity within the Patriotic Front. 'Fortunately for us Joshua turned it down,' Mugabe said. 'I wonder why he turned it down? Was it because the exercise was to be from Mozambique and in our liberated zones?'²¹

On the day the front-line summit was due to take place in Maputo, Machel received a message from Neto saying that Nkomo was in Luanda and had refused to attend the summit; Neto said that there was therefore no point in his coming. Nyerere and Kaunda were already flying in and ten minutes before Machel was due to go to the airport to meet them the Cuban ambassador arrived, saying he had a very urgent message. This was from Vivo, saying that as neither Neto or Nkomo were coming there was no point in his returning to Maputo. Machel was livid. He told the ambassador, an aide said: 'Look, this is

your idea and how do I explain to those who are coming? It was because of you we called the meeting. Am I supposed to be the fool then in the middle of all of this? So you tell Valdez Vivo that I'm extremely angry with him. No, tell Fidel I'm extremely angry with this. I don't know what game you are playing at but I'm certainly not pleased."²² Machel left for the airport to meet Nyerere and Kaunda and found the Soviet ambassador waiting with yet another message; this was from Mengistu, thanking him for the invitation but saying he was too busy to attend because of a scheduled visit to Ethiopia's provinces.

Machel explained to Nyerere and Kaunda what had happened and the Zambian confirmed that Vivo had also been to see him with the same plan. Soon after this extraordinary sequence of events Vivo was dismissed from his post in the Cuban Communist Party. To this day no explanation has ever been given to Mozambique but officials in Maputo believe that Vivo was made the scapegoat when the plan misfired. It is as well that it did. No countries recognized the Muzorewa Zimbabwe-Rhodesia administration, but a force of several thousand FPLM, ZANLA and ZIPRA troops converging on a point inside Rhodesia to install a Patriotic Front government would almost certainly have brought the South Africans into the war on a large scale in response to Muzorewa's charges that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had been invaded. The press record, including the stories of South African journalists whom it was intended to invite to the ceremony, would have provided ample evidence. The internationalization of the war and predictable escalation of the attacks on Mozambique could have forced Mozambique to appeal to the Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba for large-scale military aid, including troops, and in turn some Western countries might have had to come to the aid of Muzorewa. This was what ZANU feared, for they were convinced that they were gradually winning the war and internationalization of the conflict at that point, particularly the involvement of the Soviets, could have perverted the outcome.

The Rhodesians by this point had lost control of large areas of the countryside, particularly in the Takawira sector stretching from the Mozambique frontier to just west of Salisbury and the Nehanda sector to the north which included Sinoia to the west and Norton to the south. In the Takawira sector a permanent training camp with full-time instructors and a provincial base with a network of underground tunnels had been established. In the Nehanda sector guerrillas had

begun ploughing and cultivating their own food crops. Four ZANLA companies, each at least 150 strong, were located north, west, south and east of Salisbury. The strategy was to encircle the capital and other cities and towns in the country, cutting them off from each other.²³ Advance groups had already infiltrated the cities on sabotage missions, such as the spectacular attack on oil storage depots in Salisbury by a seven-man ZANLA group. On the northern Tete front the ZANLA guerrillas were operating as far west as the Chirau and Zvimba Tribal Trust Lands south of Sinoia, where they could threaten the road route running north-west from Salisbury to Karoi and Kariba. In the central Manica province the guerrillas had infiltrated to the west of Gwelo and Shabani and a large number had crossed the railway line running south from Gwelo through Rutenga and on to South Africa, thereby threatening Rhodesia's most vital trade route. In the southernmost Gaza province ZANLA guerrillas were south-east of Plumtree, the deepest penetration from Mozambique, and were now able to threaten Rhodesia's second trade route to the south through Botswana.²⁴

By the middle of 1979—'the Year of the People's Storm'—the ZANLA forces inside the country numbered over 20,000. By the end of the year martial law had been extended to cover 95 per cent of the country, and for the period between 1 January and 28 December—the day the ceasefire came into effect after constitutional agreement—the death toll in the war totalled 7,729, more than one-third of the total of 19,898 killed in the seven years and one week since the attack on Altena Farm on 21 December 1972. The number of members of the security forces killed—408—was almost 50 per cent higher than the previous year. The guerrillas killed numbered 4,290, according to Rhodesian statistics, while African civilians killed numbered 2,853 and non-Africans 178.²⁵ The cost of the war in financial terms was also rising sharply. In late July Muzorewa's Finance Minister, David Smith, unveiled his war budget: the war was now accounting for at least 37 per cent of the recurrent budget—about £600,000 a day—a fourfold increase in the last four years.

Journalists who had been allowed to travel around the country during the April election had been surprised by the extent of guerrilla penetration. One journalist, David Ottaway of the *Washington Post*, visited the Melsetter area south of Umtali near the border with Mozambique. Forty-two Europeans had been killed in the area in the previous three years, and of the 160 white farmers once settled around Melsetter town fewer than ten remained. Further north at the town of

Cashel 110 white farmers once lived nearby, but now only a handful remained. However, because the guerrillas had not seriously disrupted the April election, an act which would have been difficult if not foolhardy with between 70,000 and 100,000 members of the security forces mobilized for the occasion, the belief persisted that many of the guerrillas would cross over now there was a black Prime Minister. 'I think it's correct to say a lot of terrorists are going to come and hand themselves in after the election,' Melsetter's district commissioner, Martin Robe, told Ottaway. 'A lot of them are just sitting on the fence, waiting to see.'²⁶ The Rhodesians claimed that many guerrillas were defecting and Sithole claimed that his auxiliary forces were all guerrillas who had returned to the fold, a claim proved incorrect when it was shown that many of them were unemployed urban youths who had never been guerrillas. In Washington on 11 July Muzorewa claimed guerrilla defections were running at the rate of 30 to 40 per cent of their forces inside the country, adding that the government had an 80 per cent chance of defeating the guerrillas.²⁷

A confidential paper headed 'Op. Amnesty' and written on 14 June 1979—only a fortnight after Muzorewa took office—by the National Psychological Action (NATPAC) 'think tank' reveals just how little success the amnesty offer to guerrillas was meeting with. 'The current amnesty offer addressed to the terrorists by the Prime Minister and which has been communicated through the media of radio broadcasts and leaflet distribution has failed to produce meaningful results,' it began.²⁸ The paper goes on to say that *mujibas*, the youths who acted as the guerrillas' eyes and ears, were 'a major factor in the lack of SF [Security Force] successes and conversely contributed to many terr successes.' Stock thefts were a serious problem and 'Farmers' morale was also at a low ebb and the economy threatened.' The call-up was another factor 'contributing to the low state of white morale and the serious emigration problem'. Almost 4,000,000 leaflets were distributed bearing a picture of Muzorewa and the message: 'Those who fought before majority rule did so for a cause, but those who will continue to fight and die are traitors to the true will of the people and they will die in ignominy and shame, and it will be for nothing. COME HOME BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.' Despite this, and daily radio broadcasts, the message was not getting through to the guerrillas; Africans in the rural areas were still collaborating with the guerrillas, and the NATPAC document suggested they should be a 'prime psyac target group' and added: 'Current SF image needs to be improved in order to exploit this group.' Greater use of auxiliaries was suggested

plus increased activity by government to fill the 'political vacuum' which existed.

To make the amnesty proposals more attractive, NATPAC suggested increased war pressure on the guerrillas and an increase in the sums offered to those who surrendered. *Mujibas* must be removed and white morale improved, and if the rewards were increased for guerrillas who surrendered it would have to be 'surreptitiously executed so as to avoid a backlash from the SF and the whites, particularly those who have lost relatives in the war'. An all-out military and 'psyac' campaign 'backed by South Africa' on the scale of the election mobilization, was proposed, with 'terr reception centres' replacing polling stations. Assassinations were also proposed. 'An attempt should be made to "take out" the top echelon of the terrs, e.g. Nkomo, Mugabe, Tongogara, Rex Nhongo. This would seriously affect terr morale and throw them into disarray. Obviously, this is easier said than done but should always be part of the aim.'²⁹

A number of important things emerge from this NATPAC appreciation of the situation. In the first place the amnesty had been a total failure with few guerrillas responding to it. The guerrillas were obviously enjoying more success than was generally acknowledged and white morale was extremely low, a state of affairs obviously made worse by Walls and other top officers saying in public and private that Rhodesia could not win the war. The NATPAC paper also reveals the willingness of the regime to assassinate nationalist leaders opposed to them, raising the spectre of the assassinations of Chitepo and Moyo and the disappearance of Dr Edson Sithole.

While observers and others argued about whether the elections were free and fair two things became obvious: the first was that the real issue was the seriously flawed constitution, and the second was that until this was rectified the war would continue with a growing ferocity. In early July, Muzorewa flew to the United States at the invitation of a conservative Senator, Jesse Helms, a long-time friend of white Rhodesia, to plead for recognition from the Carter Administration, which he described as 'misinformed and ill-advised'.³⁰ Despite pressure from the Senate, which had voted fifty-two to forty-one in favour of lifting sanctions, Carter had said he did not regard the elections as free and fair, that the constitution gave the white minority a 'vastly disproportionate role', and that he would not lift sanctions until he saw progress towards 'more genuine majority rule'.³¹ A few days later in London, Muzorewa, apparently as prone to self-delusion as his predecessor, told a press conference after meeting Thatcher:

'We are very close to being recognized. You should not be surprised if Zimbabwe is completely recognized and sanctions completely removed three months from now.'³² Like Carter, Thatcher and Carrington had told Muzorewa that recognition was out of the question until major constitutional changes had been made. To this suggestion Smith retorted: 'If we are going to mess around with the constitution . . . then it will be the end of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.'³³ He was right, but—having failed to win American and British recognition and get sanctions lifted, and with the war escalating—Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was trapped in a whirlpool with only one way out.

A few days before the Commonwealth summit opened in Lusaka on 1 August Thatcher had stated in Parliament: 'The British Government are wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia.'³⁴ Nyerere argued that Thatcher might be offering an olive branch on the eve of the meeting, and the Commonwealth Secretary General, Shridath Ramphal, who was in the visitors' gallery of the House of Commons during the speech, felt similarly. Weeks earlier another leader in the region with a considerable interest in the outcome in Rhodesia, Machel, had startled his colleagues by observing: 'I think this woman can bring us a settlement.'³⁵ He had dispatched an aide to London to find out more about the Conservatives, the City and this strange thing called the Commonwealth, which the Mozambicans had some difficulty in understanding.

The Lusaka summit, with the exception of one unforeseen hiccup, was to be an object lesson in conference management. Psychologically it was important that Thatcher should not be backed into a corner and shouted at. It was decided to delay the southern Africa debate until Friday morning, two days after the conference opened, and, to prevent acrimony, to keep it as short as possible before adjourning it until the following week. It was crucial that the speaker chosen to lead the debate should get the balance and nuance right, and Nyerere was the man to do this. Ramphal had met Thatcher a fortnight after she came to power, when she had referred to the Patriotic Front as 'terrorists'; the Secretary-General had warned her that such language would prove provocative at Lusaka and she had quickly responded: 'Well, of course they're terrorists, they're just like the IRA.'³⁶ By Lusaka she had mellowed and Nyerere's speech struck the right chord. The principle of majority rule had now been accepted in Rhodesia, he said; that was an important advance. What was necessary now was a democratic constitution which did not leave real power

in the hands of the minority, free and fair elections internationally supervised and organized, negotiations in which everyone was involved and not just the internal parties as had been the case with the internal settlement, and a ceasefire. Thatcher agreed that the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution was 'defective in certain important respects', and she spoke of the mechanism allowing the whites to block constitutional change and their control of the service commissions. Britain, she said, would accept its colonial responsibility and was committed to genuine black majority rule, adding that independence could only be granted on the basis of a constitution comparable with the constitutions of other Commonwealth countries.³⁷

The Rhodesia debate was wound up after only two hours, the shortest debate at any Commonwealth conference since UDI, and it never resumed. During the weekend there was an informal meeting in Kaunda's book-lined study in State House between Nyerere, Kaunda, Major General Henry Adefope (the Nigerian Foreign Minister), Fraser, Michael Manley (the Jamaican Prime Minister), Thatcher and Carrington. These weekend informal get-togethers to which only the heads of delegations, their wives and the Secretary-General were invited, had become a feature of Commonwealth summits and it was in this atmosphere, without ministers and diplomats present, that the leaders could talk to each other in frank political terms. Nyerere opened the meeting by saying how reassured he had been by Thatcher's speech, and as the discussion progressed it was clear that some major elements of agreement existed. The night before, Ramphal had sat down in his house at Mulungushi village and analysed Nyerere's and Thatcher's speeches, which some people were joking must have been mixed up as they had so much in common. Ramphal extracted these common points and had a typed copy of them in his pocket. At the appropriate moment he produced the list and Thatcher observed that some agreement might be possible; she suggested that Ramphal continue the discussion with Sir Anthony Duff, Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office. Between them they refined Ramphal's paper and the leaders met again on Sunday morning. The only point of debate was over supervision of the elections. Nyerere had envisaged international supervision, but Thatcher indicated that she could not sell that to her party and that Britain would have to be trusted to supervise the elections.³⁸ A compromise was agreed that the elections would be 'supervised under British government authority, and with Commonwealth observers'.

The six leaders reached a nine-point agreement which included the recognition that new elections must be held under British authority, that a new constitution agreed between all parties was necessary and that a ceasefire was vital during the elections. They reiterated their recognition of Britain's responsibility for Rhodesia and welcomed the indications given by Thatcher that she would call a constitutional conference. The agreement was supposed to have been kept secret until it was presented to the full conference on Monday, but during Sunday afternoon it was leaked by the Australian delegation. Thatcher and Carrington were furious. Carrington called Ramphal, saying: 'The whole thing is off. It's been leaked to the press and we're in deep trouble. We can't live with this.'³⁹ Thatcher's problem was that the Tory manifesto before her election had committed her to recognition of Muzorewa's government if the elections were adjudged to be free and fair, and she now needed to head off the inevitable storm from her party backwoodsmen when they learned that she had agreed to new elections and a new constitution. Ramphal had his own problems: if Britain pulled out of the agreement now it was improbable it would ever be endorsed. Late that afternoon in Lusaka's Anglican Cathedral an aide passed the British Prime Minister a message during the service. It was from Carrington and said: 'I am quite satisfied that the Australians gave it to the press. My advice is that it's off. We have to release it but we have to release it as a draft which has emerged and will be considered and we have no position on it.'⁴⁰

Thatcher passed the note to Ramphal, who hurriedly scribbled a reply on his order of service sheet: 'I think it would be better, in deference to the heads outside the negotiating group, to hold a brief meeting of heads at Malcolm's villa shortly after they arrive at 7 p.m. We can then explain (with the texts before them) what has happened—seek their concurrence on the text—and secure their permission for immediate release. We can then get it out—as an already agreed text—before any further press briefings by leaders. Briefing on a "draft" is a recipe for disaster: it will risk a reopening of the text on the basis of the explanations given. Perhaps we can have a private word with "KK" before we leave here.'⁴¹ Thatcher agreed to go to Fraser's villa but, still furious with the Australian Prime Minister, refused to remain after the meeting for a barbecue he was giving that evening for heads of delegations. Thirty-eight presidents, prime ministers and ministers crowded into Fraser's sitting room, sitting on the arms of chairs and pouffes. Kaunda opened the meeting with the speech he had intended to make on Monday, explaining what

had transpired over the weekend at State House. Thatcher said that if the Commonwealth leaders wanted matters to proceed as outlined in the 'draft' it would be impossible for her to leave the room without agreement.⁴² An agreement was reached within an hour and the crisis was averted.

Thatcher, as she had promised, moved swiftly. Invitations to a constitutional conference at Lancaster House to be chaired by Carrington were sent to the Patriotic Front leaders and the Muzorewa government, which included Smith and Sithole in the delegation. The conference opened on 10 September and concluded after forty-seven plenary sessions with agreement on a new constitution, arrangements for the transitional period preceding independence and a ceasefire agreement on 15 December, with the formal agreements being signed by the leaders of the delegations on 21 December.

The Lancaster House conference was a tortuous cliff-hanger, a fitting finale to the Rhodesia saga. Carrington used a mixture of shrewd diplomacy mixed with blunt determination with those who crossed him. Smith was to feel the sting of Carrington's tongue when on one occasion he accused the Foreign Secretary of having blood on his hands: 'If there is blood on anyone's hands it is yours,' Carrington angrily retorted.⁴³ The Patriotic Front fought against constitutional provisions they regarded as racist (such as reserved seats for twenty whites), against restrictions on constitutional changes, the retention of the Rhodesian forces, the restriction placed on the ability of a new government to redistribute land that had been taken from the Africans over the previous ninety years, the length of time given for a ceasefire to take effect, the location of forces during the ceasefire, and many other issues. Muzorewa fought to preserve his position as much as possible against constitutional changes which he felt would undermine it and for the retention of the Rhodesian forces and any other item he felt he could turn to his advantage.

Carrington was under pressure to reach a swift agreement. The Conservative party conference threatened new pressures from right-wing extremists, but when it came Thatcher and Carrington were to win a standing ovation. The sanctions renewal order was due in November and Thatcher and Carrington indicated that it might not be renewed if agreement was not reached; however, with the full support of Labour, it was renewed, on a monthly basis. The Patriotic Front leaders faced pressures from two quarters: from their own guerrillas, many of whom viewed the unfolding events as an attempt to prevent

them gaining the victory they believed was near, and from the front-line states, who emphasized that the Patriotic Front could not be seen to be responsible for wrecking the conference and whose own economies were being wrecked by the war. That they would have continued to support them had the conference collapsed is not in doubt, but, like Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and Britain, the front-line states needed a settlement more than they needed the continuance of the war.

At the same time FRELIMO was confident that ZANU would win any election which was held. This confidence was based upon FRELIMO's intimate knowledge of the thinking of the people in the eastern half of Rhodesia, the most populous area of the country. In 1978 the FRELIMO army, the FPLM, on Machel's direction, had sent three military teams with about five men in each into Rhodesia, one to each of the Tete, Manica and Gaza fronts.⁴⁴ Throughout the war there tended to be a greater affinity between the FPLM and ZANLA than between some of FRELIMO's leaders and ZANU: the former had a more intimate knowledge of Zimbabwean reality, particularly from 1978, and they saw ZANLA operating as comrades in the field, whereas the latter were exposed to some of the more negative aspects of ZANU manifested by a few of the leaders at the rear in Maputo. Those first FPLM missions found ZANLA's structures in the war zones very different to their own during their liberation war and felt that a tighter centralized structure was necessary. The FPLM teams also found that the ZANLA forces had advanced the war further than FRELIMO had realized, exhausting the capacity of their light weapons, and that they desperately needed heavier and more sophisticated equipment, such as artillery and anti-aircraft guns, before they could defend the large static bases the FPLM felt were necessary.

It was as a result of this realization that Nyerere and Machel began urging Moscow and Havana to help ZANLA, not at the expense of ZIPRA, but in the interests of bringing the war to a more rapid conclusion. Nyerere called in the Soviet and Cuban ambassadors in Tanzania after he had been briefed about the findings of the FPLM teams. Machel dispatched Marcelino dos Santos, his number two, to Moscow with a message to Brezhnev, and Sergio Viera to Havana with another message to Castro. The missions were 'political as well as military', a Mozambique official said. FRELIMO's analysis was that the historical and tribal divisions among Zimbabweans were being exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet split, with China exclusively support-

ing ZANU and Moscow supporting ZAPU; furthermore, Peking could be of little help with the new weaponry ZANLA needed. 'If Moscow could be persuaded to be even-handed between ZANU and ZAPU we felt this would remove a point of friction and disunity.'⁴⁵ The approach to Havana elicited some response while the one to Moscow fell on deaf ears. Dos Santos was not even able to deliver the message to Brezhnev and although ZANLA was to receive some Soviet weapons during the war they were on 'loan' from the FPLM. 'ZANLA did not get one pistol or one bullet from the Russians,' Machel said soon after Mugabe's outright election victory.⁴⁶

A further important discovery by the FPLM teams during their three-month mission was 'that the guerrillas' relations with the people were good and that the areas visited were incontestably ZANU'. The three FPLM teams covered the whole of the three war zones, with the Gaza team penetrating the farthest west beyond Fort Victoria and across the north-south railway line towards Selukwe. 'There was close political identity between the people and the guerrillas. Political education was not very sophisticated but nevertheless effective. The names of ZANU leaders were recited, tracts were read from the *Zimbabwe Review*, news was given about events in Mozambique. It was very clear that Mugabe was accepted as the leader and ZANU as the party.'⁴⁷ FRELIMO were uncertain about ZANU's political strength in the Fort Victoria area, where they wondered what inroads ZAPU had made, but the FPLM team reported back that the area was solidly ZANU. 'The missions also confirmed an important point that the FPLM believed—that ZANLA was more combative than ZIPRA. And they found ZANLA's morale was very high.'

A third important point evolved from this preliminary reconnaissance and it was to have two effects. Machel decided to put a number of troops permanently into the Zimbabwe war zones. In large measure this decision was taken for FRELIMO's own benefit: Zimbabwe could be used as a school for the FPLM forces because the experience was different to their own and because many of the FPLM soldiers had not had previous war experience. FPLM troops were regularly rotated so that many more could gain experience, and when the ceasefire occurred on 28 December 1979 there were about 500 Mozambiquan troops inside Rhodesia attached to the ZANLA forces. A second benefit for Mozambique was that its forces could collect information on the activities of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), a Rhodesian-sponsored organization consisting largely of former members of the Portuguese army in Mozambique, who were

carrying out attacks into Mozambique. The Mozambique forces were also able to study where and how the Rhodesians concentrated their forces, and their logistics, prior to raids into Mozambique. This put the FPLM in a stronger position to combat Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique, and it was twice to pay dividends during the Lancaster House conference. In one Rhodesian raid into Gaza two helicopters were shot down, one with thirteen white soldiers in it, which dealt a serious blow to the morale of the small, closely-knit white Rhodesian community; in the second raid in the Chimoio area the FPLM were able to counter-attack quickly with armour and multiple-rocket-firing 'Stalin Organs', as a result of advance information.

In many ways Carrington's strongest card at Lancaster House was the belief by all of the delegations that they could win an election. If one or more of them had not believed this it is doubtful that an agreement would have been reached at all. Nkomo, whom buttons and T-shirts described as 'Father Zimbabwe', showed moments of doubt such as the time when he tried to recruit Tongogara to support his claim to become overall leader of the Patriotic Front during the Lancaster House conference.⁴⁸ Muzorewa—of whom one British newspaper asked in a headline 'Bishop or pawn?'—was a somewhat pathetic and lonely figure who clung to the hope that the Patriotic Front would wreck the conference and that thereafter Britain would belatedly recognize his administration and lift sanctions. This belief may have been encouraged by British threats of 'option two', a scenario that after the constitutional agreement had been reached Britain would go ahead with elections, independence, recognition of the elected government and the lifting of sanctions, even if the Patriotic Front would not agree on the next stages and the war continued. It was an option which was never really on: Britain could not afford to become embroiled in another Northern Ireland situation by committing troops and officials on the ground against the guerrillas, which is what would have been necessary to conduct elections.

Throughout all the hot and cold flushes of hope and despondency, an air of inevitability hung over the Lancaster House conference, as indeed it had since that epic Lusaka weekend. No one could afford to be seen to be responsible for breaking the conference, and the guerrillas had brought Rhodesia to a point where it needed the end of the war even more than recognition and the lifting of sanctions. There was only one way to end the war, and that was to agree to a new internationally acceptable constitution and to the holding of new British-supervised elections. Once an independence constitution had been

agreed there was really no way out for either side. The main principles the guerrillas had been fighting for—one man one vote elections, majority rule and independence—were all contained in it and even if the constitution was flawed on points of detail and obnoxious in some of its racial provisions, the fact remained that the main reasons for going to war had been removed. Thereafter it was a fight to exact the maximum advantage and concessions.

Among the first people to realize that the causes of the war had been removed was Tongogara, who came to be recognized by most parties as the key figure in reaching the agreement.⁴⁹ Although not entirely happy with ceasefire arrangements that were heavily stacked against the guerrillas and that were virtually impossible to implement within the allotted time-scale, he believed that it was wrong to continue fighting when agreement had been reached on the principles he had gone to war to achieve. He regarded Lancaster House as a kind of 'second front' brought about by the people of Zimbabwe and their liberation forces, and by the end of November he was firm in his conviction that they had 'scored a tremendous victory . . . in the near future the people of Zimbabwe will be proud to have their new Zimbabwe and this will never be reversed any more'.⁵⁰

Tongogara did not pretend it was going to be easy, he acknowledged that 'in the initial stages we have still a lot to do', and he thought he would be there to do it. 'I would like to see myself completing this, creating a new Zimbabwe army which has the interests of the people at heart. Probably after that one can ask me what I want to do. I may decide to go back to the countryside and do some ploughing.' It was not to be. He flew back to Maputo from London and as he was rushing to Chimoio to brief commanders on ceasefire arrangements the vehicle in which he was travelling rammed into the back of a FRELIMO lorry it was trying to overtake. He was sitting in the front passenger seat and was crushed in the collision.

Given the timing of the accident and that he was perhaps the man Zimbabwe could least afford to lose at that moment, there were inevitable questions. The Mozambique government, shattered by the loss of a comrade-in-arms whom they had come to regard so highly, launched an inquiry; the ZANU leadership, numb and immobile, held their own inquiry. Both came to the same conclusion as did the reputable white mortician summoned from Salisbury by the British Embassy to embalm the body. 'The injuries are consistent with a car accident,' said Ken Stokes of Mashford and Son.⁵¹ 'There is no doubt

in my mind that there was no foul play.' There were no bullet holes—as a deliberately planted Salisbury rumour was later to suggest.

Born in Nhema TTL near Selukwe in 1940 and named Josiah Magama—after Magama, his father—he was an exceptionally gifted child. His older brother, Mike, said that school work, which he found difficult, was easy for his brother, as were football and other sports, and even music. He grew up, says his brother, with one intention, one goal, to liberate his country, 'and I think he's done it.'⁵² His next most important goal was that his children and others should grow in peace in a free Zimbabwe and participate in its reconstruction. His untimely death could have disrupted that goal except for the courage and conviction of the young men who made up the high command and general staff, and the provincial and sectorial command in the field.

At 7 p.m. on 26 December 1979, Rex Nhongo and forty-one ZANLA commanders flew into Salisbury in a chartered Air Botswana Viscount. Many thousands of delirious supporters jammed the airport, oblivious of tear gas and police dogs. Rhodesian army sharpshooters were deployed around the airfield and soldiers had to be ordered by the British to remove a vehicle mounted with a machine-gun from the runway. Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Mafela and a similar number of ZIPRA commanders had arrived a little earlier from Lusaka. None were aware that the man they all respected, and expected to be their overall commander in a new national army, was dead.⁵³ Nhongo heard the news on Rhodesian radio at lunchtime the following day and immediately went to see the Governor, Lord Soames, who already had a message from the British Embassy in Maputo. The confidential message from Mugabe, which should have gone first to Nhongo as the senior ZANU man in Salisbury and the new acting commander of ZANLA, had to have been leaked by a British official or by Rhodesian monitoring of their communications.

Although Tongogara had not had the opportunity personally to brief all of the commanders, the ones who went to Salisbury knew their instructions and carried them out, as far as was humanly possible, to the letter. The major difficulty, as Tongogara had foreseen was the time-scale: 'Our method of co-ordination is quite different from the British. The British would sit at the headquarters there, press some buttons and everything gets to the lowest cell. Not like ours, we have to walk. . . . The British are talking of ten days. For us to leave the point where we are going to have a meeting of the high command

to a point where we are going to have a meeting of inter-provincial and sectorial leadership takes us all of ten days!'⁵⁴

Hostilities were meant to cease on 28 December and all of the guerrillas should have been in rendezvous points by 4 January for transportation to sixteen assembly points. As not all of them had heard of the ceasefire by that date this was impossible, but the dramatic reduction in the casualty rate provided ample evidence that the ceasefire was taking hold. In the week between the agreement being signed at Lancaster House on 21 December and the ceasefire becoming effective on 28 December over 100 people had been killed. The death toll the following week was down to a handful. Nhongo and Mafela made a series of radio broadcasts ordering guerrillas to report to rendezvous and assembly points and commanders were sent out into the war zones to make contact with provincial and sectorial leaders. By 4 January, 9,000 guerrillas had assembled. By the following morning the number had swollen to 17,000 and more were still coming in. The last-minute rush was inevitable, given the very brief period allowed for instructions to reach the guerrillas in the rural areas who had no radio contact with their commanders, and once the guerrillas realized that the rendezvous and assembly points were not death-traps their confidence grew, and the initial trickle of those reporting turned into a flood. Major-General John Acland, Commander of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, had only 850 soldiers from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji under his command, and it was with mounting relief that he and his staff monitored the increasing number of guerrillas accepting the ceasefire. Their task was to monitor the guerrillas in the assembly points as well as the Rhodesian Joint Operational Commands (JOCs) distributed around the country, provide logistical support for the assembly points and defuse tensions between the Rhodesians and guerrillas who had little reason to trust each other. It was an unenviable task, in many ways a public relations or confidence-building operation. With the two guerrilla armies and the Rhodesians still under their own commanders there was little the monitoring force could have done if one side, or an element of one side, decided to attack the other. Yet the monitoring force handled their task with the consummate diplomatic skill more generally attributed to Foreign Offices than to soldiers. The Governor, Lord Soames, was to thank the monitoring force for their patience, understanding, courage and discipline. Acland described the operation, codenamed Agilla, as one of the most successful in British military history, and his deputy added another fitting tribute

when he said that the key to its success had been the role played by the guerrilla liaison officers.

Given the obviously greater affinity between conventionally trained soldiers such as those from the monitoring force and the Rhodesian army, and the attitudes generally of conventionally trained soldiers towards guerrillas and political education, there were some remarkable moments and relationships during the transition. One British colonel, very much an old-school officer who boasted he had fought in Oman against 'CTs'—Communist Terrorists—described the extremely able and battle-experienced ZANLA commander he worked with as 'a splendid chap'. The ZANLA commander in return referred to the British officer as 'Comrade Colonel'. Another British officer was very disconcerted when the guerrilla liaison officer he was driving with along a dirt bush road remarked casually, and probably with mischievous good humour, that he hoped this was not one of the roads they had mined during the war. The tiny Fijian contingent in charge of assembly point Hotel were so taken by the guerrillas in their care that they caused a minor crisis. One day the guerrillas complained that their rations had been halved. This was true and it had been done on the instructions of General Acland's staff after they discovered that the sympathetic Fijians, had been giving the guerrillas double rations. Not all the contacts the guerrillas had as they emerged from the bush were as harmonious. Some were shot by Rhodesian forces on their way to assembly points and others were arrested. In a Fort Victoria hotel one liaison officer was quietly sitting in the bar one night having a drink when a white woman sat down at the same table. Was he a soldier she asked? 'Yes,' the guerrilla politely replied. 'In the Rhodesian army?' she went on. 'No,' he answered, whereupon the woman sprang to her feet loudly announcing that she was not prepared to sit at the same table as a 'terr'.⁵⁵

In the countryside the situation was desperate. The ravages of the war, Martial Law and Operation Turkey had left almost a third of the population as refugees, either internally or in Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. Operation Turkey had been introduced by the Rhodesians as a device to limit food going to the rural areas, rationing the people at subsistence level so they had nothing to spare to feed the guerrillas. Martial Law allowed the Rhodesian forces to destroy crops, huts, livestock and personal property if they suspected villagers of 'collaboration'.

Given all the difficulties of the situation Lord Soames at first sight seemed a somewhat unlikely person to send as Britain's Governor to

oversee the extremely dangerous period from the paper agreement at Lancaster House to the reality of a ceasefire, elections and independence. Educated at Eton,⁵⁶ trained at Sandhurst, commissioned in one of Britain's élite regiments, the Coldstream Guards, a Parliamentary private secretary to the late Sir Winston Churchill (he had married Churchill's youngest daughter), Leader of the House of Lords and with little experience of Africa or guerrilla movements, Christopher Soames seemed well out of his depth. The initial impression seemed to confirm this. The day before Mugabe returned from Mozambique, his return having been delayed by Soames, the Governor remarked noisily in the hearing of ZANU officials at an Australia Day cocktail party that Mugabe, whom he had not met, sounded like 'a terrible chap'. Yet Soames, balanced on a tightrope, was to prove more sympathetic and understanding of some of Rhodesia's and Zimbabwe's realities than were some of his supposedly seasoned and experienced Foreign Office aides, who persisted in the fiction that Muzorewa would win a substantial proportion of the Shona vote which, grafted together with Nkomo's seats, the twenty held by the RF and any picked up by the minority parties, could be used to create a coalition and keep Mugabe and ZANU out of power. If Mugabe wanted to join that coalition, the line went, that was fine, but it would be as a junior partner with Nkomo in charge. No one in Government House perceived the possibility of Mugabe and ZANU winning outright, and although Mugabe, on the basis of his own intelligence survey, predicted ZANU would win fifty-six seats (it in fact won fifty-seven), this was dismissed as typical electioneering propaganda and anyone brash enough to suggest it might be true was dismissed as a ZANU sympathizer.

Soames's relations with the ZANU leader were initially extremely poor. The Rhodesian forces, whom the guerrilla leaders believed under the Lancaster House agreement were to be confined to barracks during the transition, were deployed by the Governor against the guerrillas. Much was made about allegations of intimidation by the guerrillas while similar charges against the Rhodesian forces and the auxiliaries, largely loyal to Muzorewa, were generally discounted. Two African members of the Selous Scouts, one an officer, died outside a church in an African township in Salisbury the same night two other churches were blown up, and literature, purporting to be by ZANU, was left in a third church where bombs did not explode, in an obviously contrived attempt to provide 'evidence' to support the charges by Mugabe's political oppo-

nents that ZANU was anti-church. The printing presses of the Catholic Mambo Press in Gwelo—an organization which had opposed the Rhodesian Front—were blown up, with two of the bombers, a white and a black, dying in the explosion. Much later, after independence, police officials said they believed that they were also Selous Scouts or operating under contract to the Selous Scouts, and that a third man, another white, escaped to South Africa.⁵⁷ Sixteen people were killed near Rusape when a civilian bus was hit by a rocket, and the Rhodesian forces produced the body of a man dressed in guerrilla uniform whom they claimed was a member of the ZANLA group responsible for the attack. On this occasion officials in Soames's office were openly sceptical, for the 'dead guerrilla' was in fact one of the three brothers who had hired the bus and who had been aboard it at the time of the rocket attack wearing civilian clothes. Two attempts were made on Mugabe's life in the same period, the most serious at Fort Victoria where a bridge his car had just crossed was blown up by a large amount of explosive detonated by a remote control device. Even if Government House believe that ZANU could not secure the fifty-one seats needed to win an outright Parliamentary majority others apparently recognized that Mugabe was the man to beat—by whatever means.

One point Soames and his staff were unwilling to take into account was that during the war in the ZANLA areas of operation an extensive political network had been developed which included an intelligence network. Through this latter network strangers were scrutinized and many sell-outs, who were Rhodesian informers, uncovered. This scrutiny of strangers prevailed during the transition and thereafter. It was a protective mechanism that the people had built up during the grim war years and to expect it to be broken down in days and weeks was unrealistic, for it was tantamount to asking the people to drop their guard when they felt as threatened by the Rhodesian security forces and auxiliaries as they had during the war years. Most of the guerrillas had gone to the assembly points and this network, including the *mujibas*, was the only defence the people in the rural areas of eastern Rhodesia felt they had left. Thus the structures remained, a defence line for the people loyal to ZANU, and other political parties complained that they were being prevented from campaigning in these areas. Soames's response was to threaten to disenfranchise certain areas of the country, all of them conspicuous ZANU strongholds. Whether Soames ever seriously intended to disenfranchise any of these areas—a decision which would have perverted the outcome of

the election and led to the resignation of some of the British election supervisors who felt Government House was exaggerating the issue—is a matter of speculation. Possibly he was only trying to placate the other parties by threats of strong action to keep all of them on board. But many people, including Mugabe—and much of the press who had been well managed for months by Carrington's and then Soames's spokesman, Nicholas Fenn, who was doing his job well even if the press were not—believed that Soames might take this extreme step. This threat, delivered by Fenn at a briefing with a map showing the threatened areas, was to lead to one of the most important stories by any correspondent during the campaign. The Reuter's correspondent in Salisbury, Alan Cowell, who had already acquired a degree of notoriety for flying stories in by carrier pigeon from a rendezvous point, went on one of the Rhodesian orchestrated and conducted press and observer tours to Mount Darwin, one of the areas threatened with disenfranchisement because allegedly no one but ZANU could campaign or hold election meetings in the area. A Rhodesian district official told Cowell that there had been fifty-nine political rallies in the area—only nine of them by ZANU. Fenn, characteristically, put up a stout defence when confronted with this at his evening press- and observers-briefing but the revelation brought into question Government House's charges and Nyerere called in the British High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam after seeing the Reuter's story and was to later suggest, not surprisingly, that he feared the elections would be rigged.

The role of the 200 observers from thirty countries, and in particular that of the Commonwealth team, was one of the most important elements in winning international acceptance of the result and of keeping an eye on Britain's supervision of the elections, a watchdog role the Commonwealth leaders in Lusaka had insisted upon. The observers expressed their dissatisfaction with a number of what they viewed as irregularities, the deployment of the Rhodesian forces by Soames against the guerrillas, the continued presence of South African forces during the transition (they were forced to withdraw), perceived British partisanship and the threat of disenfranchising parts of the country. Equally the British election supervisors, many of them former colonial officers in Africa, who travelled the rural areas, were to play a vital role. One of them, Ronald Paterson, who was slightly wounded in an ambush, threatened to resign if Soames went ahead with his threat to disenfranchise the Buhera district, where he was in charge of supervising the election.⁵⁸ In Paterson's

view, and the view of several other British election supervisors, the degree of intimidation did not warrant such an extreme step, and it would have been foolhardy not to expect some intimidation, by all sides, in a country emerging from a brutal war. Views such as Paterson's were to play an important part in reducing the threat of disenfranchisement, a step which could have wrecked the whole delicately-woven process, leading to one or more of the parties withdrawing from the election and many countries refusing to recognize the outcome.

Another of the British election supervisors, David Glendening, in charge of an area in eastern Rhodesia, subsequently wrote to the authors explaining the difficulties he had had with the Rhodesian forces and administration during the campaign.

'The most serious problem arose because, following repeated complaints about heavy intimidation by ZANLA in the Mutasa South TTL, I stated that I intended to try to check up on the validity of these claims by, in the absence of passable roads, walking across the area to visit what centres of population there were and to ask the people for their views. My DC made no objection. In fact, my provincial supervisor in Umtali, Eric Dixon, asked if he could come with me and I, of course, agreed. Eric later told me that he had arranged for a BBC TV team (with John Humphreys) to come along as well. We had timed this for a Saturday morning. On the morning before I was told that the JOC had prohibited the journey. The DC was unfortunately away for three days' leave at that time and so I could not seek his support but I did express my disbelief that JOC Thrasher had any authority to enforce such a prohibition and that I needed a convincing reason before I would change my plans. This was followed by a personal visit from the Provincial Commissioner who said very definitely that if JOC ruled the journey out, then it was out. I repeated that I was not satisfied but said that if there was a convincing operational reason why I should not visit the eastern side of Mutasa South, as originally planned, then I would be prepared to modify the plan and walk over the western side instead. The PC, Mr Cunliffe, said that he would try to clear this with JOC and left for Umtali, but he later telephoned to say that for reasons which he was not prepared to disclose the prohibition had to stand. He also spoke to the DC's assistant and repeated this information, no doubt assuming that if transport was not provided (and I was dependent on the DC for transport) then I couldn't get there anyway.

'I kept in touch with Eric Dixon about this, since I was still unwill-

ing to accept such a ruling, especially without good reason being given. So, it turned out, was Eric and he had contacted Salisbury and had received information that as far as the Governor's office was concerned he could go unless a convincing reason was given. I then found that an entire company (the 8th Rhodesian Rifles) of the army was due to turn up at Mutasa late that afternoon and fortunately I was able to contact the OC, Major Lindsay Treadgold, who turned out to be very reasonable, and after a couple of the usual lubricants he agreed that there were no real operational constraints and that he had no objection to the walk. He even offered a protective force if required though obviously this was declined as it would have ruined the object of the exercise. From the time that Treadgold appeared my difficulties with JOC disappeared.

'I should perhaps add that I am uncertain about the exact relationship between the POU (Psychological Operations Unit) and the JOC, except that it was clear that the POU operated only with the co-operation and permission of the JOC. In this respect I can only say that I formed the view that the Army took an active role in furthering the purpose of the POU and that the Provincial Commissioner was excessively compliant in allowing the Home Affairs Department to become involved as well. I was, I think, the first to report the by now well-known anti-Marxist black and green series of pamphlets which were clearly designed to influence voters against ZANU(PF). I objected to them when I found them, since they were anonymous—I would not have complained had they been attributable to UANC, for instance. I was more concerned the following day (a Sunday) when I found that a large supply had been delivered to the DC's office. Everybody professed ignorance about how they got there and the DC immediately agreed that they should be locked up and *not* distributed. However, the pamphlets were distributed from other sources, some were dropped from the air in the Honde Valley. Others were stuck under doors in the night in the Manyika TTL, fairly obviously by the Security Force Auxiliaries (controlled in that area from Rusape not from Mutasa, in a typical conflict of jurisdiction), although all members of the SFA strenuously denied involvement when I questioned them. Indeed I subsequently discovered that the DC's office had received an instruction to distribute these pamphlets, expressly stating that they were not to be shown to me!

In his final report to Sir John Boynton, the British election commissioner, Glendening stated:

Intimidation by ZANLA, the dragooning of voters and the constant reminder that the war would continue if Mr. Mugabe was not elected had their effect. Nonetheless it would be absurd to ascribe the result of the election to intimidation alone. A traditional consensus had been reached. Families held discussions and kraal heads met. It was agreed that the people would vote for ZANU(PF) for the following reasons:

- (1) The people wanted peace. Mugabe had demonstrated that only he could end the war.
- (2) The families could be reunited. Mugabe had brought the 'boys' back. If he failed to win they would go back to Mozambique again.
- (3) The Bishop had had a chance but had failed to make any difference to power structure.
- (4) Nobody knew about Marxism. This was not an issue. What people knew about was European domination which Muzorewa had accepted but which Mugabe would end.

Despite the fact that intimidation by 'presence' may have increased the ZANU(PF) vote by some numbers, perhaps by 10%, I have no doubt whatever that the result of the election accurately reflects the opinions of the electorate. It was the authentic voice of the African people.

Some explanation here is necessary of the reference by Glendening to ZANU(PF), the party name that Mugabe and his supporters used during the election and continued to use thereafter. After his removal as ZANU's leader in 1976, Sithole had continued to claim to be the leader of ZANU, a claim shown to be palpably untrue by the result of the 1980 election; and during the 1979 'internal settlement' election, which neither Mugabe or Nkomo contested, Sithole had registered his party as ZANU, winning only a handful of seats. Thus in 1980 it was impossible for Mugabe to run as ZANU, Sithole having already claimed that name. The major question was whether Mugabe and Nkomo would run together as the Patriotic Front or whether they and their supporters would insist on running separately. For Nkomo there were obvious advantages in running together but senior ZANU officials argued that this would cost them votes in Mashonaland and would not resolve the vexed debate about which of the two leaders and parties had the largest support in the country. Thus Mugabe and his supporters chose to run on their own, and Nkomo, obviously hoping the decision would pick up votes for him, registered the name of his party as the Patriotic Front, dropping the name

ZAPU. Mugabe, now unable to stand as ZANU or the Patriotic Front, chose the name ZANU(PF). However, he committed himself to a coalition with Nkomo after the elections, a commitment some of his old guard nationalists opposed; but Nkomo made no such commitment, keeping his options open in case a coalition government became necessary which he could manoeuvre to become the head of. His decision to keep his options open strengthened the hand of his strongest opponents in Mugabe's party, who argued that it was a further demonstration that he was more interested in personal power than unity.

One further difficulty for Mugabe at this point was that his first election symbol, a crossed hoe and gun, was rejected by the electoral commission. That symbol had been traditionally associated with his party and he was forced to choose a new one, selecting the 'Jongwe' (a Shona word for cockerel) in front of a rising sun. With so many of the voters functionally illiterate, the symbols of the parties were of great importance, and soon thousands of people were wearing T shirts with the Jongwe in front of a rising sun and flapping their arms by their sides imitating a cockerel flapping its wings. One of the most amusing stories in this period concerned Ted Rowlands, a British Labour MP who had been Minister of State in the Foreign Office and who was in Rhodesia as an election observer. Rowlands visited a bar and tried to conduct a one-man opinion poll, asking people how they intended to vote in the election. Great stress was being laid by the electoral commission on a publicity campaign that people's ballots were secret, and the people in the bar pointed this out to Rowlands. After some further light-hearted exchanges Rowlands rose to leave and as he approached the door the bar erupted with a single cry of 'Cock-a-doodle-doo'. Rowlands was left in no doubt how that group intended to vote.

Each of the leaders held massive rallies in Salisbury's Highfield township at the Zimbabwe Ground, and to an extent these were to provide a barometer-reading on the public mood. Sithole attracted a small crowd and there was a marked lack of enthusiasm at the Bishop's rally. Rhodesian police spokesmen displayed a tendency to overestimate the size of the crowds for those they hoped would win, as did the local press, while underestimating the crowds at Mugabe rallies. Mugabe, his return from Mozambique delayed by Soames so that it would not clash with and detract from Highfield rallies given by other contenders, drew by far the largest and most enthusiastic crowd. He was clearly over-awed by the size of the crowd and their enthusiasm

which erupted as Muzenda led him round the raised stand, waving a clenched fist to the crowd, so that everyone could get a glimpse of him. Curiously the bulk of the press and most white Rhodesians still did not recognise the strength of the appeal of Mugabe and ZANU(PF). The bulk of journalists wrote that he would win somewhere in the region of thirty-five seats out of the eighty African seats at stake. They had little contact with grassroot feelings and even less understanding of the massive mobilization ZANLA had done in the war years. On election day, with British policemen standing impassively at polling booths, a bizarre sight in the tropical heat in their blue domed helmets, whites sent their domestic servants off with a final instruction to vote for the Bishop, and farmers took their labourers to vote with the same instructions. In rural towns, members of the Rhodesian forces had been holding private meetings with white employers telling them that their labour must vote for the Bishop if the whites' future was to be assured.

The heavy poll in the eastern rural areas obviously favoured Mugabe, and at 9 a.m. on Tuesday 4 March the Rhodesian Registrar of Elections, Eric Pope-Symonds, announced the result in a live radio broadcast to a hushed nation. ZANU(PF) had won fifty-seven seats, an outright majority, in the 100-seat Parliament. Nkomo's Patriotic Front had won twenty and the Bishop only three, leading to a popular joke in the townships that Muzorewa had more helicopters, four, than he had seats in Parliament. At his temporary home in Salisbury, at 3 Quorn Avenue, Mugabe and his supporters cheered as the results came through. Joyful demonstrations began immediately in the African townships and outside the ZANU(PF) headquarters at 88 Manica Road, blocking traffic. The whites listened in stunned disbelief. Mugabe, the man Smith's propaganda machine had portrayed as a Marxist monster, had achieved what none of them believed possible. Riot police with tear gas were deployed at 88 Manica Road and wisely withdrawn. Heavily-armed troops moved into the townships and armoured vehicles patrolled the streets. But the African mood was one of jubilation and not recrimination. The bitterness lay with the whites.

At 8 p.m. that evening Mugabe addressed the nation.⁵⁹ It was a masterly display of statesmanship. He spoke of turning swords into ploughshares to rebuild the war-torn nation, of the need for reconciliation and not recrimination, and he assured the whites that they had a place in the country—as Zimbabweans. He spoke of a coalition with ZAPU and the inclusion of 'members of other communities whom the constitution has denied the right of featuring as our candidates'—he

followed through by naming RF MP David Smith as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Denis Norman, head of the Commercial Farmers Bureau, as Minister of Agriculture. Mugabe assured his audience that 'it is not our intention to interfere with pension rights', a particular concern of white civil servants, and he authorized General Walls to 'preside over the integration process' with the commanders of ZANLA and ZIPRA, another concern of the white minority, whom it had been said were more afraid of losing the security forces than of impending majority rule. It did much to allay their fears, and Mugabe, whom few of them had ever seen before, came across as a very able, intelligent and articulate leader, qualities they had never been allowed to know he possessed. 'Let us deepen our sense of belonging,' he concluded, 'and engender a common interest that knows no race, colour or creed. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single loyalty. Long live our freedom!'

But doubts remained as to how the Rhodesian forces would respond. Unbeknown to anybody, at that point General Walls had already sent a telegram to Thatcher asking her to annul the election result.⁶⁰ A *coup d'état* was among the options but Walls subsequently insisted that it was never seriously considered. Six of the parties standing in the election, including those led by Sithole and Chikerema, had not won a single seat. Muzorewa's defeat had been so humiliating that complaints of intimidation carried no weight. He had come to power some months earlier promising to stop the war and in fact it had escalated. He had been seen to be too closely associated with the retention of the status quo, a cosmetic figure in the Prime Minister's office while real power remained with the whites.

Nkomo and some of his supporters were equally shattered by the result and size of Mugabe's victory. Mugabe offered Nkomo the Presidency, which he turned down, and then four seats in Cabinet and three junior ministers' posts. Some of Nkomo's supporters bizarrely argued that the result was a plot involving Britain, the United States, South Africa, China, Mozambique and Tanzania. While the last three preferred a Mugabe victory, Britain and South Africa certainly did not, the former preferring a coalition headed by Nkomo and the latter having pumped in millions of pounds in the hope of dividing the Shona vote and keeping Mugabe out. Wiser officials within Nkomo's ranks, however, made a more rational interpretation.

'The PF lost the election two years ago,' said one senior ZAPU official, 'when ZANU began intensive political campaigning, using ZANLA to politicize the masses. ZANLA moved into former ZIPRA

areas at this time, such as Mashonaland West. They held pungwes [meetings] for two years covering 80 per cent of the country. This is the most important factor about the election results.' There were some tribal considerations he said. 'Of ZIPRA, 99 per cent were Ndebele speaking and therefore they had language difficulties in Shona-speaking areas. . . . We concentrated in one area of the country for recruitment of soldiers.' There were some ZANLA-controlled areas, he said, where no one else could go but he ruled out election-rigging. Another senior ZAPU official said ZANU might have won a few less seats without intimidation 'but they would still have won the majority . . . the results of the election are still a rough assessment of the democratic will of the people of Zimbabwe. . . . It would be idiocy to say there was corruption by the British in favour of Mugabe. ZANU(PF) beat the British, the Americans, and South Africa at their own game.'

The final question which still had to be answered was whether the elections had been free and fair. In the view of almost all independent observers, and including the British election supervisors, they had been. But the most important judgement was to be that of the eleven Commonwealth observers. On their decision hung the reaction of Commonwealth nations and thereafter the recognition of the international community. Their report, released on 8 March, said:

'Peace has been restored to Southern Rhodesia by means of a democratic exercise without historical precedent. Never before have elections been held at a time of tenuous cease-fire, without agreed battle lines, and with rival armies uneasily apart. That this proved possible redounds to the credit of all those involved.

'In the extraordinary circumstances in which the elections were held, we could hardly have expected to find the levels of administrative propriety and public rectitude associated with the concept of free and fair elections at their ideal best, a level not always or everywhere achieved even in stable societies with long experience of democratic institutions. In the event, the degree to which they approached those levels was praiseworthy indeed.

'We were able to observe the conduct of the campaign from its very early days until its culmination in the announcement of the results. We were also able to make intensive observations in all parts of the country. Our conclusions are therefore based on a thorough study of the totality of the process that allowed the people of Rhodesia to choose the government that will take their country to sovereign independence as Zimbabwe.

'Inevitably, there were imperfections. In varying degree, the parties which sought the favour of the voters did face limitations on their freedom to campaign but not always to the extent suggested by official pronouncements or by aggrieved politicians. Curbs were sometimes imposed by party activists with or without the approval of their leaders. Sometimes they were the result of official action such as the arrest of candidates and party workers, restrictions on their electoral activity, and a selective application of emergency regulations. Sometimes they flowed from a less than impartial functioning of the principal agencies of government or an unwillingness to respond to higher authority.

'The overall impact of these limitations on the ability of the parties to take their message to the voters was mitigated by the access which all parties enjoyed to make party political broadcasts and to advertise through the publicly owned broadcasting services, as well as being free to advertise in the privately owned press. None of the major parties seemed to suffer from a shortage of resources for the latter.

'There were also some attempts to limit the freedom of choice of voters through various forms of intimidation. That there was a certain degree of violence and fear is incontestable. But the extent of intimidation was often exaggerated either for political purposes or as the result of incorrect or slanted information. Blame was not confined to any one quarter. Nevertheless, we firmly believe that its impact on the voters' freedom of choice was strongly countered, if not frustrated, by the widespread belief in the secrecy of the ballot.

'The pattern of voting too, offers evidence in support of our assessment of the extent of intimidation. There had been no charges of any significant intimidation in Salisbury itself, yet the proportion of voters supporting ZANU(PF) in urban Salisbury was broadly the same as in those rural districts where intimidation on its behalf was alleged to have been at its most severe.

'The system of proportional representation based on party lists further diminished the electoral impact of intimidation. Under this system, a massive shift in voter preference was required to make a significant difference in the number of seats gained by any one party at the polls.

'We are completely satisfied with the integrity of the conduct of the poll in all its aspects, including the security of ballot boxes and the accuracy of the count.

'Taken as a whole, it is our considered and unanimous view that the election offered an adequate opportunity to the parties to seek the

favour of the electorate and sufficient freedom to the voters to exercise their franchise according to their convictions. We therefore reaffirm the conclusion of our interim report [issued before the announcement of results] that the election was a valid and democratic expression of the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe. . . .

'We close our Report by paying our own tribute, which we believe will be widely echoed throughout the Commonwealth and beyond, to all those who, in different ways and at different times, contributed to Rhodesia's emergence as an independent Zimbabwe. Countless individuals and many countries have been touched by the tragedy of the past fifteen years. In the end, the essential triumph has been that of the people of Zimbabwe themselves. Transmuting their suffering, their faith in the processes of peace has exceeded their courage in war.'⁶¹

Notes

1

- 1 Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism press release, 21 December 1972.
- 2 Rhodesian military communiqué, 21 December 1972.
- 3 Rhodesian military communiqué, 23 December 1972.
- 4 Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism press release, 31 December 1972.
- 5 Diaries of Justin Chauke and interview with him at Chimoio, Mozambique, May 1978.
- 6 BBC Monitoring Service, 6 December 1972.
- 7 Interview after independence in April 1980 with a Rhodesian officer in Combined Operations who wished to remain anonymous.
- 8 B. Davidson, J. Slovo, and A. R. Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution* (Penguin Books, London, 1976).
- 9 BBC Monitoring Service, 6 December 1972.
- 10 International Defence and Aid, Special Report No. 2, 1973.
- 11 *Guardian*, London, 23 April 1974.
- 12 From the transcript of Niesewand's trial in his book *In Camera* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1973).
- 13 BBC Monitoring Service, 6 December 1972.
- 14 Rhodesian Government *Gazette*, 9 January 1973.
- 15 BBC Monitoring Service, 20 and 24 January 1973.
- 16 BBC Monitoring Service, 10 February 1973.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 This failure by the three intelligence-gathering branches was admitted by officials of the three organizations in a number of interviews after independence.
- 20 Interview with Michael Edden, Assistant Commissioner of Police.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Joint ZAPU-ANC Statement, Lusaka.
- 23 Interview with Emmerson M'nangagwa, London, October 1979.

- 24 Interview with William Ndangana, Salisbury, May 1980.
- 25 Interview with Josiah Tongogara, Geneva, November 1976.
- 26 Interview with Mayor Urimbo, Salisbury, May 1980.
- 27 Simbi Mubako, 'Aspects of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1966-76' (International Conference on Southern African History, Lesotho, August 1977).
- 28 Reg Shay and Chris Vermaak, *The Silent War* (Galaxie Press, Rhodesia, 1971). The dead guerrilla was also carrying Mao Tse-Tung's *The Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 International Commission of Jurists, *Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia* (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, and the ICJ, Geneva, 1976).
- 31 Interview with the Danish journalist, Jasper Soe, published in *Information*, Copenhagen, and quoted in the *Rhodesia Herald*, 18 August 1971.
- 32 *Zimbabwe News* (the official ZANU publication), No. 9, September 1973.
- 33 James Chikerema, Lusaka, 17 March 1980, in reply to Jason Moyo's *Observations on our Struggle*, Lusaka, 25 February 1970.
- 34 Interview with Michael Edden.
- 35 The details of ZANU's policy decision, meetings between ZANU and FRELIMO and the view expressed by Machel were recounted in an interview with Tongogara at Chimoio in May 1978 and confirmed by Machel.
- 36 Interview with President Machel, Maputo, 9-10 August 1980.
- 37 Interviews with FRELIMO leaders.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Interview with Josiah Tongogara, Chimoio, May 1978.
- 42 Interview with William Ndangana, Salisbury, May 1980.
- 43 Interview with Tongogara.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Interviews with FRELIMO leaders.
- 46 Interview with George Silundika, August 1980. Dates of meetings between FRELIMO and ZAPU from President Machel and Silundika.
- 47 Interviews with FRELIMO leaders. Silundika said it was 'more the logistics of it which had not been prepared', but he added that

ZAPU was very frank with FRELIMO in this period, regarding them as natural allies although with some mistrust of their contacts with ZANU.

- 48 Interviews with FRELIMO leaders.
- 49 Ibid.

2

- 1 Interview with Mayor Urimbo, Salisbury, May 1980.
- 2 Interview with Justin Chauke, Chimoio, May 1978.
- 3 Interview with Urimbo.
- 4 Mubako, 'Aspects of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1966-76' (International Conference on Southern African History, Lesotho, 1-7 August 1977).
- 5 Interview with Tongogara, Geneva, November 1976.
- 6 Interviews with Urimbo, Kadungure and Chauke.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Interview with Tongogara.
- 9 Interviews with Urimbo and Chauke.
- 10 Interviews with Urimbo, Kadungure and Chauke.
- 11 Interviews with Jose Moyane, May 1978. Moyane was FRELIMO's commander in Tete from 1970 until FRELIMO and Portugal reached an independence agreement in September 1974 after the 25 April 1974 *coup d'état* in Lisbon. At the time of the interview Moyane, a member of FRELIMO's Central Committee, was Governor of Maputo Province.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Interview with Chauke.
- 14 Interview with Urimbo.
- 15 The writings of Mao Tse-Tung on guerrilla warfare.
- 16 Che Guevara, *Organization in Secret of the First Guerrilla Band*.
- 17 Interview with Joseph Chimurenga, Geneva, November 1976.
- 18 Interview with Kadungure.
- 19 Interview with Urimbo.
- 20 Jason Moyo, *Observations on our Struggle*, and James Chikerema, *Reply to Observations on our Struggle*.
- 21 Davidson, Slomo and Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*.

22 Mubako, 'Aspects of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1966-76'.

23 Details of the growth of suspicion by the ZANLA cadres and the repercussions were given in interviews by Mubako and Dzingai Mutumbuka, both of whom were at Lusaka University at the time and closely involved in ZANU affairs. However, they put a somewhat differing interpretation on the outcome: Mutumbuka sees it as a deliberate separation of military and political affairs and the limitation of who had the right to know about military matters; Mubako does not see it as a deliberate separation but considers that the military became more security-conscious as a result of the experiences of the Sixties.

24 Interview with Urimbo.

3

1 W. D. Gale, *One Man's Vision* (Hutchinson, London, 1935; reprinted in Rhodesiana Reprint Library Silver Series, 1976).

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Terence Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97* (Heinemann, London, 1967).

5 Ibid.

6 Treaty of Agreement signed on 3 March 1836 between Britain and Mzilikazi. The treaty was signed on Mzilikazi's behalf in Cape Town by the first Matabele ever sent on a diplomatic mission, Mnom-bata, a trusted confidant of Mzilikazi and Prime Minister of the Matabele.

7 The first treaty made between Mzilikazi and the Boers was a verbal one after the last clash south of the Limpopo River in 1847. The treaty or verbal agreement was made with Andries Hendrick Potgieter, whom the Matabele referred to as Enteleka, a pronunciation corruption of the name Hendrick. Potgieter, at the time, was Head Commandant of the Holland South African Emigrants, one of the Boer frontier groups. This verbal agreement was later put in writing and on 8 January 1853 Pieter Johannes Potgieter, the son of Enteleka, signed a new agreement at Zoutpansberg in which Mzilikazi

was referred to as 'the Kaffir King'. The next treaty Mzilikazi is supposed to have signed was the Pretorius-Silkaats Treaty at Magaliesberg on 16 May 1853.

8 The relationship between Rhodes and Helms was revealed in the biography by J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, *Rhodes* (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1963).

9 Grobler Treaty.

10 Ibid.

11 Stanlake Samkange, *Origins of Rhodesia* (Heinemann, London, 1968).

12 Statement that Moffat persuaded Lobengula to sign renouncing the Grobler Treaty.

13 For explanation of the name Enteleka see note 7.

14 Moffat Treaty.

15 *Africa South*, No. 358.

16 Samkange, op. cit.

17 J. G. Wood, *Through Matabeleland* (Rhodesia Gold and Silver Series).

18 Rudd Concession, signed at the Royal Kraal.

19 Ibid.

20 Lippert Concession.

21 Lobengula renounced the Rudd Concession early in 1889. In a letter to Queen Victoria, Lobengula said that what he now learned was contained in the Concession were not his words and that he had been tricked into believing that they were.

22 *Cape Times*, 12 September 1930.

23 Gale, op. cit.

24 Samkange, op. cit.

25 Gale, op. cit.

26 Ranger, op. cit.

27 Gale, op. cit.

28 Robert Blake, *A History of Rhodesia* (Eyre Methuen, London, 1977).

29 Gale, op. cit.

30 Blake, op. cit.

31 Ibid.

32 Ranger, op. cit.

33 Gale, op. cit.

34 Ranger, op. cit..

35 Ibid.

4

- 1 Roger Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia* (Mambo Press, Gwelo, Socio-Economic Series No. 11, 1978).
- 2 M. L. Rifkind, 'The Politics of Land in Rhodesia' (M. Sc. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1969).
- 3 Duncan Clarke, *Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia* (Mambo Press, Gwelo, Socio-Economic Series No. 6, 1977).
- 4 Riddell, op. cit.
- 5 Riddell, op. cit.
- 6 'Mr Podsnap and the Sacred Trust' (Aborigine Protection Society, 1918).
- 7 Giovanni Arrighi, 'Labour supplies in historical perspective', *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1970).
- 8 Table from E. Mlambo, *Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright* (C. Hurst, London, 1972). Reproduced by permission of C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- 9 Riddell, op. cit.
- 10 Riddell, op. cit.
- 11 Mlambo, op. cit.
- 12 Howard Simson, *Zimbabwe, a Country Study* (Research Report No. 53, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1979).
- 13 Martin Loney, *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response* (Penguin Books, London, 1975).
- 14 Interview, London, November 1979.
- 15 Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (East African Publishing House in association with André Deutsch, London, 1967).
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Interview with Tongogara, Geneva, December 1976.
- 18 Mlambo, op. cit.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Census report, Salisbury, 1964, paragraphs 86-90.
- 22 Mlambo, op. cit.
- 23 Rhodesia Digest of Statistics, 1970.
- 24 M. W. Murphree, ed., *Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia* (Artea Publishers, Salisbury, 1975).
- 25 Extract from United Nations Commission on Human Rights document E/CN. 4/1110 of 25 January 1973.

5

- 26 'Labour conditions and discrimination in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)' ILO, 1978.
- 27 Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly debates, House of Assembly, 1959, column 1, 547.
- 28 V. S. Cubitt and Roger Riddell, *The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia* (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Rhodesia, 1974).
- 29 Duncan Clarke, 'Inflation and subsistence wages: Revised estimates of the Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia for September 1976'. University of Natal, Development Studies Research Group, Discussion Paper No. 1.
- 30 Central Statistical Office, Salisbury, Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1976.
- 31 P. S. Harris, *Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia* (Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974).
- 32 A. O. Pugh, 'New patterns of African rural health in Rhodesia', *Central African Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 15, No. 6 (1969).
- 33 Clarke, *Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia*.
- 34 J. Gilmurray, R. Riddell and D. Sanders, 'The Struggle for Health', *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* Series No. 7 (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London).
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Reg Austin, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa* (UNESCO, Paris, 1975).
- 38 Shamuyarira, op. cit.
- 39 Ibid.

- 1 Interviews with Rex Nhongo, Salisbury, June and July, 1980.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 BBC Monitoring Service, 19 January 1973.
- 5 Interview with Joseph Chimurenga, Geneva, November 1976.
- 6 Interview with Mayor Urimbo, Salisbury, May 1980.
- 7 Ibid. Similar abstinence was demanded during the 1890s uprisings.

- 8 Interview with Josiah Tungamirai, Chimoio, Mozambique, May 1978.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid. There is some controversy among academics as to whether Mbuya Nehanda was the genuine medium of the spirit of Nehanda who was executed in 1898; however, the important point is that the guerrillas and people living in her area believed that she was.
- 12 Interview with Urimbo.
- 13 Interviews with Urimbo and Chimurenga.
- 14 Interview with George Rutanhire, Chimoio, Mozambique, May 1978.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Interview with Josiah Tongogara, Geneva, November 1976.
- 19 Interview with Tungamirai.
- 20 Interview with Rutanhire.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Interview with Susan Rutanhire, Maputo, Mozambique, May 1978.
- 23 Interview with John Mawema, London, November 1979.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Interview with Tongogara.
- 29 In September 1973, during a brief visit to Tete with FRELIMO to interview refugees from Rhodesian raids north of the Zambezi, the author (David Martin) met many guerrillas whom he presumed were all members of FRELIMO. Three years later when Martin met Tongogara—for the first time he thought—on the eve of the Geneva conference, Tongogara insisted they had met before. When Martin asked when, he said it was in Tete in 1973. 'You could not have known,' he laughed, with the customary twinkle in his eyes, 'I was a "FRELIMO commander" in those days.'
- 30 Interview with Tongogara.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Interviews with Rex Nhongo.
- 34 Ibid.

- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Interview with Chimurenga.
- 37 Interview with Tongogara.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Interview with Chimurenga.
- 40 Interview with Tongogara.
- 41 *Daily Telegraph*, London, January 1973.
- 42 Interview with Urimbo.
- 43 Interview with Tongogara.
- 44 Interviews with Rex Nhongo.
- 45 Interview with Chimurenga.
- 46 Rhodesia military communiqués.
- 47 BBC Monitoring Service, 7 January 1973.

6

- 1 BBC Monitoring Service, 4 January 1974 and 5 January 1974.
- 2 Africa Contemporary Record (ACR) 1973/74.
- 3 Budget speech to Parliament, 19 July 1973.
- 4 ACR, 1973/74.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 BBC Monitoring Service, 21 June 1973.
- 7 ACR, 1973/74.
- 8 BBC Monitoring Service, 21 July 1973.
- 9 ACR, 1973/74.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 BBC Monitoring Service, 10 November 1973, 12 November 1973, 2 February 1974.
- 15 Ibid, 8 February 1973.
- 16 Ibid, 25 January 1973.
- 17 Rhodesian *Financial Gazette*, 31 January 1973.
- 18 BBC Monitoring Service, 8 February 1973.
- 19 BBC Monitoring Service, 14 February 1973 and 23 February 1973.
- 20 Radio South Africa, 4 April 1973.

NOTES

- 21 *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, 21 July 1973.
- 22 Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC), 23 February 1974.
- 23 Interviews with a number of Rhodesian officers.
- 24 *Observer*, London, 27 January 1974.
- 25 *Financial Times* and *Guardian*, London, 22 June 1973.
- 26 RBC, 5 April 1973.
- 27 ACR 1973/74.
- 28 Hansard, London, 18 April 1973.
- 29 ACR 1973/74.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 *Rhodesia Herald*, 2 and 4 May 1973.
- 32 Hansard, London, 14 June 1973.
- 33 Hansard, Salisbury, 29 June 1973.
- 34 *The Star*, Johannesburg, 4 August 1973.
- 35 ACR, 1973/74.
- 36 Photocopy of letter in authors' possession.
- 37 *Rhodesia Herald*, 26 June 1973.
- 38 Ibid, 19 June 1973.
- 39 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 16 August 1973.
- 40 *Rhodesia Herald*, 24 January 1973.
- 41 *Civil War in Rhodesia* (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1976).
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 6 July 1973.
- 45 Poster by the Government Printer, Salisbury, 18 April 1975.
- 46 RBC, 13 January 1973.
- 47 *Daily Express*, London, 13 December 1973.
- 48 Authors' tape-recording of press conferences when the prisoners were released in Maputo on 2 February 1979.
- 49 Observer Foreign News Service, No. 38157, 6 February 1979.
- 50 Authors' tape-recording of van der Byl press conference, Geneva, November 1976.
- 51 Peter Niesewand, *In Camera* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1973).
- 52 Rhodesian military documents in authors' possession.
- 53 BBC Monitoring Service.
- 54 Rhodesian military documents in authors' possession.

NOTES

7

- 1 BBC Monitoring Service, 25 March 1974.
 - 2 National Security Study Memorandum No. 39 (NSSM 39).
 - 3 Portuguese government official statistics released March 1975.
- Of the total, 4,788 died in action, 2,341 in 'accidents' and 545 from disease.
- 4 Radio Tanzania interview, 27 March 1974.
 - 5 Africa Contemporary Record (ACR), 1974/5, 'Portugal's Year in Africa'.
 - 6 Interviews with leaders of the Movement of the Armed Forces in Lisbon, 1974.
 - 7 Authors' notes from two press conferences given by Costa Gomes.
 - 8 Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), P. 3209, 1-30 April, 1974.
 - 9 Agence France Press, 29 April 1974.
 - 10 Movement of the Armed Forces programme.
 - 11 ARB, P. 3273, 1-30 June 1974.
 - 12 ACR, 1974/75.
 - 13 Ibid.
 - 14 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 27 April, 1974.
 - 15 Observer Foreign News Service, No. 32323, 29 May 1974.
 - 16 *The Times*, London, 31 May 1974.
 - 17 ACR, 1974/75.
 - 18 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 29 July 1974.
 - 19 ACR, 1974/75.
 - 20 Ibid.
 - 21 *Rhodesia Herald*, 17 June 1974.
 - 22 *Guardian*, London, 2 September 1974.
 - 23 ACR, 1974/75.
 - 24 Ibid.
 - 25 Hansard, Salisbury, 25 September 1974.
 - 26 ACR, 1974/75.

- 1 Jorge Jardin, *Sanctions Double Cross: Oil to Rhodesia* (Books of Rhodesia, Bulawayo, 1979). Kaunda, on several occasions, has spoken of these contacts.
- 2 Interview with President Kaunda, Lusaka, October 1980.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Interview with senior Mozambique official, Maputo, September 1980.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Interview with President Kaunda.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Interview with Dr Marquard de Villiers, Pretoria, September 1980. Kaunda and a member of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), both confirmed de Villiers' role.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Interview with former Zambian Cabinet Minister who wished to remain anonymous.
- 13 Document in authors' possession.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Interview with de Villiers.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles* (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1969).
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Kwame Nkrumah, *Rhodesia File* (PANAF).
- 20 Hall, *The High Price of Principles*.
- 21 Quoted in *ibid.*
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Sir Robert Jackson's June 1976 statement to the United Nations. A subsequent statement by Sir Robert said that the cost to Zambia from January 1973 to mid-1974 after closing the Rhodesia border was £112,000,000.
- 26 Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), 1975.
- 27 *Dear Mr. Vorster*. . . : Details of exchanges between Kaunda and Vorster (Zambian Information Services, 23 April 1971).

- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Interview with de Villiers.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 'Manifesto on Southern Africa' adopted by the fifth summit of East and Central African states, Lusaka, 14-16 April 1969. This was followed by further declarations in Mogadishu and Dar es Salaam, the latter in April 1975. The leaders of the white minority regimes south of the Zambezi never realized that the black African leader they most disliked, Nyerere, wrote the draft of the Lusaka document which was accepted virtually intact by the summit.
- 33 Interview with de Villiers.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Interview with Dr Hilgard Muller, Pretoria, September 1980.
- 36 Interview with de Villiers. Confirmed by Muller.
- 37 Africa Contemporary Record (ACR), 1974/75, 'Southern Africa: The Secret Diplomacy of Detente'.
- 38 'Why We Will Not Negotiate' (Tanzania Information Services, 3 February 1971).
- 39 Interview with Dr Hilgard Muller.
- 40 Interview with 'Pik' Botha, Pretoria, September 1980.
- 41 Mervyn Rees and Chris Day, *Muldergate* (Collins, South Africa, 1979).
- 42 Dr Zac de Beer told the authors in Johannesburg in September 1980 that neither he nor Oppenheimer had played any part in the détente exercise and had not known what was going on. Another Anglo-American man, Vernon Webber, according to Kaunda, subsequently played a peripheral role in helping to organize a southern African conference.
- 43 Interview with Tom McNally, London, 28 June 1977.
- 44 Interview with participants, 1978 and 1979.
- 45 Interview with de Villiers.
- 46 The détente 'scenario' in authors' possession.
- 47 Interview with senior Mozambique official, Maputo, September 1980. Confirmed by former Zambian Cabinet Minister.
- 48 Détente 'scenario'.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Interview with de Villiers.
- 52 Copy of telex produced to authors by de Villiers.
- 53 Interviews with President Kaunda and de Villiers.

- 54 ARB, 1974.
- 55 Text of Kaunda's speech, Background No. 61 (Zambian Information Services, 30 October 1974).
- 56 ARB, 1974.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Interviews with Mozambique and Tanzanian officials.
- 59 Interview with Mozambique official.
- 60 Interview with de Villiers.
- 61 Interviews with President Kaunda and Chona and with Mozambique officials.
- 62 Rhodesian Department of Information statistics.
- 63 Confidential Rhodesian military lecture in authors' possession.
- 64 Interview with Chona, Lusaka, August 1975.
- 65 Account of what happened in prison from interviews with Tekere (Geneva, December 1976), Malianga (Salisbury, August 1980) and Mugabe (Salisbury, September 1980); also from Nyagumbo, *With the People* (Allison & Busby, London 1980).
- 66 From transcript of Sithole's trial in the Zimbabwe National Archives, Salisbury.
- 67 Interviews with Tekere, Malianga and Mugabe; Nyagumbo, op. cit.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Nyagumbo, op. cit.
- 71 Interview with Tekere.
- 72 *Financial Times*, London, 3 December 1974.
- 73 *Guardian*, London, 5 December 1974.
- 74 Interview with de Villiers.
- 75 Copy of message in authors' possession.
- 76 Interview with de Villiers.
- 77 ARB, 1974.
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 On 10 December 1974 the Tanzanian Foreign Ministry telexed the editorial to Tanzanian missions overseas, stating that it 'reflects the views and official position for our Government as regards to the Rhodesian problem'.
- 80 Briefing by a member of President Nyerere's staff to author, Lusaka, December 1974.
- 81 Interview with Mozambique official.
- 82 Account of Tanzanian and Mozambique officials who were present and of Zimbabwean nationalists.

- 83 Interview with Chona.
- 84 Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity, Lusaka, December 1974.
- 85 Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC), 11 December 1974.
- 86 James Chikerema and other nationalists who participated. Kaunda supported this interpretation, saying that the most that was agreed was that the war would not be escalated while attempts were made to arrange a constitutional conference.
- 87 ANC statement read out by Muzorewa on his return to Salisbury, 12 December 1974.
- 88 ARB, 1974.
- 89 Interview with President Kaunda.

9

- 1 ZANU inner party circular, 27 December 1974, in authors' possession.
- 2 Biographical material from Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), 1975.
- 3 According to Rhodesian figures obtained from the Ministry of Information, the number of 'terrorists' killed dropped to 166 in 1975 from 345 the previous year, and security force casualties were down to 16 'killed in action' from 36 in 1974.
- 4 Interview with Assistant Commissioner of Police Michael Edden (who was Special Branch liaison with Combined Operations headquarters).
- 5 Account of the meetings from a variety of sources including several senior ZANU officials, M'hangagwa (who saw documents in the possession of Zambian SB), Kangai (who was a member of the Chifombo tribunal), Nhongo, Gava, Tungamirai, Teurai Ropa (who was a cadre at the parade when Nhari confessed), and several others.
- 6 According to the report of the Chitepo Commission, Tongogara mentioned a 'Captain Soares'—but as the report misquotes him on several other points there is no firm evidence of the accuracy of this information.
- 7 Biographical information from interviews with Webster Gwauya and Elias Hondo.
- 8 Confidential Rhodesian military intelligence lecture in authors' possession.

- 9 Confirmed by Chemist Ncube, *My Testimony to the Chitepo Commission*. Ncube says some members of a force sent to the front at this time were shot when they encountered Nhari and his group, and at least three were killed. Also confirmed in interviews with Gava and others. Tungamirai's account from interviews.
- 10 Interview with Tongogara during Lancaster House conference in London, November 1979.
- 11 ZANU document entitled 'Interim Co-ordination Committee of the Revolutionary Forces of the ANC of Zimbabwe—Memorandum on Unity in the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement', 1975; interview with Noel Mukono.
- 12 Simbi Mubako, 'Aspects of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1966-76' (International Conference on Southern African History, Lesotho, August 1977). Mubako, who had access to most of the people involved in Lusaka at that time, says the number 'does not exceed' sixty.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 'Terrorist War Statistics' from Ministry of Information, Salisbury.
- 15 African Contemporary Record (ACR), 1974/75.
- 16 Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), 1974.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 ACR, 1974/75.
- 19 'Appeal to Conscience by Christian Leaders', 15 August 1974.
- 20 *Guardian*, London, 24 August 1974.
- 21 Ministry of Information, Salisbury.
- 22 Tendie Nhlovu was a camp commander at the age of nineteen and is now a senior official in the ZANU(PF) Department of Information and Publicity.
- 23 Interview with John Mawema. Other contemporaries of Bond and Mao, such as Rex Nhongo, give a similar description.
- 24 A. R. Wilkinson in B. Davidson, J. Slovo and A. R. Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution* (Penguin Books, London, 1976).
- 25 ARB, 1974.
- 26 Wilkinson, op. cit.; further details from a senior Special Branch officer.
- 27 *Rhodesian Herald*, 7 October 1974.
- 28 ARB, 1974.
- 29 Direct quote is from military intelligence lecture (see Note 8); account from interviews with several sources including Tungamirai

- (who saw the South African kit at Teresera base in January) and a senior SB officer (who said the legend became known as 'Gilly's Folly' after officer who took the decision).
- 30 The Revolutionary Council of ZAPU, with a handful of fighters in the field, passed a resolution in January committing itself to the armed struggle as a means of achieving majority rule.
- 31 ZANU inner party circular (as Note 1).
- 32 Report by S. B. Mwenda, Office of the President, Special Duties, stamped 'Secret'; copy in authors' possession.
- 33 Signed by Dr N. S. Patel, identified as the State Forensic Pathologist.
- 34 ARB, 1974.
- 35 'Reply of ZANU Detainees in Zambian Prisons to the Report of the Chitepo Commission', 10 April 1976; copy in authors' possession.
- 36 *The Times*, London, 19 March 1975.
- 37 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 19 March 1975, report by Christopher Munnion.
- 38 *Guardian*, London, 19 March 1975, report by Henry Miller and William Raynor.
- 39 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 19 March 1975.
- 40 Documents skilfully concealed and now in the hands of the Zimbabwe government.
- 41 *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, 19 March 1975.
- 42 *Guardian*, London, 21 March 1975.
- 43 ARB, 1975.
- 44 Interview with Kumbirai Kangai, who was also present.
- 45 Interview with Gwauya.
- 46 Interview with Kangai.
- 47 Copy in authors' possession.
- 48 ARB, 1975.
- 49 *Financial Times*, London, 20 March 1975, report by Trevor Grundy, and interviews with Chikerema at the time.
- 50 *Guardian*, 8 April 1975.
- 51 All newspaper editions dated 29 March 1975. Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) 6 and 7 April 1975.
- 52 Account of arrests from interviews with several eyewitnesses.
- 53 Tongogara, statement to his lawyers; copy in authors' possession.
- 54 Interview with Tungamirai.
- 55 The letter, entitled 'Kaunda's Hostages: ZANU Detainees in Zambian Jails' and dated 1 June 1976, was released in London by the

Zimbabwe Detainees Defence Committee, who said it was written by Tongogara, Manyika, Chimurenga, Ncube and Kufamazuba; copy in authors' possession. Patrons of the Defence Committee in London were Basil Davidson and Bruce Kent, and committee members were Kees Maxey, Judith Acton, Peter Lowenstein, Ignatius Chigwendere, Lionel Cliffe, Susan Lowenstein, Witness Mangwende, Robert Molteno, Didymus Mutasa and Michael Scott. The Lusaka Defence Committee consisted of Simon Muzenda, Simbi Mubako, Rev. Fr Michael Traber, Dr J. V. Taderera (New York), Professor A. P. Blaustein (New York), R. C. Makanda (London), Professor S. Mudenge (Lesotho) and Rev. H. H. Makoni.

56 Mr Justice M. M. Moodley, 'The People versus Joseph Chimurenga Fazo Siwela, Josiah Magama Tongogara, Sadat Kufamazuba—Trial within a Trial Ruling', 20 October 1976; copy in authors' possession.

57 Interview with President Kaunda.

58 Letter to George John Shindler in authors' possession.

59 Copy of letter from Chona to Chigwendere in authors' possession.

60 Member of commission of inquiry, representing a front-line state.

61 *Times of Zambia*, 3 July 1975.

62 *Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo*, Lusaka, March 1976.

63 J. Z. Moyo.

64 More details of Tongogara's election to DARE contained in Chapter 2. Account of 1973 review conference from interviews with several people present.

65 Interview with Mubako.

66 Copy of police statement in authors' possession.

67 Member of commission of inquiry (as Note 60).

68 *Daily Mail*, Zambia, 7 September 1976, quoted part of Sanyanga's testimony to the court and legal record of the testimony is in authors' possession. Sanyanga says in court that he heard he was suspended from the party but did not receive formal notification.

69 Chemist Ncube, *My Testimony to the Chitepo Commission*.

70 Copy of both statements in authors' possession.

71 Copy of Chimurenga's account of his testimony to commission in authors' possession.

72 Reply of ZANU Detainees (see Note 35).

73 Authors' interview with President Kaunda.

74 Authors' interview with President Machel.

1 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 16 December 1974.

2 *Guardian*, London, 15 January 1975.

3 *Guardian*, London, 11 January 1975.

4 *The Times*, London, 22 January 1975.

5 *Guardian* and *The Times*, London, 17 December 1974. Further confirmation of this plan was subsequently provided in an interview with Callaghan's political adviser, Tom McNally, London, 28 June 1977.

6 *Rhodesia Herald*, 17 December 1974.

7 *Africa Research Bulletin* (ARB), 1975.

8 Interview with Tom McNally.

9 Ibid.

10 ARB, 1975.

11 Copy of Pretoria agreement in authors' possession.

12 ARB, 1975.

13 Although the ZLC was formed on 8 July it was not until 1 September (in a letter to ANC branches, front-line states, liberation movements and diplomatic missions) that Muzorewa revealed its membership, committee structures and committee chairmen. The chairmen of the committees had been decided at a meeting which had been organized by Sithole and Chikerema and which did not include the ZAPU members and others who might have opposed their actions. This action directly precipitated the crisis a few days later between Muzorewa and Nkomo, leading to the latter's expulsion from the ANC and bid to take over the ANC leadership.

14 Account of this period mainly from interviews with Simbi Mubako (Lusaka, 13 October 1976), Simon Muzenda (Maputo, 7 May 1978) and Kumbirai Kangai (Salisbury, 25 May 1980).

15 Interview with Mubako.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Interview with Kangai.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 *Zambian government statement*, September 1975.

22 Official ZANU version and accounts by guerrillas who were present.

- 23 Mgagao Declaration in authors' possession.
- 24 Background interview with Mugabe, Lusaka, 29 September 1976.
- 25 Interview with Tekere, Geneva, December 1976.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) news, 25 July 1975.
- 29 UNHCR and Mozambique government officials, Maputo.
- 30 Interviews with Tekere (1976) and with Moton Malianga, Salisbury, August 1980.
- 31 *Rhodesia: The Ousting of the Tangwena*, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, January 1972.
- 32 Interview with Tekere.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Letter dated 4 April 1976 from Quelimane to detainees at Mpima, in authors' possession.
- 35 Interview with senior Mozambique official. FRELIMO did not learn the true story of the prison coup until 1976 during the Geneva conference when a Mozambique observer was briefed by Mubako.
- 36 Interview with Tekere.
- 37 Interview with Kangai.
- 38 Transcript of BBC 'Focus on Africa' broadcast in authors' possession.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Letter from Tongogara, Kangai and Gumbo to Mugabe in authors' possession.
- 41 Declaration by Tongogara, Kangai and Gumbo in authors' possession.
- 42 Mugabe letter of 4 April 1976 to detainees in authors' possession.

- 1 Rhodesian military intelligence lecture in authors' possession.
- 2 Interviews with Webster Gwauya and Elias Hondo, Salisbury, September 1980.
- 3 Rhodesian military intelligence lecture (see Note 1).
- 4 Interview with President Nyerere, Dar es Salaam, 3 March 1976.

- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Copy of handwritten note in authors' possession.
- 9 Interviews with Simon Muzenda and Simbi Mubako, Salisbury, October 1980.
- 10 Interview with Mubako.
- 11 Interview with Josiah Tongogara, Kumbirai Kangai, Rex Nhongo and Dzinashe Machingura, Geneva, December 1976.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 16 Interview with Rex Nhongo, Salisbury, September 1980.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Memorandum by detained DARE members in authors' possession.
- 19 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 20 List of the ZIPA military committee dated 27 November 1975 in authors' possession. Sadza, whose real name was Arthur Magaya, was the son of an Enkeldoorn schoolteacher; he died in action in Manica province on 1 June 1976 when he was shot from a helicopter gunship. Kagure died in August of the same year when he drove into an ambush as the Selous Scouts were attacking the refugee camp at Nyadzonia.
- 21 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 22 Interviews with Nhongo, Gwauya and Hondo.
- 23 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 24 Rhodesian military intelligence lecture (see Note 1).
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 27 Bishop Abel Muzorewa, *Rise up and Walk* (Evans Brothers, London, 1978).
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 *The Times*, London, 4 March 1976.
- 31 United Nations Economic and Social Council report, E/5812, 30 April 1976.
- 32 Note No. 28 dated 17 March 1976 from the British Embassy in Maputo to the Mozambique government.
- 33 *Observer*, London, 14 March 1976.

- 34 Information supplied to author by Botswana government, March 1976.
- 35 Interview with Sir Seretse Khama, Gaborone, March 1976.
- 36 Comment of an American diplomat in Lusaka to the authors.
- 37 *Report by the African National Council on the Rhodesian Constitutional talks in Salisbury, Rhodesia, December 1975 to March 1976* (unpublished). Although it had been intended to sell the report at £1 a copy, ANC sources said Nkomo refused to have it released in case it did not show him in a good political light.
- 38 Interview with President Nyerere.
- 39 Interview with President Kaunda, Lusaka, 21 November 1975.
- 40 *The Times*, London, 18 December 1975.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 *The Times*, London, 2 December 1975.
- 43 *The Times*, London, 21 February 1976.
- 44 Interview with President Nyerere.
- 45 *Sunday Times*, London, 21 March 1976.
- 46 Interview with President Nyerere.
- 47 Hansard, London, 22 March 1976.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 *Guardian*, London, 23 March 1976.
- 50 Interview with a senior Tanzanian official.
- 51 NSSM 39 published in Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Lawrence Hill and Co., New York, 1976).
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (W. W. Norton and Co., New York, 1978).
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Interview with Tom McNally, London, 28 June 1977.
- 61 Interview with another Callaghan aide who wished to remain anonymous, London, 5 July 1977.
- 62 Text of Kissinger's speech released by the United States Information Services.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Ibid.

- 1 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 7 February 1976.
- 2 *Washington Post*, 3 July 1979.
- 3 Interview with President Machel, Dar es Salaam, 7 September 1976.
- 4 Transcript of 'Weekend World' interview.
- 5 *The Times*, London, 13 October 1975.
- 6 *Guardian*, London, 21 October 1975.
- 7 Interview with Rhodesian intelligence officer, Salisbury, October 1980.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Interview with Tom McNally, London, 28 June 1977.
- 12 *Guardian*, London, 18 June 1976.
- 13 Interviews with Presidents Nyerere, Kaunda and Machel.
- 14 Interview with Ted Rowlands, London, 21 June 1977.
- 15 Interview with President Nyerere.
- 16 Interview with captured soldier, Chimoio, May 1978.
- 17 Copies of Idoyaga reports in authors' possession.
- 18 Copy of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan's message circulated to all diplomatic missions in Maputo on 25 August 1976.
- 19 Interviews with Mugabe, Hondo, Gwauya and Mozambique officials.
- 20 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Interview with Mozambique officials.
- 25 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 26 Handwritten copy of the SAS history given to the authors by Major Graham.
- 27 Transcript of Washington press conference released by the United States Information Services in Dar es Salaam.
- 28 *Washington Post*, 28 August 1976.
- 29 *Times of Zambia*, 14 September 1976.
- 30 Transcripts of Kissinger's in-flight briefings in authors' possession.
- 31 Interview with member of Rhodesian delegation, Salisbury, October 1980.

- 32 Interview with senior Rhodesian Treasury official, Salisbury, October 1980.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Interview with President Nyerere, Dar es Salaam, 25 September 1976.
- 35 Interview with Rhodesian delegate (as Note 31).
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Kissinger in-flight briefings (as Note 30).
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 *Daily Mail*, Zambia, 23 September 1976.
- 44 Copy of document in authors' possession.
- 45 Martin Meredith, *The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979* (André Deutsch, London, 1979).
- 46 Interview with British official, London, July 1977.
- 47 Text of Smith broadcast released by the Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism.
- 48 Copy of memorandum in authors' possession.
- 49 *New African*, London, July 1977.
- 50 *Observer*, London, 26 September 1976.
- 51 *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, 28 September 1976.
- 52 Interview with President Nyerere.
- 53 Interview with British official.
- 54 Interview with Crosland aide, London, June 1977.
- 55 Copy of Gwauya letter in authors' possession.
- 56 *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, October 1976.
- 57 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 58 Interviews with Nhongo, Salisbury, September and October 1980.
- 59 Copies of Rhodesian documents in authors' possession.
- 60 Interview with Chifamba, Salisbury, August 1980.
- 61 Interviews with Gwauya and Hondo.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Accounts given to authors by Chifamba, Gwauya, Hondo, Tongogara and Mozambique officials.
- 64 Interview with Chifamba.
- 65 *Daily Mail*, Zambia, 25 January 1977.
- 66 Ibid.

- 1 *Observer*, London, 9 October 1977: 'Challenge to Britain in Africa' by David Owen, Foreign Secretary.
- 2 Interviews with British officials during this series of shuttles, and other reports.
- 3 Documents in authors' possession.
- 4 Interviews with American and front-line officials.
- 5 March 1978. United States exports to South Africa the previous year were US\$1,050 million and U.S. exports to Nigeria were US\$957 million. Exports to South Africa had dropped by 22 per cent whereas exports to Nigeria were rising; the Commerce Department figure for U.S. investment in Nigeria was US\$400 million.
- 6 Interview with senior Tanzanian official.
- 7 *Washington Notes on Africa*, Spring 1977.
- 8 Interviews with British and PF officials.
- 9 This comment almost prevented Young from visiting South Africa. Far from 'shooting from the lip' as it was often reported, Young and his Special Assistant, Stoney Cooks, always said if they made a remark which they believed in and had to withdraw it, they got a chance to repeat it at least twice.
- 10 *Rhodesia - Proposals for a Settlement* (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1977).
- 11 Interview with Mugabe, Maputo, 30 July 1977.
- 12 *Guardian*, London, 14 July 1977, report by Peter Jenkins.
- 13 Interviews with officials, August 1977.
- 14 Tape-recordings of Nyerere's news conference, State House Lusaka, August 1977.
- 15 Several sources; copy of amendment in authors' possession.
- 16 Briefings from American and British officials and press reports.
- 17 Verbatim Service.
- 18 *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination*, 1976, presented to the President on 23 April 1976.
- 19 Africa Contemporary Record (ACR), 1976/77.
- 20 Martin Meredith, *The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979* (André Deutsch, London, 1979).
- 21 Campaign advertisements in *Rhodesia Herald*.
- 22 *Guardian*, 29 August 1977, report by James MacManus.
- 23 *Rhodesia - Proposals for a Settlement* (HMSO, London, 1977).

- 24 *Rhodesia Herald* and other newspaper reports.
- 25 Copy of Patriotic Front document in authors' possession.
- 26 Thames Television programme, 'This Week', 15 September 1977.
- 27 Young to journalists.
- 28 Telex to authors from James MacManus.
- 29 *Rhodesia Herald*, September 1977.
- 30 *Ibid.*, June 1977.
- 31 Seen by Martin and reported for Observer Foreign News Service, September 1977.
- 32 *Sunday Times*, London, August 1977, report by Eric Marsden.
- 33 Copies of detainees' documents in authors' possession.
- 34 Copy of letter signed by Gumbo in authors' possession.
- 35 Letter and documents above, plus signed documents supporting Mgagao Declaration.
- 36 Interview with Rugare Gumbo, Dar es Salaam, April 1977.
- 37 Interview with Kangai, Salisbury, October 1980.
- 38 Figures from UNHCR office in Maputo, courtesy Sergio Viera de Mello, Deputy Representative.
- 39 Documents possessed by Zimbabwe government; also interviews with members of SB.
- 40 Diana Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders in Zimbabwe: Who's Who 1980* (Cannon Press, Salisbury, 1980). Verified by Dr Herbert Ushewokunze who confirmed accuracy of his biographical data (there are errors in those of others).
- 41 *Ibid.*
- 42 Interview with Dr Dzingai Mutumbuka, Maputo, May 1978.
- 43 Newspaper reports and interviews.
- 44 Separate interviews with four senior SB officials after independence.
- 45 Conversation with authors, Maputo, January 1977. Moyo asked to postpone historical interview to following week, saying 'I'm always around.'
- 46 Interview with Simon Muzenda, Lusaka, June 1977.
- 47 Edward Ndlovu to authors, June 1977.
- 48 Interviews with Rex Nhongo and Kangai, October 1980.
- 49 Interview with Muzenda; also interviews with British officials at the time and with SB members after independence.
- 50 'Terrorist Statistics', Ministry of Information, Salisbury.
- 51 *Observer*, 31 June 1977, report by David Martin.
- 52 *Ibid.*

- 53 *Rhodesia Herald*, 4 June 1977, and other newspaper reports.
- 54 *Guardian*, 17 September 1978.
- 55 Interview with senior intelligence officer, Salisbury, August 1980.
- 56 *Times of Zambia*, 14 February 1977.
- 57 Interviews with SB officer and police inspector, Salisbury, September 1980.
- 58 *Sunday People*, 13 March 1977.
- 59 Martin read the diaries in London, November 1979; excerpts subsequently published in the *Observer*.
- 60 'Focus on Rhodesia', Vol. 6.
- 61 *New African*, London, November 1978.
- 62 Stephen Macharaga, a former official of Rev. Sithole, quoted by Martin in the *Observer*, 11 August 1978. Macharaga said he had headed a delegation to Uganda to thank Amin for training 48 Sithole 'guerrillas', and that Amin gave him a message to pass to Sithole: 'Tell him to salute Smith and even say "Yes, Baas". He should do anything to get into power.' This was the first published account of 'private armies' which were used by the internal administration in tandem with the security forces and later became known as the Security Force Auxiliaries.
- 63 *Rand Daily Mail* and other newspapers, July 1978.
- 64 Authors met Father Machikicho, a firm supporter of the liberation struggle, two days before he drove into Zimuto TTL and bicycled down an isolated road to his death. His battered body was later found in a shallow grave, his car burnt out and a note left blaming it on the Dzakodzako—Muzorewa's auxiliaries—but the young men jailed for the offence were reported to be *mujibas*.
- 65 *Observer*, March 1977.
- 66 Interview at the mission, January 1980.
- 67 Remark to journalists.
- 68 Interview with Sithole, September 1975.
- 69 Meredith, *op. cit.*
- 70 Zambian and British officials to authors.
- 71 Interview with Marquard de Villiers, Pretoria, September 1980.
- 72 George Nyandoro, then still in exile and an official of the Bishop's ANC.
- 73 Cronje, Ling and Cronje, *Lonrho: Portrait of a Multinational* (Penguin Books, London 1976).
- 74 Interviews with Rhodesian officials present, Lusaka, 19 October 1977.

- 75 News conference, Lusaka, 19 October 1977.
- 76 Briefings from Tanzanian and Zambian officials.
- 77 Quoted in *Daily Mail* and *Times of Zambia*; account from several officials who attended the meeting.
- 78 Interview with President Nyerere. Confirmed by Tanzanian officials.
- 79 In a 'Statement to the International Community', 18 June 1977, Machel said that between March 1976 and March 1977 there had been 143 acts of aggression resulting in the death of 1,432 civilians. By December this figure had risen considerably, particularly after the Chimoio attack, and senior FRELIMO officials said the civilian toll was now well over 2,000.
- 80 Document dated 26 November 1977, in authors' possession.
- 81 Interview with senior SB officer, Salisbury, October 1980.
- 82 Smith in interview with London Weekend TV, screened in Salisbury and reported in *Rhodesia Herald*.
- 83 Copy of statement in authors' possession.
- 84 Unpublished history of SAS (see Chapter 12, Note 26).
- 85 *Rhodesia Herald*, 30 November 1977.
- 86 BBC radio programme, 'Analysis'.
- 87 *Rhodesia Herald*, 3 February 1978.
- 88 Briefings from British, American, front-line and PF officials.
- 89 Interviews with Tekere, Ushewokunze and others.
- 90 Documents covering this period in authors' possession.
- 91 Account of Hove affair from *Rhodesia Herald* and other press reports.
- 92 Interviews with British officials and various participants in meetings.
- 93 Interview with Michael Edden, May 1980.
- 94 *Rhodesia Herald*.
- 95 Both tape-recordings in authors' possession.
- 96 *Rhodesia Herald* and other press reports.
- 97 Interview with Tongogara, Chimoio, May 1978.
- 98 Interview with Tungamirai, Chimoio, May 1978.
- 99 Interview with Tongogara.

- 1 *Guardian*, London, 10 April 1979.
- 2 Boyd Report.

- 3 *Free and Fair? The 1979 Rhodesian Election*. Report by observers on behalf of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group.
- 4 Boyd Report.
- 5 *The Herald*, Salisbury, 26 May 1979.
- 6 *The Herald*, Salisbury, 5 May 1979.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 British diplomatic briefing to authors.
- 11 *Guardian*, London, 19 May 1979.
- 12 *Daily Express*, London, 21 May 1979.
- 13 *International Herald Tribune*, 23 May 1979.
- 14 *The Herald*, Salisbury, 29 May 1979.
- 15 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 2 July 1979.
- 16 Document dated 9 April 1979 in authors' possession.
- 17 Details of Vivo plan supplied in interviews with Mugabe, Mozambique officials and a senior member of the ZANLA forces.
- 18 Interview with Mozambique official.
- 19 Interview with Mugabe, Salisbury, 24 September 1980.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Interviews with Mozambique officials.
- 23 Interview with Tungamirai, Salisbury, October 1980. Tongogara showed the authors his map showing the penetration of the guerrillas during the Lancaster House conference in London, December 1979. Rhodesian intelligence officers, shown the map in October 1980, agreed that it accurately reflected guerrilla positions.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Rhodesian official statistics.
- 26 *International Herald Tribune*, 28 May 1979.
- 27 *Guardian*, London, 12 July 1979.
- 28 NATPAC document in authors' possession.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 *Daily Telegraph*, London, 10 July 1979.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 *Sunday Telegraph*, London, 15 July 1979.
- 33 *Guardian*, London, 16 July 1979.
- 34 Observer Foreign News Service, London, No. 38827, 8 August 1979.
- 35 Interviews with Mozambique officials.

- 36 Interview with Ramphal, London, 6 December 1979.
- 37 Commonwealth Secretariat record of Lusaka speeches.
- 38 Interview with Ramphal.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Copy of note in authors' possession.
- 42 Interview with Ramphal.
- 43 Interview with member of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia delegation, Salisbury, October 1980.
- 44 Interview with Mozambique official.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Interview with President Machel, Lusaka, 2 April 1980.
- 47 Interview with Mozambique official.
- 48 Tongogara recounted the approach to the authors at Lancaster House, London.
- 49 Carrington and most other senior British officials believed this, as did Nkomo and Mugabe. Tongogara impressed Smith with his open approach, and even asked about his mother who used to give him candy as a child when his father worked on Smith's father's farm: 'If I get home while the old lady is still alive,' he said, 'that would be one of the greatest things for me—to say hello, ask her about the sweets and whether she still has got some more for me.'
- 50 Interview with Tongogara.
- 51 Interviews with FRELIMO and ZANU officials and with Ken Stokes.
- 52 Interview with Mike Tongogara, August 1980.
- 53 Nhongo and Mafela (whose *nom de guerre* was Masuku) and British officials, to authors.
- 54 Interview with Tongogara.
- 55 Anecdotes from interviews with people involved.
- 56 Soames's biographical details from British Information Services, Reference Biography Service.
- 57 Interviews with police officials, Salisbury, May–June 1980.
- 58 Interview with Paterson, Umtali, March 1980.
- 59 Tape recording and official transcript.
- 60 Walls interviewed on BBC Panorama by Richard Lindley, July–August 1980.
- 61 'Southern Rhodesia Elections, February 1980. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group.'

Index

- Acland, John, 321, 322
 Adefope, Henry, 313
 African Labour Regulations Act (1911), 59
 African National Congress (1934), 64
 African National Congress (ANC), 66, 171, 216; formation, 154; alliance with ZAPU, 10; Wankie battle, 10, 27; Soviet support, 14; 1945 revival, 65; and the 1971 constitutional proposals, 99, 100; 1973–4 talks with Smith, 100–1; and Muzorewa's 1974 negotiations with Smith, 123–4; and the détente proposals, 141; Lusaka summit, 154; and Declaration of Unity, 155; OAU backs, 172; and Chitepo's death, 184; Victoria Falls Conference, 194–5; power struggle in, 195; and formation of ZLC, 196; Mgagao Declaration, 200, 209–10; Mugabe on, 213–14; lack of unity, 217, 244, 248; and Nkomo's negotiations with Smith, 228
 African National Youth League (ANYL), 66
 African (Registration and Identification) Act (1973), 61
 African Settlement Convention, 101
 Aga Khan, Prince Sadruddin, 242
 Ainslie, M. J. F., 111
 Altena Farm, 1–2, 73–4, 90–1, 92, 146
 Alves, Victor, 120
 Amnesty International, 106, 183
 Angola, 125, 142, 219; US role in, 232–3
 Annfield, A. Pierce, 182–3
 Antunes, Melo, 120
 Aquina, Sister Mary, 206
 Arthur, Brother, 174
 Badza, 109, 110, 159–60, 163, 165, 166, 167, 187
 Baldwin, Detective Inspector, 109–10
 Banana, Canaan, 265
 Banda, Dr Hastings, 67, 136, 177
 Banda, Philip, 182
 Banda, Rupiah, 138
 Beira, 3, 119–20, 121, 125, 146, 224, 225, 286, 290
 Belingwe, 48
 Benn, Tony Wedgwood, 268
 Berlin Conference (1884–5), 36, 38
 Binda, 110
 Bingham, Thomas, 265
 Black, James, 107
 Blake, Robert, 47
 Bland, Robert, 106
 Bloom, Bridget, 151, 179
 Bond, James (Paul Murwira), 78, 170
 Botha, P. W., 171
 Botha, 'Pik', 136, 138, 239, 269, 270
 Botswana, 112, 137, 138, 139, 239; guerrilla build-up in, 3; Mawema expelled from, 84; Rhodesian rail links through, 226–7; refugee camps, 278
 Bowdler, William, 249
 Boyd, Viscount, 300, 301–2
 Boynton, Sir John, 327
 Brezhnev, Leonid, 316, 317
 Britain: settlement proposals, 98, 99–100; Callaghan tightens sanctions, 121; and effect of sanctions on Zambia, 130, 131; Kaunda proposes referendum in Rhodesia held by, 133; and Zambian attempts at Rhodesia settlement, 137; Mugabe's 1976 visit, 209–10; grants to Mozambique, 226; preconditions for constitutional

INDEX

- Britain—*contd.*
 conference, 229–30; attitude to Smith, 239, 240, 249; and Kissinger's negotiations with Smith, 249, 255, 256; sends army to Zambia, 297; and the internal settlement, 300–5; 1979 Commonwealth summit, 313–15; election supervision, 325–6
 British African Voice Association, 65
 British South Africa Company, 35, 36, 43, 45, 46, 64
 Brown, Mervyn, 291–2
 Burombo, Benjamin, 65, 209
 Butiku, Joseph, 147, 149, 244
 Byrd Amendment, 231–2, 234, 267
- Cabral, Amilcar, 175
 Caetano, Marcello, 3–4, 115, 116, 117, 126
 Callaghan, James, 137, 233, 239, 247; calls for majority rule, 121; visits Africa, 193; preconditions for constitutional conference, 229–30, 234; Anglo-American settlement plans, 267, 269
 Candour League, 228
 Carrington, Sir Frederick, 48
 Carrington, Lord, 304–5, 312, 313, 314, 315, 318
 Carter, Jimmy, 250, 263, 266–7, 269, 294, 304, 311, 312
 Carver, Lord, 273, 284, 288, 290
 Castro, Fidel, 27, 266, 308, 316
 Catholic Church, 64, 77, 102
 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), 103–5
 Centenary, 82, 90, 113
 Central African Federation, 65, 70
 Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), 9, 33
 Chaminuka, 75
 Chamunorwa, 79
 Chand, Prem, 274, 284, 288, 290
 Chandawa, Sam, 167, 185, 187
 Charter Tribal Trust Lands, 86
 Charumuka, Nathan, 10
 Chatambudza, Christopher, 10
 Chauke, Justin, 24, 77, 93; reconnaissance work, 2–3, 6, 25; training with FRELIMO, 21, 26–7; biographical note, 22; prepares for infiltration, 34; and Nharai Rebellion, 161, 165; and Chitepo's death, 180
 Chavunduka, Dr Gordon, 123, 155
 'Chedu, General', 69
 Chesa African Purchase Area, 110, 111, 113
 Chesa Tribal Trust Land, 103
 Chete, 112
 Chibabawa, 276, 277
 Chidyamuyu, 75
 Chifamba, John, 260–1, 262
 Chifombo, 17, 50, 76, 77, 78–9, 106, 112, 159, 160, 161, 162, 166, 172, 180
 Chigowe, Cletus, 16, 25, 78, 176–7, 181, 198, 275, 291
 Chigwendere, Ignatius, 183
 Chihota, Henry, 101
 Chihota, Peter Baya, 25, 163
 Chikadaya, Lovemore, 162
 Chikerema, James, 204, 242; alliance between ZAPU and ANC, 10; reassesses ZAPU policy, 13; disunity in ZAPU, 18, 29–30, 88; unity with ZANU, 31, 32; and the ANC, 65–6; arrested, 66; begins the armed struggle, 71; negotiations with Smith, 99; Declaration of Unity, 155; and Zambian arrests of guerrillas, 179; and Chitepo's death, 186; power struggle in ANC, 195; and the ZLC, 196; Mgagao Declaration, 200, 201, 225; and escalation of the war, 216; and ZIPA, 217, 221, 244; and Nkomo's negotiations with Smith, 228; and leadership of the guerrillas, 242, 243; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 245; 1980 election, 331
 Chikuwa, 102–3
 Chikwingwizha, 76
 Chimbande, John, 172–3
 Chimbichimbi, 82
 Chimbodza, Simon, 10
 Chimedza, 88
 Chimoio, 17, 247, 275, 276, 288–90, 291, 318
 Chimurenga, Joseph, 109; joins guerrillas, 24, 28; reconnaissance work, 25; biographical note, 28; becomes deputy commander, 29; prepares for infiltration, 34; and the importance of spirit mediums, 75; and the support of the people, 88, 89; and attacks on farms, 91; Nhari Rebellion, 162, 166; and Chitepo's death, 178, 180, 181, 182, 188; 1976 ZIPA crisis, 261
 Chimurenga Day, 10
 China: support and training for ZANU, 10–11, 12, 24, 83, 84, 88, 164, 170, 316–17; support for 'non-authentic', 15; and Zambian rail link, 131; weapon supplies, 160, 167, 201, 220; Sir Seretse Khama visits, 227; US and intervention in Africa by, 231

INDEX

- Chinamano, Josiah, 58, 295
 Chinamaropa, 180
 Chinamora, 292
 Chinkuli, Kingsley, 142
 Chipampata, George, 135, 150
 Chipande, Alberto, 260–1
 Chipembere, 78
 Chipfeni, 75
 Chipopera, Parker, 198, 218, 219, 221
 Chipunza, Chad, 124
 Chirau, Chief, 288, 289, 293, 294–5, 298, 301
 Chirau Tribal Trust Land, 309
 Chiredzi, 307
 Chisiza, Dunduza, 65–6
 Chitepo, Herbert, 155, 198, 206, 278; and ZANU's new strategy, 13; forms link with FRELIMO, 16, 17; unity between ZANU and ZAPU, 31, 32; begins the armed struggle, 71; and détente proposals, 144; and Sithole's suspension, 150–1; demands immediate majority rule, 151–2; biographical note, 158–9; and Nhari Rebellion, 161, 162–3, 165, 166, 196; assassination, 141, 167, 173–90, 212
 Chitepo, Victoria, 175, 178
 Chitepo International Commission, 182–90
 Chitnis, Lord, 301
 Chiweshe, Chief, 73, 103
 Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, 73, 102–3, 161, 169
 Chona, M. Mainza, 183, 186
 Chona, Mark, 129, 150; détente negotiations, 134, 135, 137, 138, 141, 142–3, 149, 193; and majority rule, 152, 154; and nationalist unity, 155; and Chitepo's death, 186–8; Victoria Falls Conference, 194, 216
 Chou En-lai, 266
 Chung, Fay, 179–80
 Churchill, Winston, 290–1
 CIA, 232–3, 251, 255
 City Youth League, 65–6
 Clark, Joe, 304
 Colyton, Lord, 127
 Connemara prison, 149
 Costa Gomes, Francisco, 117
 Cowell, Alan, 325
 Cowper, Reginald, 281
 'Crocodile Commando', 24
 Crosland, Anthony, 256–7
 Cuba, 27, 83, 146, 233, 305–8, 316, 317
 Cunhal, Alvaro, 118
 Cunliffe, Mr, 326
 Dabengwa, Dumiso, 320
 Da Costa, Luis Alfonso, 5
 Daily News, 63
 Dalglish, Archie, 2
 Dande, 82, 90, 113
 Dar es Salaam, 15, 16, 70, 77, 112, 121, 131, 150, 151, 240, 242–3, 292
 Dare re Chimurenga (DARE), 31, 150, 159, 198; formation, 16; expanded, 32; Tonogara elected to, 33–4, 185; and Nhari Rebellion, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165; visit to Malawi, 177; relations with Zambia, 178; and Chitepo's death, 180, 185, 188, 189, 190; removes Sithole, 198–9; escalation of the war, 204
 Dauramanzi, Charles, 162, 166, 178, 180, 181
 Day, Derek, 304
 De Beer, Dr Zac, 137
 De Borchgrave, Marc, 1–2, 73
 Deveteve, 4
 De Villiers, Marquard, 127–30, 133–5, 138, 142–3, 145, 152, 153, 285
 Dixon, Eric, 326–7
 Doeroi, 276
 Dondo, 223
 Dos Santos, Marcellino, 18–19, 116–17, 316, 317
 Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, 7, 99–100
 Dube, Athan, 174
 Dube, John, 221
 Duff, Sir Anthony, 313
 Dumbutshena, Enoch, 69
 D'Urban, Sir Benjamin, 37
 Dziruni, 186
 Eames, Ronald, 109
 Edden, Michael, 9, 14, 296
 Egypt, 12, 83
 Elim Pentecostal mission, 282
 Emergency Powers Act (1960), 61, 67
 Ennals, David, 227
 Enteleka, 40
 Ethiopia, 71
 Federal Review Conference, London, 1960, 67
 Fenn, Nicholas, 325
 Field, Sir Winston, 9, 58, 69, 71
 Fingoe, 180
 Firmino Miguel, Lieutenant-Colonel, 120
 Fleming, John, 6
 Fletcher High School, Gwelo, 57
 Flower, Ken, 9
 Ford, Gerald, 232, 263, 266

INDEX

- Fourie, Brand, 135, 149, 153
 FPLM, 316, 317-18
 Francistown, 112, 223, 278
 Franklin, A. P., 111
 Fraser, Malcolm, 304-5, 313, 314
 'Freedom Camp', 296
 Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), 45, 68-9, 78, 110, 112, 135, 136, 159, 200, 207, 222, 243, 275; threatens Rhodesian trade routes, 3; develops links with ZANU, 9, 14-20; not taken seriously, 14; ZANLA joins in the Tete, 21-9, 34; Che Guevara criticizes, 28; Rutanhire's first contact with, 80; and support for ZANLA, 84; and the Portuguese *coup d'état*, 118-19, 121; wins independence, 121; and negotiations with Jardim, 125-8; and the détente proposals, 139-40, 141; and the Nhari Rebellion, 163, 166; and arrests after Chitepo's death, 180; and Mugabe's presence in Mozambique, 207, 208; and 1976 ZIPA crisis, 261, 262; and the 'unity group', 275; and Owen, 290; and ZANU's political strength, 316-17
 FROLIZI, 18, 87, 88, 108, 154, 179, 197, 198, 214, 216
 Frost, Des, 192, 230, 249, 271
 Fry, John, 41
 Gadzema, 12
 Garanewako, Catherine, 178
 Garba, Joseph, 294, 295
 Gatooma, 299
 Gava, Sheba, 24, 25, 162, 166
 Gaylard, Jack, 153
 Geneva conference, 99, 256, 257, 258-60, 261, 263, 265
 Geneva Convention, 106
 Geza, Sam, 179-80
 Ghana, 11, 83
 Glendenning, David, 326-9
 Gomporeshumba, 49
 Goncalves, Vasco, 120
 Goodman, Lord, 133
 Gordon, George, 190
 Goromonzi, 57
 Graham, John, 267, 268, 269, 284, 298
 Graham, Michael, 246
 Great Zimbabwe, 37
 Greenhill, Sir Denis, 100
 Grobbelaar, A., 122
 Grobler, Piet, 38, 39, 41-2
 Grobler treaty (1887), 38, 39, 40, 41
 Guevara, Che, 27-8
 Gumbo, 211, 243; and the Nhari Rebellion, 161, 166; joins DARE, 185; and the Mgagao Declaration, 198, 199; and ZIPA, 218, 220; FRELIMO detains, 275, 291
 Gutu, 76
 Guvamatanga, Commander, 108
 Guzuzu, David, 10
 Gwanda, 112
 Gwauya, Webster, 166, 178, 180, 197, 213, 221, 242, 243, 244, 257
 Gwelo, 48, 57, 228
 Gwetera, 110
 Gwindingwi, John, 218
 Gwindingwi, Kenneth, 81, 84, 86
 Hamadziripi, Henry, 199, 243; unity with Chikerema, 32; arrested, 66; begins the armed struggle, 71; Nhari Rebellion, 161; Malawi trip, 176-7; and ZIPA, 220; 1976 ZIPA crisis, 260, 261; detained by FRELIMO, 275, 291
 Hannah, Alan, 102
 Harare, 35
 Harlech, Lord, 304
 Harper, William, 228
 Hart, Judith, 131, 226
 Hawkins, Harold, 251
 Hawkins, Roger, 280
 Hawksworth, Gerald, 106
 Healey, Denis, 268
 Helms, Charles D., 38, 40-1, 42, 56
 Helms, Jesse, 311
 Hernandez, Martin, 4
 Hickman, John, 274
 Holman, Michael, 281
 Hondo, Elias, 166, 197, 221, 261
 Hopedzichirira, 74
 Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 136, 233
 Hove, Byron, 185, 293-4
 Hughes, Cledwyn, 298
 Humphrys, John, 326
 Idensohn, Len, 192, 228
 Idoyaga, H., 241-2
 Indemnity and Compensation Act (1975), 103, 104
 Industrial Boards, 60
 Industrial Conciliation Act (1934), 60
 Industrial Councils, 60
 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 12
 International Defence and Aid Fund, 4
 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 96-7
 Iringa, 84

INDEX

- Itumbi, 12, 22-4, 77, 88, 162
 Jacha, Aaron, 64
 Jackson, Sir Robert, 132
 Jairos, 73, 74
 Jakachaka, 110
 Jameson, Leander, 46, 47-8
 Jameson raid, 47-8, 237-8
 Jardim, Jorge, 125-7
 Johnson, Frank, 35, 43-4
 Joint Military Command (JMC), 18-19, 111, 145, 198
 Joint Political Council, 111
 Joubert, 108
 Jumbe, Aboud, 230
 Kadalie, Clements, 64
 Kaduma, Ibrahim, 227, 230
 Kadungure, Ernest, 24, 25, 28, 29, 34
 Kagubi, 49
 Kagure, Edmund, 221
 Kamanga, Reuben, 184
 Kamwala, 161
 Kangai, 211; and the Nhari Rebellion, 161, 165, 166; and continuation of the war, 177; Chitepo's death, 178-9, 185-6; biographical note, 186; Mgagao Declaration, 198, 199; and ZIPA, 218, 219, 220; and leadership of the guerrillas, 243; 1976 ZIPA crisis, 260, 261
 Kapurura, John, 166
 Kashiri, 88
 Kaswende, 17, 28, 78, 85
 Kaunda, Kenneth, 178, 193, 203, 313; and the closure of the Rhodesian border, 7; and ZANU's use of the Tete, 19-20; ties with ZAPU, 24; 1960 Federal Review Conference, 67; and government-in-exile proposals, 70; trade links through Mozambique, 125; and FRELIMO, 126-9; and effects of sanctions on Zambian economy, 129-30; on a black victory in Rhodesia, 129-30; and détente proposals, 142-5, 152, 157; meeting with ZANU leaders, 149; and Sithole's suspension, 150-1; meeting with Sithole and Nkomo, 151; and majority rule proposals, 152-3; and nationalist unity, 155; and the Chitepo assassination trial, 181-2, 183, 184, 190; meeting with Vorster, 137, 139, 195; Mugabe attacks, 210-11, 213; and the resumption of war, 216; and Nkomo's negotiations with Smith, 227, 228; and Angolan crisis, 232, 233; and plans to ditch Smith, 240; releases nationalist leaders, 245-6, 257; and Kissinger's negotiations with Smith, 251, 252, 253, 255; relations with Owen, 265; and Owen/Young plan, 274; Smith visits, 284-5; split with Nyerere, 285-6; and the need for elections, 286, 287; and Smith's internal settlement, 295; reopens railway to Rhodesia, 297; and Cuban plans for Patriotic Front, 306, 308; 1979 Commonwealth summit, 313, 314-15
 Kawawa, Rashidi, 230
 Kennerley, John, 107
 Kezi, 112
 Khama, Chief, 41, 46
 Khama, Sir Seretse, 149, 151, 155, 193, 226-7, 240, 244, 255, 306
 Kingolwira, 87, 243
 Kissinger, Henry, 115, 230-40, 246-56, 259, 260, 266, 267
 Kissinger, Nancy, 251-2
 Knutsford, Lord, 41
 Kock, Wickus de, 97
 Koornhof, Piet, 144
 Kruger, President, 41, 47
 Kruger, Jimmy, 238
 Kufamazuba, Sadat, 173, 181-2, 188
 Kuraouone, Fred, 25, 28
 Kutubu, S. M. F., 189
 Kuzvipa, Gideon, 25
 Lamont, Bishop Donal, 102, 283
 Lancaster House, 315-16, 318
 Land Apportionment Act (1930), 52-4, 68, 69
 Land Tenure Act (1970), 55, 100, 271
 Langa, Francisco, 163
 Lardner-Burke, Desmond, 95, 102, 192
 Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (1960), 60, 61, 67, 103
 Lee, Comrade, 12
 Lendy, Captain, 45-6
 Lenin, 81, 275
 Liebig, 51
 Lippert, Edouard, 43
 Lippert concession, 51
 Livingstone, David, 36, 40, 56
 Lobengula, King, 37-9, 40-5, 46
 Lobito, 125
 Lockwood, Edgar, 231
 London Convention (1884), 39
 London Missionary Society, 40
 Lonrho, 128, 129, 134-5, 137, 184, 284-5
 Lotshe, 42
 Low, Stephen, 267, 268, 269, 284, 298

INDEX

- Luangwa, 113
 Lusaka, 14, 16, 19, 22, 77, 87, 127, 128, 130, 131, 145, 149, 150, 161, 163-5, 167-8, 216, 269, 297
 Maartens, Johannes, 106-7, 108
 Mabika, 181
 Mabote, Sebastao, 16
 McDermott, Niall, 182
 Macguire, Rochfort, 42-3
 Macheke, 62
 Machel, Samora, 118, 267-8; and the 'authentic', 14; and ZANLA operations in Tete, 16, 17, 19-20, 34, 85, 88; and Kaunda's negotiations with Portugal, 126-7, 128; cult hero in South Africa, 135; and détente proposals, 144-5; meeting with ZANU leaders, 149; and Sithole's suspension, 150, 151; last meeting with Tongogara, 190; and escalation of war, 216; and unity of nationalists, 217, 222; and ZIPA, 221, 224, 244; closes border, 225, 226; and American policy on Rhodesia, 236; and plans to ditch Smith, 240; 1967 Dar es Salaam summit, 242-5; and leadership of the guerrillas, 242-3; Nyadzonja massacre 242-3; release of ZIPA leaders, 245-6; and Kissinger's negotiations with Smith, 255; and 1976 ZIPA crisis, 261; Kaunda reopens railway to Rhodesia, 297; and Cuban plans for Patriotic Front, 305, 307-8; belief in Thatcher, 312; and ZANU's political strength, 316; and Soviet support for ZANLA, 317
 McHenry, Don, 274
 Machikicho, Father, 283
 Machingura, Dzinashu, 84, 196-8, 218-19, 221, 242-4, 258, 261
 MacLaughlin, Sister Janice, 283
 MacManus, James, 151, 179, 192
 Macmillan, Sr Harold, 60, 66-7
 McNally, Tom, 137, 193-4, 239
 Madekorozwa, Edgar, 188
 Madiba, 24
 Madziwa, 113, 161, 168
 Mafela, Lookout (Masuku), 87, 320, 321
 Magobeya, George, 25
 Makombe, Nolan, 265
 Makoni, Andrew, 110
 Malawi, 125-6, 136, 176-7
 Malianga, Moton, 70, 101, 148, 149, 150, 204, 206
 Malta, 290-1
 'Malta Two', 292
 Mana Pools, 112
 Mandizvidza, Chrispen, 206, 243, 275
 Mangena, Alfred 'Nikita', 87, 215, 218, 220, 221, 222, 279
 Mangwana, Denis, 33
 Mangwe, 48
 Mangwende, 292
 Manica, 222, 224, 292, 307, 309
 Manley, Michael, 313
 Manyeranyere, Godwin, 10
 Manyika, Robson, 166, 188
 Mao (Patrick Tavengwa), 170
 Mao Tse-Tung, 27, 81, 84, 146, 275
 Mapondera uprising (1900), 63
 Maposa, Joseph, 112
 Maputo (Lourenço Marques), 106, 107, 119, 121, 135, 146, 221, 222, 224, 225, 242, 257, 279, 307
 Martin, Sir Richard, 47
 Marx, Karl, 81, 275
 Mashangara, Kefas, 110
 Mashayangombe, Chief, 37
 Mashonganyika, 49
 Mashyangombi, Chief, 49
 Masters and Servants Act (1901), 59, 60
 Matabele National Home Movement, 63
 Mataure, John, 150, 151, 161, 163-6, 185, 187
 Matimbe, 110
 Matsinha, Mariano, 16
 Maund, E. M., 43
 Mavudzi, 276
 Mavuradonha Mountains, 86
 Mawema, John, 83-4
 Mawema, Michael, 66
 Mazoe, 49, 63, 113, 171
 Mbeya, 87
 Mbita, Hashim Iddi, 184, 201, 217, 220, 274
 Mboroma, 18, 180, 197, 199, 201, 202, 225
 Melsetter, 24, 37, 49, 223-4, 309
 Mengistu, 306, 308
 Mgagao, 29, 77, 81-2, 84, 217, 218, 220, 222, 225, 243, 247, 279
 Mgagao Declaration, 199-200, 202, 209-10, 211, 212, 213, 215-16, 225
 Milner, Aaron, 179
 M'nangagwa, Emmerson, 11, 22
 Mobutu, 232, 233
 Moffat, Rev. John, 40, 42, 56
 Moffat, Rev. Robert, 40
 Moffat treaty (1888), 38
 Mogwe, Archie, 269
 Molife, Ceasar, 160

INDEX

- Mondale, Walter, 268
 Mondlane, Eduardo, 16, 34, 175
 Monkton Commission, 67
 Monteiro, Oscar, 195
 Moodley, Manival, 181-2
 Moore, Norman, 91, 105-6, 108
 Moose, Richard, 290
 Moto, 63
 Mount Darwin, 79, 82, 90, 110, 160, 277, 325
 Mount Hampden, 35
 Moyana, David, 221, 223
 Moyane, Jose, 26, 28, 166
 Moyo, Dick, 174
 Moyo, Jason 'J.Z.', 242; and ZAPU leadership, 13, 29-30; and Chikerema, 13, 18, 29-30; and support for ZAPU, 19; and unity with ZANU, 31; placed under restriction, 69; begins the armed struggle, 71; lack of fighting programme, 87-8; and détente proposals, 144-5; and Chitepo's death 190; and formation of ZLC, 196; military unity, 198; and ZIPA, 217-18, 220-1; forms Patriotic Front, 257; death, 278-9
 Mozambique: guerrillas build up in, 3; Rhodesian raids in, 4-5, 9, 170, 241, 270, 286, 288-90; Portuguese support for guerrillas in, 115; and Portuguese *coup d'état*, 116, 117, 119-20; settlement of independence, 121, 144, 146, 159; South Africa's relations with, 122, 135-6, 138, 139, 140; and the détente proposals, 139-40, 143; Mgagao Declaration, 201; ZANU recruits in, 205, 207-8, 215; Mugabe enters, 206; and resumption of the war, 216, 220; closes border, 225-6, 238; Nyadzonja massacre, 241; refugee camps, 276-8; and the Muzorewa government, 305; puts FPLM into Rhodesia, 317-18
 Mpangara, Bassopo, 84
 Mpima prison, 198-200, 201, 202, 209, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220
 Mpofu, Cornelius, 21, 26, 27, 28
 Mpoko, Report, 221
 Mpotshwana, 48
 Mpundu, Dickson, 182, 188
 Mpunzarima, Patrick, 24, 25, 161, 178, 180, 181
 Msengezi, 75
 Mtimkulu, Walter, 30
 Mtine, Tom, 134-5
 Mtoko, 49, 90-1, 111
 Mubako, Simbi, 11-12, 23, 31, 167-8, 197, 198, 209, 213
 Mudavanhu, Jameson, 11
 Mudende, 261
 Mudzi, Mukudzei, 31, 151, 218; elected to DARE, 32; begins the armed struggle, 71; and Sithole's suspension, 150; Nhari Rebellion, 165; Chitepo's death, 178, 179-80; Mgagao Declaration, 199; and ZIPA, 220, 243; FRELIMO detains, 275
 Mudzingwa, Dr Augustus, 221, 260-1
 Mugabe, Robert, 242, 251, 293; Sithole and Nkomo step down in favour of, 31; 1961 constitutional talks, 67; placed under restriction, 69; and government-in-exile proposals, 70; detained, 71; and Muzorewa's talks with Smith, 101; and prisoners of war, 107, 108; and Sithole's suspension from ZANU, 148, 149-50; meeting with Kaunda and Nyerere, 149-50; release, 149; conditions for negotiations, 156-7; and formation of ZANU, 158; and Chitepo's death, 174; transition to majority rule, 192; biographical note, 202; becomes leader of ZANU, 202, 211; rise to power, 202-11; break with Nkomo, 203; in Mozambique, 206-9; 1967 visit to Britain, 209-10; attacks Kaunda, 210-11, 213; and ZIPA, 217, 221; escalation of war, 229; and leadership of the guerrillas, 243, 258; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 244, 245; and Kissinger's proposed rehabilitation fund, 255; forms Patriotic Front, 257; Geneva conference, 260; and 1976 ZIPA crisis, 260, 261; starts asserting authority, 263; and the Owen/Young plan, 268, 272; becomes President of ZANU, 275; and Smith's visit to Kaunda, 285; Malta talks, 290; and Smith's internal settlement, 295; aid from Moscow, 303-4; relations with Soames, 322-3; 1980 elections, 323, 328-31, 332; and Soames's threat of disenfranchisement, 325
 Mugabe, Sally, 70, 203
 Mukono, Noel, 16, 32, 34, 161, 164-6, 185, 187, 196-7, 199, 200, 218
 Mukumbura, 4, 19, 80, 159
 Mulambo, 218
 Mulilo, Dangani, 221
 Muller, Hilgard, 135, 136, 138, 237, 238
 Munnion, Christopher, 105, 179
 Munyoni, Gordon, 221
 Murambo, Peter, 197

INDEX

- Musalapasi, Enos (Short), 188
Mushonga, Silas, 11
Musikavanhu, 275
Mussett, Jack, 294
Mutambanengwe, Simpson, 32, 33, 166, 176, 185, 186, 196, 200, 218
Mutasa, Didymus, 208
Mutasa South Tribal Trust Land, 326-7
Mutinhiri, Ambrose, 221
Mutizwa, Taziana, 31, 32
Mutuma, Bernard, 11
Mutumbuka, Dr Dzingai, 179-80, 277-8
Muzenda, Simon, 206, 242, 275, 279, 330; and Sithole's suspension, 148; biographical note, 209; works with detained leaders, 209, 218; unity of guerrilla forces, 218; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 243, 245; 1976 ZIPA crisis, 261, 262
Muzorewa, Abel, 196, 242, 269, 271, 272; condemns terrorists, 92; 1971 constitutional proposals, 99; first official meeting with Smith, 100-1; 1974 negotiations with Smith, 122-4; and the 1973 agreement, 123-4; and formation of ANC, 154; Declaration of Unity, 155; conditions for negotiations, 156; and Chitepo's death, 175-6, 178-9, 184; and Sithole's arrest, 193; Victoria Falls Conference, 194-5; power struggle in ANC, 195; and Mgagao Declaration, 200, 201; and escalation of the war, 216; Nyerere on, 217; and ZIPA, 217, 224-5, 244; and Nkomo's negotiations with Smith, 228-9; negotiations with Smith, 237; and leadership of the guerrillas, 242, 243; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 243, 244-5; Geneva Conference, 260; and Smith's internal settlement, 284, 288, 291, 293, 295, 299; and the Chimoio raid, 289-90; Hove affair, 294; and Rhodesian air attacks, 297; 1979 elections, 300, 301, 303, 304; and British 1979 election, 302; claims guerrilla defections, 310; and recognition of his government, 311-12; Lancaster House Conference, 315, 318; 1980 election, 302, 323, 329, 330, 331
Mwaanga, Vernon, 137-8, 145
Mwari cult, 48
Mwene Mutapa dynasty, 36-7
Mwenje One, 81
Myerscough, Father, 281
Mzilikazi, King, 37-8, 39, 40, 41
Mzingeli, Charles, 65
Nachingwea, 34, 82, 162, 246, 274, 279, 286
Namibia, 134, 138, 141-2, 239, 248
National Democratic Party (NDP), 66, 67-8
National Grievances, 81
National Psychological Action (NATPAC), 310-11
National Resistance Movement (NRM), 317-18
National Unifying Force (NUF), 272
Native Affairs Department, 56
Native Education Ordinance, (1907), 56
Native Land Husbandry Act (1951), 54-5, 65
Native Purchase Areas, 53
Native Reserves Commission, 52
Ncube, Chemist, 186-8
Ndanga, Mathew, 166
Ndangana, William, 11, 16, 23-5, 162, 166, 185
Ndiweni, Chief, 294-5
Ndlovu, Edward, 30
Ndlovu, Masocha, 64, 71
Nehanda, Mbuya, 49-50, 73, 75-6, 77-8
Neto, Dr Agostinho, 255, 286, 306, 307
Ngomo, Chief, 45
Ngonomo, Beatrice, 182
Ngwenya, Peter, 162
Nhamo, Everisto, 24, 90
Nhari, Thomas, 79, 81, 109, 110, 159-68, 175
'Nhari Rebellion', 159-68, 185, 196
Nhongo, Rex, 93, 109, 162, 170, 206, 218, 240, 242, 279; Altena Farm attack, 73-4, 90-1; biographical note, 86; joins ZAPU, 87, 160; changes to ZANLA, 88; opens ZZ zone, 112; and Nhari Rebellion, 160, 161, 165, 185; and Chitepo's death, 178, 180; and ZIPA, 215, 219, 221, 244; and resumption of war, 220, 222; and Geneva Conference, 258; 1976 ZIPA crisis, 261; rescues Tekere, 291; and Tongogara's death, 320; ceasefire, 321
Niesewand, Peter, 6, 109
Nigeria, 67, 71, 239, 266, 294, 302-3
Nixon, Richard, 115, 231
Nkala, Enos, 101, 149, 151, 204-6, 243
Nkomo, Joshua, 196, 242, 243, 251, 293, 323; steps down in favour of Mugabe, 31; 1953 federal elections, 65; and the ANC, 65, 66, 154-5; and formation of NDP, 66; 1960 Federal Review Conference, 49; 1961 constitutional talks, 67-8; formation of ZAPU, 68; puts

INDEX

- case to UN Committee of Twenty Four, 69; placed under restriction, 69; proposes government-in-exile, 70, 203; dissatisfaction with indecisiveness of, 70; formation of PCC, 70-1; detained, 71; negotiations with Smith, 99, 223, 227-9; released, 140, 145, 151; Declaration of Unity, 155; Zambian interest in, 181; and Chitepo's death, 184, 189; power struggle in ANC, 195; Mgagao Declaration, 200; Mugabe breaks with, 203; and escalation of the war, 216; expelled from ANC, 216; Nyerere on, 217; and ZIPA, 220-1, 221; expelled from ANC, 225; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 243, 244, 245; and Kissinger's meeting with Smith, 253; Geneva Conference, 260; and the Owen/Young plan, 268; and Smith's internal settlement, 285, 294-5; Nyerere's support for, 286; contacts with Smith, 287; Malta talks, 290; and shooting down of planes, 295-6; 1980 election, 328-9, 330, 331
Nkrumah, Kwame, 130, 203-4
Norman, Denis, 331
North Korea, 146
NSSM 39, 115, 230-1, 234, 235
Nupapa Chanyanga, 22
Nyabadza, 187
Nyadzonja massacre, 173, 240-2, 276, 289
Nyagumbo, Maurice, 101, 148-51, 204-6, 243, 277
Nyandoro, Edmund, 12
Nyandoro, George, 65-6, 71, 195, 204
Nyati, Morrison, 173
Nyerere, Julius, 242-3, 244, 258; and ZANU's use of the Tete, 20; and government-in-exile proposals, 70; relations with South Africa, 136; and détente proposals, 144, 145; meeting with ZANU leaders, 149; meeting with Sithole, 150; and Sithole's suspension, 150; calls for nationalist unity, 151, 154; meeting with Sithole and Nkomo, 151; and majority rule, 153-4; and Britain's role in the settlement, 193; and escalation of the war, 216-17; and ZIPA, 221, 224; and Botswana rail link, 227; Nkomo's negotiations with Smith, 227, 228; Kissinger visits, 230; and plans to ditch Smith, 240; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 243-5; and release of ZIPA leaders from Zambia, 245-6; and Kissinger's pressure on Smith, 248, 249, 253, 255-6; Kissinger's distrust of, 251; and resettlement of whites, 254; Podgorny visits, 266; relations with US, 266; and Owen/Young plan, 269, 273; questions Kaunda, 285-6; and need for elections, 286-7; Malta talks, 291-2; and Smith's internal settlement, 295; Kaunda reopens railway to Rhodesia, 297; and Cuban plans for Patriotic Front government, 306, 307, 308; 1979 Commonwealth summit, 312-13; urges Soviet support for ZANLA, 316; and 1980 elections, 325
Nyikadzinashe, James, 197-8, 218-19, 221, 260
Nyombwe, 113
Obasanjo, Olusegun, 274
Oberholtzer, Petrus, 24
Occupation Day, 36
Operations: Agilla, 321-2; Excess, 9; Hurricane, 109-10, 113-14, 224; Overload, 169; Pol, 143; Repulse, 224; Tangent, 223; Thrasher, 224; Turkey, 322
Oppenheimer, Harry, 137
Organization for African Unity (OAU), 32; and recruitment for ZANU and ZAPU, 23; and unification of ZANU and ZAPU, 31; and the ZANU/ZAPU split, 71; and Chitepo's death, 183, 184; forms JMC, 198; support for Patriotic Front, 287
Liberation Committee, 71, 78, 108, 111-12, 167, 172, 176, 177, 200, 201, 219, 223
Special Fund for Liberation, 23
Ottaway, David, 309, 310
Owen, Dr David, 264-70, 273-4, 290-3, 297-8, 302-3
Palma Carlos, 120
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), 10, 15, 27
Parirewa, Stanley, 32, 166
Paterson, Randal, 325-6
Patriotic Front, 268, 269-70, 274; formation, 257, 263, 278; and the Owen/Young plan, 273; and Smith's visit to Kaunda, 284, 285; OAU support for, 287; Malta talks, 291; 'Malta Two' talks, 292; and Smith's internal settlement, 293, 295; unity, 298; unity against Muzorewa government, 305-7; Cuban plan for government by, 305-8; Lancaster House Conference, 315, 16, 318; 1980 election, 328-9, 330, 331, 2

INDEX

- Paul, Silas, 170
 Pearce Commission, 98, 124, 217
 Peking, Nanking Academy, 11
 People's Caretaker Council (PCC), 70-1
 People's Movement, 265
 Pfeferere, Tendai, 221, 261
 Pioneer Day, 36
 Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich, 265-6
 Pope-Symonds, Eric, 330
 Portugal, 125, 231; and closure of Rhodesian border with Zambia, 7; territorial expansion in Africa, 36-7, 41; atrocities by, 80; *coup d'état*, 115, 116-19, 120-1, 122, 146; wars in Africa, 116; grants independence to Mozambique, 121
 Potgieter, Pieter Johannes, 38
 Potgieter treaty (1853), 38, 39
 Public Order Act, 67
 Public Services Act (1931), 57
 Pym, Francis, 300-1, 302

 Que Que, 147, 149, 150, 151, 299
 Quelimane, 224, 225
 Quenet Report, 271

 Rabie, Andre, 110-11
 Ramphal, Shridath, 312, 313, 314
 Rauya, 78
 Red Cross (ICRC), 106, 296
 Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (RICU), 64-5
 Rhodes, Cecil, 35-49
 Rhodesia Action Party (RAP), 272
 Rhodesian African Rifles, 95, 168
 Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association, 64
 Rhodesian Front: and African education, 58; formation, 68, 69; bans PCC and ZANU, 71; complacency, 96; 1974 elections, 121; 1977 crisis, 270-2; and Smith's transitional government, 293
 Rhodesian National Party, 192, 228
 Rhodesian Railways, 60, 65, 94
 Rhodesian Settlement Forum, 101
 Rhodie, Dr Eschel, 136-7
 Richard, Ivor, 257, 259, 260, 261, 263, 270-1
 Riddell, Roger, 55
 Robe, Martin, 310
 Robello, Jorge, 261
 Roberto, Holden, 71
 Robertson, John, 92-3
 Robinson, Sir Albert, 121-2
 Robinson, Derrick 'Robbie', 148, 294, 295
 Robinson, Sir Hercules, 39-40

 Rogers, William, 232
 Rogersson, Tony, 282
 Rowland, Roland 'Tiny', 126-9, 133-4, 145, 284-5, 294, 295
 Rowlands, Ted, 239-40, 329
 Rozwi, 37, 38
 Rudd, Charles, 42-3
 Rudd Concession (1888), 38
 Rumania, 163, 167
 Rutanhire, George, 79-81, 82-3, 93
 Rutanhire, Susan, 80-1, 82
 Rutenga, 120, 224, 225

 Sadza, Saul, 197-8, 218-19, 220, 221
 St Albert's Mission, 86, 90, 170
 St Paul's Mission, 281-2
 Sakala, Ernest, 181
 Salazar, Dr Antonio, 125, 126
 Salisbury Prison, 101, 106, 148
 Samkange, Stanlake, 44
 Samkange, Thomas, 65
 Sanderson, Denis, 106
 Sandys, Duncan, 67, 68
 Santana, Felix, 11
 Sanyanga, Cornelius Martin Ditima, 186
 Saranowako, 24
 Savanhu, Godfrey, 87
 Savimbi, Dr Jonas, 233
 Savory, Allan, 96
 Schaufele, William, 239, 251
 Schmitt, Adolf Gregor, 283
 Sebele, Enoch, 223
 Sekeramayi, Dr Sydney, 277
 Selous Scouts, 173, 241, 246-7, 277-8, 281-2, 288, 323, 324
 Senegal, 71, 136
 Senghor, Leopold, 136, 233
 Shamiso, Silas, 173
 Shamuyarira, Nathan, 31, 32, 59, 67
 Shell BP, 131
 Shenjere, Ephraim, 10
 Shippard, Sir Sydney, 40, 42
 Shirihuru, Eddison, 11
 Shoniwa, John, 11, 77, 83
 Shumba, 21, 26, 27, 28
 Shungu, Herbert, 171
 Sibanda, Abel, 261-2
 Sikatana, M. F., 182-3
 Silundika, George 'T.C.', 18-19, 30, 71, 279
 Sinoia, Battle of, 10, 11-12, 33
 Sithole, Edson: forms City Youth League, 65-6; arrested, 66; and inevitability of guerrilla warfare, 95; detained, 123; and 1974 negotiations with Smith, 123; and ceasefire leaflets,

INDEX

- 172; and Chitepo's death, 174; disappearance, 206
 Sithole, Ndabaningi, 81, 154-5, 194-5, 213, 221, 242, 282-3, 289, 291; reported to have stepped down in favour of Mugabe, 31; persuades Nkomo to return to Rhodesia, 69; and formation of ZANU, 70, 158; detained, 71; negotiations with Smith, 99; and Muzorewa's talks with Smith, 101; release, 140, 145; suspended as leader of ZANU, 147-9, 150, 151; Declaration of Unity, 155; and Nhari Rebellion, 163, 164, 165; re-arrest, 174, 175, 193, 205; and Chitepo's death, 179, 184; and majority rule, 192; power struggle in ANC, 195; and ZLC, 196-7, 215; and the Mgagao Declaration, 196-202, 208, 211, 212, 219, 220, 225; recruitment, 204; released, 207; and escalation of the war, 216; and ZIPA, 217, 224, 244; and ZLA, 218; and Nkomo's negotiations with Smith, 228; and leadership of the guerrillas, 242, 243, 245; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 243, 244-5; Geneva Conference, 260; returns to Rhodesia, 284; and Smith's internal settlement, 288, 293, 294, 299, 301; on Thatcher's approach, 302; claims guerrillas defecting, 310; Lancaster House Conference, 315; 1980 election, 328, 329, 331
 Siyovelwa, Peter, 244
 Smith, David, 248-9, 309, 331
 Smith, George, 284
 Smith, Ian, 12, 131, 136, 137, 148, 155, 195-6, 243; on the 'relaxed racial climate', 1; and the first guerrilla attacks, 2, 3; and guerrilla operations from Mozambique, 4, 6; infiltration from Zambia, 6-7, 8; and the Internal Affairs Ministry, 7-8; and African education, 58; becomes Prime Minister, 71, 130; UDI, 73; and the outbreak of war, 74-5; encourages immigration, 94; complacency, 96, 97-9, 171; leadership, 98-9; and 1971 negotiations with ANC, 99, 100; first meeting with Muzorewa, 100-1; repressive legislation, 102, 105; and the Portuguese *coup d'état*, 115, 117, 119-20, 122; seeks new trade route to South Africa, 120; and Mozambique's independence, 121, 146; 1974 negotiations with Muzorewa, 122-4; South Africa's relations with, 138; and the détente proposals, 140, 152, 156, 157, 215; South Africa to put pressure on, 144; releases nationalist leaders, 145-7; trade routes, 146-7; ready to discuss majority rule, 151; and majority rule, 152-4, 191-4; opts for war, 156; Vorster's influence over, 157; talks with Vorster, 175; dispute over Lusaka agreement, 192-3; Victoria Falls Conference, 194-5; not ready to negotiate, 217; negotiations with Nkomo, 223, 227-9; brings Chiefs into Cabinet, 230; and US policy, 234; on resumption of war, 235; persuaded to accept majority rule, 236-7, 255; animosity towards Vorster, 236-7, 238; becomes a liability, 238-9; Britain plans to ditch, 239, 240; and Kissinger's plan, 246, 247-54, 255-6, 259, 263; Geneva Conference, 259-60; and the Owen/Young plan, 268, 269-70, 273; 1977 election, 270-1, 272; repeals some racial legislation, 271; visits Kaunda, 284-5; internal settlement, 284-99; Malta talks, 291; 'Malta Two' talks, 292; 1979 election, 301; and Thatcher's victory, 302; and recognition of Muzorewa's government, 312; Lancaster House Conference, 315
 Smith, Lance, 95-6
 Smith, Tony, 153
 Soames, Lord, 320, 321, 322-3, 324-5, 329
 Soares, Mario, 118, 121
 South Africa, 63, 64; and closure of Rhodesian border with Zambia, 7; and colonization of Rhodesia, 35; secondary education in, 57; and support for Rhodesia, 96; Smith's visit after Portuguese *coup d'état*, 119; mounting hostility to Rhodesia, 121-2; and a settlement in Rhodesia, 129, 135-43, 151, 156; trade with Zambia, 130, 131; relations with Zambia, 132-5; Vorster replaces Verwoerd, 132; paramilitary police in Rhodesia, 143, 161, 170-1, 222, 237-8; apartheid, 144; and Rhodesian trade routes, 146; pressure on Smith, 191; majority rule proposal, 192; Victoria Falls Conference, 194, 216; Rhodesia dependent on, 238-9; prepared to ditch Smith, 239; puts pressure on Rhodesia, 248; and the Owen/Young plan, 270
 Soviet Union, 305; support for ZAPU and ANC, 10, 87; support for the 'authen-

INDEX

- Soviet Union—*contd.*
 ties', 14; guerrilla training, by, 88, 146;
 weapon supplies from, 164; US and
 intervention in Africa by, 231;
 Podgorny visits Zambia, 265-6; aid for
 Mugabe, 303-4; support for ZANLA,
 307, 316-17
 Spain, Jim, 292
 Spinola, Antonio de, 116-18, 120, 121
 Squires, Hilary, 293-4
 Stanton, Peter, 109-10
 Stockwell, John, 232-3
 Stokes, Ken, 319-20
 Stuttaford's, 33
 Swoswe, Lawrence, 11

 Taderera, Dr Joseph, 33, 197, 258, 275
 Takawira, Leopold, 67-70, 76, 148, 158,
 203, 308
 Tambo, Oliver, 10
 Tandau, Alfred, 228
 Tangwena, Chief, 206-7
 Tanzania, 119, 131, 137, 138, 139, 239,
 247; guerrilla training in, 12, 22-3, 81,
 150, 160, 166, 246; independence, 67;
 recognition of ZANU and ZAPU, 71;
 relations with South Africa, 136; bans
 ZANU and ZAPU, 179, 206; Mgagao
 Declaration, 200, 201; and the resump-
 tion of the war, 216; withholds arms,
 220; Kissinger visits, 230; Podgorny
 visits, 266
 Tekere, Edgar, 243, 244, 275; and
 Muzorewa's talks with Smith, 101; and
 release of prisoners of war, 107; and
 suspension of Sithole, 149, 151; goes to
 Mozambique, 174, 206-9, 213; bio-
 graphical note, 204-5; and ZIPA, 221;
 1976 ZIPA crisis, 261; capture, 291
 Tembwe, 220, 247, 288, 289
 Teresera, 166
 Thatcher, Margaret, 300-5, 311-15, 331
 Thompson, Francis, 42-3
 Tichatonga, Cephas, 159, 166
 Todd, Garfield, 57-8, 59, 66, 67, 202
 Todlana, 260-1
 Tongogara, Josiah, 16, 17, 22, 25, 26, 32,
 66, 77, 84, 87, 93, 197, 211, 275; train-
 ing, 11, 24; elected to DARE, 33-4,
 185; and the deprivation of land, 56;
 influence of Burombo on, 65; collects
 first guerrillas, 78; and the use of
 FRELIMO contacts, 79; use of politi-
 cal commissars, 81; moves into
 Rhodesia, 85-6; and the use of Tete,
 85; and the support of the people,
 88-90; starts the war, 90; and prisoners
 of war, 106, 107; on the Operation
 Hurricane report, 110; and Sithole's
 suspension, 150; meeting with Nyer-
 ere, 151; Nhari Rebellion, 161, 162-7,
 187; and Chitepo's death, 141, 178-81,
 186, 188, 190; Mgagao Declaration,
 198-9; Declaration of Unity, 204; and
 ZIPA, 217-19, 220, 222; and guerrilla
 leadership, 243, 258; release from
 Zambia, 257, 263; 1976 ZIPA crisis,
 260, 261-2; and Chimoio massacre,
 289; ZANLA stops recruiting, 298;
 and the internal settlement, 299; Lan-
 caster House Conference, 318, 319;
 ceasefire, 319; death, 319-20
 Tongogara, Kumbirai, 165, 197-8, 219
 Treadgold, Lindsay, 327
 Tredgold, Sir Robert, 103
 Tribal Trust Lands, 55, 62, 271
 Tsangano, Enoch, 221
 Tungamirai, Josiah, 76-8, 81, 84, 86,
 161-2, 166, 172, 179-81, 299
 Twala, Abraham, 64
 Tyndale-Biscoe, Lieutenant, 35

 UDENAMO, 15
 Umlugulu, 48
 Umtali, 91, 92
 Unilateral Declaration of Independence
 (UDI), 3, 64, 71-2, 86, 94, 130-1, 252
 United African National Council
 (UANC), 294, 327
 United Federal Party, 69
 United Methodist Church, 99
 United National Independence Party
 (UNIP), 22
 United Nations, 130, 131-2, 138, 141,
 274, 291, 292, 300, 302; Committee of
 Twenty-Four on Decolonisation, 69;
 High Commission for Refugees
 (UNHCR), 241-2, 276, 296; Security
 Council, 293
 United States of America: policy in
 southern Africa, 115-16, 230-1,
 233-4, 268; Rhodesian sanctions,
 231-2; and Anglo crisis, 232; policy in
 Rhodesia, 236, 259-60; and plans to
 ditch Smith, 240; rehabilitation fund
 for Rhodesia, 255; Anglo-American
 policy on Rhodesia, 267-70, 272-4,
 284; threatens sanctions against South
 Africa, 270; and the internal settle-
 ment, 304; and recognition of
 Muzorewa government, 311
 Unlawful Organisations Act, 60

INDEX

- Urimbo, Mayor, 24, 93, 109; and mobil-
 ization of the masses, 11; biographical
 note, 21-2; leads ZANLA in Tete,
 21-2; early recruitment, 23; infiltrates
 into Zambia, 25; early training with
 FRELIMO, 26, 27; dispute over tac-
 tics, 28; 1971 review conference, 29,
 32, 34; and the importance of spirit
 mediums, 75-6, 78; Nhari Rebellion,
 165; and Chitepo's death, 178, 180
 Ushewokunze, Dr Herbert, 277, 291

 Vagrancy Amendment Act (1973), 61
 Valverde, Alfonso, 4
 Van den Bergh, Hendrik, 129, 133-5,
 137, 138, 142-5, 177
 Van der Byl, P. K., 96, 107-8, 237, 238,
 242, 268, 302
 Vance, Cyrus, 267, 269, 292, 304
 Verwoerd, Dr Hendrik, 132
 Victoria Falls Conference, 99, 216
 Victoria Falls Game Reserve, 112
 Victory camp, 278
 Viera, Sergio, 180, 184, 316
 Viljoen, J. H., 12
 Vivo, Raul Valdez, 305, 306, 307-8
 Vorster, John: and closure of Rhodesian
 border with Zambia, 7; and Portuguese
coup d'état, 119, 122; Smith seeks new
 trade route from, 120; and Mozam-
 bique's independence, 127, 128, 129;
 replaces Verwoerd, 132; relations with
 Zambia, 132-5; seeks settlement in
 Rhodesia, 135-8; meeting with
 Kaunda, 137, 139, 143, 195; and
 détente proposals with Kaunda,
 138-40, 143-6, 151-3, 216; and South
 African paramilitary police in
 Rhodesia, 143; secures release of
 nationalist leaders, 145; and majority
 rule proposals, 153, 154; Declaration of
 Unity, 155; influence on Smith, 157;
 talks with Smith, 175; and Victoria
 Falls Conference, 194, 195; animosity
 towards Smith, 236-7, 238; Kissinger
 meets, 239, 246; Kissinger puts
 pressure on Smith, 246, 247-53, 256;
 Mondale visits, 268; Owen/Young
 plan, 270

 Waldheim, Kurt, 274
 Walls, Peter, 93, 97, 112, 289, 302, 311,
 331
 Wankie Game Reserve, 10, 27
 Warraker, Rob, 246
 Westlands Farm, 296

 Whistlefield Farm, 2, 105
 White, Robin, 209-10
 Whitehead, Sir Edgar, 68-9
 Wigglesworth, Thomas, 106, 107
 Wilkinson, Anthony, 96-7
 Wilson, Allan, 46
 Wilson, Harold, 71-2, 131, 133, 231-2,
 265, 301
 Wood, Gordon Thomas, 281-2
 Wood, Joseph, 42
 Wood, Mark, 102
 World Council of Churches (WCC), 92
 Wrathall, John, 93-4

 Young, Andrew, 266, 268-70, 273-4,
 290

 Zambia: Smith closes border with, 6-7;
 guerrilla infiltration from, 6, 9, 24-5;
 recruitment and training in, 23, 30, 83;
 closure of border, 94; trade links
 through Mozambique, 125-6; and
 FRELIMO, 128-9; effects of sanctions
 on economy of, 130-2; and South
 Africa plans for Rhodesian settlement,
 132-5, 136-8; and the détente propo-
 sals, 138-43, 156; Namibian policy,
 141-2; and Chitepo's death, 175,
 176-90; relations with ZANU, 177-8;
 majority rule proposals, 192; Mboroma
 incident, 199; Mgagao Declaration,
 201; and the resumption of war, 216;
 Owen visits, 265; Rhodesian air attacks
 on, 296-7
 Zenda, John, 25
 Zimbabwe African National Liberation
 Army (ZANLA), 2-3, 6, 14, 22, 81,
 108, 150, 160, 243; Battle of Sinoia,
 9-10; joins FRELIMO in Tete, 20,
 21-9, 34; early training, 24-9, 34; and
 spirit mediums, 76; use of FRELIMO
 contacts, 79; infiltration into Mount
 Darwin area, 80; women trainees, 82;
 recruitment, 84-5; and mass mobiliza-
 tion, 88, 90; the Operation Hurricane
 report on, 109-10, 113-14; political
 education, 114; training in Zambia,
 136; reassesses policy and strategy,
 146; Machel threatens to arrest, 151;
 and Chitepo's murder, 159, 188, 190;
 expansion, 167; and formation of Z.L.C.,
 196; detention at Mboroma, 197;
 Mboroma incident, 199; and Z.I.P.A.,
 218, 221-3; and Muzorewa, 225; crisis
 over released leaders, 257-8; as a 'third
 force', 274; training, 279, 286; enters

INDEX

- Zimbabwe—*contd.*
 new phase of war, 292; stops recruiting, 298, 299; pushes farther into Rhodesia, 309; Machel urges Soviet support for, 316–17; intimidation by, 324–8; 1980 elections, 331–2
- Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 2, 21, 22, 25, 168–9, 216, 263; policy and strategy reassessment, 9, 12–14; criticizes ZAPU/ANC action, 10; support from China, 10–11, 12; develops links with FRELIMO, 14–20; negotiates use of Tete as a base, 14–20; early recruiting problems, 23; and the 1967 Wankie battle, 27; tensions with ZAPU, 31–4; formation, 70–1, 203; split with ZAPU, 71; radio programmes, 77; political training, 81–2; recruitment, 83; and the support of the people, 88–90, 146; and the 1971 constitutional proposals, 99; and Muzorewa's talks with Smith, 101; prisoners of war, 105–7; propaganda, 108; and the détente proposals, 140, 141, 145, 152; moves base to Mozambique, 142; Lusaka meeting with Kaunda, 147; Sithole suspended as leader of, 147–9, 150; Lusaka summit, 154–5; rivalry with ZAPU, 154–5; Nhari Rebellion, 160–8; and failure of the ceasefire, 171; OAU withdraws recognition, 172; and Chitepo's death, 175–90; relations with Malawi, 176–7; relations with Zambia, 177; Zambian bases, 179; and Mozambique's independence, 196; and FROLIZO, 198; Mugabe becomes leader, 202; banned, 204; recruitment, 207–8; dominance of, 210; recruiting in Mozambique, 213; and ZIPA, 219, 220–1; crisis over released leaders, 257–8; and Patriotic Front, 257; 1976 ZIPA crisis, 260–1; Soviet Union refuses support for, 266; ZANU (PF), 267, 329, 330, 332, 333; Mugabe becomes President, 275; disarray after Geneva, 276; Military Coordinating Committee, 279; and Smith's visit to Kaunda, 285; Owen's relations with, 290; Year of the People, 292; and Cuba's plan for Patriotic Front, 306, 307, 308; political strength, 316–17; 1980 election, 324, 325, 327, 328–9, 331–2
- Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), 167, 177, 220, 275, 306; alliance with ANC, 10; Soviet support for, 10, 317; reassesses policy, 13; FRELIMO and, 15, 16; and the use of Tete as a base, 16–20; early recruitment problems, 23; Wankie battle, 27; internal differences, 29–30, 31, 87–8; tension with ZANU, 31–4; formation, 68; decides on military action, 69; PCC to act for, 70; split with ZANU, 71; radio programmes, 77; recruitment, 83; and 1971 constitutional proposals, 99; recognizes Geneva Convention, 106; propaganda, 108; intelligence reports on, 111; and the détente proposals, 140, 141, 145; Lusaka summit, 154–5; rivalry with ZANU, 154; OAU withdraws recognition, 172; Zambia bans, 179; and ZLC, 196, 216; and FROLIZI, 198; and ZIPA, 219, 220–1; resumes fighting, 223; and Patriotic Front, 257; Military Coordinating Committee, 279
- Zimbabwe Development Fund, 255, 272
- Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA), 218, 220
- Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC), 196, 197, 200, 210, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220, 227
- Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), 243; formation, 215–17, 220–1, 224; unity in, 243–4; 1976 Dar es Salaam summit, 243–5; release of leaders from Zambia, 245–6; crisis over released leaders, 257–8, 260–2; disarray after Geneva, 276
- Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), 13, 20, 108, 197, 218, 221, 243; internal differences, 30; training, 87, 146, 279, 286; intelligence reports on, 112; clashes with SAP, 171; resumption of war, 222–3; returns to Zambia, 243–4; increasingly drawn into war, 299
- Zimbabwe United People's Organisation (ZUPO), 288
- Zindoga, Amon, 2–3, 6, 34
- Zvamutsana, Kennedy, 111
- Zvimba Tribal Trust Land, 309
- Zvobgo, Eddison, 148
- Zwangendaba, 38